- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Position escrow
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Geraint Price wrote: > This technology already exists in Britain (I don't know about any other > countries), where you can buy a mobile without any subscription information > off the shelf. To use the mobile, you go and purchase a 'token' which allows > you to use the mobile on a pay-per-call basis much the same as a public phone. Dan Todd wrote: > > There is a similar (probably a number of them) service in parts of the US. > While visiting Michigan recently I saw a wireless phone with a "calling > card" from a company called Isis. It appeared to be an anonymous, pre-paid > cellular phone Keep in mind that Timothy McVeigh thought he had anonymity with his use of a prepaid 'anonymous' phone card over public payphones. He was wrong. The testimony in this regard at McVeigh's trial was 'fixed'--not in the 'facts' of tracing his identity, but in the 'timing' of tracing his identity. i.e. - It was made to appear to be a longer and more difficult process than it truly was. It is highly unlikely that electronically-based 'anonymous' technology is going to be any more untracable than meatspace-disseminated tools of anonymity. X-1.237Y-2.459Z-37.46Monger

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CWD -- Wiretap In the Night
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 26 Sep 1996 16:32:01 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: CWD -- Wiretap In the Night CyberWire Dispatch // September // Copyright (c) 1996 // Jacking in from the "Smoked Filled Room" Port: Washington, DC -- Federal provisions funding the digital telephony bill and roving wiretaps, surgically removed earlier this year from an anti-terrorism bill, have quietly been wedged into a $600 billion omnibus spending bill. The bill creates a Justice Department "telecommunications carrier compliance fund" to pay for the provisions called for in the digital telephony bill, formally known as the Communications Assistance in Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). In reality, this is a slush fund. Congress originally budgeted $500 million for CALEA, far short of the billions actually needed to build in instant wiretap capabilities into America's telephone, cable, cellular and PCS networks. This bill now approves a slush fund of pooled dollars from the budgets of "any agency" with "law enforcement, national security or intelligence responsibilities." That means the FBI, CIA, NSA and DEA, among others, will now have a vested interest in how the majority of your communications are tapped. The spending bill also provides for "multipoint wiretaps." This is the tricked up code phase for what amounts to roving wiretaps. Where the FBI can only tap one phone at a time in conjunction with an investigation, it now wants the ability to "follow" a conversation from phone to phone; meaning that if your neighbor is under investigation and happens to use your phone for some reason, your phone gets tapped. It also means that the FBI can tap public pay phones... think about that next time you call 1-800-COLLECT. In addition, all the public and congressional accountability provisions for how CALEA money was spent, which were in the original House version (H.R. 3814), got torpedoed in the Senate Appropriations Committee. Provisions stripped out by the Senate: -- GONE: Money isn't to be spent unless an implementation plan is sent to each member of the Judiciary Committee and Appropriations committees. -- GONE: Requirement that the FBI provide public details of how its new wiretap plan exceeds or differs from current capabilities. -- GONE: Report on the "actual and maximum number of simultaneous surveillance/intercepts" the FBI expects. The FBI ran into a fire storm earlier this year when it botched its long overdue report that said it wanted the capability to tap one out of every 100 phones *simultaneously*. Now, thanks to this funding bill, rather than having to defend that request, it doesn't have to say shit. -- GONE: Complete estimate of the full costs of deploying and developing the digital wiretapping plan. -- GONE: An annual report to Congress "specifically detailing" how all taxpayer money -- YOUR money -- is spent to carry out these new wiretap provisions. "No matter what side you come down on this (digital wiretapping) issue, the stakes for democracy are that we need to have public accountability," said Jerry Berman, executive director of the Center for Democracy and Technology. Although it appeared that no one in congress had the balls to take on the issue, one stalwart has stepped forward, Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga.). He has succeeded in getting some of the accountability provisions back into the bill, according to a Barr staffer. But the fight couldn't have been an easy one. The FBI has worked congress relentlessly in an effort to skirt the original reporting and implementation requirements as outlined in CALEA. Further, Barr isn't exactly on the FBI's Christmas card list. Last year it was primarily Barr who scotched the funding for CALEA during the 104th Congress' first session. But Barr has won again. He has, with backing from the Senate, succeeded in *putting back* the requirement that the FBI must justify all CALEA expenditures to the Judiciary Committee. Further, the implementation plan, "though somewhat modified" will "still have some punch," Barr's staffer assured me. That includes making the FBI report on its expected capacities and capabilities for digital wiretapping. In other words, the FBI won't be able to "cook the books" on the wiretap figures in secret. Barr also was successful in making the Justice Department submit an annual report detailing its CALEA spending to Congress. However, the funding for digital wiretaps remains. Stuffing the funding measures into a huge omnibus spending bill almost certainly assures its passage. Congress is twitchy now, anxious to leave. They are chomping at the bit, sensing the end of the 104th Congress' tortured run as the legislative calender is due to run out sometime early next week. Then they will all literally race from Capitol Hill at the final gavel, heading for the parking lot, jumping in their cars like stock car drivers as they make a made dash for National Airport to return to their home districts in an effort to campaign for another term in the loopy world of national politics. Congress is "going to try to sneak this (spending bill) through the back door in the middle of the night," says Leslie Hagan, legislative director for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. She calls this a "worst case scenario" that is "particularly dangerous" because the "deliberative legislative process is short-circuited." Such matters as wiretapping deserve to be aired in the full sunlight of congressional hearings, not stuffed into an 11th hour spending bill. This is legislative cowardice. Sadly, it will most likely succeed. And through this all, the Net sits mute. Unlike a few months ago, on the shameful day the Net cried "wolf" over these same provisions, mindlessly flooding congressional switchboards and any Email box within keyboard reach, despite the fact that the funding provisions had been already been stripped from the anti-terrorism bill, there has been no hue-and-cry about these most recent moves. Yes, some groups, such as the ACLU, EPIC and the Center for Democracy and Technology have been working the congressional back channels, buzzing around the frenzied legislators like crazed gnats. But why haven't we heard about all this before now? Why has this bill come down to the wire without the now expected flurry of "alerts" "bulletins" and other assorted red-flag waving by our esteemed Net guardians? Barr's had his ass hanging in the wind, fighting FBI Director Louis "Teflon" Freeh; he could have used some political cover from the cyberspace community. Yet, if he'd gone to that digital well, he'd have found only the echo of his own voice. And while the efforts of Rep. Barr are encouraging, it's anything from a done deal. "As long as the door is cracked... there is room for mischief," said Barr's staffer. Meaning, until the bill is reported and voted on, some snapperhead congressman could fuck up the process yet again. We all caught a bit of a reprieve here, but I wouldn't sleep well. This community still has a lot to learn about the Washington boneyard. Personally, I'm a little tired of getting beat up at every turn. Muscle up, folks, the fight doesn't get any easier. Meeks out... ------------ Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> contributed to this report. ###

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NISSC
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The National Information Systems Security Conference in Baltimore on October 22-25 is bountifully described at: http://csrc.nist.gov/nissc/program Section No. 10, Solutions, will interest those who want a peek at what the Puzzle Palace gang is up to. The other nine sessions cover everything the info-sec gov-biz wants to do to make the infoworld safe from everyone except them.

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Re: CWD--Wiretap In the Night
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adding to the CWD wiretap alarm by Brock and Declan: The Washington Post, September 26, 1996, p. A30. Wiretaps and Money Bills [Editorial] Legislators who have pet projects but not enough support to get them passed have a way of turning desperate during the closing days of the congressional session. Their thoughts turn ineluctably to unrelated appropriations bills. Only last week, Rep. Frank Wolf used the transportation funding bill as a vehicle for usurping the courts' role in a specific domestic relations dispute. Now senators working on the Commerce, State and Justice appropriations bill have slipped in provisions relating to wiretaps that have been before the Congress for 18 months but have not been adopted. The law should not be changed by means of these stealthy riders. One of the substantive changes in the criminal laws ordered by the money committee, for example, would make it easier to obtain court orders authorizing "roving" wiretaps. This would permit putting taps on any phone a suspect might use -- including unspecified public phones -- without requiring, as the law now does, that the government show that the suspect is attempting to thwart a home or office tap by repeatedly changing phones. This may or may not be reasonable, but Congress considered and rejected it earlier this year. It shouldn't be shoved through on an appropriations bill. The committee bill also increased the number of crimes for which a wiretap can be issued, adding a list of new, relatively imprecise offenses related to terrorism such as "providing material support to terrorists" and "terrorist acts transcending national borders." Taps already are allowed for just about every major crime in which a terrorist might engage, including bombing, arson, murder, kidnapping, extortion, espionage, sabotage, treason, hostage-taking and the destruction of trains ships, aircraft and aircraft facilities. What, then, is the reason for adding these new elastic terms, which could include far less serious offenses that someone thinks might be linked to terrorism? The committees that dealt with the subject in April did not see fit to do so. Why now has the Appropriations Committee intervened? The competing values of security and privacy rights require a much better sorting out. It's best done by people who have had the benefit of relevant testimony and experience. The appropriations committees are the wrong setting to deal with such questions, which should not be presented in a take-it-or-leave-it package with the government's continued operation at stake. [End]

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CDT Policy Post 2.34 - House Committee Holds Hearing on Crypto Bill
by editor＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- _____ _____ _______ / ____| __ \__ __| ____ ___ ____ __ | | | | | | | | / __ \____ / (_)______ __ / __ \____ _____/ /_ | | | | | | | | / /_/ / __ \/ / / ___/ / / / / /_/ / __ \/ ___/ __/ | |____| |__| | | | / ____/ /_/ / / / /__/ /_/ / / ____/ /_/ (__ ) /_ \_____|_____/ |_| /_/ \____/_/_/\___/\__, / /_/ \____/____/\__/ The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 2, Number 34 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 34 September 26, 1996 CONTENTS: (1) House Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on Encryption Bill; NSA, DOJ Oppose Efforts to Promote Privacy Online (2) How to Subscribe/Unsubscribe to the Policy Post list (3) About CDT, contacting us ** This document may be redistributed freely with this banner intact ** Excerpts may be re-posted with permission of <editor(a)cdt.org> ** This document looks best when viewed in COURIER font ** ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HOLDS HEARING ON ENCRYPTION LEGISLATION; NSA, DOJ OPPOSE CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PRIVACY ONLINE At a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee on Wednesday September 25, Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick laid to rest any lingering suspicion that the Administration would agree to change current export controls on strong non-escrowed encryption. Equally troubling to Internet users, Administration witnesses confirmed that the Government is seeking to compel domestic Internet users towards a "voluntary" key-escrow encryption system. The hearing was called to consider the "Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act of 1996," (H.R. 3011) sponsored by Representatives Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), Anna Eshoo (D-CA), and a bi-partisan group of more than 43 other Representatives. The bill is designed to encourage the widespread availability of strong, easy to use encryption technology by relaxing current encryption export controls. The hearing -- the first before the House in nearly 3 years -- marked the first time the House Judiciary Committee has formally considered the encryption issue, and marks an important step along the path towards passage of real encryption policy reforms. Witnesses testifying before the Committee Wednesday: * Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), chief Sponsor of the HR 3011 * Jamie Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General * William Crowell, Deputy Director, National Security Agency * William Reinsch, Under Secretary of Commerce, Export Administration * Melinda Brown, VP and General Counsel, Lotus Development Corp. * Roberta Katz, VP and General Counsel, Netscape Communications Corp. * Patricia Rippley, Managing Director, Bear Stearns & Company * Dr. Charles Deneka, Senior VP and CTO, Corning, Inc (on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers). REPORTS OF ADMINISTRATION COMPROMISE PROVE PREMATURE Although some press reports had suggested that the Administration was poised to announce a new compromise encryption policy in testimony before the Committee, these reports proved to be premature. In response to rumors that the administration would relax export controls on 56 bit DES encryption (encryption exports are currently limited to 40 bit keys) Gorelick stated that the Administration does not support the unrestricted export of 56 bit DES. However, Gorelick did confirm that the Administration plans to propose legislation soon, and suggested such a proposal would specify the process for law enforcement to access encryption keys held by third-parties. The proposal would include new civil penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of keys. Additionally, credible sources have told CDT that the Administration's new proposal will transfer jurisdiction for encryption exports from the State Department to the Commerce Department, and that domestic law enforcement will have a role in evaluating export applications. It is also likely that the Administration will again offer to raise the export limit from 40 to 64 bit key-lengths with law enforcement access. ADMINISTRATION REITERATES PLANS TO COMPEL USE OF KEY-ESCROW DOMESTICALLY Both Gorelick and NSA Deputy Director William Crowell stressed that the Administration is not seeking to mandate the domestic use of key-escrow encryption. However, both admitted that they would like to see the widespread adoption of key-escrow systems and have initiated a broad effort to encourage industry to develop such systems. In her prepared statement, Gorelick acknowledged that criminals will at times use non-escrowed encryption to communicate with themselves, but, "we believe that if strong key recovery encryption products that will not interoperate -- at least in the long term -- with non-key recovery products are made available overseas and domestically and become part of a global KMI (Key Management Infrastructure), such products will become the worldwide standard. Under those circumstances, even criminals will be compelled to use key recovery products, because even criminals need to communicate with legitimate organizations like banks, both nationally and internationally." The administration continues to insist that their policy is "voluntary", despite the fact that their policy is clearly designed to compel the use of key-escrow domestically through continued controls on encryption exports and negotiations with foreign governments through the OECD. This apparent double-talk from the Administration cannot be the basis for sound encryption policy reform. CONGRESS, INDUSTRY REMAIN SKEPTICAL OF ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION, STAGE IS SET FOR REAL REFORM NEXT YEAR Led by Representatives Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) and Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), members of the Judiciary Committee expressed a great deal of skepticism about the Administration's proposal. Rep. Goodlatte (a chief sponsor of the SAFE bill) testified that in his view, "the chief roadblock to electronic commerce on the Internet is government regulation of encryption." Goodlatte added, "The arguments that the FBI, CIA, and NSA have given me to justify the need for a massive 'key-escrow' or as it's now called 'key-recovery' plan just don't ring true in 1996." Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), expressed concern that current US encryption policy is endangering the future of the US high-technology industry. Lofgren was also highly critical of the Administrations efforts to push for a global key-escrow standards through the OECD. Lofgren said: "The Deputy Attorney General also argues that the United States, combined with its allies, can control the world encryption market and can coordinate the implementation of an international 'key-escrow' regime. Notwithstanding the absence of any demonstrable progress towards such an agreement, the aspirations for a comprehensive global key escrow scheme ignore the undeniable power of market demand for cryptographic products that do not incorporate any form of escrow. The customers that purchase encryption products DO NOT WANT products with escrowed keys, and if use suppliers are forbidden to supply these products, then someone undoubtedly will. Whatever hopes we may have for an international system of key escrow, we will never achieve 100 percent participation, and those who do not participate will profit heavily at our expense." (emphasis in original) Several other members of the Committee, including Reps. Sonny Bono (R-CA), John Conyers (D-MI), Robert Scott (D-VA), and John Bryant (D-TX) echoed these concerns in their questions of the Administration witnesses. The fact that Committee members from both parties expressed deep skepticism of the Administration's proposal is an extremely encouraging preview of the debate when Congress resumes in January. Finally, witnesses testifying on behalf of the software industry, the securities industry and users of encryption technology all expressed support for the SAFE bill, and argued that current policy threatens the competitiveness of US businesses and Internet users. NEXT STEPS Time is running out in a busy election year Congressional calendar, and chances of passage of encryption reform legislation in either the House or Senate before the end of the current term are slim. However, the stage is clearly set for an all out battle when Congress returns in January, and support for encryption policy is clearly growing in Congress. Forty-five Republican and Democratic members of the House have signed on as co-sponsors of the Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE). The Burns/Leahy "Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era (ProCODE) Act also enjoys broad bi-partisan support in the Senate. Meanwhile, the Administration continues to offer more of the same -- continued reliance on export controls while pushing for a global key-escrow standard. The stage is set, but the battle over U.S. encryption policy reform is only just beginning. CDT will continue to work to educate policy makers and the public on the importance of encryption policy reform. Over the next several months, stay tuned for more information on what you can do to help protect privacy and security on the Internet. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (2) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Be sure you are up to date on the latest public policy issues affecting civil liberties online and how they will affect you! Subscribe to the CDT Policy Post news distribution list. CDT Policy Posts, the regular news publication of the Center For Democracy and Technology, are received by nearly 10,000 Internet users, industry leaders, policy makers and activists, and have become the leading source for information about critical free speech and privacy issues affecting the Internet and other interactive communications media. To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to policy-posts-request(a)cdt.org with a subject: subscribe policy-posts If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, send mail to the above address with a subject of: unsubscribe policy-posts ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (3) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public policies that advance democratic values and constitutional civil liberties in new computer and communications technologies. Contacting us: General information: info(a)cdt.org World Wide Web: URL:http://www.cdt.org/ FTP URL:ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/ Snail Mail: The Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW * Suite 1100 * Washington, DC 20006 (v) +1.202.637.9800 * (f) +1.202.637.0968 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- End Policy Post 2.34 9/26/96 -----------------------------------------------------------------------

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CWD--Wiretap In the Night
by Brock N. Meeks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CyberWire Dispatch // September // Copyright (c) 1996 // Jacking in from the "Smoked Filled Room" Port: Washington, DC -- Federal provisions funding the digital telephony bill and roving wiretaps, surgically removed earlier this year from an anti-terrorism bill, have quietly been wedged into a $600 billion omnibus spending bill. The bill creates a Justice Department "telecommunications carrier compliance fund" to pay for the provisions called for in the digital telephony bill, formally known as the Communications Assistance in Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). In reality, this is a slush fund. Congress originally budgeted $500 million for CALEA, far short of the billions actually needed to build in instant wiretap capabilities into America's telephone, cable, cellular and PCS networks. This bill now approves a slush fund of pooled dollars from the budgets of "any agency" with "law enforcement, national security or intelligence responsibilities." That means the FBI, CIA, NSA and DEA, among others, will now have a vested interest in how the majority of your communications are tapped. The spending bill also provides for "multipoint wiretaps." This is the tricked up code phase for what amounts to roving wiretaps. Where the FBI can only tap one phone at a time in conjunction with an investigation, it now wants the ability to "follow" a conversation from phone to phone; meaning that if your neighbor is under investigation and happens to use your phone for some reason, your phone gets tapped. It also means that the FBI can tap public pay phones... think about that next time you call 1-800-COLLECT. In addition, all the public and congressional accountability provisions for how CALEA money was spent, which were in the original House version (H.R. 3814), got torpedoed in the Senate Appropriations Committee. Provisions stripped out by the Senate: -- GONE: Money isn't to be spent unless an implementation plan is sent to each member of the Judiciary Committee and Appropriations committees. -- GONE: Requirement that the FBI provide public details of how its new wiretap plan exceeds or differs from current capabilities. -- GONE: Report on the "actual and maximum number of simultaneous surveillance/intercepts" the FBI expects. The FBI ran into a fire storm earlier this year when it botched its long overdue report that said it wanted the capability to tap one out of every 100 phones *simultaneously*. Now, thanks to this funding bill, rather than having to defend that request, it doesn't have to say shit. -- GONE: Complete estimate of the full costs of deploying and developing the digital wiretapping plan. -- GONE: An annual report to Congress "specifically detailing" how all taxpayer money -- YOUR money -- is spent to carry out these new wiretap provisions. "No matter what side you come down on this (digital wiretapping) issue, the stakes for democracy are that we need to have public accountability," said Jerry Berman, executive director of the Center for Democracy and Technology. Although it appeared that no one in congress had the balls to take on the issue, one stalwart has stepped forward, Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga.). He has succeeded in getting some of the accountability provisions back into the bill, according to a Barr staffer. But the fight couldn't have been an easy one. The FBI has worked congress relentlessly in an effort to skirt the original reporting and implementation requirements as outlined in CALEA. Further, Barr isn't exactly on the FBI's Christmas card list. Last year it was primarily Barr who scotched the funding for CALEA during the 104th Congress' first session. But Barr has won again. He has, with backing from the Senate, succeeded in *putting back* the requirement that the FBI must justify all CALEA expenditures to the Judiciary Committee. Further, the implementation plan, "though somewhat modified" will "still have some punch," Barr's staffer assured me. That includes making the FBI report on its expected capacities and capabilities for digital wiretapping. In other words, the FBI won't be able to "cook the books" on the wiretap figures in secret. Barr also was successful in making the Justice Department submit an annual report detailing its CALEA spending to Congress. However, the funding for digital wiretaps remains. Stuffing the funding measures into a huge omnibus spending bill almost certainly assures its passage. Congress is twitchy now, anxious to leave. They are chomping at the bit, sensing the end of the 104th Congress' tortured run as the legislative calender is due to run out sometime early next week. Then they will all literally race from Capitol Hill at the final gavel, heading for the parking lot, jumping in their cars like stock car drivers as they make a made dash for National Airport to return to their home districts in an effort to campaign for another term in the loopy world of national politics. Congress is "going to try to sneak this (spending bill) through the back door in the middle of the night," says Leslie Hagan, legislative director for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. She calls this a "worst case scenario" that is "particularly dangerous" because the "deliberative legislative process is short-ciricutied." Such matters as wiretapping deserve to be aired in the full sunlight of congressional hearings, not stuffed into an 11th hour spending bill. This is legislative cowardice. Sadly, it will most likely succeed. And through this all, the Net sits mute. Unlike a few months ago, on the shameful day the Net cried "wolf" over these same provisions, mindlessly flooding congressional switchboards and any Email box within keyboard reach, despite the fact that the funding provisions had been already been stripped from the anti-terrorism bill, there has been no hue-and-cry about these most recent moves. Yes, some groups, such as the ACLU, EPIC and the Center for Democracy and Technology have been working the congressional back channels, buzzing around the frenzied legislators like crazed gnats. But why haven't we heard about all this before now? Why has this bill come down to the wire without the now expected flurry of "alerts" "bulletins" and other assorted red-flag waving by our esteemed Net guardians? Barr's had his ass hanging in the wind, fighting FBI Director Louis "Teflon" Freeh; he could have used some political cover from the cyberspace community. Yet, if he'd gone to that digital well, he'd have found only the echo of his own voice. And while the efforts of Rep. Barr are encouraging, it's anything from a done deal. "As long as the door is cracked... there is room for mischief," said Barr's staffer. Meaning, until the bill is reported and voted on, some snapperhead congressman could fuck up the process yet again. We all caught a bit of a reprieve here, but I wouldn't sleep well. This community still has a lot to learn about the Washington boneyard. Personally, I'm a little tired of getting beat up at every turn. Muscle up, folks, the fight doesn't get any easier. Meeks out... ------------ Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> contributed to this report.

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INFO: Netscape CEO Jim Barksdale signs the pro-crypto petition! (9/26/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| MORE NET LUMINARIES JOIN THOUSANDS IN SIGNING PRO-ENCRYPTION PETITION http://www.crypto.com/petition/ JUDICIARY HEARING ON HR 3011 (9/25/96) Date: September 25, 1996 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com If you redistribute this, please do so in its entirety, with the banner intact. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents Introduction Join Netscape CEO Jim Barksdale as he signs the pro-crypto petition! How to receive crypto-news Press contacts ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INTRODUCTION This is a busy last few days for Washington. In the midst of it all, the Judiciary committee held a hearing HR 3011, beginning the process of educating Congress for next year, and bringing in the Administration for a regular public drubbing about their antiquated encryption regulations. The very same day, WWW.Crypto.Com was honored to have Netscape CEO Jim Barksdale sign onto petition that supports legislation that would: -Relax export controls on encryption technology; -Prohibit the government from imposing "Key Escrow" solutions domestically; and -Recognize the importance of privacy and security for the future of electronic commerce, individual liberty, and the success of the Internet. Jim Barksdale is no stranger to the encryption debate. He testified at the July 25th hearing on the pro-encryption Pro-CODE bill (S1726). You can hear him in his own words by listening to the RealAudio transcript of the hearing cybercast at http://www.crypto.com/events/072596/ We'll be continuing the petition throughout the break and the election and use it next year to support the encryption legislation that will surely be introduced again. Be a part of it by signing the petition with Jim Barksdale at http://www.crypto.com/petition/ ! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- JOIN NETSCAPE CEO JIM BARKSDALE IN FIGHTING FOR YOUR PRIVACY! The following petition can be signed onto at http://www.crypto.com/petition/ The Information Revolution is being held hostage by an outdated, Cold War-era U.S. encryption policy. Current U.S. export controls and other initiatives are slowing the widespread availability of strong encryption products, endangering the privacy and security of electronic communications, harming the competitiveness of U.S. businesses, and threatening the future of electronic commerce and the growth of the Global Information Infrastructure (GII). We the undersigned Internet users and concerned citizens strongly support Congressional efforts to address this critical issue. Bills are currently pending in both Houses of Congress which would: -Relax export controls on encryption technology; -Prohibit the government from imposing "Key Escrow" solutions domestically; and -Recognize the importance of privacy and security for the future of electronic commerce, individual liberty, and the success of the Internet. We urge Congress to act NOW to enact a U.S. encryption policy that promotes electronic privacy and security. Add your name to his at http://www.crypto.com/petition/ ! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO RECEIVE CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo(a)panix.com with "unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir(a)vtw.org Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger(a)cdt.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- End crypto-news =============================================================================

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Re: AP Protocol Failures [NOISE]
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:37 PM 9/26/96 -0500, snow wrote: >> >> Troops are in Northern Ireland for a very simple and depressing >> >> reason. People like Jim want to impose their will on others by force. >> But AP is great - adding more violence to Ireland is just the thing >> they need........ > > It wouldn't ADD more violence. I had intended to respond to Bill Stewart's comment before this. I was surprised that he would suggest that AP would (necessarily?) cause "more violence." To me, it's obvious that it will cause _different_ violence, and I strongly suspect it'll actually reduce the total violence level, and certainly will do so in the long term. But far more than reducing violence, it'll reduce coercion that doesn't rise to the level of violence as well. When people AREN'T put in jail or prison for a victimless crime, I consider that a drastic reduction in coercion, and that's progress. Put fewer people in jail, and you anger fewer people, and you rob fewer people by taxation to pay for that jail, etc. >> One of the strong negatives of AP is that it leads to reverse AP - >> if you don't know _which_ Hatfield killed the latest McCoy, >> you might as well just shoot one or two Hatfield Boys at random. >> If you kill off GrandDaddy Hatfield, there's nobody to say >> "OK, let's stop shooting each other"; instead there's a bunch of >> angry grandkids, and uncles, _all_ of whom have the >> authority to say "Let's go kill the McCoy bastards who did this!" >> The protocols may work when there's one hierarchical target - >> they don't work with two. Hammurabi's law about "An eye for an eye >> and a tooth for a tooth" was a _limitation_ on the amount of vengeance >> you were allowed to take, not a minimum required vengeance. > > Putting AP into place doesn't make murder legal. You could still >be arrested, tried (depending on the jurisdiction) and punished for it. Not only that, you could use AP to kill somebody who killed SOMEBODY ELSE with AP! (which is, to me, a rather obvious fact, but one that escapes an unusually large number of people. 'course, you'd have to figure out who did it... a non-trivial task under the circumstances.) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Public Schools
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phil Fraering <pgf(a)acadian.net> writes: >> > Without vouchers, you don't say anything about the intelligence of >> > your test subjects; to a _very_ large degree, intelligence isn't >> > genetic. Or Bag of shit wrote: >> That's the political correct thing to say, but do you have any >> scientific evidence to support this claim? At 11:19 PM 9/25/96 -0700, Dale Thorn wrote: > People have argued for genetic disposition to certain things, and I > think they are sometimes (most times?) confused [...] [Lots of meaningless hand waving hot air deleted] The key basic test of the power of genes is studies of identical twins raised in different families. They have near identical IQ's, and a wide range of very similar behavior. Identical twins raised in different families are more similar than identical twins raised in the same family, probably because of deliberate attempts to differentiate themselves. Except in the case of extreme environmental pressures -- starvation, neglect, and the like, genes count for just about everything, and environment for almost nothing. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Hallam-Baker demands more repudiations or he'll write!
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 27 Sep 96 at 0:21, Simon Spero wrote: > On Thu, 26 Sep 1996, Declan McCullagh wrote: > > > Anonymity and nonescrowed crypto are the linchpins of AP and its > > more general case, Maysian crypto anarchy. The withering of the > > nation-state. > > If I might dare a crypto-related comment as well; it also requires > an absolutely trusted third-party to manage the funds and issue the > ecash used to pay the murderer, (sorry, fortunate gambler). The > reason why the third party must be trusted by both the payers and > the gambler, and thus cannot be anonymous (only at 'best' > pseduonymous) should be obvious. For the payer, the ammount involved is so small that he might thing it is worth a shot to put the price of two bottles of beer "just in case" it works. As the system gets known, it'll gain reputation. For the hitman, this is another story, but there is a way. AP, a sensationalistically choosen name (No, Jim, I know... you intended it only as a joke) very badly describes what the server does. It could accept donations for all sorts of things, many of them being legally unconsequential. So, a potential hitman group could make donations for anybody who would predict any kind of event and see if they would pay. The server could not even know if these would be integrity tests or legitimate donations. IMO, there is only one way to prevent AP: it is by preventing the advent of e-cash. Making it illegal to issue such currency, and seize and prosecute heavily if any of it is found. This would includes, of course, gold (or other material value) e-tokens, etc. It will come from a total control of money. Can it be done? I doubt it very stronly. jfa Did you give away a copy of PGP to a friend today? Please Cc me any reply, I am not on Cypherpunks anymore. Thanks.

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