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Re: CLIPPER COMPROMIZED?
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just got word from the RISKS folks that the upcoming issue has a denouncement of the Network World article, from Denning. She says she checked up on it, and it's BS. This is pretty much obvious, but it still leaves open the question of who originally came up with this rumor to monger, and why? It looks almost like an act of desperation. That's my interest in this. If it was something that could be taken seriously, it would be a good bit of propaganda work, truth or falsehood aside. But the entire short article smacks of conspiracy theorist ranting. I hope this sort of stuff isn't going to become more frequent, or it may make anti-Clipper people look, from the outside, like kooks. -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

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Re: CLIPPER COMPROMIZED?
by Peter Wayner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is the story that Ames sent the secret of the Clipper Chips to Moscow unlikely? Well, yes. There are no escrow agents because there aren't any keys yet. Plus, it is unlikely that the specific design got to him. But Dorothy characterizes the entire rumor as absurd and I don't think that this is the case. It seems entirely plausible to me that someone in Ames position could severely compromise the Clipper system. Why? Someone in Ames position would presumably need access to Clipper encrypted calls to conduct counter-intelligence operations. Remember some of the first customers will be the DOJ, a good place to put a mole. So if someone in Ames wanted a Clipper key, he could probably ask the escrow agents for it and get it, no questions asked. Dorothy uses arguments like Ames wouldn't have a "Need to Know." This really isn't a strong point. Ames is accused of being a spy. Spies, by definition, circumvent "need to know" requirements. I believe that they found some documents in Ames possession that he was not authorized to hold. The specific rumor is probably false, but I think that the Ames case is a perfect proof of what will almost certainly go wrong with the Clipper system. Someone will rat. History has shown time and time again that three can keep a secret if two are dead. Me and the two Clipper Agencies make three.

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Re: CLIPPER COMPROMIZED!!!! :-)
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's been a report going around linking Aldrich Ames to Clipper. Back when I read alt.folklore.urban a lot, I'd see stories like that. My guess about the origin of this report is that it evolved like this: - Somebody on talk.politics.crypto posts a comment like "Oh, come on - if the CIA can't prevent trusted spies like Aldrich Ames from leaking the names of other spies, how will the NSA keep its people from giving away the CLipper secrets, either for bribes or for "patriotic" reasons like loyalty to the "Office of the President". - Somebody else reads that and says "What if a *spy* like Aldrich Ames gave away Clipper?" - Somebody else reads that and says "Does anybody know if Aldrich Ames had anything to do with Clipper?" which somebody in the press hears somebody say to somebody else, and it turns into a report like: > <<CLIPPER COMPROMISED? "Security Insider Report," a monthly newsletter > published in Seminole, Fla., has reported that government officials are > seeking to determine whether former CIA employee and alleged traitor > Aldrich Ames may have sold information to the Russians about the > government's secret key-escrow technology used in Clipper Chip chipsets > and Capstone Tessera cards. The secret key-escrow technology, dubbed > Skipjack, can be used to encrypt network voice and data. which must *obviously* be true because it came off the *wire services*... Probably Aldrich Ames didn't have any contact with the people in the NSA doing Clipper or the FBI people doing Digital Telephony Prevention. Bill

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Re: CLIPPER COMPROMIZED!!!! :-)
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204) >>> <<CLIPPER COMPROMISED? "Security Insider Report," a monthly newsletter >> published in Seminole, Fla., has reported that government officials are >> seeking to determine whether former CIA employee and alleged traitor >> Aldrich Ames may have sold information to the Russians about the >> government's secret key-escrow technology used in Clipper Chip chipsets >> and Capstone Tessera cards. The secret key-escrow technology, dubbed >> Skipjack, can be used to encrypt network voice and data. > >which must *obviously* be true because it came off the *wire services*... >Probably Aldrich Ames didn't have any contact with the people in the >NSA doing Clipper or the FBI people doing Digital Telephony Prevention. Ames may have had access to the rationale Dot and an un-named white house source were quoted to effect ' ..if you knew what I know, you would understand the need' (in effect tying Clipper to national security). Were he to compromise how good the interception is IN THIS COUNTRY to a foreign powers intelligence service, for instance, it might severly change their way of doing communications in the U.S. (the target country). Thus, nullifying some of the effect of say, a hypothetical successor to SHAMROCK, (Allen Steeles Big Ear).

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Re: Counterfieting $$$$
by Jeremiah A Blatz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 18-Mar-94 Re: Locating Color Copiers by stevenJ(a)alpha1.csd.uwm.e > Additionally, it's only possible to photocopy $1, $5 and $10 because anything > larger than that has that funny little strip of plastic in the bill. Actually, they have strips on the tens, too. Re: passing bills Okay, so the 10's and 20's have little mylar strips on them. You can't copy old bills, because they get wrinkles, and, anyway, if someone handed me a crisp, new 1983 $20 I'd get a bit suspicious. There are ways to age bills, but they look a lot less convincing. However.... What night manager at Denny's knows about the strips. How many times have you seen someone at your local convience store check for the strip when you hand them a $20. If you travel a lot, and never use counterfiet bills for transactions where your name is recorded, you can do lots with counterfiet money. True, though, if you wanted to sell suitcases of it for $3 per twenty dollar bill (I just guessed at the price), you may have a problem. Not a crook, Jer darklord(a)cmu.edu | "it's not a matter of rights / it's just a matter of war finger me for my | don't have a reason to fight / they never had one before" Geek Code and | -Ministry, "Hero" PGP public key | http://www.cs.cmu.edu:8001/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr25/jbde/

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Re: EFF gun-shy of legally employing PGP
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous is alleged to have said: > : > Yes, but the point of the reply, is that PGP signatures SHOULD > : > be used by sysops. > : Hmmm... why PGP, as opposed to the FIPS Digital Signature Standard? > Yes, you can use the DSS (unless it is given away to PK partners, that is). No, you can't use the DSS. The reason NIST was getting into confusion about whether they have to give it to PKP is that PKP says that it infringes on Schnorr's patent, which they recently bought up; assuming that's true technically (I haven't looked in a while), this means you need a license from PKP to use DSS. Unlike RSA, which the government has some rights to use because it partially funded their work, even the government doesn't have rights over Schnorr's work, since they didn't fund it, so the NIST is in deeper yogurt with DSS than with RSa signatures. You can still use DSS for research and the usual things you can use patents for without a license, but you can do the same with PGP. RIPEM can be used free non-commercially in the US+Canada under the RSAREF license terms, and RIPEM-SIG can even be exported. (Now all we need to do is find a way to get RIPEM-SIG to do key exchange and message encryption as well as signatures and patch it into PGP :-) (presumed not possible...) Bill

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Re: FOIA text
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jdblair(a)nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU: > Does anyone know an ftp site where I can find the full text of the > Freedom of Information Act? ftp: ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Access_govt_info/FOIA/us_foia_act.txt other articles, acts, cases in the same directory. ftp.eff.org is full of information, articles etc of interest to cypherpunks, particularly in the Policy directory. Most of the material I'm putting into a hypertext WWW guide to cpunks is from there. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "What is civilisation rishab(a)doe.ernet.in, rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in but a ribonucleic Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 hangover?" H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Pondering Clipper
by sonny＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Lake <lake(a)uenics.evansville.edu> says: -> I have been receiving cypherpunk material for about a week now. I am new -> to cryptography, and new to security(feel free to laugh). I hope this -> posting is appropriate.. Well enough excuses for what I am about to say -> but I might like Clipper. [Don't worry, each individual should be able to make up her/his own mind regarding issues such as this (ie., individual privacy).] -> 1.) From what I am hearing (largely propaganda from both sides) Clipper -> will be OPTIONAL. If I am businessman X and I dont know squat about [If the claim that Clipper will be "OPTIONAL" is propaganda, you might want to take it with a grain of salt. "OPTIONAL" today might not mean "OPTIONAL" tomorrow.] -> security (but realize it is a good thing) wouldnt I want something I -> could feel secure with? For me, wouldnt Clipper be a good thig? [If you are arguing that ignorance about security is a prerequisite for considering Clipper to be a good thing, you may be correct.] -> 2) If, for some reason, I wanted to keep something even more secure so -> the government couldnt see what I was doing, couldnt I just encrypt a -> message before or after it goes through the Clipper Chip? I would think -> this would prevent the government as well as anyone else from reading my -> message en route [If you have the technology at hand to encrypt a message before or after it goes through the Clipper chip using a method that the government can't crack, you don't need to spend money (as a prudent businessman) on Clipper hardware.] -> 3) Right now I can pick up cellular phone conversations and intercept data -> through any network lines with a datascope. For anyone who doesnt wan [Not bad for someone who is "new to security(feel free to laugh)."] -> this to occur wouldnt it be nice if they couldat least be reasonably -> certain that no one could understand what they are hearing or seeing? [Yes. This is why many people don't want Clipper. They want to be "reasonably certain that no one could understand what they are hearing or seeing"] -> 4) Also, would it be unreasonable to have an on/off switch on the Clipper -> chip? [I don't know.] -> Please dont assume me to be a pro-clipper individual. I am -> merely trying to form a logical, educated opinion on the issue. I will -> always feel skeptical when the FBI say we just need this to maintain our -> current state of survellience capability (or is that survellience state -> ;-) And I am also aware that if anybody thinks these keys will be kept -> confidential unless the government has a warrant blah blah blah well -> I -> better stop there.......... -> -> lake(a)uenics.evansville.edu >James<

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(fwd) FBI Wiretaps. Old news....
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For thos who haven't read some of the recent (compelling) newsbytes on Digital Telphony II - Forwarded message: > Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk > From: catalyst-remailer(a)netcom.com > Message-ID: <199403190626.WAA25701(a)mail2.netcom.com> > Subject: FBI Wiretaps. Old news.... > Date: Fri, 18 Mar 1994 22:26:45 -0800 > X-Received: by usenet.pa.dec.com; id AA17267; Fri, 18 Mar 94 22:30:46 -0800 > X-Received: from mail2.netcom.com by inet-gw-1.pa.dec.com (5.65/13Jan94) > id AA08698; Fri, 18 Mar 94 22:25:42 -0800 > X-Received: from localhost by mail2.netcom.com (8.6.4/SMI-4.1/Netcom) > id WAA25701; Fri, 18 Mar 1994 22:26:45 -0800 > X-To: comp.org.eff.talk.usenet > X-Remailed-By: Remailer <catalyst-remailer(a)netcom.com> > > Today's news. > > WASHINGTON (Reuter) - The FBI warned Friday that wiretaps > might soon become impossible unless Congress updates a law > requiring telephone companies to cooperate with law enforcement > agencies on electronic surveillance. > ``Unless Congress creates a new law, law enforcement's > ability to protect the public against crime will be gravely > eroded and the national security will be placed at risk,'' FBI > Director Louis Freeh told a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing. > Freeh said new technology such as cellular telephones, call > forwarding and digital switching was making it more difficult > for the FBI and other agencies to operate wiretaps, which he > called one of law enforcement's best tools against crime and > terrorism. > ``We could be out of the wiretap business in a very short > time,'' Freeh said. He said 91 court-approved wiretaps were > abandoned last year because telephone companies could not solve > technical problems. > ``They (telephone companies) have told us they will not be > able to provide the access we need. We have certain requirements > which they tell us are not going into the software,'' he said. > Freeh said he wanted the 1968 law rewritten to require all > telephone companies to meet technical requirements for wiretaps > of new equipment. He said it would cost less than $1 billion and > would be paid in part by the federal government. > He said wiretaps had helped prevent several terrorist > attacks in the United States in recent years, including a 1986 > plot to shoot down an airliner, and helped convict over 22,000 > felons in the past decade. > Freeh said a new law would not jeopardize privacy, but > Senator Patrick Leahy, a Vermont Democrat, said he was still > concerned: ``My hope is that we can serve legitimate law > enforcement needs without jeopardizing privacy rights or > frustrating innovation and development of new technologies or > undercutting the competitiveness of America's high tech > industries.'' > The U.S. Telephone Association, which represents more than > 1,100 local telephone companies including the regional Bell > companies, said it believed the current law was adequate. It > said its members were cooperating with law enforcement. > Freeh said he had been meeting with representatives of the > telephone industry but had been unable to get a voluntary > agreement that would cover all companies. > - paul

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Re: (fwd) FBI Wiretaps. Old news....
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> ``We could be out of the wiretap business in a very short > time,'' Freeh said. He said 91 court-approved wiretaps were > abandoned last year because telephone companies could not solve > technical problems. I forgot to add, EFF's recent FOIA act asking for equipment interference with court ordered wiretaps showed NO problems. Where the 91 figure comes from is a mystery.

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