- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Is the public involved in the crypto policy debate?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:50 AM 4/26/96, Alex Strasheim wrote: >> In the United States and Europe, encryption policy is formed by a mix >> of interests. Advocates of business, national security agencies, and >> more recently the police -- all play a large role in the policy >> debate. > >Someone's conspicuously absent here: us. To be fair to Jim Bell, he made the same point a day or so ago. I don't necessarily sift Stewart Baker's words for hermeneutical signs of what the government is planning. He might just as well have included "public opinion" in his list, and nothing would change. And I'm quite sure that Baker, Denning, Nelson, et. al. are acutely aware of the role of the "public" in these matters. The "public" as made manifest in newspaper articles critical of Clipper, in "Wired" features against key escrow and in favor of Cypherpunks-type themes, and so on. While the "vocal minority" that rails against Administration policy in sci.crypt, talk.politics.crypto, comp.org.eff.talk, this list, etc., are not the public at large, we are certainly a part of the public. I think the rejection of Clipper by "the public" is proof of this. (If we were leftist theoreticians, we could debate for years or even decades whether our movement is truly a mass movement, or just a vanguard movement, etc.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: PGP + Pegasus Mail
by Jim Byrd 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:50 PM 4/26/96 +0000, G Ackerman wrote: >Hi, > >I want to know if it is possible - and how to use PGP from within >Pmail. (I want to use the Encrypt option in PMail with a method PGP >- is it possible and what must I do to get it to work) (including Digital >Signature, etc) I don't know the answer to this question, but there is a pgp-users mailing list where someone might know. Here's how to subscribe: "To subscribe to the list, simply e-mail "pgp-users-request @rivertown.net" with the word "subscribe" in the subject **NOT THE BODY** of the e-mail and you will be automatically subscribed to the list. To subscribe to the digest, sent your request to "pgp-users-d- request(a)rivertown.net" and your subscription will be likewise processed. Depending on list volume, digests will go out from once a day to several times a day."

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PGP + Pegasus Mail
by G Ackerman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I want to know if it is possible - and how to use PGP from within Pmail. (I want to use the Encrypt option in PMail with a method PGP - is it possible and what must I do to get it to work) (including Digital Signature, etc) Thanks |\/\/\/| | | | | | (o)(o) G Ackerman C _) Free State Education Department | ,____| gerhard(a)pyrod.ovsod.co.za | / +27 +(0)51 4074127 /__\ / \ DISCLAIMER: EXPRESSED OPINIONS ARE MY OWN AND MIGHT NOT BE SHARED BY MY EMPLOYER OR ANYONE ELSE.

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Gemplus' Crypto Cards
by Ben 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyoneknow anything about the Gemplus Smart Card systems? Specifically: http://www.gemplus.com/gpr400.html They claim that they're secure and can do things like 40Mbits/second in a PCMCIA form factor for Digital signatures and other uses. Thanks! Ben.

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Private Idaho and MS Exchange
by Ben Wern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone has any experience with / tried to use Private Idaho with MS Exchange? I select the settings for Exchange, but it doesn't seem to transfer the message over properly. Ben Wern

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Re: trusting the processor chip
by Rick Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

cwe(a)it.kth.se (Christian Wettergren) writes: >Take a look at the IEEE Symp on Security and Privacy Proceedings from >1995, I believe it was. There was a paper there about security bugs in >the Intel processors, enumerating a number of them in 80386 for example. >There where at least one or two byte sequences that plainly stopped >the processor. Yes, and this is where the real risks are. The original question was entirely about explicit subversion. The larger risk is accidental flaws. Same with software in most cases. Rick. smith(a)sctc.com secure computing corporation

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Re: Past one terabit/second on fiber
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One problem with the development of such high-end technologies is that they tend to increase economies of scale to the point where it's impractical to have anything but a monopoly or ogliopoly. As well as concerns about the degree of control such an organization may be able to exert in and of itself (acting like a government, in essence), there's also that such an organization is easier to pressure than a lot of small providers. Anyone have a suggested solution, or reasons that I shouldn't be so worried? -Allen

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APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 2nd EDITION Errata version 1.3
by Bruce Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just mailed a copy of the new errata to everyone on my mailing list. If you didn't get one, it means that you are not on my mailing list. Send me e-mail to correct that oversight immediately. Wiley has not yet committed to making an updated version of the book. If you want to complain to my editor, he is psutherl(a)jwiley.com. Bruce ************************************************************************** * Bruce Schneier APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, 2nd EDITION is * Counterpane Systems available. For info on a 15% * schneier(a)counterpane.com discount offer, send me e-mail. * * For Blowfish C code, see ftp.ox.ac.uk:/pub/crypto/misc/blowfish.c.gz **************************************************************************

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Re: trusting the processor chip
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:01 AM 4/26/96, Christian Wettergren wrote: ... >They "promised" to build their own "processor tester" to try to find >the most obvious ones at least. But it will be very hard to find all of >these bugs, judging from the released bugs. Some of them are only >appearing sporadically under a pretty complicated set of circumstances, >like what is in the pipeline, the cache etc... > >The processor is ever important, if it is illdefined or flakey, it is >almost impossible to build security on top of it. Maybe true in theory, under special circumstances, but not something of immediate importance. Finding bugs is important, but no modern processor chip set (including the peripheral chips) is likely to be "100% secure," whatever that means. (The NSA and its minions put out the "Rainbow Books" to define this, and few machines come close to the top rating...) There was a British plan some years back to develop a "provably secure" microprocessor for life-critical applications, e.g. train controllers. It was called "Viper." Last I heard, the project was not progressing. It seems that most people would rather use the hundreds of MIPS of processing power of a modern, high-density processor that the sub-MIPS power of a Viper-type chip. (I'm not of course saying that processing power and security are inverses of each other, only noting that they haven't gone together so far.) The most famed chip flaw of all time had no security implications, nor would it ever have affected a single life. (Except stock market lives.) I'm glad Intel offered a recall and fixed the bug, but the plain fact is that the bug truly was obscure and could only be demonstrated under contrived conditions. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Click here to become an International Arms Trafficker
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Click here to become an International Arms Trafficker" Offshore Information Services Ltd. has set up a web page to make it really easy for people to become International Arms Traffickers. All they have to do is fill in their name and email address and then click. Check out: http://online.offshore.com.ai/arms-trafficker/ If you think this is half as funny as I do, please make a link from one of your pages to this one. -- Vince

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