- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

No Subject
by lurker＠ottoman.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

October 30, 1997 Web posted at: 9:34 p.m. EST (0234 GMT) ROBY, Illinois (CNN) -- Shirley A. Allen, a mentally disturbed woman who held police off for 39 days with a shotgun and entertained herself by listening to public radio, was captured Thursday and taken to a hospital. "The good news is she's safe," said Terrance Gainer, Illinois state police director. "The great news is nobody got seriously hurt or killed." The standoff ended when Allen ventured out on the deck behind her home to throw away food and water left for her by the police. On her third trip, she stooped to cut a wire attached to a pail in which a police camera was hidden. A trooper fired six rubber bullets at her, striking her two or three times and knocking her to the deck, where she was captured. Gainer said that Allen, who wore a full camouflage suit padded with a pillow and magazines, was examined at a hospital and reported to be in good condition was feisty enough after the ordeal to scold police for their tactics during the standoff. Gainer said she is still in custody and will undergo a psychiatric examination. "I think she's probably as relieved right now as we are that this is over," said Allen's brother, Byron Dugger, who talked with her after she was captured. Gainer said Allen asked Dugger to open his mouth to prove he wasn't someone wearing a mask that looked like him. 'They have zapped my head with radar' The standoff in this small central Illinois town began September 22 when Allen, 51, brandished a shotgun as her brother and sheriff's deputies tried to take her in for a court-ordered evaluation. Allen's relatives were concerned because she had become increasingly depressed and paranoid since her husband died of pancreatic cancer in 1989. More recently, she had refused to see or talk to her brother or her 86-year-old mother. In a letter to her mother in May 1996, Allen wrote, "They have zapped my head with radar. I have swelling and inflammation of the brain." She did not say who "they" were, but when police offered her water after she was captured, she said "the helicopters" told her not to drink it. There were no helicopters in sight, but she finally drank the water after troopers drank some to prove it wasn't poisoned. She told them she hadn't eaten or had anything to drink in three days. Allen also talked to her daughter, Kate Waddell, after she was captured. "But she wasn't quite sure it was Mrs. Waddell," Gainer said. Allen's case attracted the sympathy of many neighbors and became a rallying point for some who called it "Roby Ridge," likening it to shootouts at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas, as an example of overzealous law enforcement. Standoff cost taxpayers about $1 million Others questioned the expense of the standoff. Gainer tackled that one head-on at a news conference Thursday, saying it was about $15,000 a day. He estimated the total cost of the operation at $750,000 to $1 million. Obviously relieved that Allen was taken alive, an unapologetic Gainer said, "But I don't think Mrs. Shirley Allen is worth a cent less than that." Police tried to get Allen out of her green frame farmhouse with tear gas, pepper spray and music. They also tried to coax her out with a visit from her favorite stepdaughter. This week, they began giving her food and restored her power, which had been shut off earlier, in a goodwill gesture they hoped would calm her down. Allen had fought off tear gas by smearing her face with petroleum jelly and withstood beanbag bullets by wearing heavy layers of clothing. She apparently slept in a sleeping bag in the living room -- the room where her husband died -- and had two transistor radios with earplugs. Gainer said the radios were tuned to a local public radio station. Protesters gathered daily to support her and criticized the police. 'Mrs. Allen is where she needs to be' "The good feeling is it's over for her. The bad feeling is how she's going to be trapped after this is over with," said John Powers, a neighbor and one of the protesters. "We don't know if they'll treat her as a person who is sane or as a person who tried to shoot their dog." Although Allen fired at state troopers and wounded a police dog sent into her home Sunday, "it would serve no useful purpose to charge her," Gainer said. "Given what we have known from Day 1, Mrs. Allen is where she needs to be right now." Reporter Lisa Price and The Associated Press contributed to this report.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

OK, now for something completely different: A few years back, a sculpture was created and presented to the CIA by an artist who inscribed the base of the work with a cyphertext. He refused to tell anyone what it said, but I think he later acquiesced and told the DCI. Has anyone heard anything more about this? Was the cypher cracked?

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Re: more than spread spectrum
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phil Karn said: >This idea of setting up your own independent network isn't as far fetched >as it sounds, at least in a relatively local area with critical mass. A little while ago I mentioned an SF Bay Area grass roots internet connection project. When I talked to Qarin about it almost 1.5 years ago, I'd thought that she was proposing an actual independent network beginning in Santa Cruz, which is why I brought it up. However apparently it is simply a connection to existing sub-Inets. After chasing down some leads, Tom Jennings' .vacation notice says to contact John Gilmore regarding SF area Little Garden business while Tom is away. This naturally leads me to suspect that everyone here except me is already well acquainted with all this...I've no idea what's going on with Little Garden myself. I like Phil's ideas, just for the record. :-) Anyway, here's what I found on the Santa Cruz project, as long as I've got it lying around. P.S. The following does not include some rumors I heard some months ago, that this project ran into opposition from commercial Internet providers around here. It also says nothing about Qarin's radio wave internet link ideas, so maybe that fell through. ---------------------- Item 1 of 2 --------------------------- >From netcomsv!darkstar.UCSC.EDU!injectnews 20 Sep 93 23: 11 PDT Wed Sep 22 18:55:52 PDT 1993 From: matthew kaufman <matthew(a)klinzhai.echo.com> Newsgroups: scruz.sysops Subject: Santa Cruz Community Internet (scruz-net) STATUS UPDATE Date: 20 Sep 1993 23:18:03 -0700 Organization: University of California, Santa Cruz Santa Cruz Community Internet (scruz-net) 903 Pacific Ave. #203-A Santa Cruz, CA 95060 (408) 426-6771 [for now...until new line is installed] matthew(a)echo.com, queue(a)echo.com, garlick(a)echo.com SEPTEMBER 20, 1993 STATUS UPDATE Summary: Full speed ahead. Full Service Begins November 1st. - We now have an office leased for the hub. Address is above. This is also our new mailing address. - We have ordered the 56kbps digital line to Mtn. View. - RGNet (formerly TLG, The Little Garden) has signed their agreement with Sprint for a new Internet feed. They will switch to Sprint on or about November 1st, coincident with our beginning of full service. - scruz-net has a registered domain name for our hub equipment and FTP/name servers (scruz.net) - scruz-net has a Class B IP address space to be used to provide IP addresses to sites that haven't already obtained an IP address (165.227.x.x) (initial sites... your IP address will be assigned this week) - Santa Cruz Community Internet (scruz-net) is now a registered fictitous business name. We also have a City of Santa Cruz business license. We are a partnership. - We have a checking account, so all the founding connection checks have been deposited. - We have some of the equipment required (donated and/or loaned), and we will be purchasing the rest over the next few weeks. - We will be obtaining a pager so that we can be contacted 24hrs in case of network problems. Latest timeline: October 1 - we move equipment into office space and begin wiring everything up. October 13 - 56kbps line installation should be complete. October 15 - Testing begins. We bring up 56kbps connection to Mountain View, begin software configuration of routers and terminal servers. Sites which want to participate in initial testing can start dropping off their modems and we'll assign phone lines. Full IP routing will NOT be in effect, but you (and we) will be able to test SLIP/PPP software, failure recovery, local routing. Initial sites: before connecting, you'll need to sign an actual agreement, which we're writing up. November 1 - Sprint begins routing our addresses to RGnet, who then routes them to us. Full operation begins. Any sites which have paid initial fees can begin full operation. (Note that this item depends upon the Sprint-RGnet arrangement) December 1 - First monthly payment due for connected sites. Thanks to the 9 people who've already gotten us checks for their initial connection, and the 3 whose checks we'll have soon. Without your commitment we wouldn't have been able to get started. Anyone else who wants to be included in the initial startup, you're welcome to join... a check for $406 to "scruz-net" will sign you up for a 14.4kbps connection. (That's $250 startup, $70 for the first month, $70 for the phone line at our end, and $16 for the first month of phone service at our end... you provide both modems, phone line at your end, and all equipment at your end needed for a SLIP/PPP connection). After this, fees are $86/month ($70 for IP, $16 for phone at our end. Faster connections (56kbps leased line, 128kbps over ISDN) are available... just ask. -Matthew Kaufman Qarin Van Brink Tim Garlick matthew(a)echo.com queue(a)echo.com garlick(a)echo.com ---------------------- Item 2 of 2 --------------------------- >From matthew(a)klinzhai.echo.com Wed Sep 22 23:11:09 1993 Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 23:14:34 PDT From: matthew(a)klinzhai.echo.com (matthew kaufman) To: doug(a)netcom.com Subject: Re: Santa Cruz Community Internet (scruz-net) STATUS UPDATE well, the best source of information is to just ask us questions. The most interesting piece of information that someone who wants to start something similar should know is that there's a group like us in the Bay Area (San Francisco, Palo Alto and Mountain View) called The Little Garden, and they're in fact who we're working with to get IP connectivity to Santa Cruz. The contact person for that is Tom Jennings (tomj(a)wps.com) If they want to do something substantially south of Mountain View, it might be cheaper to connect to us, or perhaps we could work out an arrangement to reduce the digital line charges somehow, so definitely they should keep in touch with us as well. -matthew

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Re: The NSA Visits Compendium
by strick at Jihad 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> So, send me your examples. Supply as much detail as you can, including > company names if possible. I'll accept "unnamed sources" if they are > _primary_ sources, but no "friend of a friend told me that...," unless the > details look very convincing. Tim, a friend comments that if you're serious about getting reports this way, you should contact one of the human rights groups (Amnesty International, Article 19...) that gathers reports which are generally believed to be accurate under much more threatening situations. I thought it a good comment. I've worked for amnesty before, and know of their reputation, but now how they attained it... strick

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First amendment and ITARs
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In U.S. v Posey, 864 F2d 1487, the defendant was convicted of violating the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act ("CAAA") and the Arms Export Control Act ("AECA") by sending design documents relating to the C-130 aircraft to South Africa. Posey obtained these documents from the U.S. government via the Freedom of Information Act. The U.S. government agreed that these documents were technically public domain within the meaning of the ITAR's. However, the CAAA, which applies only to exports to South Africa, does not contain the "public domain" exemption that the AECA (which applies to exports in general) does. The recent grand jury action regarding PGP appears to involve possible violations of the AECA. Posey appealed on several grounds, one of which was that these Acts violated his first amendment rights, since the information was, after all, freely available. The court rejected this argument, with a lengthy (and, to my mind, somewhat confused) discussion, which is worth repeating: VII. FIRST AMENDMENT Appellant's final argument is that the First Amendment bars the government from restricting the export of information that is already available to the public. He insists that the data he sent abroad was available under the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore could be legally obtained by virtually everyone in the world. He contends that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the AECA and CAAA to the export of such publicly available information. Our Court has already considered and rejected this argument. In United States v. Edler Industries, 579 F2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978), we rejected an essentially identical challenge to the predecessor of the AECA. The defendant was convicted of exporting certain manufacturing designs that were on the Munitions List but were not classified. He challenged his conviction on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the government could not constitutionally prohibit the export of techno- logical data that was widely distributed within the United States. In rejecting that claim, we explained that even assuming that the First Amendment offers some protection to the dissemination of technical data, the government has a strong interest in regulating the export of military information: The federal government undeniably possesses the power to regulate the international arms traffic.... As a necessary incident to the power to control arms export, the President is empowered to control the flow of information concerning the production and use of arms. The authority to regulate arms traffic would be of negligible practical value if it encompassed only the exportation of particular military equipment but not the exportation of blueprints specifying the construction of the very same equipment. 579 F2d at 520. We accordingly concluded that the government could permissibly restrict the flow abroad of data included in the Munitions List. 579 F2d at 521. Finally, we held that the government's power to issue such restrictions was not affected by the domestic availability of the regulated data: Given the unquestionable legitimacy of the national interest in restricting the dissemination of military information, the claim of public availability in the United States is not a defense recognized by the Constitution. 579 F2d at 522. Appellant attempts to distinguish Edler from the present case by pointing out that the exported data in Edler was "cutting edge" technology and was not widely used in this country. [Citation]. Whether or not this was factually true of the technology at issue in Edler, however, the Edler decision clearly assumed for purposes of its decision that the material was extensively available in the United States. See 579 F2d at 518, 522. Moreover, we believe Edler should not be read as permitting the govern- ment to restrict the export of only that information which is not widely available domestically. Under appellant's reading of Edler, if the government wished to prevent technical data from being sent to foreign powers, it would be required to suppress the information alto- gether, at home as well as abroad. This outcome would blur the fact that national security concerns may be more sharply implicated by the export abroad of military data than by the domestic disclosure of such data. Technical data that is relatively harmless and even socially val- uable when available domestically may, when sent abroad, pose unique threats to national security. It would hardly serve First Amendment values to compel the government to purge the public libraries of every scrap of data whose export abroad it deemed for security reasons necessary to prohibit. We conclude that appellant's conviction does not violate the First Amendment. (Hal speaking again here.) The thing I find somewhat ironic about this decision is this last paragraph. The court is saying that if the First Amendment implied that domestically available information could be exported, then the government might have to restrict domestically available information. But, this ignores the fact that the AECA already contains an explicit exemption for public domain information. So, the court is going to some length in this last paragraph to consider an argument which is mooted by the public domain exemption in the AECA. And in fact, as we have seen, at least one government official is daring to argue that this provision of the AECA does in fact give the U.S. government the power to keep Munitions List information out of public libraries! In any case, this decision and the earlier one it quotes both represent rejections by the 9th circuit appellate court (which includes California, where the grand jury investigations are taking place) of the argument that the ITARs infringe on First Amendment rights. This will make it more difficult to use the First Amendment defense in any new charges of arms export violations. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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QPK, SOURSE, FTP
by David Colston 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I do agree with your concepts for a public key voice system. I don't think Joel will be up to speed for a long time<G>. Re: SOURCE CODE I will snail mail you the Call Security source and exe's today. You should have them by tomorrow or Saturday. Please post them on an FTP, so that any of the cypherpunks can get a copy. TO ALL EAVES DROPPERS<G> If you need the source snail mailed to you, then send a floppy any size to: Colston & Associates 5111 Rogers Ave. Suite 507 Fort Smith, AR 72903 I'll stand good the return postage, but the disks will help out.

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Red Ryder decoder rings declared illegal (fwd)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I apologize if this has already been posted to the list, as I have been extremely busy the past couple of days and have not had the luxury of reading every message that has been posted. If this is old news -- sorry. ,-) Begin excerpted message --------------------------- > Subject: Cu Digest, #5.74 - More on Moby Crypto ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 21 Sep 1993 21:13:17 GMT From: Grady Ward <grady(a)netcom.com> Subject: File 2--NEW State Dept FLASH on Moby Clipper (Grady Ward) (please edit follow-ups) In a fresh (to me, stunning) development, the Austin Code Works received a letter today (Tuesday 9/21/93) from the State Department, Bureau of Politico Military Affairs, Office of Defense Trade Controls advising them, in part, of their need to register as an International Arms Trafficker *even if* their crypto material is intended solely for *domestic* publication, regardless of whether they are selling executables, source, descriptions, algorithms of any crypto (and presumably viral detection) software or documentation, as defined by ITAR. This requirement literally implies that a Cereal manufacturer is required to register as an arms trafficker if it wants to include a secret de/coder ring in the box, has a cardboard outline of a de/coder printed on the box, or even a description how to construct or use a de/coder ring. Complete text of the letter follows: (State Department Seal) United States Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Office of Defense Trade Controls Washington, D.C. 20522-0602 AUG 31 1993 Austin Code Works 11100 Leafwood Lane Austin, TX 78750-3587 Dear Sir: It has come to the attention of this office that your company is making cryptographic source code and technical data available for commercial export claiming a technical data exemption from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Cryptographic software, including source code, is a munitions article as defined in 22 CFR # 120.1, category XIII(b). Further, the exemptions listed in 22 CFR # 125.4 for technical data do not apply to cryptographic software and source code. A valid Department of State license is required to export cryptographic source code. As such, it would be a violation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations to export cryptographic source code without a valid Department of State export license. We take this opportunity of advise you that any company or individual who engages in the United State in the business of either manufacturing or exporting defense articles or furnishing defense services is required to register for a fee with the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) pursuant to 22 U.S.C. # 2778(b)(1)(A) and 22 C.F.R. Part 122. Furthermore, the export of such defense articles and related technical data must be licensed by the Department of State in accordance with 22 U.S.C # 2778(b)(1)(B)(2) and 22 D.F.R. Parts 120-130 (International Traffic in Arms Regulations). A booklet entitled "REGISTRATION: The First Step in Defense Trade" is enclosed. If you are unsure whether an article is on the U.S. Munitions List, you may send five (5) copies of descriptive literature about the product and request a commodity jurisdiction determination from this office according to 22 C.F.R # 120.5 of the ITAR. If you have any questions regarding the matters discussed in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact this office at (703) 875-6650. Sincerely, (signed) Clyde G. Bryant, Jr., Chief Compliance and Enforcement Branch ++++++++++++++++ I guess this means that all FTP sites who implement the GET command and have anything to do with crypto or viral detection, including RFCs, overviews or discussions of specific techniques or algorithms, etc. must be registered as International Arms Traffickers *even if* they disallow all but domestic FTP connections. What to do now. My advice to this new twist of the NSA and State Department regulating activities *within* the United States is twofold: (1) GET and FAMILIARIZE yourself with PGP sources or other crypto options NOW and upload it to your local BBS (if you deem it still legal for you to do these things) and (2) Consider supporting the Electronic Freedom Foundation. PGP sites: black.ox.ac.uk (129.67.1.165) src.doc.ic.ac.uk (146.169.2.1) ftp.demon.co.uk (158.152.1.65) ghost.dsi.unimi.it (149.132.2.1) nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) soda.berkeley.edu (128.32.149.19) Electronic Freedom Foundation 1001 G Street, NW Suite 950 East Washington, D.C. 20001 202/347-5400 voice 202/393-5509 FAX FTP ftp.eff.org End excerpted message ------------------------------

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Propriety of crypto on Munitions List
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In U.S. v Martinez, Elizabeth Martinez and her fiance were convicted of violating the Arms Export Control Act by exporting cryptographic hardware, namely "Videocipher II" video descrambling devices. (I believe these are used to descramble satellite TV broadcasts of HBO and other networks.) Defendants appealed, asking the court to overturn their conviction on the grounds that "the inclusion of 'cryptographic devices and software (encoding and decoding)' on the [Munitions] list is overbroad because this heading includes items already in the public domain whose dissemination would pose no security threat, and which lack any characteristic that is inherently or predominantly military." The 11th circuit appellate court rejected this argument in 904 F2d 601. The court decided that the question of whether an item properly belongs on the Munitions List is inherently political and is excluded from judicial review. "The question whether a particular item should have been placed on the Munitions List possesses nearly every trait that the Supreme Court has enumerated traditionally renders a question 'political'.... No satisfactory or manageable standards exist for judicial determination of the issue, as defendants themselves acknowledge the disagreement among experts as to whether Videocipher II belongs on the List.... Neither the courts nor the parties are privy to reports of the intelligence services on which this decision, or decisions like it, may have been based.... The consequences of uninformed judicial action could be grave." In these days of judicial activism, it is ironic that one time when civil libertarians might wish the court to take a hand and reverse a decision made by the other branches of government, the court chooses not to do so. Shortly before this decision was issued, the AECA was amended by adding the following section, 22 USC 2778(h): "The designation by the President (or by an official to whom the President's functions under subsection (a) have been duly delegated), in regulations issued under this section, of items as defense articles or defense services for purposes of this section shall not be subject to judicial review." So Congress and the court agree that the propriety of an item's placement on the Munitions List is not a matter for the courts to decide. There appears to be little chance that any prosecution for AECA violations will result in the judical removal of cryptographic equipment from the Munitions List. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Bill O Rights
by Jiva De Voe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lil while back someone posted something about "Our rights are dropping like flies" aboiut various violations of the Bill Of Rights.. could someone re-email that to me? Thanks! :)

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P. Wayner on CSSPAB meeting
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

an eternity ago in cyberspatial time (a few days ago in real time) P. Wayner posted some comments about the latest CSSPAB meeting. He hasn't appeared to have gotten any direct feedback on the list to that report, which I think is a pity, because he's one of the few cypherpunk `infiltrators' not only consistently attending important national government meetings, but conscientiously reporting them on the list (which involves a significant amount of labor) often to no reward but flames! (there's been quite a bit of indirect reaction to the `software Skipjack CRADA proposal he illuminated.) Anyway, my personal thanks! Cypherpunks, its in these kinds of reports that very important clues of future NSA directions are buried, and I'll start off with a gem: >A group of computer scientists from NIST came to discuss their plan >for the Federal Criteria for secure systems and the new "Common >Criteria" that may emerge. This is an updated version of the old >Orange Book classification scheme of C2 and B1 and stuff like that. >The scientists said the draft is being finished but it isn't ready >for release. But now, they're working on "Something Better." This >is a new plan to standardize the grading of secure systems with >other countries and evolve a "Common Criteria." In general, the >board groused about the fact that the public and industry have never >been invited to give comments during the process. The summary >of this talk is: "We might be able to tell you something someday." `other countries'? `Common Criteria'? holy cow, this is something *very big* in the works. The U.S. can barely figure out its *own* cryptographic policies, and imagine the sheer logistical nightmare of trying to come to an agreement between the most isolated and imperious agencies! I suspect GCHQ (Britain's NSA) would be involved in this at least. (There is a very cozy relationship between NSA and GCHQ that Kahn was harassed for revealing in _CodeBreakers_.)What other agencies? Mr. GraveDigger, the man in charge of NSA's Key Escrow: >He filled the hour with more descriptions with all of the restrictions >that they place on wiretaps at the Justice department. Once again, I >found myself wondering why they are going through so much trouble >over something that just seems to cause them grief. The taps cost >money. They divert manpower. Etc. Yet, the FBI and the rest of the >community is willing to go through a full court press on this topic. >The taps are essential in crime encapsulated in conversations (i.e. >influence peddling, bribery). but this only suggests how much of a crutch they have become for these agencies. They are terrified of losing this tool, for which they have come to rely on disproportionately. They have come to associate their job security with wiretapping -- a very dangerous proposition for freedom. >Some people from the Social Security Agency came to tell the board >about their internal security procedures that they use to track down >people inside the agency generating information for outsiders like >private detectives. They routinely run sting operations where they >call up information brokers and ask them to get a Social Security >file for an individual. Then they watch for accesses to that record >and flag the miscreant. fascinating. has this ever been noted before? the IRS would have benefited from this a few months ago. Or, on second thought, nevermind! all the tax evaders on the list will object to the IRS getting any help! >Dorothy Denning came to say that there was no final report from the >outside team performing an outside review of the Clipper algorithm. >In general, she said that the comments have been favorable to their >work. Several members of the board questioned the independence of the >review given that it was done at the NSA using NSA's computers and >NSA's programmers. They also wondered about the depth of the review >because it was apparent that Denning leaned heavily on the NSA's >analysis. reassuring to hear Dingaling is still alive and plugging away... I wonder what her next Lead Balloon will be? [EFF's Digital Privacy & Security Working Group] >The group feels that it can accept >Clipper if any participation in the key escrow program is completely >volutary. They proposed to test the administration's committment >to volunteerism by noting whether they relaxed export requirements. >To me, the statement was little more than a political gambit. All >of the companies involved in the DPSWG really, really, really want >export restrictions eased. So they offered their support for >Clipper as a quid pro quo. Let us export anything (not just Clipper) >and we'll support it. This is a very interesting stance, and IMHO not a bad tradeoff, if `support' means `lack of active attack and criticism'. But the NSA would never agree to this in a cyberspatial lifetime. We *still* don't even have any substantial promise that Clipper is guaranteed to be voluntary, let alone export restrictions relaxed. (Hypocritically, the announcements have always touted Clipper as Voluntary, the last redeeming feature cited by scoundrels like Dingaling and Sternlight, without ever guaranteeing it, and potentially even hiding the plan of *revoking* that aspect.) The plan, very likely, is quite to the contrary: increase market penetration of Clipper to the point that restricting other cryptography in subtle and insideous ways becomes possible. And I'm still waiting for the announcement in blaring fanfare that Clipper-based hardware can be freely exported, nothing else. I think its close on the horizon. Once they get chips that work :) [crafting official group report] >Most of the board wanted to say that the Clipper chip was >a pain in the neck that wasn't worth the trouble [...] >The fight seemed to break down between government employees and >non-government employees. Those outside the government kept arguing >for stronger language and those inside kept saying things like, >"But expensive relative to what? We don't have any concrete cost >estimates." hee, hee. the U.S. Civilization in a microcosm.

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