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Warning about PGP
by trollins＠debbie.telos.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING Quoting "Applied Cryptography by Bruce Schneier, Page 287-288." > Low Exponent Attack Agenst RSA > Another suggestion to "improve" RSA is to use low > values for e, the public key. This makes encryption > fast and easy to perform. Unfortunately, it is also > insecure. Hastad demonstrated a successful attack > against RSA with a low encryption key [417]. Another > attack by Michael Wiener will recover e, when e is > up to one quarter the size of n [878]. A low decryption > key d, is just as serious a problem. Moral: Choose > large values for e and d. > 417. J. Hastad, "On Using RSA with Low Exponent in a Public- > Key Network," Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '85 > Proceedings, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1986, pp403-408 > 878. M. J. Weiner, "Cryptanalysis of Short RSA Secret Exponents." > IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, v.36, n. 3, > May 1990, pp. 553-558. The public domain PGP programs curriently produce short public key exponents, (17 is a common value). It would seem that the Governments of the world have had easy access to PGP traffic. Tom Rollins <trollins(a)debbie.telos.com> WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCzAgUBLg3CpGWJTLDtTMmNAQHhfQTwkalahr6xBNpeO8Yg2Ln1TkTbJ/VDccSS 4hZmqos1WEhmNuHEYTbKBZoS5wA9PHJkd26byy8JCAxoM5siiL6tNUaA4hRa+0IV RJtIYnS5yIvGfocrBcmN+e2fJGZXyyc+h1cUzNMq/aml4CEmnaHl7PKhL69pk4jI TfKUnah0ihgCb72Dkzqtsw6iTsJpg1rEd+TDpDPpTp3KIB0xbtk= =e5eN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: H.E.A.T. UPDATE
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, shoot, what's the use of watching this show if Fabio (+5) isn't in it? Why, it's because when he *is* on, it will make you ponder the need for & importance of privacy. I get it, now. Blanc Le Bon Femme

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Re: Warning about PGP - relax
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: Re: Warning about PGP - relax > WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING > > insecure. Hastad demonstrated a successful attack > > against RSA with a low encryption key [417]. Another > > attack by Michael Wiener will recover e, when e is > > up to one quarter the size of n [878]. Take a look at the errata (I'm quoting from version 1.5.9). } Page 287: Last line: Wiener's attack is misstated. If d is } less than one-quarter the length of the modulus, then the attack } can use e and n to find d quickly. Still, I do prefer e=65537 to e=17 (the value that PGP typically uses). But the situation isn't as bad as it looks from reading Schneier. Mark -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQBVAgUBLg5YfWrJdmD9QWqxAQHwGAH/b0NcQQCSO7xcsF0VufzsSG5mk0tZu1Eq jt3Cr5gfhZsuuf2zoNEIOLVEz+Hsbgv9mBhccCNSOIgP3aowgcWoyQ== =tavZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca - RIPEM MD5: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433 ViaCrypt PGP key fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 low security key fingerprint: EC E7 C3 A9 2C 30 25 C6 F9 E1 25 F3 F5 AF 92 E3 cryptography archive maintainer -- anon ftp to ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto

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Re: Is the NSA really competent?
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- An anonymous author writes: > For all their vaunted competence, for all the mathematicians > they have been alleged to employ, despite having a cryptography > budget orders of magnitude larger than any other Western > crypto group, it looks like the NSA contribued to _none_ of > the major advances in cryptography that occured during its zenith. The above assumes that if the NSA does something interesting they'll tell the world about it. I'm not sure that's a plausible assumption. They seem to view their mission as creating and maintaining a balance-of-power of intelligence in favor of the United States; specifically, gathering intelligence, preserving their ability to gather intelligence, and preventing others from gathering intelligence. Revealing the existence or substance of crypto breakthroughs isn't necessarily compatible with that mission, at least as it's been historically understood. (I think remailers are good, but their use makes it necessary to write to the list to reply; I'd have preferred to reply in E-mail.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.5 iQCVAgUBLg56633YhjZY3fMNAQEUrwP+OKCOWXHtiMh6dLoe8owILD5N26AIKtpY dEdp74XlJ1pCagyIUsEeMNjvBPpH3xHpCZKygHWfPI74GRrDoxpDOdfIiHM6kDmI fDwQf395aDrNrYcZJFOBVEM6FwpW3iMNZ8TRJPsLqKMbYSxq/pu/ST45jlxRg2eO 7eZjdJmqz8Q= =BgnT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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H.E.A.T. UPDATE
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C'punks, "Acapulco H.E.A.T." was hip deep in crypto again this week. This time the Team was trying to bust *drug trafficers* (bad, bad drug lords). For some reason, my favorite character, "Cat" (Alison Armitage) got herself into a school for women drug operative recruited by the trafficers. We got to see lots of scenes of Cat and other nubiles jogging, doing jumping jacks, push ups and, best of all, shooting strange large caliber automatic weapons. The crypto part? Oh, yeah, right. Anyway, the trafficers (ex-KGB types) were transmitting date, time and location information to associates in Miami. Communications was via a series of numbers read in the clear over shortwave radio. For some reason, the H.E.A.T. guys new that the "key" was a ten-digit number that was the *same* every time! Since the KGB guy had once been busted by the CIA, H.E.A.T. finally guessed that the key was the CIA's phone number. No kidding. There was some other minor computer stuff, but the important values were preserved: Alison and other babes did callisthenics, there was lots of gun play and Fabio did *not* "act" in this episode. Tune in next--same H.E.A.T.-time, same H.E.A.T.-channel--for the further crypto adventures of "Acapulco H.E.A.T." S a n d y

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Re: Is the NSA really competent?
by Patrick Juola 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here are the biggest breakthroughs in cryptography during the period when the NSA has been the purported leader in the field, and has enjoyed by far the largest budget: [ list of major breakthroughs deleted. ] For all their vaunted competence, for all the mathematicians they have been alleged to employ, despite having a cryptography budget orders of magnitude larger than any other Western crypto group, it looks like the NSA contribued to _none_ of the major advances in cryptography that occured during its zenith. My understanding is that we don't *know* what NSA actually has found. For example, *someone* knew about differential cryptanalysis long before Adi Shamir rediscovered it, as the DES S-boxes are optimized against it. Similarly, they may have discovered public-key encryption fifty years ago and simply not bothered to patent/publish it.... - Patrick p.s. Any other cypherpunks heading to ACL this week? If so, look me up (Patrick Juola, U. of Colorado) and we can go grab a brew or something and discuss the state of the world.... pmj

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Re: Lotto odds
by tim werner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: edgar(a)spectrx.sbay.org (Edgar W. Swank) >Date: Mon, 27 Jun 94 23:43:46 PDT > >One other tip for lotto players: Never mark your ticket with any >recognizable pattern. The random "quick pick" is probably best. >Reason: A pattern is equally likely to be picked at random as a "quick >pick" but much -more- likely to also be picked by some other schmuck. >So if your pattern pick wins, you're more likely to have to split the >prize. Another hot tip: use at least 1 number greater than 31, so you don't have to share with people who use family members' birthdays. Or, like I told my sister: "The best number is 1-2-3-4-5-6", to which she replied, "But that'll NEVER hit!". tw

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Tom Clancy's Random Number Generator..
by jpinson＠fcdarwin.org.ec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There have been some recent discussions on the list about generating random number using "thermal" noise from diodes and from radio receivers. I thought some of you might be interested in this fictional depiction of a Random Number Generator from Tom Clancy's book "The Sum of all Fears". The story also touches on the topic of distributing OTP's on CD-ROMS, a topic discussed some time back on this list. -------- story by Tom Clancy, typos by me....-------- "Tell me about it. I haven't been briefed in" "Essential it's our own version of the TAPDANCE. It's a one-time pad with transpositions stored on laser-disk CD ROM. The transpositions are generated from atmospheric radio noise, then super encrypted with noise from later in the day - atmospheric noise is prety random, and by using two separate sets of the noise, and using a computer-generated random algorithm to mix the two, well, the mathematicians say that's as random as it gets. The transpositions are generated by computer and fed onto laser disks in realtime. We use a different disk for everyday of the year. Each disk is unique, two copies only, one to the station, one in MERCURY- no backups. The laser-disk reader we use at both ends looks normal, but has a beefed-up laser, and as it reads the transposition codes from the disk it also burns them right off the plastic. When the disk is used up, or the day ends- and the day will end first, since we're talking billions of characters per disk- the disk is destroyed by baking it in a microwave oven. That takes two minutes. It ought to be secure as hell. It can only be compromised at three stages: fist when the disks ar manufactured; second, from disk-storage here,: third, from disk storage at each station. Compromise of one station does not compromise anyone else. ..... ---------- end of quoted material (ciphers were discussed several times in the book, but I won't take up bandwidth to reproduce them all) Jim Pinson Galapagos

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Review of a Review
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A new novel, "Black Money" by Michael M. Thomas was reviewed in the Sunday and Monday New York Times (both). It concerns the money laundering of the proceeds from the retail pharmaceutical trade. >From the Monday review: Black money, says a character ... is "money fleeing regulation, taxation or disclosure....Offshore is where it seeks and acquires anonymity. Of course, you must not think of 'offshore' as having a defined physical geography, as an exotic setting for a Paul Erdman novel. Offshore is no longer of our geography: it exists in what is called cyberspace, its cartography is digital. You can be in the bar of this very hotel, and if you have a palmtop computer and a phone jack you can make yourself every bit as 'offshore' as if you were sitting on a Swiss mountaintop or a beach on Vanuatu." Make that a palmtop and a wireless net link... DCF "If 5 billion people each have the ability to travel anywhere, buy anywhere, sell anywhere, invest anywhere, and communicate with anyone, the design of a control regime to rule them quickly becomes an NP complete problem." - DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Regional Lists
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A month or so back, there was a brief discussion talking about the production of a cypherpunks net.book. Out of that discussion I talked about the fact that I (would) have a workstation available to provide a platform for various mailing lists if they were needed. On of the suggestions that was made by Eric was that it might be a 'good thing'{tm} to creat some regional cypherpunk lists to facilitate the planning of physical meetings, to make announcements about speakers, or whatever. In any case, I have the computer up and running, and am now in a position to create whatever cypherpunk mailing lists might be wanted or needed. So, does anyone have anything they'd want a mailing list for? ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)vorlon.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> I do not necessarily speak for the \/ Finger for PGP Public Key <=> City of Mankato or Blue Earth County -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

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