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Officers face suspension for email offenses: Half of Town's Police Force Involved
by Max Inux 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Chief cleans house after half the Department makes fun of him via email on Patrol Car Computer Terminals (PDC's)... (Plus it's a rally cool website - listen to police scanners while you read FBI FOIA files on people like Frank Sinatra). OAKLAND, N.J. (APB) -- Half of this small borough's police force may be suspended for allegedly using computer terminals in their patrol cars to send one another disrespectful comments about the chief and the borough. http://www.apbonline.com/911/1998/12/06/oakland1206_1.html

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U.S. Attorney Morgenthau on Money Laundering
by David Watts 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New York Times November 9, 1998, Monday Editorial Desk On the Trail of Global Capital By Robert M. Morgenthau What are the five largest financial centers in the world? Many will name New York, London, Tokyo and Hong Kong. But how many will guess the fifth? It's the Cayman Islands -- or so, at least, its Government claims on its Web site. It's certainly the case that huge companies -- including hedge funds like Long-Term Capital Management -- have made the Caymans their nominal home. And bank regulators in the United States have confirmed that bank deposits on the islands now total about $500 billion, twice the amount of four years ago and more than the amount on deposit in the New York Federal Reserve District. That is about $14 million for every man, woman and child in the Caymans. The financial community there consists of 575 banks and trust companies. More than 20,000 corporations are chartered on the Caymans. What draws so many capitalists to so unlikely a spot? Secrecy, for one thing. In the United States, capital markets are regulated by requiring transparency in financial dealings. The Caymans, by contrast, have no such openness, no tiresome restrictions on the pursuit of wealth. With respect to regulation, the Caymans have won the race to the bottom. Take, for example, Long-Term Capital Management, which had to be bailed out earlier this year. The fund's basic operations are conducted in Connecticut, but it is chartered in the Cayman Islands. The fund kept the details of its borrowings and investments secret -- a result not obtainable where there must be concerns for the curiosity of regulators. The results were disastrous. No one knew the absurd extent to which Long-Term Capital's confident superstars were leveraging their assets -- until the bubble burst. The Caymans' financial secrecy laws make it easy to hide suspect dealings. It is now well known that the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, whose collapse in 1991 was the biggest banking scandal in history, took advantage of those laws. Beyond the assistance they lend to criminals, secrecy laws aid reckless acts by high-rolling entrepreneurs. But in fact, most of the ''offshore'' Cayman banks are run not from the islands, but from New York. Amazingly, the Cayman Government Web site itself boasts that, of the 575 banks and trust companies ''based'' in the islands, a full 106 actually have a physical presence there! Resort to these institutions is a simple charade. What would happen if a determined American bank inspector flew to the islands and demanded to see the books of one of these institutions? He would be arrested. It's the law. There is yet another explanation for the remarkable blossoming of financial institutions in the Cayman Islands. The islands have no income tax, no capital gains tax, no value added tax, no sales tax, no inheritance tax and no tax treaties. Sophisticated Americans place billions in Cayman investment vehicles like Long-Term Capital that are carefully structured to reduce American tax liability. Citizens of other countries invest billions there so their incomes will be exempt from American taxes. Commendably, the Treasury Department recently resolved to study ways to keep sham transactions from having an impact on tax liabilities, and the Group of Seven industrialized nations has said that hedge funds should ''possibly'' be subject to disclosure rules. But those are only tentative steps. More can be done. The Cayman Islands are a British dependency, and both the governor and the attorney general are appointed by the British Government. This means Britain can end the laissez-faire practices of the islands. And since, from a financial perspective, the islands are an American dependency, Washington can also stop the offshore shenanigans -- for instance, by imposing more prudent oversight of lenders doing business with Cayman entities. The Caymans are only part of the problem. The Isle of Jersey, the British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Antigua, Liechtenstein, Panama, the Netherlands Antilles, the Bahamas, Luxembourg and, of course, Switzerland all offer ''offshore'' sanctuary. Until action is taken to eliminate these havens, taxpayers and honest players in the financial markets will be at a very unfair disadvantage. _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

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nCipher joined KRAP/GAK drive too?
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This arose out of a discussion on ukcrypto about NAI (which PGP Inc is now part of) having recently rejoined the KRA list -- I notice that nCipher are on it too, and there was a earlier exchange on ukcrypto about nCipher... ========= nCipher too are now on the KRAP list (wonder how long for?) Bruce Tober forwards from www.kra.org: > [...] > nCipher Corporation Ltd. nCipher fairly recently made some press release that was commented on on this list as sounding a bit in favour of UK/DTI/GCHQ GAK attempts. Then they claimed that it was just being read incorrectly and the text was neutral and the title that was badly chosen and by hired PR. So nCipher guys, how do you explain the membership of KRAP away? >From the last list discussion, Ian Jackson, who works for nCipher wrote: : We do not have any weakened or GAK products. The Marketing Director : has assured me that we have no plans to produce any. also: : So, in summary, there are no artificial restrictions on the sizes of : keys which can be used, generated or stored by our units, and no : backdoor GAK or key recovery facilities. given the KRAP membership one might have cause to be worry that this may not still be true. Perhaps people using recent nCipher boards or with recent software upgrades ought to read the specs real closely -- to see if it admits to encrypting stuff to GCHQ also! Ian also wrote (in a post marked as not an official nCipher statement): : I personally would feel that putting deliberate backdoors or other : similar things into our products would be highly unethical and I would : have nothing to do with it. and: : This has nothing to do with the spooks or escrow or anything of the : kind. That's what GAK and KRAP is all about -- putting backdoors into products which the government and secret service groups like GCHQ, NSA and ECHELON get the keys to. and: : I do believe that the personal views of senior management at : nCipher - particularly towards the technical end - are opposed to : escrow et al. Perhaps those technical types could have a go at prevailing over whichever marketing type or suit decided to sign up for KRAP. This is not intended to attack Ian, as he seemed pretty much against GAK, and Niko van Someren to some extent too. Not so sure about the other non technical can Someren, but clearly someone in nCipher thinks KRAP and GAK are a good marketing ploy. Otherwise, I figure you're better off giving money to DEC alpha than supporting GAKkers. Alpha's run SSLeay pretty fast. Adam ========= and a second post, with more specifics: ========= I wrote: > nCipher too are now on the KRAP list (wonder how long for?) here we go: http://www.ncipher.com/news/files/press/97/keyrecov.html since May 97! contains such gems as: : We are delighted to support the Key Recovery Alliance," said : Alex van Someren, President of nCipher. so that pin-points at least one GAK enthousiast at nCipher. It also makes for some rather strange contradictions. The flap about nCiphers apparent whole-hearted support for DTI GAK attempts was May this year -- nCipher had already been a paid up KRAP member for a whole year. press release continues (least there is any confusion as to what KRA as an organisation is about): : Encryption makes information readable only to a person holding a : unique "key" which will unlock the data. Encryption is critical to : ensure the security of sensitive information that is either stored : electronically or sent over public networks such as the Internet. : Key recovery is a new method that allows for authorized access : to encrypted information without the need to store or "escrow" : any encryption keys with a third party. Key recovery is an : effective tool to meet commercial, private and institutional needs. institutions obliquely mentioned being presumably the likes of GCHQ and NSA? yet Ian was saying: > : So, in summary, there are no artificial restrictions on the sizes of > : keys which can be used, generated or stored by our units, and no > : backdoor GAK or key recovery facilities. saying there were no key recovery facilities, and : We do not have any weakened or GAK products. The Marketing Director : has assured me that we have no plans to produce any. and no plans to install any. yet this is what KRA is all about, and they were signed up to it already at that time. I suppose someone is now going to try to claim that KRA is all about key recovery for commercial purposes, but not for government -- but this is not the way I understand that KRA came into being at all. I think it is very much a NSA led attempt to further the clipper attempts. If I recall it started in the wake of the NSA/NIST attempts at clipper IV (or whatever number it was at by then) to coerce companies into including software based key escrow. Probably tied up with the permission to use marginally higher key lengths if the company can demonstrate to NSA a plan to introduce GAK in two year time scale (within the US), though I may be forgetting the details. Anyone like to clarify KRAs aims and history? Adam

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[ISN] Privacy Group Pushes For Hearings on ECHELON (fwd)
by Jukka E Isosaari 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1998 06:52:45 -0700 (MST) From: mea culpa <jericho(a)dimensional.com> To: InfoSec News <isn(a)repsec.com> Subject: [ISN] Privacy Group Pushes For Hearings on ECHELON Push for hearings on Echelon: Global spy system needs scrutiny, says rights group http://www.worldnetdaily.com/bluesky_exnews/19981112_xex_push_hearing.shtml Stephan Archer In an effort to create some accountability between the country's citizens and the National Security Agency's top-secret global surveillance system known as Echelon, the Free Congress Foundation is urging that congressional hearings be held concerning the NSA's use of the system. Originally, Echelon was designed to spy on the Communist Bloc during the Cold War. However, since the end of the Cold War, the NSA has used it for other questionable purposes that include spying on the citizens of U.S. allies as well as the citizens of other countries, commercial spying, and even domestic spying. In essence, Echelon works through a series of high-tech spy facilities located primarily in five countries: the United States, Canada, England, New Zealand, and Australia. These countries, which are sworn to secrecy about the project in a secret agreement known as UKUSA, all actively take part in this encroachment of privacy into the lives of the people of the world by collecting virtually all fax transmissions, e-mails, and phone calls. Not even cellular phone calls escape the grasp of the Echelon system. "Obviously, we need to have these capabilities," said Wayne Madsen, who worked in the National COMSEC Assessment Center at the NSA's Fort Meade, Maryland, facility back in the 1980s and is currently a senior fellow at the Electronic Privacy Information Center. As an example of our country's need for the system, Madsen said, "No one can argue about using the system to counter terrorism. Where people will have a problem is where Echelon is used for political and business interests." The Echelon system gets most of its data by collecting all transmissions handled by the Intelsat and Inmarsat satellites, which are responsible for much of the electronic communication that takes place between countries. Earth-bound communication is sucked up and absorbed by other spy satellites that the NSA has launched into space. "It's a huge vacuum cleaner," said Madsen. Once these spy facilities collect the phone calls, e-mails, and faxes, of virtually everyone on earth, the Echelon system sorts them through a kind of filter system known as the Echelon dictionary. This dictionary looks for "flag" words in all of the transmitted communication. While it lets a majority of all collected material pass through its filter, it tags those that may pose a threat and tracks all subsequent communication coming from the source of the original "flagged" message. Concerning Echelon's inherent intrusion on people's privacy, Patrick Poole, the deputy director for the Center of Technology Policy at the Free Congress Foundation, said, "While we understand the need for the intelligence power embodied by Echelon, the indiscriminate use of Echelon presents major threats to liberty not only to U.S. citizens but to citizens around the world." And this threat is real. The foundation's report states that U.S. leaders have, in fact, already abused this awesome technology. For example, the report states the following: "In September 1993, President Clinton asked the CIA to spy on Japanese auto manufacturers that were designing zero-emission cars and to forward that information to the Big Three U.S. car manufacturers: Ford, General Motors and Chrysler." "You can assume that all major U.S. corporations are fed items of interest (via Echelon) from time to time to give them a leg up on international competitors," said Madsen. Although this may be seen as a strategic corporate weapon for American businesses, in reality, it's an example of technology that can get out of hand. For example, former Canadian spy Mike Frost stated in his book, "Spyworld," that in 1981, there was an "accidental" cell phone intercept of the American ambassador to Canada that resulted in the U.S. getting outbid by the Canadians in a grain deal with China. The deal brought in $2.5 billion for the Canadian Wheat Board. With this kind of abuse of Echelon's power, the question as to whether or not the U.S. government has been using this power for political purposes can be easily raised. This question is seemingly answered in the foundation's report. "The discovery of domestic surveillance targeted at American civilians for reasons of 'unpopular' political affiliation -- or for no probable cause at all -- in violation of the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution is regularly impeded by very elaborate and complex legal arguments and privilege claims by the intelligence agencies and the U.S. government," the report says. When asked if the system has been used by the U.S. government to spy on its citizens, Madsen told WorldNetDaily that he was sure it has been. "I don't believe that the NSA or the current Administration would hesitate to use this system on American citizens for their own agendas," he said. Outraged by this flagrant abuse of power illustrated by our country's elected officials, Poole said, "While the U.S. is the prime mover behind the Echelon system, it's shameful that the European Parliament is the body holding the constitutional debate in regards to Echelon today." A September 1998 report for the European Parliament by the Omega Foundation said, "Within Europe, all e-mail, telephone, and fax communications are routinely intercepted by the United States National Security Agency. According to the Omega Foundation report, it is this ability of the NSA that brings major concern to the European Parliament. In an effort to bring the issues surrounding Echelon to the forefront of American politics, the Free Congress Foundation plans to send out a report about Echelon to all of the 500 policy organizations in the U.S. as well as to select members of Congress. These select individuals include members from both the House and Senate intelligence committees as well as House and Senate Constitution subcommittees. Copies of the report will also be sent to the congressional leadership of both parties. Although the foundation is hoping to get some action out of these members of Congress, Poole said that support at the grassroots level of our nation's political structure will be a must if this issue isn't to end up buried by the intelligence committees. "For there to be any account and oversight to the Echelon system, the American people are going to have to contact their elected representatives in order to investigate the abuses that we know have occurred in regards to the Echelon system," Poole said. See Free Congress Foundation's report on Echelon at: http://www.freecongress.org/ctp/echelon.html -o- Subscribe: mail majordomo(a)repsec.com with "subscribe isn". Today's ISN Sponsor: Repent Security Incorporated [www.repsec.com]

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Enter Symbol's Developer Contest at the Palm Computing Platform Developer Conference!!! (revised message)
by palmdeveloper＠palmdevcon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Symbol announces the first annual Symbol SPT 1500 Developer Contest!!!!! You could win a Toshiba Tecra 780 DVD 266 MHz Pentium II Notebook by developing the Best SPT 1500 Application or You could win a EXP PC Card DVD Traveler Bundle by developing the Best Riverbed Scout MTS Application or the Best Puma Satellite Forms Application or the Best IDEAM EZTrak Application. Other cool prizes will also be awarded. Everyone who participates will receive a t-shirt. You must be a registered attendee of the Palm Computing Developer Conference to participate. Winners will be announced at the Conference on December 4. For more details on the contest, and to register for the conference, point your browser to http://www.palmdevcon.com.

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Welcome to the Risk Professionals Discussion Area!
by garp＠chadmarc.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thank you for participating in our conferencing system, John. Please save this message. It contains important information, such as your login name and password (see below). Our web conferencing offers online Help for all major features. If you have questions about a feature, look for the help button on the menubar. Here is your login information. Be sure to keep it somewhere safe! Your Login Name: cypherpunks Your Password: cypherpunks You can change your password, email address, and other items by selecting "Profiles" from the "More" button on the menubar. Please be sure to come back and visit us at: http://chat.bccg.com:8080/~GARP We hope you enjoy participating in our conferences! Sincerely, garp(a)chadmarc.com

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Will Price (NAI employee) on KRA
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This comment on NAI's KRA(P) membership by Will Price <wprice(a)pgp.com>, a crypto type who works for PGP was forwarded to the ukcrypto list by Ian Goodyer (uk-crypto list admin). Not sure where it was posted originally, or perhaps Will asked Ian to forwarded it. Adam ------- Start of forwarded message ------- Date: Sat, 14 Nov 1998 11:43:07 +0000 To: ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk From: "Ian D. Goodyer" <goodyer(a)well.ox.ac.uk> Subject: Re: Escrow - news Here is a response from Will Price who was formally from PGP inc and now of course is with NAI. ian -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I've commented about this on this list before I believe. This appears to be a case of really old news suddenly being dredged up for no apparent wholesome reason -- which strikes me as quite odd because Wired was apparently so eager to break this ancient story that they didn't wait to ask anyone from NAI about it. NAI being listed on the KRA page is *solely* a result of our TIS acquisition. I really doubt anyone here actually called some KRA person and officially renewed our membership. Frankly, I doubt anyone here actually knows who to talk to there -- if there even is a "there". As I have said before, due to the TIS acquisition, NAI now has a bunch of products which contain key escrow features. Eliminating or modifying these features such that they work in a less big brother-like fashion will take significant time -- indeed entire TIS products were based around managing key escrow infrastructures. Don't get me wrong, TIS had a lot of other great products, but it will take time to redesign and rethink some of them in the context of export and key escrow. I'm not sure there's much point in withdrawing from KRA when those products still exist. These issues have no effect whatsoever on the PGP group. As always, we continue to publish full source code which effectively solves all the export issues for us. Robert Guerra wrote: > I just picked this up from another mailing list that I am on. Perhaps the > folks at NAI can clarify things? > > - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1998 10:55:06 +0000 > From: Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> > Reply-To: ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk > To: ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: Escrow - news > > (1) Network Associates has quietly rejoined the Key Recovery Alliance > - - see http://www.kra.org. - -- Will -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.0.2 iQA/AwUBNkySo6y7FkvPc+xMEQIuygCfYosXGISVrKd4dYWwM8xOrVdd4WAAn3dT XvDG6FMapZpjmvjucF67fwM5 =xa+R -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Will Price, Architect/Sr. Mgr., PGP Client Products Total Network Security Division Network Associates, Inc. Direct (408)346-5906 Cell/VM (650)533-0399 <pgpfone://cast.cyphers.net> PGPkey: <http://pgpkeys.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xCF73EC4C> ------- End of forwarded message -------

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Privacy and the internet
by Jason Burton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know what I should do if someone was posting sensitive information on a website? And what if the webmaster of the domain doesnt respond to the request for removal of information. IS there something that say's what is and isn't able to be published "personal information" on the internet. If someone can reply I'd appreciate it. Seeking council. Jason Burton - Starloop Security security(a)starloop.com

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Re: DBS, Privacy, Money Laundering nonsense.
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Sat, 14 Nov 1998 15:55:00 -0400 To: tboyle(a)rosehill.net Cc: dbs(a)philodox.com Subject: Re: DBS, Privacy, Money Laundering nonsense. Mime-Version: 1.0 From: Ryan Lackey <ryan(a)venona.com> Sender: <dbs(a)philodox.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Subscribe: <mailto:requests@philodox.com?subject=subscribe%20dbs> X-Web-Archive: http://www.philodox.com/dbs-archive/ Also Sprach Todd Boyle (tboyle(a)rosehill.net) > > * If thieves could hide the money they stole, there would be substantial > increase in frequency and severity of theft; I think this is definitely true. Particularly if it is *easy* to hide the money stolen, as criminals may be expert in a particular field of crime that is *not* financial -- it's already easy for a white-collar criminal to hide money, using the same skills used in white-collar crimes of other sorts, but not so easy for an armed robber. > * Reducing trackability of money increases the severity and frequency > of collusive crimes. Reducing trackability and improving the velocity of money *does* do this, but it's a side effect of the more important (and wider spread) effect of useful forms of money: increasing the severity and frequency of all kinds of collusion and cooperation! This is what money is for -- exchange. That criminal exchange uses DBS is just saying that criminal exchange is a form of exchange. > > In mean time, managing the out-of-control government sector is your civic > duty, to your less intelligent wives, Heh...I'd be afraid of saying this if I were married or ever planning to be :) On an archived list, no less... :) > > You need a coherent argument on this problem. You need measures within > the DBS technology itself, to address the need. Opponents of DBS will > raise all these demagogic arguments. You'll be hooted off the podium. This technology is layered (ooh, bad word to use in relation to money and payment systems :). I think you will agree with me that the correct place for financial restraints (particularly voluntary ones, for auditing purposes, which IMO are the most important -- it allows you to say you are doing something, specify how it can be measured, and then have it measured, rather than just having some vague after-the-fact threat of enforcement if they catch you) on digital token money is not at the following layers: * Sub-atomic layer * Atomic layer * Hardware layer * Network connection layer and you seem to be making the case that it doesn't belong at the human/legal layer. However, there are two layers in the middle: * application (core DBS protocols, etc.) and * presentation (graphical clients, etc.) I believe the correct place for any voluntary restraints on DBS money is not at the DBS protocol layer, but at a higher level. This can be built into the clients people choose to use for managing their money, generate auditing reports, etc. This provides people with the freedom to use clients tailored to their legal requirements -- a corporation's internal financial system should be far more complicated and constrained than my personal wallet -- and makes it relatively easy for everything to interoperate. You can even design things at the levels higher than the DBS level to escrow parts of coins with third parties, this requiring their participation or approval for any transaction -- sort of a "registered DBS system". If you believe taxes are a worthwhile thing, a government could mandage the use of such a system where the IRS was a party to each and every transaction. This would work perfectly well technically, and would not compromise the integrity of the protocols -- it's just a business decision on the part of an issuer of electronic cash. It's easy to see how this could work with insurance schemes, split control of coins, etc. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: DBS, Privacy, Money Laundering nonsense.
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: "Michael Alexander" <mfa(a)alpha.univie.ac.at> To: <dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu> Subject: Re: DBS, Privacy, Money Laundering nonsense. Date: Sat, 14 Nov 1998 20:52:53 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.0810.800 Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: "Michael Alexander" <mfa(a)alpha.univie.ac.at> >From: "Black Unicorn" <unicorn(a)schloss.li> > That's on the order of $600 >trillion per year, just in SWIFT. (Add another $1.3 billion for CHIPS and >$989 million for Fedwire daily. Oh, don't forget the foreign exchange as a minor correction, SWIFT 's main service is to exchange payment messages to feed into e.g. Fedwire or CHIPS so that would be double counting >The payment system today eats up over 1.5% of the GNP primarily because of >nonsense regulations like CTR's and other transaction reporting ... >1% of the GNP. Instant 1% growth for changing a system of clearing. Think >about that for awhile. slowly on that: payment systems costs represent what economists call 'specific taxes' that is they inflict deadweight losses on the economy. More efficient payment instruments such as some being based on bearer certificates would per se lower GDP but lead to higher demand in theory. Its effect would be as instant as a cut in other broad ones such as income or capital gains that is it involves lag. On the actual percentage of payment systems costs as % of GDP my estimates are way higher. By simply taking clearing float days of the major retail, business and interbank instruments, the figure is more like >2% with current (low) interest for the U.S. and even higher for Europe. This does not take into account that a more efficient payment system with a higher money velocity would lower the demand for transaction money among other effects. Michael For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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