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Re: Fw: Hi, I'm from the government and I'm here to screw you
by CJ Knight 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi Brian, and happy new year. Thanks for another thought provoking post. A few things you might not be aware of happening over here in Europe, specifically the UK: We have ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Recognition) cameras in place on every motorway junction, plus all major roads. They aren't advertised, they look like plain grey boxes, but people are slowly catching on to what they do, and how much they see. A journey from one end of the country to the other can be tracked in real time. An EU Directive has stated that all new cars must have inbuilt 3G capability "in case of accidents". I personally do not believe this reason, and suspect it's just another form of tracking surveillance. Lastly, our government a few years back came up with an idea to fit "black box" recorders in *all* cars but the public backlash was so huge they shelved the idea. Instead, the insurance industry has adopted the technology, so new drivers and those with a poor accident record can opt to have one of these boxes fitted in return for a discount on their insurance. It is now becoming a norm for young people to take this option; when I ask them why they are prepared to violate their own privacy they just shrug, but I guess privacy means something different to the Facebook generation. Conversely, it is now becoming *more* expensive to insure a car if you do not have a black box; they have tried norming this by penalising the law abiding (but privacy conscious). Anyway, just thought you might like to know. Best, CJ On 02/01/14 18:04, brian carroll wrote: >> Any questions? > > observation: ...<snip>... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJSxeNUAAoJEIRAsFEItJzjLyMH/iXOzH5R8mJi1LYqwU5RgdPj yBxI6T9hhlQOnA1mZOTrTxDfLMDBi4IEWkyJK+C3C3wCoq7/+5sJphEqZ6tikQdP 8cPeR0E6/tlXRW9H78FcDlWwWJgi/xwT+Z2aOwIDdr9xjWl7WJF2rrgbRENC05aX OLtnvbHmm+nPKKjFYx7resXD37e7O8kYd7k1ArkJ5o+h3BuIm5oQMCZU4xUqlfoO IJ2xclzLRKLu70O3xUeYsmTjsF61xaRpMXy1404lWpJkKsW+1wqugOBVDMf9dRxH qnZhM09ToF5hICvUkvch3juV2z0Pg69N8CZS27xrCjYTSVxsr8JUjuQLS5E6kvw= =diAd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Status of opportunistic encryption
by Victor Duchovni 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Wed, May 31, 2006 at 08:56:53AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote: > Active attacks are rare, possibly nonexistent except for > Wifi. If NSA and the other TLAs were doing active > attacks, they would be detected some of the time. They > don't like being detected. Active attacks at the network layer are relatively rare, but definitely not non-existent. Spammers occasionally hijack BGP prefixes, send some spam and move on. They can also hijack nameserver IPs, MX host IPs, but for now they prefer sending over receiving. This will likely change, the playbook of organized crime on the net has been expanding steadily when money overtook teen-age dare-do as the most common motivation for active attacks in ~2002. > If anyone does an active attack, this is a one off > event. If someone routinely and regularly does active > attacks, the attack will be detected, the point where > they are modifying messages will be detected, and will > be bypassed. They keep moving around, some ISPs turn a blind eye in return for the revenue stream. > > Consequently, also SSH with GSS KEX, is not MITM > > resistant when the attacker can tamper with DNS > > responses. > > My understanding is that SSH when using GSS KEX does not > cache the keys, which strikes me as a amazingly stupid > idea, No, that's the whole point. What works for the individual administering 10 machines, does not scale to organizations with hundres of administrators managing tens of thousands of machines. With KEX you trust Kerberos, not your key store. The problem is that one also ends up trusting, DNS or NIS or LDAP, ... > particularly when SSH key caching has been so > successful, and when the user thinks he knows his > security comes from key caching. The experience with > PKI suggests that it is very difficult to have security > without durable cached keys. Quite the converse, the PKI keys are too durable. (Segue to Wheeler & Wheeler) the Kerberos online verification model is actually superior, but in practice the implementation runs into issues with insecure nameservices. We need a more secure stack. > Attacks on DNS are common, though less common than other > attacks, but they are by scammers, not TLA agencies, > perhaps because they are so easily detected. Yes, but the scammers are getting into more markets, first spam and advance fee scams, then phishing, now pump and dump scams, they are evolving fast. We are largely standing still. > Encrypting DNS is unacceptable, because the very large > number of very short messages make public key encryption > an intolerable overhead. A DNS message also has to fit > in a single datagram. Workable DNS-SEC exists, what lacks now is the will and political muscle to make it happen. Signing is done on update, not on read. > To accommodate these constraints, we need DNS > certificates sent in the clear, and signed with elliptic > curve public keys (which allow both signatures and > certificates to be short enough to fit in a datagram). The real question is not how to do DNS-SEC, but how soon, and then how to leverage it in real protocols. Will there be a reasonably comprehensive set of Internet integrated services that work *together* "securely" in a reasonable fashion, or are we still building the tower of Babel (now in software). A more trustworthy DNS would IMHO be a good foundation. -- /"\ ASCII RIBBON NOTICE: If received in error, \ / CAMPAIGN Victor Duchovni please destroy and notify X AGAINST IT Security, sender. Sender does not waive / \ HTML MAIL Morgan Stanley confidentiality or privilege, and use is prohibited. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[tahoe-lafs-weekly-news] Tahoe-LAFS Weekly #3
by Patrick R McDonald 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

========================================== Tahoe-LAFS Weekly News, issue number 3 ========================================== Welcome to the Tahoe-LAFS Weekly News (TWN) brought to you by Patrick McDonald, scribe and Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn. Tahoe-LAFS_ is a secure, distributed storage system. This edition is also available here_. If you wish to subscribe via email, please go to the `mailing list`_ page. .. _Tahoe-LAFS: http://tahoe-lafs.org .. _here: http://tahoe-lafs.org/~zooko/TWN3.html .. _`mailing list`: http://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-lafs-weekly-news Announcements and News ====================== The First International Tahoe Summit is coming up soon. It starts the 27th of June. Below is the schedule for the Summit: * Monday meet the developers, etc. ask questions, invite Noisebridgers * Tuesday for all day deep dive on design with Brian * Wed, Thu work on what we got excited about on Tuesday * Brian either cancel Movie Night or we all go to Movie Night Nathan announced the Summit Grid Creation Party will be held at Noisebridge during the Summit. More details regarding the party can be found in this email_. Kevan made continued progress with MDMF. In particular, he made progess exposing MDMF dirs in the web API. The web user interface (WUI) and the CLI are next. .. _email: http://tahoe-lafs.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-June/006458.html Interview with the Developers ============================= This is quickly becoming my favorite section to write for the TWN. While lurking in #tahoe-lafs is a great way to learn a good deal about all assortments of topics, these interviews with the devs have taught me all kinds of things about the code which is Tahoe, but also about the people, ideas and the motivations behind it. I hope these interviews help make you as passionate about the project as it has made me. This week it was my pleasure to interview Peter Secor. Peter is the fomer President and CEO of Allmydata, Inc. and is the volunteer director for Tahoe-LAFS. Peter is currently working repairing the old prodcution grid from allmydata.com and later moving the grid to S3. If you are interested in helping to repair the grid, please contact Peter. Patrick: Give me a little introduction about yourself, tell me a bit about who you are. Peter: UC Berkeley undergraduate degree in applied mathematics with lots of computer science classes, worked for a bit in hardware/software integration, grad school at NYU in applied math, dropped out to help start up a network management software company, sold that, helped start Allmydata to provide secure storage to consumers and enterprises. I've lived in California, New York, Paris, Brussels. Patrick: Wow, that's pretty impressive. So how did you come to develop for Tahoe-LAFS? Peter: I was at Allmydata and we made the decision to develop the core software as an open source project. We went to Lake Tahoe for an off-site to design the next generation distributed, encrypted storage system. Thus Tahoe was born. Zooko and Warner were there along with a few other people. Patrick: Being one of the founders of Tahoe, what is your favorite memory of the project? Peter: My favorite memory so far, hmm b& thinking. Ah, I know, my favorite memories are of the hack-parties we threw at the Allmydata offices. We used to throw hack parties every time Zooko came out to the Bay Area. Allmydata would buy food and drinks, and we'd invite people over for a small presentation on something interesting, and then try to solve some problems. Patrick: Sounds like a good deal of fun. Peter: Yes, and we also fixed a lot of bugs or found a vulnerability. Patrick: So the next big feature is MDMF due in 1.9.0. What feature or features would you like to see in upcoming versions? Peter: I would like to see the newly open-sourced javascript UI cleaned up so that it can work by being served up by a grid. It would be a great example of an unhosted app, and very useful for managing files on the grid. I had it mostly working that way a couple years ago, but there has been bit-rot. Patrick: That is webdrive, correct? Peter: Correct. Patrick: Any words of wisdom for developers looking to join the Tahoe team? Peter: It's a good way to learn about Python, crypto, capability models, or all of them at the same time! Patrick: Where do you see Tahoe headed in the future? One year from now, what is new in Tahoe? Peter: There are a couple operational things and a couple functional things. I'm looking forward to the MDMF on the functional side, and a year from now I'd like to see some sort of accounting built-in. On the operational side, I'd like to have the website and build master no longer dependent upon a single box in my garage and migrated to virtual infrastructure. I'd also like to see the foundation get more funding support from outside sources, so that's something I'll take on. Patrick: As the volunteer director, what efforts can you talk which looking to raise funds for Tahoe? Peter: So, in order to raise funds, I'm talking to a few larger companies (like Google, Adobe, etc) and also to a few other smaller, niche companies that are interested in this area. We've been sponsored by Google Summer of Code a couple times, but I'd like to get something more permanent. Patrick: How do you like working the "suit" side of the project as opposed to the coder portion? Peter: I'm not a great coder, more of an integrator/prototyper, so working the funding side is fine for me if it's a good cause. I think Tahoe-LAFS is important in a few ways, one of which is being able to provide a solution that allows you to store files across corporate infrastructures without having to divulge the content. That gives a lot of power to the end user as they can continue to own their data and privacy. Patrick: Thank you very much for your time. This has been a fantastic interview. Peter: Adios Bug of the week =============== In a bit of shameless self promotion, the bug of the week is 1416_. This bug covers the TWN template. Please do not just think of it as template bug. Please provide information on things you would like to see, things you would like to see go. Use it as a forum to provide us with much needed feedback. Help me, help you. In all seriousness, the ticket of the week is 796_, write-only backup caps. Below is a direct quote from Zooko on why this ticket received his nomination. "The reason that I'm thinking of this is Bitcoin. I'm pretty excited about Bitcoin, and I read the sad story of a Bitcoin user whose value was stored on his computer in his wallet.dat file, and someone stole that file and transferred all of his Bitcoins to themselves. At current market rates, that was USD 500,000 worth! http://forum.bitcoin.org/index.php?topic=16457.0 Now if you use symmetric encryption on your wallet.dat file then this does *not* protect you from malware which is running on your computer about Bitcoin, and I read the sad story of a Bitcoin user whose value was stored on his computer in his wallet.dat file, and someone stole that file and transferred all of his Bitcoins to themselves. At current market rates, that was USD 500,000 worth! http://forum.bitcoin.org/index.php?topic=16457.0 Now if you use symmetric encryption on your wallet.dat file then this does *not* protect you from malware which is running on your computer [*]. Such malware can do whatever you can do, so if you can symmetrically encrypt and decrypt your wallet (in order to, for example, store more money in a symmetrically encrypted wallet) then that allows the attacker to do the same and steal all your money. It is like a lockbox that you have to open to put more cash in. But if you open it, the attacker can steal everything from inside it. On the other hand, public key encryption does not have the same property. You can encrypt your b without having, on that same computer, the ability to decrypt it, because your private key which is necessary for decryption is stored somewhere else and you access it rarely and carefully. This is more like a "piggy bank". A very strong piggy bank. How about: it is like a piggy-bank-shaped safe that has a little slot on top into which you can drop coins, but which cannot be opened without the key/combination. Some people currently protect their Bitcoin wallet by encrypting it with gpg and then backing up the encrypted copy to a remote site. This accomplishes the "piggy bank safe" scenario. Perfect! Except that most people don't do it, because they don't know how to use gpg. The Bitcoin developers are apparently working on adding symmetric encryption to the official client. That would be the lockbox scenario. In my opinion this is near-useless and may actually harm people by giving them a false sense of security. So, it would be cool, not only for Bitcoin wallets but also for all other sorts of backups, if you had a "write-only capability", which implements public key encryption just like the GPG scenario above, but integrated into your Tahoe-LAFS filesystem and your automated Tahoe-LAFS-based backups. This is the subject of 796_." .. _1416: http://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1416 .. _796: http://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/796 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------- | Patrick R. McDonald GPG Key: 668AA5DF | | https://www.antagonism.org/ <marlowe(a)antagonism.org> | | <mcdonald.patrick.r(a)gmail.com> | | <patrick(a)opensecurityfoundation.org> | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | Malo periculosam libertatem quam quietum servitium | ---------------------------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________ tahoe-lafs-weekly-news mailing list tahoe-lafs-weekly-news(a)tahoe-lafs.org http://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-lafs-weekly-news ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [ZS] BitCoin FBI report
by R|diger Koch 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

2012/5/8 Bryce Lynch <virtualadept(a)gmail.com> > > Botnets are already being used to mine bitcoins. Or so they say. With mining moving from GPUs to FPGA, and ASIC mining on the horizon, what can even a billion CPUs do? > Blackhats are already using Bitcoins to pay for services, including > periods of DDoS attack against arbitrary targets and selling > weaponized exploits. Judging from the reputation tracking on the Silk > Road for such services, somebody's got to be getting their money's > worth... > > We had best tread carefully. I can't disagree any stronger. The cashless society is coming up. Listen what RMS has to say: http://bitcoinmedia.com/stallman-likes-bitcoin/ But even he doesn't completely grasp the full issue. It's not only the payment provider who has to nod to each and every one of your transactions. You also need at least your government to agree. And that of the counter party. In a cashless society your government has a level of power over you that even the Kims of North Korea can only dream of having over their subjects. If the government simply does not help you in your purchases, you cannot buy a thing. The cashless society as dreamed up by certain companies and governments will turn out a totalitarian nightmare that will not end. Unless we do something. This is a number of years off. Bitcoin is our best hope that we will never have to physically fight for our rights. So the least what we can do at the moment is to use Bitcoin for every (legitimate) purchase that can be done with Bitcoin. Or start working on developing an > disseminating a memetic counterattack. > Yeah. -R|diger -- Zero State mailing list: http://groups.google.com/group/DoctrineZero ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Important new protection for anonymous speech in Texas
by Paul Levy 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The Texas Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate District at Texarkana took an important step today toward protecting the rights of Internet bloggers in Texas to write anonymously. In an opinion issued by Justice Jack Carter in Essent v. Doe, the court of appeals joins a broad consensus of state and federal courts in insisting that plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to show they could win at trial before gaining access to information identifying anonymous speakers whom they wish to sue for wrongdoing. The case arose from a blog about the Paris Regional Medical Center in Paris, Texas, which included analysis of problems at the hospital (http://the-paris-site.blogspot.com ). Claiming a concern for patient privacy, Essent, the operator of the Medical Center, sued for defamation, and immediately sought discovery to identify the employees who, Essent claimed, were revealing confidential patient information in the course of criticizing abuses at the hospital. The Doe, represented by James Rodgers of the Moore Law Firm in Paris, sought to block discovery but District Judge Scott McDowell upheld the request. However, the Court of Appeals has now reversed and remanded the case to give the hospital a chance to submit evidence for consideration under the proper legal standard. In ruling, the court recognized that although Internet anonymity can be abused, the right to speak anonymously online is protected by the First Amendment. That right cannot be denied absent real evidence supporting the plaintiffbs claims of wrongdoing. Otherwise, the very threat of litigation will have a serious chilling effect on anonymous speech. The court also agreed with rulings in other states that declare an anonymous blogger has b standingb to oppose discovery even though the discovery demand is directed to a third-party Internet hosting service, and that a blogger has the right to appeal if their request for anonymity is denied. The decision is not a perfect one. Unlike last monthbs decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Mobilisa v. Doe, and the 2001 ruling of the New Jersey Appellate Division in Dendrite v. Doe, the Texas Court of Appeals did not add an explicit balancing step, under which, for example, the danger of retaliation against an employee whistleblower can be considered in deciding whether the plaintiff has put in enough evidence of wrongdoing. This case may well present a realistic possibility of such retaliation. So far as I have been able to determine, the balancing step was not proposed to the Texas court. Still, the requirement of presenting evidence provides an important measure of protection for employee whistleblowers and other anonymous critics of powerful corporations, political figures, and others. The opinion can be found on the web site of the Texas Court of Appeals at http://www.6thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/HTMLOpinion.asp?OpinionID=9055 (We have not been involved in the Essent case, having learned about the appeal too late to submit our views as friend of the court) Paul Alan Levy Public Citizen Litigation Group 1600 - 20th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 588-1000 http://www.citizen.org/litigation ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] Important new protection for anonymous speech in Texas
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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wow - palladiated! (Re: Palladium: technical limits and implications)
by Adam Back 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Wed, Aug 07, 2002 at 03:08:08PM -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > At 6:54 PM +0100 on 8/7/02, Adam Back wrote: > > Palladiumized > > Palladiated? > > ;-). that's pretty funny, rhymes with irradiated -- nice connotations of radioactive material with radioactive half-lives spewing life-hazardous neutron radiation ;-) Helps that palladium is in fact a heavy metal. Man, perhaps Pd even _has_ a half-life on the decay path from plutonium down to lead or something. That would be very funny. Adam --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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MS recruits for Palladium microkernel and/or DRM platform
by R. A. Hettinga 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/26651.html MS recruits for Palladium microkernel and/or DRM platform By John Lettice Posted: 13/08/2002 at 10:23 GMT Microsoft's efforts to disassociate Palladium from DRM seem to have hit their first speed bump. Some voices within the company (and we currently believe these voices to be right and sensible) hold the view that Palladium has to be about users' security if it's to stand any chance of winning hearts and minds, and that associating it with protecting the music business' IP will be the kiss of death. So they'll probably not be best pleased by the Microsoft job ad that seeks a group program manager "interested in being part of Microsoft's effort to build the Digital Rights Management (DRM) and trusted platforms of the future (Palladium)." [...] ---------- --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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Re: Block directory authorities, is it possible?
by Kevin Smith 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Why hasn't Tor been blocked in China already? Torpark is redirecting to the Google homepage (1). The psiphon homepage has been blocked. The Freegate homepage is blocked. Why not Tor? Could it be that Tor is being used to help identify suspected dissidents? Consider the following: I'm sitting at my home in Beijing using Tor. The Chinese internet police see my computer periodically connecting to a Tor directory server or entry node. They know I am using Tor. Ok. Here's someone using Tor. Who is he? Well, his IP address is linked to Beihang University. A quick check with the Beihang University IT department reveals that he is Kevin Smith in building AB apartment XYZ, his passport number is 123456789, he teaches English and has no record of political activity aside from voting in those despicable American national elections. Not too likely that he is a dissident. Wang Guolu is sitting at home using Tor. The Chinese internet police see his computer periodically connecting to a Tor directory server or entry node. They know he is using Tor. Ok. Here's someone using Tor. Who is he? Well, his IP address is linked to China Netcom in Dalian. A quick check with Dalian China Netcom reveals that he is Wang Guolu who lives in building CD apartment UVW on Renmin Lu. His ID number is 987654321, he has a low paying job at a local factory and is suspected of being a member of the FLG. A relatively low paid factory worker using advanced internet anonymizing software? That just screams dissident. The above situation has been suggested before on the mailing list: http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Aug-2006/msg00089.html http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Aug-2006/msg00091.html (1) http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Dec-2006/msg00076.html Kevin S. On 1/13/07, Pei Hanru <peihanru(a)gmail.com> wrote: >On 2007-1-13 4:44 CST(UTC+8), Mike Perry wrote: >>> I live in China and was/am having difficulties in using Tor, the problem >>> is: it takes quite a long time to build a circuit for the first time I >>> start Tor on my Windows machine. >>> >>> Am I understanding correctly? Are there any actions Tor can take? After >>> all, we cannot simply assume this will not happen in the future. >> >> If the problem right now is just IP blocking you can try the tor >> option HttpProxy which will route your dirserver traffic through an >> http proxy you specify. Unfortunately, certain areas have begun >> blocking by the /tor/ url postfix that dirservers use, independent of >> IP. There is an option in 1.2.x/SVN to tunnel this traffic via other >> tor nodes (via SSL), but I believe it is prone to exploding at this >> point in time. > >Actually, no IP is blocked at this time, it is due to a natural disaster. :( > >It's interesting to evaluate whether the option you mentioned will >defend the attack (that is, blocking all directory authorities), in that >setting, there's no living network-status, how to find "other tor >nodes"? Manually importing required files is an idea, but, it's not that >elegant and finding up-to-date files is a problem. > >I'm curious on more details. :) > >Thanks, >Hanru > ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Re: is restricted cell net access acceptable?
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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