- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

HACKER REPORT
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In> Just saw part I of a two-part series on "hackers" being broadcast In> by a local San Francisco TV station. Nothing horrible, in my In> opinion. The adroitly sidestepped the hacker/cracker distinction In> by saying the "hacker" has come to mean..." and then gave the In> negative, intrusive definition. <<SNIP>> In> Tomorrow's show should be more interesting (and possibly much In> more sensationalistic). Part II is "The Hacker Underground." In> Oooh, scary! Christ. They are almost taking this chapter-for-chapter out of The Hacker Crackdown... P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... Descartes of Borg - "I assimilate, therefore I am." ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

1 0

[REPOST] The Net and Terrorism
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I sent this out on 29 June 1996. In light of recent events, the comments about "soft targets" seem worth mentioning again. I doubt my comment, "A few airliners will shot down by Soviet surface-to-air missiles. This is unsurprising." will get me any visits from the FBI, as this is the consensus of folks far more expert than I. Likewise, my closing coment, "avoid crowded downtown areas," was just common sense, not a tip-off to the Atlanta bombing.] There have been many recent reports linking the Net and anonymous remailers, pseudonyms, and (of course) strong crypto to various possible and actual terrorist events, with an emphasis on the "possible." (If the Net is linked to _actual_ terrorist incidents, little is being disclosed publically as of yet.) Recent comments by John Deutch, William Perry, and Louis Freeh make reference to the growing danger of the Net. And the "Russian mafia" is playing a major role in this debate; I won't recap the various articles in major magazines about arms sales from the former Soviet Army, the reports that an entire paramilitary unit of the KGB is now working for the Russian mafia, and the obvious corruption of the entire former Soviet system (I'm not saying it wasn't corrupt before, just that now the paymasters have changed). Can anything be done? To stop the likely effects of lots more surface-to-air missiles, lots more nerve gas available on the black market, and so on? In a word, "no." I've been thinking about this a lot, reading the various articles, and pondering the implications. The plain fact is that the modern world is one of great "liquidity," and the vast amount of arms built up by the U.S.S.R. (thanks in large part to responding to a similar build-up in the U.S., without taking any sides...) are now "leaking out" in increasing numbers. (The leakage is quite similar to that seen in the 1975-79 period, when thousands of tons of armaments abandoned by the U.S. in Viet Nam were sold around the world. Except, of course, that the the Soviet weapons include some interesting new things.) Not even a police state can stop armaments from being diverted in situations such as faced in the former U.S.S.R. (For those not familiar with the conditions, read up on it. The combination of former command economy, secret police, selling off of industry to highest bidders, lack of a conventional industrial base...all of this makes it nearly unavoidable that much of the former state industry is now controlled by black marketeers and former Party apparatchniks....after all, who else would have the money to buy these former State industries?) In fact, a former police state does not change its stripes. The names and paymasters change a bit, but the organism lives on. (One need only look at the police states of Central and South America and their platitudes about the "Drug War" to understand the realities of such markets.) Unbreakable crypto will of course be used. This is unsurprising. A few airliners will shot down by Soviet surface-to-air missiles. This is unsurprising. I expect a city or two to get nuked in the next decade or so. (Haifa or Tel Aviv would be my leading candidates.) To me, this is unsurprising. My personal solution dovetails with other perceived threat responses: avoid living in or near major cities and take reasonable measures to cope with moderate economic or physical crises. (No, I am not a "survivalist," just mentally and physically prepared to deal with a major earthquake, economic dislocation, or terrorist incident in San Jose, which is 30 miles north of me.) FBI Director Louis Freeh and the TLA spooks are already sounding the alarm about the "Four Horsemen." Sen. Sam Nunn is calling for measures to ensure that cyberspace is "secured" and that the Net is not used to further chemical and biological terrorism. The point is that even a police state cannot stop the consequences of the increased "degrees of freedom" the modern world (and the Net) provides. In fact, police states tend to make the scale of the corruption even greater, as the Soviet and Latin American examples show. (I could of course get into the examples of arms dealings in Iran-Contra, the CIA's role in covert arms supply, etc., but this should be self-evident to all.) An Australian radio journalist asked me if the Net could make possible new types of terrorism, and could allow terrorists to plot crimes in new ways. He seemed surprised when I said "Of course" and then proceeded to give some examples of how the Net can be used to undermine governments (what those governments of course refer to as "terrorism," even when it is mostly not). I'm not advocating such "terrorism," by the way, merely telling it like it is. Arguing that the Net cannot and will not be used in such ways is naive and ultimately counterproductive. It is more accurate and useful to point out that the increased role of terrorism is due to many factors, including prominently the vast amount of armaments in the world, the role of police states which have benefitted from these build-ups in the military-industrial complex, the expansion of "virtual communities" around the world, and, crucially, the expanded number of degrees of freedom in transportation, communication, banking, and other such Information Age channels. Keep your head down, avoid crowded downtown areas, prepare for moderate disruptions, and reject arguments that an American Police State will do anything to stop terrorism. (Remember, terrorism is just warfare carried on by other means, with apolgies to Von Clausewitz.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

RE: Overwelmed with Stupidity...
by Gregory Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Shaun Clark <jacquard(a)teleport.com> writes: > > > Ok, ok... Let me say something, but I don't want anyone to > > take this wrong. I'm not trying to be stupid, but I don't > > have half the knowledge you all seem to posses. > and Mike Duvos <mpd(a)netcom.com> replies: >That's ok. Welcome to the list. > then proceeds to pull Mike's leg by telling him TRS-80 is a technical paper by David Sternlight, DES is a synthetic estrogen that shrinks your dick, and GAK is green slime on a kiddie show. In my mind, this is just schoolyard bully-ism at the expense of the "new kid." Really mature, really nurturing of the serious values and issues this list exists to disseminate. Go back to second grade, Mike. I, too, am a relative newcomer to this list, and have not participated very actively because I'm having a hard time gauging the balance between the genuinely useful technical and philosophical issues being discussed (of which there are many) and the childish, irrational ranting and insulting pseudo-intellectual one-upsmanship being bantered about (of which there is far too much). If people like Mike Duvos can't bring themselves to offer any useful information to newcomers who earnestly ask, they could at least refrain from insulting them for the "crime" of not knowing. Shaun, TRS-80 is an early line of microcomputers produced by Radio Shack, DES is a (not very secure) encryption algorithm supported by the Bureau of Standards, and GAK stand for "govenment access to keys," the position that the government should have access to all private keys (in escrow, of course) just in case there is a "legitimate" need to listen in on anybody's private communications. I believe in the values this list was founded to promulgate, and I value it for the open political, technical and philosopical discussions of issues crucial to our time. And, yes, it's great to have fun, too, but does it always have to be mean-spirited fun at someone else's expense? -- Gregory <gregorye(a)microsoft.com> "Opinions expressed herein are entirely my own and not the opinions of my employer." PGP key for <gregorye(a)microsoft.com> is on the keyservers >

3 3

Is Colossus out of date?
by Martin Minow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You may recall recent comments by Attorney General Janet Reno where she notes that exportable encryption cannot be broken in reasonable time by modern supercomputers. With that as background, you may find the following paragraph interesting. It is from the Financial Times article on Colossus. http://jya.com/coloss.txt > [Tony] Sale describes [Colossus] as a large electronic valve > programmable logic calculator. "No lay person would argue > that it is not a computer," he says. Furthermore, because > it wasted no time retrieving a stored program it was almost > as fast as a high-speed modern computer whose nominal > work-rate is 1,000 times quicker. A simulation of Colossus > which Sale ran on a top-of-the-range Pentium PC took twice > as long as the real thing. Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

2 1

Re: WaPo on Crypto-Genie Terrorism
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:21 PM 7/27/96 GMT, John Young wrote: > The Washington Post, July 27, 1996, p. A22. [Snip] > Mr. Freeh and others argue, "the genie is not yet > out of the bottle" on "robust," meaning uncrackable, > encryption. Why does it sounds like Mr. Freeh and his friends are drinking out of a different bottle than the rest of us? The genie is out of the bottle and has been for a while. The tools are there for those who care to use them. Maybe it is a diffrenet genie that he is trying to portray... Maybe it is the acceptance and relyance on crypto that has not quite escaped into the general populace. If someone tried to portray all automobie drivers as dangerous maniacs and cars as only useful for making getaways, he would be laughed out of the room. If someone tried to claim that phones are a haven for drug dealers, and thus must be licenced, they would get a harsh reaction from the public. Freeh is fighting a war against the public having a positive view of Crypto. By smearing crypto users as "criminals and terrorists", he is using his office to influence the opinions of "law abiding citizens" to be anti-crypto. I beleive that there is alot that can be done to influence the public to be pro-crypto. With the proper memes, you can reveal the flaws in the anti-privacy forces arguments. Here are a few in no particular order... Teaching computer users how to use PGP. Offer to give instruction in use of PGP amongst general PC and Mac users groups. Whenever possible associate the wiretapping requests of the FBI with the opening of mail. Remind people of the abuses in the past. Ask them of if they can remember any good coming from these program. Ask them if they mind *you* looking through their mail and what makes the Government any better or worse. Local stations will usually have a "public forum discussion" program on varioussubjects. get on it. Usually the program is rigged in one direction por another, but you can get in a good meme or two that will stick in the heads of the people watching. (And it can be alot of fun!) Offer to sponsor a crypto archive and discussion area on a local BBS. Keep it current. Get others interested. Spread the tools and teach people how to use them. Build web sites that are pro-crypto. Where possible, get them working under SSL. Are there any SSL crypto sites out there? I know of only one, and it is not advertised. (Or up to date.) Work fast lest the darkness overcome us all... Be creative. The control freaks and authoritarians lack that creativity. Lets use it to our advantage. --- |"Computers are Voodoo -- You just have to know where to stick the pins."| |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

1 0

BCI_sys
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

7-27-96. WaPo: A report on the Army's Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS), designed by TRW, which identifies friendly targets through triple-checked microwave pulses, encrypted signals that change frequencies 43 times a second to resist jamming or detection by the enemy. (The roasting of friendlies depicted in "Courage Under Fire" is cited as firing increased public interest.) ----- http://jya.com/bcisys.txt (14 kb) BCI_sys

1 0

Re: Public vs. Private Munitions
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:24 PM 7/27/96, Erle Greer wrote: > Theoretically, the government should only be have the resources to >control commercially-available, public encryption systems. Who is to stop While I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a "commercially-available, public encryption system," I think your point is incorrect. (My confusion is that a commercially-available system is not necessarily a "public" system, if by public one means public domain. If one means "published specifications," still not the case. Confusing.) Howver, the government cannot step in and "control" a commercially-available product, by even the most liberal interpretations of the commerce clause. "Tim's Pretty Flaky Snakeoil System," for example. I can announce it, sell it, and the government is powerless to "control" it. (Even if it were "public.") If by "public" you mean an NBS or NIST standard, like DES, then I suppose the government can in some sense "control" it. (Even this is iffy, IMO, as I know of no rules saying DES implementations must be approved by NIST or anyone else.) >anyone from designing their own cryptosystem for personal use? If the >government intercepted a transmission from this private cryptosystem, and >could not decrypt it, would they assume that it must be considered >munitions? Similarly, anyone could send uniformly-formatted random garble >that could also be considered munitions, or at least waste the governments >processing time. Most of the cryptosystems are not under the "control" of the government, even by the standards of your first definition. Period. RSA is not a government-controlled system, though it is both "commercially-available" AND "public" (in that the spec and algorithm are clearly published). And the talk about "personal use" is misleading, IMO. It suggests that government can and should regulate use for "business purposes" but not personal uses. I disagree with this distinction. > Why are we so worried about government regulation? Can't we just >devise our own cryptosystems and just don't sell them or make them publicly >available? You mean the way public key systems in general and RSA in particular were invented and devised by non-government folks? --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

cypherpunks vs hackers
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How can we differentiate cypherpunks to hackers? What are their attitudes, psychological thinking, main objective?

1 0

Re: WaPo on Crypto-Genie Terrorism
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:35 7/28/96, Charley Sparks wrote: >I occasionally get invited to teach at a local college.. some students are >not US. Anyone have any suggestions on a way I can sneek some good privacy >into the lesson plan.. the course is usually the Internet or networking in >general. Ignore ITAR. It is unconstitutional. BTW, independently from what the Supreme Court may ore may not decide. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

1 0

Re: Why <jf_avon@citenet.net> was blocked.
by Erle Greer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Umm.. when telling other ppl that they do not know how to read, it might >be usefull to use sentances with a subject AND a predicate. I know that >this is something they taught you _way_ back in second grade, but you >should still remember it. > > --Deviant I'm not even going to comment on the twentieth word here. Nope. Not gonna'. Can't make me. No way. vagab0nd(a)sd.cybernex.net http://ww2.sd.cybernex.net/~vagab0nd/index.html Visit web page for public key.

1 0