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A possibility...
by Ophir Ronen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello All, I have an idea that may or may not be feasible so I am offering it for scrutiny. What I am thinking is to have one person encrypt using a RNG (noise). He encrypts his message using the noise on one channel and then copies the noise utilized on another channel. He then mixes the two channels to create....noise. On the other side the person must be expecting the noise and must know how to seperate the signal. It seems that this leaves things open by having the encryption key along with the message, but the message itself is just noise. (i.e. the interloper must know of the signal, and know how to split it into it's two components.) Comments? -Ophir ******************************************************************* Ophir Ronen <a-ophirr(a)microsoft.com> key id:E67065 print = 66 57 94 27 D9 70 C5 B4 95 31 F6 41 FD 5C EB 1A ******************************************************************* -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLZCfXNhDgNPk5nBlAQHYwAP+LtV07arvUwpdkTtmSQcm8WAk9E+7LX4F I4ILQfuOt9fnIoFOgMr2QX1gbRmYR1+PgKeuzMV8QEmdxXb/tJdF4Gven4OCmRUR XRIln4Eau0uuxbjmPkI+gVcdgbML1LKb6I4ExCsIQOZhVoYcO1PJWugxxiIaRkDd QiBwuZ0yQTk= =4r3N -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PowerMac & PGP
by Harry Shapiro Hawk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

X-Reposting Policy: Don't redistribute without permission. Rev.1.0.1 I just got my 7100 PowerPC based PowerMac. So far I am using only 680x00 code and it is runnin just fine. Since there was some questions about where MacPGP would work on this platform, I just generated a key pair. It seems to work fine. I am including the pair and the pass phrase below. Don't use this for privacy :) Here is the pair: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQBPAi2RHwoAAAECANiGZ0Qir9+KnQmGi2wIDQyh2E0jG1kclcBwonmct1II6bq1 I50thXufH/7HL/ISYT8iC//miy89RRKoKLcBkzkAEQEAAbQaUG93ZXJQR1A8aGFi c0B3YXJ3aWNrLmNvbT6JAJUCBRAtkR8kT2czE8MZ2cUBAVfRA/wN3Ozs89tjJgZ4 5dFB65eAQ2iVjGrDDQ3AUEQD4CBDQ1jMerXHKNnK5BsGmf2NIw9OGk4wbybDzKh0 Sk1JT+3TU0zqOE3PNf1lxdJrQvnenDw9fWxw/KDbxHFoxsFjpvKNNA1MIbWt2hR4 gOxjNHW3KSmFTtWlSOSXRTQg9/3axA== =tgZ6 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.3 lQECAi2RHwoAAAECANiGZ0Qir9+KnQmGi2wIDQyh2E0jG1kclcBwonmct1II6bq1 I50thXufH/7HL/ISYT8iC//miy89RRKoKLcBkzkAEQEAAQFWWTx9RmAzxAH/YDTp P9s8+lIhguVPMgrI/L9AIqpYjZ9XDiZ94NfDX68k0/A+hTp7f4/J/jIUp21x+HV5 t1kNE+IfE/HifOH/HQEA9JmghV5dHv8eGH/VkgoRn+OrlN3sv0Ds+fHzUbqNWV4B AMlbeRZVsGNUfP/1qUaP4Yl+h2NGIuXPoa0r2wfY9IevAP7U8bCkPgi1Q5mDlG0e M1SKs6XfMObaSdwOB/6CJQljQ0/9tBpQb3dlclBHUDxoYWJzQHdhcndpY2suY29t Pg== =dokV -----END PGP MESSAGE----- The pass phrase is: powerPGP Harry Shapiro Hawk Manager of Computer Services Warwick Baker & Fiore habs(a)uucp.warwick.com

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Clipper (again)
by dwomack＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is probably erroneous logic but... 1. Mr Davis of The New Republic sends parts of his article via modem. The article (unencrypted) is intercepted by persons unknown. Mr. Davis receives a cryptic (pun intended) call in his room about the transmissions. 2. The Clinton Administration wants Clipper to facilitate monitoring of communications. 3. The Government would escrow clipper keys. 4. What keeps someone in a high government office from misusing these keys? Especially since item 1 is illegal due to antiwiretap laws anyway? I e-mailed a copy of this to Rush...since a lot more people are excited about Whitewater than about Clipper, it seems like it might make a decent tie-in... Comments? Regards, Dave

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Smile For Big Brother
by John K Clark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm an engineer at a TV station, one of our microwave receivers at the 800 foot level of our broadcast tower has been getting an odd signal for almost 3 weeks, it's black and white video of a house and it's on 24 hours a day 7 days a week. Out of curiosity I decided to find the house, it wasn't too hard I knew the bearing and I knew exactly what the house looked like. It turns out the house is in a middle class neighborhood in Miramar Florida (about 30 miles north of Miami). The tiny camera and antenna are crudely mounted with duct tape on a telephone pole across the street , it looks like it taps into the power lines for electricity. Nobody would ever notice it unless you knew precisely where to look and what to look for. We are receiving the signal at 2458 megacycles but I think that's a second harmonic, the primary signal must be at 1229 meg, a government frequency, known to be used by the DEA. John K Clark johnkc(a)well.sf.ca.us -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLZJ3qnwRpTAWSvwVAQFsgwP8D+JmENH434G8QArys35R75dab5PA2ZHY PGLhH9u/hQh2kof3ZKjPtL1wfXlBvPRMwqBCJJWmkb9dDOvhxp4izc7eLMm/m8NK cYrii6gqz+E6c7V+A5ONhlqRxnw7mP0pOJ8wGI06lDneYb55SvnBIbssshYhFcTV kOb0tKG0MxY= =bvp/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[comp.home.misc] Internet access/digicash
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- There has been a post to comp.home.misc about how we need net providers to keep accounts of where people access on the net so that they can be charged for the net services they use. I replied saying that we need it in a digital cash scheme. Those more knowledgeable about the specifics of digicash might want to check out that group and field any questions, if they may arise. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLZMRqni7eNFdXppdAQHTrQQAkdRmUoq9OBO2dOW0sZO6w1TNPRi7FTF+ rLxvUdIjMBfFE8VI7ndBLZNbnBX/uuVvTrDyBjNLv1DGaoW/Bk+Ew9J5PDb383bE j3e4QslvTRDXhRatrC3diiqNLLi6Bm65JfTUic0izAqvLKpnNci3rzFdh0kw0x0n +Si5atV8ABA= =UifB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Real Digital Money
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While we are discussing digital cash systems, I just happened to notice that a local BBS I use is now accepting a form of digital cash for subscriptions and services. They have solved the conversion problem between physical money and digital money in a rather interesting way which I thought I would pass along. Through a commercial firm by the name of True Media, Inc, located in Florida, one can obtain a 7 digit token in return for a $10 charge to ones phone bill by calling a 900 number. An automated voice system reads you the 7 digit number without the need for human intervention. Said tokens may then be enclosed in Email to the Sysop when requesting subscription upgrades and will be accepted as if they were real money. Although this is primitive compared to the protocols we have been discussing, it is kind of neat. Using an automated response system on a 900 number in order to convert dollars into digital tokens is an innovative approach. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.3a Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Re: Digital Cash
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I sent mail to Stefan Brands yesterday asking about what kind of information is retained by the (hardware-based) observer in his digital cash system. Brands has worked with Chaum in the past and is now seeking funding (via Usenet, apparently) for development of his own digital cash and anonymous transaction technology, which he claims is greatly improved over existing systems in terms of memory and computation requirements. Brands explained that the way his system works, the user *never* has all the information needed to represent the "digital coin". Instead, the user has part of the information, and the tamper-resistant observer chip has the other part. To spend the coin, the user and the chip have to cooperate in the protocol. Then the chip can mark its own information about that coin as having been spent, or even erase it altogether. It is this change in the internal state of the observer chip which lets it prevent double-spending (and which arguably could be defeated in any software rep- resentation of an observer). I have always been skeptical of this observer-chip approach, because it wasn't clear that it was feasible to make a tamper-resistant chip economically, and because the specialized hardware that would be required would prevent the system from being used on widely-available PCs. However, now we see that our military rulers apparently trust tamper-resistant technology well enough to put it into thousands of public hands, without fear that even one chip will be opened and read. Breaking an observer only lets you double-spend the coins it holds, while breaking Clipper allows you to permanently defeat the escrow provisions of the whole system. So this suggests that the technology is adequate for observers. As for the specialized hardware, probably a more realistic picture of the digital cash user of the future is someone holding a PDA in his hand, with possibly an infrared or cellular modem link, rather than the hacker sitting at home in front of his PC. In that context it may be realistic to imagine custom PDA's which support secure offline cash as a practical product. Hal

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Re: Digital Cash
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a thought on ways to deter all of this multiple spending gunk - when you start off, have a centralized bank server. While traffic is low, you can have each individual certificate cleared with the bank server upon creation and execution. As someone else noted, ``crypto is all economics''. In the New York City subway system, the new fare card readers are all linked to a central computer, specifically to prevent double spending. They could have used smart cards and fancy crypto -- but this is cheaper, especially because they have an excellent handle on the maximum load -- the number of subway riders at rush hour. Fancy technology could get them into an ``arms race'' with rip-off artists, who reverse-engineer cards, crack algorithms, etc. Digital cash -- which provide anonymity, as contrasted against cryptographically-signed debit card transactions -- will become a reality if and only if someone finds it more profitable than the alternative, after deducting the costs for observer chips, licenses for Chaum's patents, etc. Some people are willing to pay for privacy -- but are there enough of them to make it pay? --Steve Bellovin

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Whoa, now... (was Re: Digital Cash)
by James G. Speth 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Graham Toal <gtoal(a)an-teallach.com> writes: >There is a *considerable* difference between kiddy hackers breaking >game protection, and breaking a cryptographically secure protocol. It seems to me that Mikolaj Habryn's original posting was taken out of context. He made a valid point that so called un-interpretable and un-alterable algorithms are routinely cracked by elite warez d00dz. He never implied that the software crackers were going to render your PGP key insecure. In fact, he began this thread by citing someone who was talking about using an obscured algorithm to prevent digital cash double spending. (ie. If you can't get to the algorithm, you can't cheat the system.) His comments were on the dangers of relying on this. Graham Toal <gtoal(a)an-teallach.com> writes: >Sure, but what's that got to do with cracking crypto? If you can't see >the difference between STO protection schemes and mathematically hard >algorithms, ... That's the point. Mikolaj was _never_ referring to cryptographic security. He was pointing out how security through obscuring algorithms can never be considered reliable. Extinguishing a match with a fire-hose, Jim ________________________________________________________________________________ james speth email for pgp compatible public-key december(a)end.com ________________________________________________________________________________ Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL and the company that'll bring it to you... AT&T

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Re: Where is PGP 2.4?
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> What's PGP 2.4 ? There are several PGP 2.4's around. The ViaCrypt commercial version calls itself 2.4, and if I'm not mixing it up with something else, the SGI internal-use version (which uses a licensed RSA) also calls itself 2.4.

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