- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Response to ping re: CJR
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just got a message on my answering machine from Sam Capino. He said they are working on answer to my CJR. They had hoped to get it out by now, but were set back by "the furlough." I had called him about a week ago to check up on the status, but at the time only got his answering machine. Of course, the original 15 days have passed, but I'm perfectly willing to let that slide since I'm not completely sure that the CJR was submitted using exactly the right process. Just thought you'd like to know. Raph

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Re: The future will be easy to use
by Jonathan Zamick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:26 AM 11/28/95, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Jonathan Zamick writes: >> I can't agree. The model of a successful enterprise includes feedback from >> different levels of participants. > >This isn't an enterprise. The government is not a participant except >by their own desire to interfere. > >> Regardless, the government will be taking a role in encryption. > >What makes you say that? Besides, why would that be desirable on any >level? > >The Government will try to set standards and we will ignore them until >they try to force them on us by law, period. This discussion was based on a group of people getting together to create a new easy to use package for handling keys and such. The government is going to try to take a dominant stance, and mandate elements of it. That has to be assumed. Those elements we don't agree with will be ignored or worked around (depending if its government opinion or government law.) However, it is possible, even in an antagonistic relationship, to develop positive feedback. I may be cracked, but I'd like to think that it would be an advantage to find some area where the government and the Cypherpunk members do agree, to minimize the conflict over the areas where we don't. Still, this is getting past the original topic, and gets more into the religious level of whether there can be any cooperation when the two sides are Government and Good/Widespread Encryption. My stance is that currently, no, but that doesn't preclude it in the future. Others don't see it happening at all, or don't see it worth the investment to achieve. That is perfectly valid. --- Returning to the original topic though, do we want to get a smaller list together to spec out some ideas for the project that was discussed? A simple, transparent, tool which would allow people to use strong encryption without having to think about it? I don't have much time to contribute right now, but I can at least put together the list, and some ideas. Jonathan ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ..Jonathan Zamick Consensus Development Corporation.. ..<JonathanZ(a)consensus.com> 1563 Solano Ave, #355.. .. Berkeley, CA 94707-2116.. .. o510/559-1500 f510/559-1505.. ..Mosaic/WWW Home Page: .. .. Consensus Home Page ..

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Re: key for Alice as promised (not)
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 28 Nov 1995, Adam Hupp wrote: > >Can you imagine?? I'm simply not willing to fool myself into thinking > >that I ahve security by posting a key and using PGP. > > Unless you can post some proof that PGP is insecure, stop insisting it is. PGP is really not the issue. The issue is more my security and the environment that I use PGP in. I don't have a trusted machine to run PGP on. Anyone who wants to can come up to machine and copy my secret keyring or they can even watch me typing my password in. So, I don't fool myself, and I don't use PGP, except for things like exchanging a one-time pad with someone when I've already sent the message out across another delivery mechanism, like on a floppy delivered my courier. Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: The future will be easy to use
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:30 11/28/95 -0500, Carl Ellison wrote: >BTW -- PGP currently lacks a way for me to note, when I sign a key, how it >is that I trust that key (by personal meeting, by attribution, by message >association, ...). A signed attribute record would let me record that >information for myself as well as for others. There is more to this problem than how it is that I trust the key. There is also what I trust it for. I just added a key to my key ring that I will use for sending confidental data to a client site. I trust that no one can access the secret key who is not also inside their firewall. However, the key is on a multi-user system, so I do not trust that it is accessable to only one person. Since the data I intend to send will be publicly available inside the firewall, I don't have to trust more than the firewall. It is hard to see how to record the information about how much I trust the receipent's systems security. Bill ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Netscape gives in to key escrow
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:55 AM 11/30/95 -0800, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > All press accounts I've read so far > have lots of stuff attributed to Jim, but very little of it is actual > quotes. Then we would like to hear Jim "clarify" his position. Absent such clarification, we must assume he considers the press reports of what he said to be reasonably accurate. > I don't want to go down in history as a facilitator of the totalitarian > state, and I don't think anyone else here does either. Most of the major players have taken a position overtly opposed to GAK (whilst leaving themselves some wriggle room, should the heat get too severe). What is netscape's position? --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: key for Alice as promised (not)
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 29 Nov 1995, Adam Shostack wrote: > > PGP is really not the issue. The issue is more my security and the > > environment that I use PGP in. I don't have a trusted machine to run PGP > > on. Anyone who wants to can come up to machine and copy my secret keyring > > or they can even watch me typing my password in. > > Threat, please?? Do people often stand over your shoulder as > you type? Yes. > Enter your office, Yep, especially my night cleaning staff. > point guns at you, Not recently ... I'd co-operate fully in that situation, though. > and take a backup of your entire computer? You mean like the on-site backups that I have in the filing cabinet beside me, or the off-site backups that aren't here (in case of fire, or such) nd are completely outside my control? > Have you considered putting the secret keyring > on a floppy and locking it in your desk/safe when you're not actually > in the office? (Or home..) Yep, I've considerred it. It's still not all that helpful. Cleaning staff has plenty of time when I'm not around to deal with that. > > So, I don't fool myself, and I don't use PGP, except for things like > > exchanging a one-time pad with someone when I've already sent the message > > out across another delivery mechanism, like on a floppy delivered my > > courier. > > I don't follow. You're claiming that PGP is good enough to > transfer OTPads, but not good enough to sign pseudononymous messages? Sure. Two different situations. If I take a message or a data tape and encrypt it with a one time pad. And then I send the message out to someone via Greyhound or DHL. And once they've confirmed that they have the encrypted message safely in hand, then I'll call them and ask them to call me with their public key delivered by voice via telephone. Which I then use to encrypt the one-time-pad, using the PGP key only once. Then, I'm comfortable sending it (not the message, but the pad) over the Internet encrypted with PGP. And I think at that point, I have Pretty Good Privacy. > Adam > > -- > "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: key for Alice as promised (not) (fwd)
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Wed, 29 Nov 1995, Adam Shostack wrote: > >> > PGP is really not the issue. The issue is more my security and the >> > environment that I use PGP in. I don't have a trusted machine to run PGP >> Threat, please?? Do people often stand over your shoulder as >> you type? > >Yes. And you can't ask them to leave, as you send anonymous messages? Or does your whole office know your one of those who post to cypherpunks as Alice d' nonymouys? >> Have you considered putting the secret keyring >> on a floppy and locking it in your desk/safe when you're not actually >> in the office? (Or home..) > >Yep, I've considerred it. It's still not all that helpful. Cleaning >staff has plenty of time when I'm not around to deal with that. Of course, if the cleaning staff cut your safe open, you have a good indication of that in the morning. Not that you've demonstrated that the level of effort to do all of this at all equates to what is gained, namely, the ability to impersonate you. Which everyone in the world has today. >> > So, I don't fool myself, and I don't use PGP, except for things like >> > exchanging a one-time pad with someone when I've already sent the message >> > out across another delivery mechanism, like on a floppy delivered my >> > courier. >> >> I don't follow. You're claiming that PGP is good enough to >> transfer OTPads, but not good enough to sign pseudononymous messages? > >Sure. Two different situations. [...] >And once they've confirmed that they have the encrypted message safely in >hand, then I'll call them and ask them to call me with their public key >delivered by voice via telephone. >Which I then use to encrypt the one-time-pad, using the PGP key only once. > >Then, I'm comfortable sending it (not the message, but the pad) over the >Internet encrypted with PGP. And I think at that point, I have Pretty >Good Privacy. Of course, then your message only has 128 bits of security, because the Greyhound or DHL employee could be easily comprimised, as could the message in their office. So you encrypt the pad with IDEA, getting you IDEA level security, and think you're working with one time pads?? I'm flabbergasted.

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Re: ecash lottery (Was: ecash casino)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:00 AM 11/30/95, Dr. Dimitri Vulis wrote: >iagoldbe(a)csclub.uwaterloo.ca (Ian Goldberg) writes: >> So; is there a problem with the implementation outlined above? > >What about the income tax on winnings? That's a good one! A bit subtle as humor, though. (For many of us, even most of us, the whole _attraction_ of such gambling schemes--to the extent any gambling scheme can ever be attractive to a rational person--is the tax avoidance. And any scheme that allows taxation of winnings, but not losses on individual bets, would kill this proposal dead.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Fertile ground for papers....
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:22 AM 11/30/95, Pete Loshin wrote: >In any case, using such a "public" and daily number >eliminates the problem of proving the game isn't fixed. Maybe. In passing, the whole field of cryptography is filled with interesting papers with titles like "How to toss a fair coin over the telephone" and "Avoiding double spenders in digital money systems." Meaning, how robust cryptographic protocols can be used to avoid scams familiar to the most junior grifter. The theme of "proving anonymous betting schemes are not fixed" is in the same vein, and could establish the reputation of any budding Amos Fiats or David Chaums out there. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: politics aren't all or nothing (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 18 Sep 1997 19:51:40 -0700 > From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> > Subject: Re: politics aren't all or nothing > Democracy is the problem, not the solution. A democracy which doesn't respect its limits of power is the problem. This has always been the problem with all forms of governments and will continue to be the problem with all forms of government (even anarchy). People are people, people are strange; it isn't a question of technology [1] or time. The solution is people taking more direct and immediate action in the first person. Always has been, always will be. Irrespective of all the spin-doctor protestrations to the contrary not withstanding. Governments are governed by the 3 laws of thermodynamics just like everything else. You can't get ahead You can't break even You can't quit the game The failing with the founding fathers is that there were not enough amendments in the Bill of Rights explicity listing citizen rights and federal duties and limits in the first place. THAT is the problem with our government today: even the harshest critics of their day trusted a federal government too much. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________| [1] Governments are a form of technology.

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