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by Godzilla's Home Boy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Crypto and 4th A.
by Lee Tien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Roy: I'm a lawyer, and I've not run across any law review articles that discuss cryptography in relation to privacy or Fourth Amendment rights. The classic treatise on Fourth Amendment search and seizure is by LaFave. I haven't looked at it recently, but it might discuss crypto. One "brute-force" approach to the legal literature is to go to the law library and scan the Index to Legal Periodicals, which is organized by subject as well as author. I don't think you'll find anything under crypto, but you'll find LOTS of stuff about the Fourth Amendment. It'll take time, but by scanning the titles of the articles you'll be able to tell if there's anything about crypto. Some law libraries also have an index of recent articles on CD- ROM, which is easier to search but is typically less comprehensive. Also check under the name Tribe, L. Tribe is the nation's leading constitutional scholar IMHO and at the first Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy he gave a talk on "technology and the Constitution." I don't recall his talking about crypto at all, but he did use as an example the cases involving privacy and wiretapping, i.e., Olmstead v. U.S., Katz v. U.S. Katz is the case which set forth the notion of "reasonable expectation of privacy." (REP) Tribe was a Supreme Court clerk who worked on this opinion, I believe. Tribe's one-volume treatise, "American Constitutional Law," briefly discusses constitutional dimensions of privacy law in one section. It is good, but only current up to 1988, as I recall. Having said that, it becomes obvious that you may want to focus on the law of REP and how it intersects with technological change. For instance, advocates of Digital Telephony, Clipper et al often make the argument that "we're only trying to maintain the status quo -- we just want to keep the existing practical balance that comes from most communications being plaintext." Yet in the same discussion -- almost in the same breath -- the same advocates of "maintaining the status quo" will remind you that you have NO REP in such things as your hair fibers, DNA obtained from saliva under a postage stamp, etc., and therefore "we don't need a search warrant." Clearly, forensic technologies have improved greatly over the years, but the law has not consistently followed a "status quo" approach. Law enforcement is better described as having a "ratchet" approach; they want to keep all the gains from improvements in forensic and surveillance technology, but not the losses. (I am indebted to Mike Godwin of EFF for this point, which he made publicly in a panel with an Assistant U.S. Attorney back in January.) BTW, keep in mind that there's an (arguably) crucial difference between the privacy implications of something like hair fiber or DNA forensic analysis and encryption/decryption relative to communications. Analyzing my hair fibers reveals no information about anyone else. With most communications there is a threat to the privacy of more than one person. I'm curious -- what's the thesis or general thrust of your article? I could say more, but that's probably enough for now. We can take this discussion to e-mail rather than the list if Cypherpunks find it too tangential. Lee Tien tien(a)well.sf.ca.us

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4th ammendment and cryptography
by mpjohnso＠nyx10.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I didn't say much on the 4th ammendment, but did mention it in csn.org:/mpj/cryptusa.* My main argument was that the ITAR violates the 1st ammendment. By the way, the above mentioned ftp site has an "export controlled" area for crypto software and information. Don't let lack of a distribution point stop you from writing crypto software. Send me some mail if you are interested in distributing a quality, strong crypto program in the USA. Mike Johson mpj(a)csn.org

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Crypto-Doc Gopher
by ejohnson＠pmip.dist.maricopa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Crypto-Doc Gopher is open: gopher://pmip.maricopa.edu:770/ It may in the future become a WWW server; who knows. New documents, updates, and comments appreciated: ejohnson(a)pmip.maricopa.edu --Eric --- "Knowledge of C++ isn't a requirement of full (voting) membership of the committee." -- Bjarne Stroustrup Eric Johnson ejohnson(a)names.maricopa.edu Maricopa Community Colleges, Tempe AZ 602-731-8919

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No Subject
by god 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

God knows I have sent messages to the -request address, but again I must ask, and this time maybe it will happen... unsubscribe blankenm(a)seq.oit.osshe.edu ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - It's an analog world, son... - -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just thought some people would want to know -- Detweiler has turned up under a new nym from the PENET server. Some posts to his "cypherwonks" list have recently appeared with the From line of From: an62770(a)anon.penet.fi (CRaP) <anon12070(a)anon.penet.fi> (S.Boxx) Undoubtedly this will turn up elsewhere as well. Yours, A LOYAL TENTACLE OF MEDUSA

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Re: Randomness of a bit string
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I remember one of those MENSA-type tests where your were supposed to >find the pattern in a set of numbers. One of the strings were the >stops of a NY City subway line! ...thereby demonstrating that Stephen Hawking, for instance, is probably not qualified to join the ranks of Mensa. I wish people would learn to distinguish "intelligence" from "high tolerance for retaining massive amounts of pointless trivia". Sorry, just a peeve of mine. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Re: Crypto-Doc Gopher
by consensus＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:29 PM 1/26/94 -0700, Eric Johnson wrote: >The Crypto-Doc Gopher is open: > > gopher://pmip.maricopa.edu:770/ > >It may in the future become a WWW server; who knows. You are aware that you really don't have to have a http server to serve HTML documents. I do it only with ftp (see my signature file for URL.) It is not as elegant as an http server with it's lower overhead protocol, but it works! ..Christopher Allen ..Consensus Develoment Corporation ..4104-24th Street #419 ..San Francisco, CA 94114-3615 ..(415) 647-6384 Fax ..(415) 647-6383 Voice ..email: consensus(a)netcom.com ..mosaic frontpage: .."ftp://netcom.com/pub/consensus/www/ConsensusFrontDoor.html"

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Multikey crypto
by Mike Markley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since I am relatively new to the field of encryption forgive me if this is a FAQ. Has anyone ever done anything with an encryption scheme that allows multiple unlocking keys? What I'm thinking about is a way to encrypt some data and then create multiple keys that will decrypt the data. I want to be able to encrypt a document and then give multiple people access to the document and be able to lock out a key and/or generate new keys without having to redistribute keys to everybody that already has one. I realize that this makes it easier to attack the encrypted information since there are multiple keys to unlock the data but I don't consider this a big problem. If someone wants to throw heavy duty horsepower at the problem they will crack it eventually anyway. Mike -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Mike Markley || The opinions here do not represent the mmarkley(a)microsoft.com || opinions of my employer. Attempts to || associate the two are pointless. "I want to look at life, In the available light" - Neil Peart -

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clipper cracking
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May says; >Yeah, I guess Duncan is right. I did write some comments about the >procedures that would be needed to reverse-engineer the Clipper >chip (having started Intel's electron-beam analysis lab in 1981), >but I don't think I ever advocated it as a Cyperpunks project, >that's for sure! >(If I'm misremembering, someone will correct me.) >Might I suggest first spending several thousand dollars to buy--if >you can--some Clipperphones, then tear them apart to see how the >chips are mounted (rumor: surface mount, hard to get at) and what >kind of encapsulization is used. I'll be happy to provide a few >hours or more of free consulting on what kind of plasma asher >you'll need to get to the chip surface, some approaches to >voltage-contrast analysis, and other "peeling" steps to consider. >--Tim May I remember that post, in fact I have it right here <digital rummaging sounds> Here's a fairly long posting I made to sci.crypt and comp.lsi about reverse engineering the Clipper chip. Especially on the technical issues about tamper-resistant modules and electron-beam probing. (followup to comp.lsi added, as they may have something to say on this) allyn (allyn(a)netcom.com) wrote: I ran an electron microscope/chip testing lab for Intel, circa 1981-84. (We built a kind of "time machine" for imaging the internal states of complex chips--the 286 in those days--and displaying them on an image processing system which "subtracted out" the states of bad chips from known good chips and thus allowed us to analyze the nucleation and propagation of logic faults through the chip. Very useful for finding subtle speed and voltage problems, as well as gross faults, of course.) Analyzing the Clipper chip, or any "tamper-resistant module," will not be trivial, but neither will it be impossible. Some issues, questions, problems: 1. Getting through the package to the chip surface itself is problematic. Proprietray molding compounds may be used to make this tough. (For example, carborundum and sapphire particles are often mixed in, so that mechanical grinding and lapping also destroys the chip. And plasma ashing won't work.) 2. Sometimes the package itself has "traps" which wipe the chip (the data) if breached (fiber optic lines mixed in the epoxy, for example). This seems unlikely for a relatively low-cost solution like the Clipper. Papers presented at the "Crypto Conference" have dealt with this. (The main uses: nuclear weapons "Permissive Action Links" and credit card "smart cards," which use less intensive measures, obviously.) 3. Once at the chip surface, via grinding, chemical etch, plasma ashing, etc., the chip can be analyzed. Carefully photographing the chip as layers are etched away (or even carefully lapped away) can reveal much about the internal operation, though not the data stored in internal ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, Flash EPROM, etc. If the Clipper/Capstone algorithm is embedded in the microcode and not apparent from the visible circuitry, then it must be read by other means. 5. Voltage contrast electron microscopy allows internal chip voltages to be read with good reliability. Cf. any of the the many papers on this. Commercial e-beam probers are available. (How voltage contrast works is itself an interesting issue, and there are many good references on this.) 6. However, operating the chip is necessary to read the internal states and voltage levels, and opening the chip under "hostile conditions" (read: limited numbers of samples, no knowledge of the molding compound, no help from the manufacturer) often destroys the functionality. It can be done, but count on lots of trial and error. 7. Metal layers may be used to shield lower signal-carrying layers from scrutiny by electron beam probes. Intel, for example, builds the new Pentium on a 3-layer metal process in which the top layer almost completely covers the lower layers. (Extremely sophisticated measurements using lasers (Kerr effect) and magnetic field sensing may be possible. Count on a very expensive set-up to do this.) 8. Other "tricks" may route parts of the key circuitry through buried layers, polysilicon lines, several layers of metal, etc. 9. VLSI Technology, Inc., the company with the "tamper-resistant technology" used by Mykotronx (VTI will fab the chips), may also be storing bits in very small EEPROM cells, which are very hard to e-beam probe (especially without disrupting them!). Note also that Intel bought a partial stake in VLSI. (I'm not imputing anything and don't know if Intel is somehow involved in the Clipper/Capstone effort. In fact, I left Intel in 1986.) 10. The easiest way to get the Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone details is probably the old-fashioned way: offer money for it. With anonymous remailers and digital cash, this may be much easier. Just some thoughts on this extremely interesting issue of reverse-engineering the Clipper. - -Tim May No, you clearly did not advocate this as a Cypherpunk project, but feel free to elaborate.... Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLUgn+tCcBnAsu2t1AQEVLgP8DVxH2AJgk/6M8+Xj2i6L+GIJCRahkg5A pjKIFQcE++nQwqmnOnAAl/zr7jR8hezLl/e5CNaD4Chjo21MDuoj8+ZQZPOAF85s lxhBxmy6prME36EA4cOpgwOvZrKpMeEskRUmXoLJfd9DVcJKhMImHbsDrNNaplij cm4BJIC0ch8= =FHiQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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