- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Associate Program
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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IP: ISPI Clips 5.29: What's on Your Hard Drive That The Delete Didn't Delete?
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "ama-gi ISPI" <offshore(a)email.msn.com> Subject: IP: ISPI Clips 5.29: What's on Your Hard Drive That The Delete Didn't Delete? Date: Fri, 9 Oct 1998 00:40:03 -0700 To: <Undisclosed.Recipients(a)majordomo.pobox.com> ISPI Clips 5.29: What's on Your Hard Drive That The Delete Didn't Delete? News & Info from the Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) Friday October 9, 1998 ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This From: The New York Times, October 8, 1998 http://www.nytimes.com What's on Your Hard Drive? If You Want Privacy, It Pays to Find Out What Data Your Computer Saves And How to Erase Information That the Delete Button Hardly Touches http://search.nytimes.com/search/daily/bin/fastweb?getdoc+site+iib-site+52+ 0+wAAA+privacy By PETER H. LEWIS For computer users, some of the more startling revelations in the Starr report have nothing to do with sex. Footnotes in the report from the Office of the Independent Counsel include such phrases as "document recovered from Ms. Lewinsky's home computer," "e-mail retrieved from Catherine Davis's computer" and "deleted file from Ms. Lewinsky's home computer." One of the ways Kenneth W. Starr's investigators peered into the private lives of their subjects was to peer into their computers. What they were able to find, and the ease with which they found it, may prompt computer users to re-evaluate their computer practices. Word processing software, Web browsing software and electronic mail have become integral to all sorts of communications, both professional and personal. As a result, many people have files on their hard disks that they wish to keep private, like love letters, confidential business documents or financial data. And many people have sensitive, confidential and potentially embarrassing files in their computers that they do not know are there, either because they think that the files have been erased or because they are unaware that certain common programs on the computer automatically keep a log of what the user does. "Recovering files that were deleted from a computer directory is a trivial process," said Joel R. Reidenberg, a professor at the Fordham University School of Law in New York who specializes in privacy issues. He said a related issue was the computer's creation of sensitive files that the user often did not know were there in the first place. "The user's Web browser will create files, unbeknownst to the user, that record all their interactions," Professor Reidenberg said. "Many people today know about cookie files, but the browser creates a history file as well that keeps a record of the Web sites the user visits. And then there's a cache file that sometimes even keeps copies of the pictures that have been downloaded." More obscure are the temporary files created by word processors, for example, and the so-called swap files that an operating system creates as a way to manage computer memory. These files often remain readable even if the original files are erased. In computers, being safe can sometimes lead to being sorry, as Oliver L. North discovered in the Iran-contra investigation in the Reagan Administration, when incriminating files he thought had been deleted were later resurrected from network backup tapes. In the current Justice Department investigation of the Microsoft Corporation, e-mail messages and memorandums from long ago are being resurrected from computer disks and cited as crucial evidence. The great majority of computer users have little reason to believe that their computer files will be scrutinized by law-enforcement agents, corporate and government spies, or even special investigators. But what about unscrupulous co-workers or curious children or computer thieves? What confidential information resides on the hard disk of the computer that was donated to charity, sold at a yard sale or accidentally left on the commuter train? Examples abound of sensitive information going out the door when government agencies, pharmacies, doctors' offices and other businesses donate or sell used computers without erasing the computers' memories. Last year, for example, a woman in Nevada bought a used computer from an Internet auction company and was surprised to find that it contained names, addresses, Social Security numbers and prescription information for 2,000 people, including people being treated for AIDS, alcoholism and mental illnesses. A pharmacy had failed to erase the information when it sold the computer. The rise in the number of computer thefts and the increased sharing of computers in the home are confronting consumers with security issues that in the past were issues only for big corporations, banks, the military and government agencies, said Steve Solomon, chief executive of Citadel Technology Inc., a security software company in Dallas whose products include Winshield and Folderbolt. "It's moving down into the small office and home office markets, to schools and to home computer users," he said. How does one keep confidential information private? And when the information is no longer needed, how does one make sure that it is completely erased? Both questions involve a combination of good computer security policies and good security software. The software is the easy part. Creating and sticking with good security habits is the hard part. "Technology exists today to protect individual privacy for as long as the individual chooses to keep the information private," said Scott Schnell, senior vice president of marketing at RSA Data Security of San Mateo, Calif. Computer users today have access to inexpensive software tools that can encrypt the contents of a file (including images), an e-mail message or even the entire contents of a computer so thoroughly that it can never be read by someone else in our lifetimes. Other programs can shred unwanted files so completely that no one can recover them. But very few people use such security tools. Computers are good at keeping secrets. Too good, in fact. The secrets can reside on a computer, and on a computer network, long after the user deletes them. The files are forgotten, but not gone. Deleting a file does not really delete the file. It merely hides it from view so it no longer shows up in a directory of files. It's like getting an unlisted telephone number. The listing may not appear in the phone directory, but the phone can still ring if someone knows the right number. When a user deletes a file, the computer stops listing it in the file directory and marks the disk space as available for reuse. Another file may eventually be written atop the same space, obliterating any traces of the original. But as hard disk capacities swell into the gigabytes, the space may not be overwritten for a long, long time. In that limbo period when the deleted file is undead, any moderately skilled computer user can locate, restore and read the deleted file by using such commands as "undelete" or "unerase," which are common features of many software utilities. The computer's ability to remember deleted files is most often a good thing, especially when important files have been deleted by accident. Every day, computer technicians get frantic calls from people who have inadvertently erased the boss's speech or the big presentation due the next morning, or who have children who have erased those boring Quicken folders to make room on the disk for games. At those moments, being able to resurrect the files from the dead seems like a miracle. There are a number of utility programs available that have an "unerase" capability, to be used both in emergencies and as a precaution against accidents. Examples include Norton Utilities from the Symantec Corporation. But as with most tools, "unerase" programs can be dangerous in the wrong hands. To truly erase a file and prevent it from being recovered, one must write over it, or wipe it. There are several utility programs available that enable the user to overwrite a single file or the entire disk, or anything in between. Such programs typically have apocalyptic names, such as Shredder, Flame File and Burn. Similar disk-wiping tools are often included in PC utility programs and encryption programs, but others are available for downloading without charge from the Internet. These programs typically hash over the designated disk space with meaningless patterns of ones and zeroes, instead of the meaningful patterns of ones and zeroes that represent the original information. That process renders the deleted file unreadable in most cases. The key phrase is "in most cases." Just as with encryption, there are people working just as hard to recover wiped files as there are people working to wipe them. Law-enforcement agencies and spies have developed ways to reverse a simple, one-pass wipe with ones and zeroes and retrieve the original file. So the Federal Government requires that sensitive files be wiped many times with random characters, which, in theory, obliterates the original file and makes it unrecoverable. Unless, of course, the file has already been copied onto backup tapes. In the digital world, the original file may be shredded, while one or more perfect copies can exist elsewhere. An even more bulletproof way to render files unreadable is to encrypt them. Encryption scrambles a disk or file, including pictures (or a telephone conversation, or a credit card sent over the Internet) so it can be opened and read only by the person holding the proper key, or password. The strength of the encryption is often measured by the length of the key, which is in turn measured in bits. In general, each additional bit of key length doubles the amount of effort needed for unauthorized users to break the key. Even weak encryption (with a 40-bit key length, for example) is sufficient to deter most casual snoops. Breaking a 56-bit key requires computing resources that are beyond the reach of all but the most determined code breakers, and even then it can require days of sustained attacks by a supercomputer just to crack one e-mail message. (The Government's National Security Agency, by far the most formidable group of code breakers on the planet, is thought to be able to break 56-bit keys in a much shorter time, said Enrique Salem, a chief technology officer at Symantec, whose products include Disk Lock, Norton Your Eyes Only, and Norton Secret Stuff. Some encryption programs available today use 128-bit keys, which are "infinitely unbreakable, at least in our lifetimes, even taking into consideration the predictable advances in computing power," said Schnell of RSA. In other words, it is more secure than the strongest physical vault ever built. Not even the National Security Agency is believed to have the ability to break a 128-bit key. And then there is e-mail. People type all sorts of embarrassing, confidential or intemperate words in e-mail in the mistaken belief that such messages are private. In reality, messages sent by e-mail are less secure than messages scribbled on a postcard. The way the Internet mail system works, an e-mail message passes through several exchange points, or nodes, on its way to the recipient's computer. The system administrator at each handoff point can in theory read the message, copy it, reroute it or tamper with it. If the message originates or terminates in a corporate computer system, chances are high that a copy will persist in the company's backup tapes or disk for days, at least. In the end, there are only two ways to keep information confidential in the digital age. One is to use strong encryption. The other is never to write it down or speak it in the first place. PRIVACY PROTECTION: Who knows what secrets lurk on your hard drive? With luck, and with the following security programs, only you do. PGP 6.0 (Windows 95, 98 and NT, and Macintosh OS 7.5.3 and newer; free for individual, noncommercial use) Philip R. Zimmermann's Pretty Good Privacy, or PGP, is one of the world's most widely used encryption programs for personal computers, so good, in fact, that the United States Government contends that it is as potent a military weapon as a jet fighter or a cruise missile. NORTON YOUR EYES ONLY 4.1 (Windows 95, 98 and NT; about $75; (800) 441-7234.) Norton Your Eyes Only performs a variety of password-protected security functions. It can be set to blank the screen and lock the computer if the user steps away for a minute or to prevent unauthorized users from booting the machine. RSA SECURPC (Windows 95, 98 and NT; $59; Security Dynamics Technologies; (800) 732-8743.) Intended more for small office use, SecurPC links with the Windows Explorer file management system to automatically and transparently lock disks and files with 128-bit encryption, but it allows the keys to be shared with administrators. COOKIE CRUSHER (Windows 95, 98 and NT; $15 shareware; www.zdnet.com/swlib, www.shareware.com, etc.) Cookies are small files that a Web site installs on your hard drive. The cookie can contain technical and personal information, including a history of the Web pages you have visited. These utilities enable the user to accept or reject cookies. BCWIPE WINDOWS (Windows 95, 98 and NT; $15 shareware; www. download.com, www.zdnet.com/swlib and others.) For those who prefer not to use an encryption package, BCWipe provides military-grade file and disk wiping to make sure that deleted files are really erased. Copyright 1998 The New York Times Company --------------------------------NOTICE:------------------------------ ISPI Clips are news & opinion articles on privacy issues from all points of view; they are clipped from local, national and international newspapers, journals and magazines, etc. Inclusion as an ISPI Clip does not necessarily reflect an endorsement of the content or opinion by ISPI. In compliance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed free without profit or payment for non-profit research and educational purposes only. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ISPI Clips is a FREE e-mail service from the "Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues" (ISPI). To receive "ISPI Clips" on a regular bases (up to 3 - 8 clips per day) send the following message "Please enter [Your Name] into the ISPI Clips list: [Your e-mail address]" to: ISPIClips(a)ama-gi.com . The Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) is a small contributor-funded organization based in Victoria, British Columbia (Canada). ISPI operates on a not-for-profit basis, accepts no government funding and takes a global perspective. ISPI's mandate is to conduct & promote interdisciplinary research into electronic, personal and financial privacy with a view toward helping ordinary people understand the degree of privacy they have with respect to government, industry and each other and to likewise inform them about techniques to enhance their privacy. But, none of this can be accomplished without your kind and generous financial support. If you value in the ISPI Clips service or if you are concerned about the erosion of your privacy in general, won't you please help us continue this important work by becoming an "ISPI Clips Supporter" or by taking out an institute Membership? We gratefully accept all contributions: Less than $60 ISPI Clips Supporter $60 - $99 Primary ISPI Membership (1 year) $100 - $300 Senior ISPI Membership (2 years) More than $300 Executive Council Membership (life) Your ISPI "membership" contribution entitles you to receive "The ISPI Privacy Reporter" (our bi-monthly 12 page hard-copy newsletter in multi-contributor format) for the duration of your membership. For a contribution form with postal instructions please send the following message "ISPI Contribution Form" to ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com . We maintain a strict privacy policy. Any information you divulge to ISPI is kept in strict confidence. It will not be sold, lent or given away to any third party. ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: Canadian Military Ready for Y2K Meltdown
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Canadian Military Ready for Y2K Meltdown Date: Fri, 09 Oct 1998 10:18:46 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: NOW On Communications http://www.now.com/issues/current/News/tech.html Militia readies for millennium meltdown 2000 cyberglitch the major concern for Canadian forces By PATRICK CAIN Preparing for a civil emergency resulting from mass computer collapse on January 1, 2000, has become the first priority of the Canadian military, a general told a group of Toronto-area reservists in Meaford Sunday. That means the military is taking the millennium bug so seriously that its worst-case plan, Operation Abacus, is a higher priority than Canada's part in the NATO force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where 1,319 Canadian soldiers (at the moment, most from Ontario) are helping enforce the Dayton Accord. "Some people argue that it is the first priority amongst many priorities," brigadier general Walt Holmes, who commands ground forces in Ontario, tells NOW Monday. "Our operational commitments in Bosnia will carry on, and so our soldiers who are either deployed to or preparing for those operations will be given the same support. "One can never anticipate what else may happen in the world to cause us to have to deploy soldiers, so the bottom line is, if nothing else from a contingency-planning point of view (emerges) it's the top priority with the Canadian Forces." The problem, often referred to as Y2K, stems from the way computers express the year portion of a numerical date, like 12/31/99. When the code that forms the foundation of modern computer software was being written in the 50s and 60s, programmers decided not to use then-precious computer space for the first two digits of the year. Because computers working on these assumptions aren't aware of centuries or millennia, they will decide that January 1, 2000, is actually January 1, 1900. Because this disrupts the computer's sense of chronological sequence, it can cause chaos and system breakdown. Since computer systems with six-digit dates control everything from electricity systems to emergency dispatch systems to air traffic control, companies, utilities and governments are pouring money and time into finding and fixing the bug. Too vast But because this involves scanning miles upon miles of computer code, some argue that the task is simply too vast and intricate to be accomplished. Rotting food, cranky nuclear reactors, banking systems run amok -- a few hours in the world of Y2K prophecy is enough to make you think a bunker in Algoma full of canned beans might be the best idea after all. Most things we depend on depend on a computer chip somewhere, and that includes deep freezes, nuclear reactors, food distribution systems, banking systems, phone switching systems, wage and pension cheques, taxes, and building management systems without which high-rise office buildings -- and therefore Bay Street -- can't function. "I can't make you feel 100 per cent confident that everything is going to function on January 1 of the year 2000," Ted Clark, the vice-president of Ontario Hydro's Y2K project, told an alarmed parliamentary committee in April. Hydro says it has 600 people working on the problem. But we don't need to wait for the end of the millennium to watch the problem unfold -- Y2K glitches are already happening. Earlier this year, the New York State liquor licence system crashed spectacularly when officials tried to enter a licence that would expire in 2000. More recently, the systems of several hospitals in Pennsylvania crashed when staff tried to enter a medical appointment in 2000. At a conference in Ottawa last week, Toronto-based senior army officers argued for a mobilization plan to deal with military involvement in a possible crisis. Mobilization plan "The recommendation from us is that we would like to see some form of commitment to ensuring that the reserves are able to respond," Holmes observes. "We just said some sort of mobilization plan, to allow us to determine what reserves we may get. (That would correspond to) Level Two mobilization." (In Canadian military doctrine, four stages of mobilization exist -- Stage 1 is the existence of the armed forces, Stage 2 is deployment of the armed forces in its existing organization, Stage 3 is military expansion in an emergency, and Stage 4 is national mobilization in war.) Among the options the military is considering is the stockpiling of food and generators in armouries against a serious emergency. "As to where they're going to go, and what the end result will be, we don't know yet," Holmes says. "It depends on the perceived threat, as we get closer to the date." Persistent rumours that Christmas leave in 1999 will be cancelled for regular soldiers are premature, Holmes says. ("They'll probably wait until everybody's made plans, and do it then," quips military critic Scott Taylor.) One important issue is what legal category military involvement in a crisis would fall into. The armed forces recognize two types of domestic operations -- unarmed assistance to civil authorities, which mostly involves coping with natural disasters like the February ice storm or the Manitoba flood, and "aid to the civil power," which implies the potential use of force. Oka and the imposition of the War Measures Act in 1970 would fall into this latter category. Humanitarian relief "The emphasis would be on domestic operations and humanitarian relief, if required," Holmes says. "We are the force of last resort, and if something happens, we are there to be called upon, but the focus is clearly on domestic (humanitarian) operations." Toronto-area army reservists in Meaford last weekend were told that riot-control training, which the militia in Toronto last underwent on a large scale in the late 80s and early 90s in the aftermath of the Oka crisis, is not on the agenda for now. NOW OCTOBER 8-14, 1998 © 1998 NOW Communications Inc. NOW and NOW Magazine and the NOW design are protected through trademark registration. ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: Privacy, Other Issues Post Difficulty for E-Commerce Meeting
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Privacy, Other Issues Post Difficulty for E-Commerce Meeting Date: Fri, 09 Oct 1998 09:38:25 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: USIA http://www.usia.gov/current/news/latest/98100807.clt.html?/products/washfile /newsitem.shtml 08 October 1998 PRIVACY, OTHER ISSUES POSE DIFFICULTY FOR E-COMMERCE MEETING (U.S. position outlined at OECD conference in Ottawa) (840) By Bruce Odessey USIA Staff Correspondent Ottawa -- As ministers from industrialized countries met to work out ways for promoting electronic commerce, differences persisted on a number of issues, especially privacy. When the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Ministerial Conference in Ottawa ends October 9, either the ministers will produce a communique demonstrating some sort of agreement or the Canadian minister presiding will produce a communique demonstrating continued disagreement. In an October 8 address to the conference, U.S. Secretary of Commerce William Daley called privacy "the make-or-break issue for all of electronic commerce." At issue are the potential for abuse of credit card numbers and confidential medical and other private information by unscrupulous businesses. Daley was confident that the privacy and other consumer protection issues would be resolved. In a panel session, President Clinton's adviser Ira Magaziner described the U.S. vision for protecting consumer privacy on the Internet, a vision reliant on industry self-regulation, not government regulation. In each country, he said, some independent private sector organization would develop a privacy code of conduct and authorize a graphic seal of approval for web sites that pledge to follow that code. The participating web site would have to notify potential buyers about what information it would collect about the buyer and how it would use it. The buyer would have the choice not to make a purchase under those conditions. In addition, Magaziner said, consumers would have the ability to settle complaints about privacy abuse through the organization, which would also conduct routine audits to assure compliance by its web site participants. Already 70 percent of relevant U.S. businesses conducting electronic commerce have agreed to participate in this program once it becomes established in the next few months, he said. Magaziner compared the U.S. approach with the European Union (EU) approach, which establishes government privacy regulation from the beginning. In fact, a EU privacy directive scheduled to enter into force in two weeks, prohibiting flows of electronic data about EU nationals to countries that have no similar regulation, threatens some disruption of data flows to U.S. companies. Secretary Daley said he remains hopeful the two sides will avert any disruption. "To be frank, we must succeed or millions of transactions between the United States and Europe may be blocked," he said. Magaziner argued that the U.S. vision of an alliance of independent organizations for protecting consumer privacy operating in different countries would achieve the flexibility required for the rapidly evolving business of electronic commerce in a way that governments could not. "None of us know where this is headed," he said. "We have to be very cautious before we act" to impose government regulation that could stifle the expansion of this new technology soon after its birth. The OECD secretariat draft proposal on privacy recognizes the different approaches to privacy and other consumer protection issues -- government regulation and industry self-regulation -- and suggests ways for both to exist. While some EU representatives grumbled that the OECD draft pays too little heed to consumers, Secretary Daley was pleased. "I welcome this commitment to work together to find common ground on this issue," Daley said. "We believe that our self-regulatory approach can co-exist with approaches taken by other governments. "To be honest, it won't be easy," he said. "But with careful thought and hard work, we can get the job done." Privacy is but one in a set of issues concerned about building consumer trust in electronic commerce. Conference participants acknowledged that the level of trust remains low for most consumers, who hesitate to commit their credit card numbers to cyberspace. One of those issues concerns authentication of information exchanged by parties to an e-commerce deal; another concerns enforcement of contracts; another concerns the use of encryption for authentication and privacy. No one expects final answers to emerge at Ottawa. Another area of controversy the ministers are tackling concerns taxation of e-commerce transactions. At an October 8 panel, U.S. Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Charles Rossotti said a discussion the day earlier among government and business participants pointed to some consensus emerging at least about broad principles. First, he said, there was consensus that definition was needed about where products delivered by the Internet are consumed, especially for intangible products like services. Second, he said, participants wanted to promote the availability of electronic taxpayer services, including electronic tax filing and provision of tax information and guidance on the Internet. Third, he said, taxes should be collected in a way that does not disadvantage those who comply and tax authorities should aim to prevent cheating by electronic means. Fourth, he said, existing international tax rules should be clarified for their application to electronic commerce, especially potential problems caused by the location of information servers. ---------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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No Subject
by HyperReal-Anon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>HOW MUCH CODE DID 'CYPHERPUNK' TIM MAY EVER WRITE? How much code have you ever written?

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[SF Bay Area] SCSI controller/PCI person?
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If any of the Bay Area Cypherpunks here know of somebody or are themselves knowledgeable in SCSI controller firmware or design, PCI boards, or fast embedded systems crypto, please get in touch with me for a chat. Thanks, --Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP 5.x encrypted email preferred

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EZ Wiretap Server
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Sean Donelan, see a point and click CALEA wiretap server: http://www.newnet.com/products/win/calea.html

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AD: Stock-Pick Discovers Media Goldmine!!
by stock-pick＠stock-pick.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This message is sent in compliance of the new e-mail bill: SECTION 301, Paragraph (a)(2)(C) of s. 1618 Sender : Stock-Pick, P.O. Box 130544, St Paul, MN 55113 Phone : 1-612-646-8174 E-mail : stock-pick(a)stock-pick.net To be removed from our mailing list, simply reply with "REMOVE" in the subject. Visit http://www.stock-pick.net for full details. Financial Highlights: Triangle Broadcasting, Inc. (OTC BB : GAAY) Shares Outstanding (Aug 31, 1998) : 19.4 Million Shares Current Market Capitalization (Current Stock Price of $0.05) - $970,000 Stockholders Equity (June 30, 1998) - $2,233,470 - Equity per Share : $0.115 At current stock price of $0.05 we feel this stock to be tremendous BUY at these levels. Currently there are 19.4 million shares outstanding, this gives a market capitalization of only $970,000 - a modest investment could yield enormous rewards for the investors who entered on the ground floor. At current price levels $1000 would purchase 20,000 shares. "Mark Twain said: "The secret to success is - find out where the people are going and get there first". We feel that Triangle Broadcasting, Inc. (OTC BB : GAAY) has followed that adage to a T. Triangle Broadcasting Company, Inc. (OTC BB : GAAY) is launching itself to a right future. They are the first mass media company to target gays and lesbians on a national level. Successful companies always take one step at a time so that they never skip over something important that will haunt them in the future. First, Triangle Broadcasting Company, Inc. did extensive surveys. They found out what were the people's preferences. They also figured out what would be the most strategic way to market their product and what programs would be received well by both the gay and lesbian communities and the mass market. They set up their programming and found what cities they should target first. Triangle Broadcasting Company, Inc. is going to start in 15 cities. They have chosen 15 cities with large gay and lesbian populations. After they have gained acceptance in these markets, they will expand to a national level. They can already be received by over 10,000 stations in the United States and Canada. Triangle Broadcasting Company, Inc. will not expand until they have made a presence in the markets that they are focusing on. Triangle Broadcast Company, Inc. hand-picked it's management infrastructure. They took broadcast executives who had extensive knowledge about the industry. Gay and lesbian nightclub owners were brought in to help formulate the programming. Business advisors help with the complexities of running a business. And last but not least real estate people help with the planning of which communities would be their first targets. After all this was set up they contacted advertising executives of major companies throughout the United States and Canada. The response was overwhelming. With all the above factors, and the fact that advertisers are already lining up, success is almost inevitable. This is truly an amazing company with nothing but positive opportunities in front of it. Once again visit http://www.stock-pick.net for full details. ****** DISCLAIMER ****** This material is being provided by Stock-Pick, a paid public relations company, and is for informational purposes only and is not to be construed as an offer or solicitation of an offer to sell or buy any security. Stock-Pick is an independent electronic publication providing both information and factual analysis on selected companies that in the opinion of Stock-Pick have investment potential. Companies featured by Stock-Pick or company affiliates pay consideration to Stock-Pick for the electronic dissemination of company information. 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"TCQ" (request for comments)
by Frank O'Dwyer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some people asked for more detail on the project I am working on, so I have begun a quick write-up about it. A draft version is at the URL below. This is just a sketch, and the document is fairly scrappy still, but I thought it would be worth asking for comments at this stage anyway. So, flame away. http://www.brd.ie/papers/tcq.pdf (Yes, it's an acrobat doc. Apologies for the somewhat awkward format here.) Cheers, Frank O'Dwyer.

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TCQ ascii version
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(c) 1998 Frank O'Dwyer. Verbatim copying and redistribution in any medium is permitted provided this copyright notice is preserved on all copies. TCQ ("They Seek You") Mass-market Strong Anonymity Frank O'Dwyer fod(a)brd.ie Introduction This document sketches the design goals and features of "TCQ", a work in progress with the aim of providing a mix of features offered by ICQ, IRC and email -- but using cryptography to provide strong anonymity and privacy. As the name implies, TCQ "(They Seek You") is similar in purpose to ICQ ("I Seek You"), but with a very different emphasis. TCQ is motivated by the recognition that people being sought do not always wish to be found, and that those doing the seeking (people, organisations, or governments) can be threatening. TCQ is also motivated by a desire to make the use of strong anonymity easier and much more common, riding the current wave of popularity of "anonymous" services like IRC, ICQ and webmail. Status TCQ is in the early stages of being designed and prototyped; this early draft is being made available now to solicit comments (and assistance) from anyone with an interest in this project. Some initial design decisions and the rationale for them are also documented here. It is planned to make TCQ freely available in source and binary form, under a liberal licence (such as MozPL, or a BSD-style licence). If you can contribute ideas, or code on those terms, you are welcome to. Background Basic political background to this, intended for general consumption (including people who may not be aware of what GAK is, etc.). This is just a sketch. - FOD Anonymous communication is hugely popular. Vast numbers of non-technical people use services such as ICQ (www.mirabilis.com) and Hotmail (www.hotmail.com) because they want to communicate privately and anonymously. However, these systems only offer a weak form of privacy and anonymity. They use unencrypted links (which can easily be tapped), unencrypted messages on centralised servers (which can easily be commandeered or shut down) and well known sites (to which access can easily be blocked). They also use communication links that can be traced to individuals, albeit requiring some effort. Systems which offer much better privacy and anonymity are available (for example PGP, Cypherpunks remailers), but relatively few people use those systems. This is partly because relatively few people know about them, but mainly because they are difficult to use. There is a lot of additional theory on strongly anonymous and strongly private communications [ref Cypherpunks literature here], but few implementations of any sort and no mass-market implementations. (that I am aware of - FOD). In the case of strong anonymity, most services thus far have been based on email. Email has a strong culture of being suspicious of "fake names", and this is another factor in the lack of mainstream take-up of strong anonymity. However, with services such as IRC and ICQ, "fake names" are the norm -- these cultures are now becoming mainstream and they may be more receptive to strong anonymity. At the same time, an individual's ability to communicate with true privacy and anonymity is under threat from various quarters, including for example: o Government Access to Keys. Proposals designed to allow governmental access to private communications, (including encrypted private communications between individuals) have been circulating for some time in many jurisdictions including the United States and Europe. These proposals are typically sold on the back of "hard cases", such as a claimed need for law enforcement to be able to intercept the communications of paedophiles and terrorists. o Physical border inspections. Users who cross borders may be subject to customs inspection of any computer equipment they may be carrying; for example, if their laptops contain (or appear to contain) encrypted information, they may be required to provide the key(s). On the other hand, if their information is not encrypted, then users' confidential information (private diaries, letters, business plans) is exposed. There are rumours that some countries (such as the UK) already perform such inspections. o Centralised Services. There is a growing trend to move security-critical services off users' own PCs and onto the web. Prime examples include online backup and webmail. Even non-technical people often instinctively react to this by becoming "anonymous" (e.g. lying about their names and location). However, this is still a very hospitable climate for attack by governments and other parties, and in any case, the level of anonymity is weak. Also, in so far as such services benefit privacy/anonymity (e.g. webmail), they are easily monitored, blocked, or shut down. o Strongly Identifying Protocols. Commercial security products, some of which apparently offer strong encryption and privacy, are almost universally based upon "X.509 certificates" and trusted third parties known as "Certification Authorities" (CAs). This trend is worrying for a number of reasons: o X.509 is typically used as a strongly identifying protocol, and the analogy is often made between X.509 certificates and a driving licence or passport. Although X.509 can facilitate private communications, it effectively prevents anonymous private communications since by design it requires you to show your "passport" to strangers. (X.509 does not have to be used this way, but people are often encouraged to use it that way.) o Use of X.509, and in particular establishment of public CAs, is likely to be heavily regulated. Proposals have been made to "licence" CAs, for example. Regulated management of individuals' encryption keys is not a healthy development for online privacy. o Extensions for governmental access to keys have been made to X.509, and X.509 is at the heart of some governmental strategies to mandate key access. o If Public CAs take off then they will turn out to be single points of failure and an extremely attractive attack target. Anyone (individual, corporation or government) who can compromise a public CA is in an excellent position to attack the communications of all users served by that CA. o Logical border inspections. Communications that cross cyberspace borders may be subject to traffic monitoring and/or filtering. This might occur at corporate firewalls or at well defined national "entry points" and "exit points". o Non-repudiation. Some systems for private communications have as a side effect that it is difficult for a person to plausibly deny sending or receiving a particular message. This is sometimes welcome, but it can be a problem if the person thinks he or she is anonymous. For example, a warm body might be linked to a message just by being found in physical possession of related cryptographic keys. Design goals These goals are listed to give an idea of the features TCQ is intended to provide. It is likely that TCQ will meet these goals only in a piecemeal fashion as it evolves, doing the easy bits first and leaving the hard bits till later. We will see. -FOD 1. Casual Anonymity. TCQ should offer a messaging service based on disposable cryptographic identities. This level of anonymity is weak, but it is easiest to implement and it is a start. 2. Relative Anonymity. It can be useful to have multiple identities (or "nyms") and for some identities to be less anonymous than others. A nym might be anonymous, identified to a friend, identified to a select group, or generally identified to everyone. For example, this allows for applications where the sender is anonymous but the receiver is not. TCQ should allow people to selectively reveal their identities (including partial information about themselves) while remaining fully anonymous to others. TCQ should also allow multiple identities to be maintained, with varying degrees of anonymity, and allow these identities to be kept at arm's length from each other. Lastly, it should be possible for a TCQ sender to selectively reveal "also known as" relationships between one nym and another. (lots of requirements here -- might be worth splitting this up). 3. Strong Anonymity. TCQ should be extensible to use, or natively offer, stronger anonymity services (mixes, remailer-type functionality, etc.). 4. Privacy. It should not be possible for unintended recipients to read TCQ messages (but see the caveats below). 5. Integrity. It should not be possible for a third party to tamper with TCQ messages. (again see the caveats below.) 6. Repudiability. It should be possible to plausibly deny having sent a TCQ message, or at least know when this will not be the case. 7. Ease of use. o TCQ should be easy to install and use for average users of ICQ, webmail and IRC, and should not require special cryptographic expertise. o TCQ should also be easy to use for advanced users, and allow them to know what is going on "under the hood". o It should be easy for average users to become advanced users, and they should be guided to documentation of issues that affect their privacy. o It should be easy for developers to extend TCQ without being intimately acquainted with all of its workings (ideally, it should offer well-defined extension points wherever possible). 8. Decentralisation. TCQ should not depend upon well-known centralised servers, since they are easily monitored and shut down. (This is unfortunate, since many ICQ-style features are very difficult to provide without central servers; TCQ may have to piggyback on existing public resources such as IRC and webmail to provide these.) 9. No Special Resources. TCQ should require only resources that are available to the average dial-up ISP user. (Users should not be required to set up a server on the Internet for example, though they should be able to use any public resources that exist, and private resources if they have them.) 10. Secure Message Store. TCQ should provide encrypted and tamperproof storage for received messages, and should provide a feature to securely erase messages from this store. (It is arguable whether "securely erase" is always useful -- an attacker will usually be able to record encrypted messages in transit anyhow. However there may be draft messages in the store that were never sent anywhere.) 11. Mobility. TCQ users will be typical dial-up users. They will not necessarily have fixed or easily discovered IP addresses. They may also change ISPs, move from location to location, or switch computers. While travelling they may cross borders and potentially they will be subject to inspections of their computing equipment. 12. Channel Independence. It should be possible to extend TCQ (with code) so that TCQ messages can be sent over whatever channels and drop-points are available (e.g. direct connections, email, webmail, IRC, ICQ, ftp sites, newsgroups, mailing lists, remailers, eternity services, etc.). Initially it should be possible to use at least IRC, email and webmail, since these are easiest to implement, most people have easy access to these, and IRC and webmail are relatively anonymous to begin with. (The expectation of anonymity is also highest on these services.) After that, use (and ultimately provision) of anonymous remailer style services is the natural next step. 13. Programmatic Access. It should be possible for programs (robots) to send messages via TCQ, and to automatically handle received messages. Command line and API access, coupled with some form of scriptability and the ability to call out to scripts to handle, pre-process or send messages is desirable for this. 14. Group communication. Programs such as IRC and ICQ offer the ability to have N-way chats. If it is to attract users of these programs, TCQ needs to offer that too. (This is difficult to do generically and securely, however.) 15. File Transfer. Messages should not be restricted to text messages, and messages should not be limited in size. 16. Stealth, firewall negotiation. TCQ should be able to avail of stealthy channels, and should not make its protocols easy to firewall. Protocols that are easy to firewall are usually easy to filter and monitor, and always easy to shut down. 17. Persistent pseudonyms, friend location. With IRC and ICQ, it is straightforward to determine if a friend is online and communicate with them again (although this is not done securely). Although it has no central server, TCQ should allow this in a similarly straightforward fashion, otherwise few will use it. 18. Key Management Independence. TCQ should not presuppose much more than the availability of a key pair per pseudonym. This allows different key management systems to be used, including web-of-trust, reputation capital systems, manual key exchange etc. 19. No patent problems. TCQ should not require the use of patented techniques or patented algorithms such as RSA and IDEA, as this would affect its use in some countries. 20. Sugar. Popular chat clients (e.g. Mirc, Vplaces) provide various "nice to have" features such as the ability to play sound files during conversations and the ability to have avatars (graphical representations of participants). TCQ should provide similar features. Anonymity and Privacy Caveats This is just an attempt on my part to work out what is and is not achievable in terms of privacy and integrity when purely anonymous participants are involved and relationships are formed wholly online (i.e. no out-of-band contact or face-to-face meetings). I just wrote it down here to clarify my own thinking and to capture it somewhere. Comments on this reasoning are very welcome. - FOD. Anonymous Receivers When talking to an anonymous receiver, privacy of communications does not apply in the usual sense, regardless of how much encryption is present. This is because an anonymous receiver could be anyone (by definition). In such a scenario, the sender should assume the worst, namely that the receiver is not someone the sender wishes to communicate confidential information to. For example, the receiver could be some entity out to determine the sender's identity or exact location. In addition, the receiver could pass the sender's messages on to others. Thus, not only could you be talking to anyone, you could be talking to everyone. In a group where all relationships are anonymous and formed wholly online, no amount of strong cryptography or "reputation capital" changes this (see Man in the middle attacks below). So why bother encrypting to an anonymous receiver? The only reason seems to be that in an anonymous online relationship, privacy comes from sender anonymity and sender anonymity might fail. If it does, then message encryption is a second line of defence against eavesdroppers but only if the anonymous receiver is trustworthy after all. There seem to be plenty of threat models in which encryption to anonymous receivers is worthless. An example may clarify this: Nym1 wishes to admit some embarrassing but non-identifying fact about themselves to Nym2. The reason Nym1 is willing to make the admission is because Nym1 believes itself to be speaking anonymously, not because it believes it is speaking privately. After all, Nym2 could be anyone/everyone. However, if Nym1's anonymity fails somehow, then encrypting to Nym2 can be beneficial if there is some significant chance that Nym2 is not revealing Nym1's messages, and Nym2 does not know Nym1 or is otherwise not an adversary of Nym1. Similarly, if there is a significant chance that Nym2 does know Nym1, or is an adversary, then encryption to Nym2 is pointless. In both cases, encryption is secondary and anonymity is the point. Anonymous Senders The flip side of the above, from the receiver perspective, is that an anonymous sender could be anyone. The receiver cannot assume that it is the only person receiving the sender's messages, even if they are encrypted. The sender could be broadcasting them. Nor can the receiver assume that the messages are in any sense "from" any particular sender, even if integrity protection is applied. They could be from anyone. It seems at first sight that given a sequence of messages from the same anonymous sender (same key pair) then each message is from the same individual, and that reputations can be built based on that fact. In the wholly-online/wholly-anonymous case, this is not quite true however (see below). Man in the middle attacks In a group based on public keys where all relationships are anonymous and formed wholly online, all communications within the group are always subject to (active) man-in-the-middle attacks. There is a possible defence against this using scale and publicity, but approaches such as web-of-trust and reputation capital do not work for this. This is how it seems to me, anyway, assuming a public key system is used, and I try to prove it below -- are there techniques other than public key techniques that do any better? - FOD This can be proved by informal induction; the first relationship (between Alice and Bob) is necessarily formed by exchange of naked public keys. No third party can vouch for the keys; there is no third party. No reputation capital can attach to the keys; Alice and Bob have just met for the first time. Since the public keys are naked, an active attacker can substitute its own keys for those of Alice and Bob during the key exchange. Thereafter the active attacker can eavesdrop on the conversation between Alice and Bob, and can also inject, delete, reorder, delay or modify messages at any time. As further participants join the population, any new relationships formed can be similarly attacked. Alice and Bob cannot reliably certify any new participants since they can both be impersonated, and in any case, by definition they do not know any new anonymous participants and can certify nothing about them. For the same reason, new participants cannot certify Alice and Bob either. Therefore, in principle at least, the attacker can impersonate or eavesdrop on any member of the population, no matter how large the population grows and no matter how many messages are exchanged. Such an elaborate spoof is arguably not feasible once some size of population is reached, but this is not terrifically comforting. (Publicity on out-of-band channels (e.g. face-to-face meetings) could be used to make these systems more reliable, but these are excluded by construction -- relationships are formed wholly online). Reputation capital does not help, since it does not matter how much capital Alice accrues if she can be impersonated. The attacker can damage or abuse Alice's reputation at any time, for example by injecting or modifying a message and making it appear to come from Alice. What reputation capital can do, however, is eventually defeat an attacker who for some reason is only able to attack some of Alice's exchanges. In that case, Alice will appear to have two public keys, one real and one fake (supplied by the attacker). It is then up to Alice to boost the reputation of the real key and damage that of the fake (assuming she gets to know of it). Initial Design Decisions This is still very incomplete, just a few notes for now - FOD Programming Language, Platform o TCQ will be implemented in Java/Swing, targeting Java 1.1/1.2 and Windows initially. Rationale: Java code is mobile and can be digitally signed, which leaves room for the entire TCQ program and its data to be dumped to cyberspace while travelling, and picked up securely upon arrival (even on a different computer). Thus a mobile TCQ user could cross borders with nothing more than a signature verification key and a memorised passphrase, and still restore a secure environment in the new location. Java is also cross-platform, so although most people use Windows a relatively easy port to other platforms (e.g., Macintosh, UNIX) should be possible, and developers using other platforms can provide extensions without much in the way of special tools. It is possible to call out to scripts from Java, and Java can be driven by script (e.g. TCL script, or E (?)). Java also has good support for cryptography, and an internationally available crypto library (Cryptix). Some problems with Java are that certain aspects of it are difficult to secure, and Java GUIs are frustrating to port in practice. Secure random number generation and protection of sensitive information such as keys are hard problems in Java. However, these problems are not significantly easier in other languages, and the GUI port is much more difficult. If necessary native code could be used to provide any features Java can't handle. Generic Delivery Channels o TCQ should presuppose only generic delivery channels for messages, allowing new delivery channels to be added easily. Rationale: To be usable over as many concrete delivery channels as possible (IRC, sockets, webmail, ftp sites, remailers, etc. -- see above), TCQ should not assume too much about the channel. In particular this means that security features should be applied to the messages themselves, not the channels. If channels can be assumed insecure, then people adding code for new delivery channels do not need to implement any security features unless it is to strengthen anonymity. Some properties that TCQ will need to know about each channel type are: o Whether it is offline or online. That is, with some channels the other party will be present at that moment and the communication can be real-time. This is important mainly because on an online channel an ephemeral key exchange can take place in order to establish perfect forward secrecy for that particular conversation. A second set of temporary keys can also be established while online, for later use in offline communications. For communication that takes place entirely offline, one-sided ephemeral key exchanges could be used as a form of key change (this would allow the related nym to persist across key changes and also improve forward secrecy.) Whether a channel is on or offline can be modelled as just binary (on/offline) or alternatively as some estimate of the channel lag. o Its anonymity characteristics. Some channel types will be more identifying than others. For example, a direct socket channel is relatively traceable, whereas a channel through a remailer-type network is much harder to trace. Channels via drop-points such as public news groups are somewhere in the middle, but nearer the "traceable" end of the spectrum. Message Format o TCQ messages will consist of an XML header and a MIME-typed content. Rationale: (This is all based on more of a hunch than a firm conviction.) XML is readable, easy to extend and easy to process with scripting languages. It's a nice framework for prototyping protocols, and unrecognised detail can easily be skipped. There are also canonical formats for XML, which lend themselves to hashing, digital signature, etc. It's good for assertions (certificates, RDF possibilities, W3C digsig?) too. There's also a pretty simple mapping from protocols such as SPKI and SDSI to XML, if necessary. MIME is a well-established standard for messaging and content identification, and the Java Activation Framework uses it for drag-and-drop, etc. Something like S/MIME or PGP/MIME could be used instead of XML+MIME, but these do not work so well in the online case and S/MIME uses X.509. In any case, these formats can still be used if desired, since they can be embedded as MIME-types in the body of a TCQ message. Generic "Friend Location" o TCQ should presuppose only generic methods of locating friends. Rationale: locating friends (i.e. finding if they are online, determining their current IP address or preferred drop-point) is difficult to do without a central server network. One approach is to piggyback on some server network that already exists, such as an IRC or ICQ network, or netphone directories. For example if two people log onto an IRC network using one of a set of prearranged handles, they can readily determine each other's online status and IP address. Another approach is to post a current IP address in a prearranged location, such as a web or FTP site. There are also some proposals for "dynamic DNS" which could be useful, since this is a general problem for mobile IP. Yet another approach is for the requirement to have no servers to be relaxed to the extent of allowing "nym servers" to be used just for the purposes of resolving previously exchanged nonces to current IP addresses, current drop-points, etc. Such servers could also double as drop-points themselves or as the basis of a remailer network, if there were enough of them. A variation on the last approach is to have sets of users collaborating to provide location services and message forwarding services for one another. This is probably the most interesting approach, but it is also the most difficult, it is vulnerable to disruption, and firewalls are a problem. By using a generic approach, simple initial solutions can be replaced with other solutions later.

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