- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: A brief comparison of email encryption protocols
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Murray wrote: | Adam Shostack writes: | > | > Leaving it out may be ok because we can define a standard location by | > key type: | > | > key://slack.lne.com/~ericm/key.asc | > key://slack.lne.com/~ericm/key.x509 | > | > key://slack.lne.com/~ericm/x509/key.cert | > key://slack.lne.com/~ericm/pgp/key.asc | > | > I have no objection to defining a shorter URL, but would want some | > indicator that we're in user space, not host/domain/realm space. A | > ~username serves that purpose as well as /u/ and is a more common | > usage. | | Ok. Sounds good, for user-maintained keys like PGP anyhow. | More hierarchical keys, like X.509, could be maintained | by a CA that also maintains the server... some people who | could use encryption don't know, and don't want to know, enough | about it to even be willing to hold their own certificates. They | want it to "just work". I think that this scheme should be flexable | enough to be able to support a CA maintaining user's certificates | for them. Note that this doesn't mean that the CA/key server | would know the keys, i.e. this should not support GAK*. Having keys placed in a namespace defiend by a user does not mean the user needs to make the key available, only that the key can be found there. Nothing says we can't have key://keys.verisign.com/~ericm if they issue keys in some space that maps into user names. | > My last comment is that if we define a URN scheme for keys, we should | > force a dependable structure on it, so that its predictable where to | > find a users PGP key from an email address, without having to check 6 | > locations. Nothing is there now, we should require order to make | > everyones life easier. | | Along those lines, I was envisioning adding a KEY RR type to | DNS, and using it to maintain pointers to keyservers. [...] | This sounds so obvious that I'm sure that I'm not the first | or even the tenth person to think of it, and in fact I | see a KEY RR type defined in the BIND 4.9.3BETA17 source. But | there's just a type there, nothing else to support it. | Anyone know what it's for? Donald Eastlake is writing the spec for storing keys in nameservers. Its in the process of moving to draft standard; there will probably be something about it after LA. I think its: ftp://ds.internic.net/draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-09.txt Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Re: Remailers run by spooks
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:11 AM 3/4/96, Just Rich wrote: >However, I also have no doubt that Strassmann and Marlow are spreading >disinformation and exaggerating their capabilities in an attempt to break >the web of trust and incite a witch hunt. It won't work. The answer in any >case is more use of remailers, not less. Just turn up the noise level. >You already know that nothing is 100% secure, but you do what you can. >It's a war of attrition. Only the shadow and a few bureaucrats know whether spooks have infiltrated the remailer operators' web of trust. I'd imagine the payoff in suggesting the possibility would lie in breeding mistrust not among operators but, rather, among potential users: diminishing the use and propagation of remailers would lower the overall noise level, making case-by-case interception and cracking that much more manageable. But this hall-of-mirrors speculation is really just misguided FUD: improving protocols, more remailers, and expanding webs of trust are the prize to keep our eyes on. Ted

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re: Validating credit cards
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Actually can think of several phleneomum that would satisfy but first need to separate transactions into relating to electronic items and relating to physical items. In the case of physical items, pickup for shipping is probably done in batches (example: for FedEx the last pickup typically at 5 pm). It is not necessary to verify transactions instantaneously but rather when the order is processed /shipped. This could be done in a batch mode syncronized with order processing. In the case of electronic media there are two choices: either immediate access or delayed access. In the first case either access can be granted or immediate verification can be done. In the case of immediate access, it should be limited to items of restricted value. In delayed access the same batch processing mode can be performed (during the 0-dark hours most likely). This leaves only cases where immediate access must be granted and I suspect that in most cases the vulnerability of 6-24 hours of access before verification will be small. Where the possible loss is low, we are back to (a). So in the small proportion of transactions where immediate verification and transfer is necessary, I have no doubt that the existing infrastructure can handle it. At "slight additional charge" by the credit card company no doubt. Warmly, Padgett

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PARTY PICTURES PLUS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, This should be my last post about my party [sound of crowd cheering]. Because several of you wanted more info about the pictures and/or felt slighted by the file identification tabs, I have added additional information: http://www.c2.org/party/masquerade/ Enjoy. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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re: NYT on crypto
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I thought that, for the most part, the telegraph systems described >above were to reduce cable charges (1 code word instead of a 15-word >sentence, a huge savings in those days). Was one use however I seem to recall citations dating back to Niccolo Polo reguarding the use of trade codes & that was a while before the telegraph. If I were really curious, would also check out Reuters, Lloyds, Rothchilds, and the Borgias. Would not be surprised to find a reference in either/all "The Prince", "The Art of War", and the letters of Nathan Hale. However I suspect that Markoff really meant to be referring to mathematical algoritms such as the LOASDR. I suppose that only dates back to the diameters of stygi (sp ?) about the same time that passwords were first recorded (and changed daily). Warmly, Padgett ps if anyone has a spare LOASDR or CMSDR, I would be interested 8*).

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Re: (Fwd) Gov't run anon servers
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: John Perry <perry(a)vishnu.alias.net> > Well actually... The passphrase in a mixmaster remailer is defined as > an environmental variable at compile time. The passphrase is not > stored in any cleartext fashion but is embedded in the > executable. Additionally the newer Ghio code (Matt's latest revision) > has the passphrase defined as an environmental variable in > remailer.c. Once remailer is compiled, you can delete the passphrase > from the code. I can't speak for the freedom or other remailers as I > haven't tried them. It's a little harder to get the key than just > looking for a cleartext file that contains it. That is, if the > remailer operator is being careful. OK, I stand corrected regarding the operation of mixmaster. However, this does not gain much security, certainly not in comparison to the effort involved to break a key. It will be just as easy to steal the mixmaster executable as to steal a script file containing a pass phrase. And it might even be possible to run the stolen mixmaster directly to decrypt intercepted incoming mail messages, without even having to type in the pass phrase. Failing that the attacker could easily extract the pass phrase from the mixmaster executable file. The other suggestion that was made here, that the operator would have to manually type in the pass phrase every time the computer rebooted, would be a way of avoiding having the information in the clear on the disk. However it would probably not be a practical method of operation given the reliability of at least the Unix operating systems that I am familiar with. And even then the information is in memory. An attacker who could gain root privileges (and let's not pretend that the NSA can't do that) can dump memory and later comb it for the key information. My point remains that strong keys are pointless for remailers which run on Unix systems connected to the net. Now if you have your remailer on a PC at home, and you're not running anything else on it (like http servers), maybe that is safe. I am not familiar enough with security holes in such a configuration to judge. Probably it would depend on what mail-processing software you run, and the nature of your net connection. Recall that my original comments were in connection with the claim that the government was running most of the remailers. As I said, I still think that is absurd when it would be so much easier to simply steal their keys. Hal

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Gordon Liddy
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gordon Liddy just waved the bloody shirt in a stirring defense of crypto rights. The gist of it was that we can't trust the muderers of waco with our secret keys. He also mentioned PGP. I never how to react to over the top rhetoric that supports something I believe strongly in. -- Alex Strasheim, alex(a)proust.suba.com

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"Zap part of the CDA" live Capitol Hill news conference on CU-SeeMe
by ISP-TV Main Contact 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ISP-TV Network Presents: Zap the Comstock Law Before It Becomes a Computer Virus on the Internet! [Cybercast using CU-SeeMe (tm)] Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) and Senator Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ) will hold a joint news conference at 10:00 AM EST on Wednesday, March 6, to discuss the introduction of a bill to strike a provision of the 1996 Telecommunications Act that criminalizes the transmission and reception of information about abotion over the Internet. The conference will be cybercast live from room HC-6 at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. Joining Lautenberg and Schroeder will be Kate Michelman, President of the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, and Kathryn Kolbert, Vice President of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy. This will be the first Capitol Hill news conference ever to be transmitted live over the Internet using CU-SeeMe technology! See http://www.house.gov/schroeder/cu-seeme.html for more info. Time: 10:00 AM EST Thursday, March 6, 1996 IP: Main ISP-TV Reflector 205.197.247.33 Other ISP-TV affiliates see http://www.digex.net/isptv/members.html To obtain CU-SeeMe software, go to one of these URL's: CU-SeeMe for Windows -- http://goliath.wpine.com/cudownload.htm CU-SeeMe for Macintosh -- http://goliath.wpine.com/moredemos.htm http://www.digex.net/isptv for more information about ISP-TV

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Just testing the post
by uunet!in2.uu.net!news.sprintlink.net!news.utech.net!＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Post Test -- John G. Jones Director, Computer Services UTDS, Inc. <http://www.utech.net> <mailto:john@utech.net> 1593 E. Chestnut Lompoc, CA 93436 (805) 735-4447

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Re: (Fwd) Gov't run anon servers
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:08 PM 3/5/96 -0800, Jim McCoy wrote: >The point is not to make a system which is absolutely, positively, no >doubt about it, secure against any attacker. If cypherpunks could do >this they would be working for defense contractors and others who make >certified systems. The objective is to make a system which is difficult >to attack, one which costs the attacker time/money. ... It seems to me that one of the best ways to better protect the remailer system would be to regulary change the remailer keys. By destroying the old secret keys, you protect the remailer and its operator against rubber hose attacks aimed at decrypting recorded traffic. As a suggestion: Assume you change the keys every week. You post this week's key to a public keyserver, replacing last week's key. To allow continuous operation you remember both this week's and last week's secret keys and process messages encrypted under either. To validate these keys, you use a long-term key to sign them. Note that for the really paranoid, this long-term key can be kept at a separate site, and only used after e.g. voice verification of the new key's fingerprint. Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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