- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Instant Remailers
by middle-man-admin＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 19 May 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > >It is possible for someone to operate an anonymous remailer anonymously. > >Just get a UNIX shell account under a fake name, pay with cash, and set up > >the remailing software. The identity of the operator of such a remailer > >would be difficult, if not impossible, to discover. > > I'm always surprised that this hasn't been happening; maybe it will when > the new clients become available. I'm currently working on a version of Mixmaster that allows an individual to run a remailer anonymously. The idea is to set up the primary address of the remailer as a nym. That was easy. I've almost finished the modifications to Mixmaster to allow it to call Raph Levien's premail package. I've set it up to cause all outgoing mail to chain through 2 more random remailers before the message is delivered to the destination. This effectively allows me to operate as a "hidden remailer-in-the-middle". I'll provide more details when I finish the code and it's been thoroughly tested. middle-man-admin

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Re:
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:54 AM 5/19/96 -0700, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: >Cypherpunks is not a political newsgroup. ROTFLMAO!!! Since *WHEN*? (Actually the above is right -- sort of. This is not a newsgroup, it is a mailing list.) One of the reasons I read this list is for the political content. The quoted article was information I was interested in reading, and as far as I am concerned (as if anyone cares), on topic. You are new here, aren't you... ]:> --- | Remember: Life is not always champagne. Sometimes it is REAL pain. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Re: News from Burma
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:54 AM 5/19/96 -0700, an anonymous entity wrote: >Cypherpunks is not a political newsgroup. Cypherpunks is a _highly_ political newsgroup, it's just focussed on enabling technology and not too worried about political agreement. In this case, there are folks in Burma using PGP, and the cypherpunks goals of creating the ability to have private communications make it relevant to discuss societies where you can be busted for simply possessing communications technology even if the Thugs can't tell what you're saying on it. And a 9-line PBX may be usable as a telephone remailer... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Re: Cypherpunks, a political "newsgroup?"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:09 PM 5/19/96 -0400, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: >Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 19-May-96 by anonymous-remailer@shell >> Cypherpunks is not a political newsgroup. > >Hah! Most everything that's discussed here has political overtones. I, >for one, appreciated in the info on the Burmese businessman and >forwarded it to fight-censorship. I'll link it in to >http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~declan/international/ when I get a chance. I happen to agree. Information privacy, security, and freedom are definitely "on-topic" around here. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Defeating fingerprints
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"sinclai(a)ecf.toronto.edu" "SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N" 18-MAY-1996 04:15:33.26 >Not that random playing with carcinogenic chemicals is a good idea, but... >I've found that if you use just one reagent from epoxy glue, the collagen >in your skin will disolve. You can sculpt it into whatever shape you want, >and it will stay that way for an hour or so. I don't remember if it was >the resin or the hardener though. This was regular 5 minute epoxy. I somehow doubt that the collagen is dissolving. You may be loosening the keratinized dead skin cells and pushing them around, and then they flake off in some length of time (probably speeded up by this treatment). Any signs of redness, etcetera in the skin afterwards? Unusual sensitivity of the fingertips, especially to pain? One thing to keep in mind is that fingerprints aren't just from the whorl pattern that you see. They're also from that the sebaceous (oil) glands in the skin are arranged along those whorls. You need a pretty resistant barrier to stop these. I've been told by the son of a cop that the combination of a pair of latex gloves with a couple layers of cotton gloves stops both the oils and the normal pressure patterns. -Allen

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Re: Is Chaum's System Traceable or Untraceable?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:10 AM 5/19/96 -0400, Simon Spero wrote: >> > (On the other hand, I have had a longstanding faith that the system can be >> > made to be both payer- and payee-anonymous. Moneychangers, for example.) .. >This scheme can't be used with the ecash API, and I believe is not looked >on kindly when applying for ecash licences. It makes you a lot more >vulnerable to traffic analysis There are at least two reasons for wanting payee anonymity - general privacy - criminal activities, e.g. ransom, where payee doesn't trust payer. In the latter case, the facts that collaboration is required, special software is needed, and licenses are violated are not really a problem - the Bad Guy can give the payer the code along with the ransom note, and doesn't care about the license. Traffic analysis is a concern, but you're probably not going to collect ransom from the same person on a regular basis, and for blackmail, you can keep changing the payment address, and you're a bit less worried about the payer's location being noticed than if you were collaborating in something like tax evasion. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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FW: "CyberPayment Infrastructure"
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>---------- >From: Dick Moores[SMTP:rdm@netcom.com] >Sent: Sunday, June 30, 1996 2:13 PM >To: SEASIGI >Subject: "CyberPayment Infrastructure" > >"CyberPayment Infrastructure" is the title of a new article from the >Journal of Online Law. I have an email subscription, but there's also >a >web site, http://www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol . The new article >should be on the web site soon, but if it's not, I'll send it to anyone >who asks. It's about 20k. Here's the abstract: > > {Article 6} > > CyberPayment Infrastructure > Henry H. Perritt, Jr. [NOTE 1] > > [Cite as Henry H. Perritt, Jr., > "CyberPayment Infrastructure," > 1996 J. Online L. art. 6, par. ___] > >Abstract > >{par. 1} An essential requisite for commerce on the Internet >is the existence of a reliable and secure system to handle >payment for goods and services purchased. The basic >technology for such systems is public key encryption. >Professor Perritt explains how this technology can be used >to create a variety of "payment infrastructures." Any >payment system must meet certain requirements: merchants can >depend on it to be paid; consumers have access to the means >of payment through intermediaries like "certificate >authorities;" these intermediaries understand their >responsibilities and risks; and existing financial >institutions understand their responsibilities in the world >of non-paper-based financial instruments. Much of what is >necessary can be accomplished within today's legal framework >without need of new laws. > >----------------------------------------------------------------- > >Dick Moores rdm(a)netcom.com > >

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Technology and Privacy
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Washington Post, July 1, 1996, p. A16. Technology and Privacy [Letter] In reference to the May 31 editorial "Plant Lights and Privacy" commenting on an 11th Circuit Court of Appeals decision to uphold the use of thermal imaging in cases involving indoor marijuana growing operations: The U.S. Supreme Court had just declined to review that 11th Circuit decision. On June 11, The Post published a letter from Jack King ["When Government Can Look Through Walls"] warning us that thermal imaging, as developed by the military and as used by civilian law enforcement agencies with the cooperation of the military, posed an Orwellian threat to citizens because the government could use the technology to tell if two people were making love in the privacy of their bedroom. To set the record straight, military thermal imaging is used to support civilian law enforcement only after other probable cause for a search warrant, such as power bills, observation of boarded-up windows, vents on the roof to draw away heat and buys by confidential informants, are documented. The military is then called in, using thermal imagers, to determine if there is an unusual heat source in the house as detected by heat escaping from the house. In dozens of cases where thermal imaging was used, I have not observed one case where it could detect the activity of people in a house, let alone a bedroom. I also have not observed the technology to have the ability to detect what people are doing in any room behind closed doors, covered windows and walls other than to detect blurs or shadows moving around behind light curtains. The United States v. Cusumano language quoted by Mr. King was reversed last month by the court because the original three judges decided it was an issue that didn't need deciding, i.e. the constitutionality of thermal imaging absent a search warrant, and did not exercise "judicial restraint." The trend to Mr. King's "militarization" of the war on drugs, based on a decision by then-secretary of defense Richard Cheney that drug use represented a threat to our national security, is being carried out with restraint, respect for the law and an appropriate appreciation for the privacy of our citizens. Barrie A. Vernon Alexandria The writer is an attorney with the National Guard Bureau at the Pentagon working in support of the counter-drug directorate. [End]

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LOS_tit
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

7-2-96 UST, page one: "Companies fear losing privacy, customers' trust." In a show of self-reliance reminiscent of the old West, companies are taking matters into their own hands, hiring security firms to protect their computer systems and ignoring the convention that law enforcement is the best defense. It's a stance that has implications for law enforcement and commerce, raises broad questions of privacy and control, and pits the philosophy of the Clinton administration directly against that of many Fortune 500 companies. "An organization has very little to gain" by reporting, says Lloyd Hession, of IBM's Business Recovery Services. There seems to be universal agreement that the strongest means for securing computer data against theft lies in cryptography, but the Clinton administration, citing fears that criminals would use cryptography to cloak their activities, is setting regulations slowing development of cryptography software. The Clinton administration is to announce, as early as this week, a commission to determine the federal government's role in securing cyberspace, from terrorism to petty crimes. http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/lostit.txt (13 kb) Go via www.anonymizer.com. Pipeline now belongs to Mindspring, an Atlanta company. LOS_tit

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Re: rsync and md4
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 11.36 AM 7/1/96 -0400, David F. Ogren wrote: >2. >(quoted from Mr. Perry in an article entitled "MD5 breaks, etc.") > >> checked. However, the result is widely known. MD5 is *not* >> something that should be trusted going forward, and I hope the next >> version of PGP uses SHA-1. > >As I understand the current plans, PGP 3.0 _will_ incorporate a SHA option. >In fact, I believe that there may already be "bootleg" versions that >incorporate SHA. What is the difference between SHA and SHA-1? Is this algorithm subject to the same licensing as MD5? Could someone point me to such a bootleg version for DOS, please? Thanks. =============================================================================== David Rosoff (nihongo o sukoshi dekiru) ----------------> drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu For PGP key 0xD37692F9, finger drosoff(a)acoma.arc.unm.edu 0xD37692F9 Key fingerprint = 25 7D AA 01 85 41 43 89 50 5A 33 76 F1 F1 99 67 Non-technical beginner's guide to PGP ---> http://www.arc.unm.edu/~drosoff/pgp/ Anonymous ok, PGP ok. If it's not PGP-signed, you know that I didn't write it. === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === === "Truth is stranger than fiction, especially when truth is being defined by the O.J. Simpson Defense Team." -Dave Barry -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMdiLyBguzHDTdpL5AQHACgP/dmJJ6aQ0ZVlHN3WcAsPkaGoAypU/iCz4 F8HSK6nxbmG+pBd5+82Flzqpquy23Wfp+uk2l+CIv7oygoOMXVvadRLTQKXZEe+h 8/rk0pLATszwLakwa427P5xgGs4mfwvKjzBi0LpEIu1qkUmWYGQphl7KPAumdLc+ +3Wpc0INmHY= =qXUq -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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