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RE: What backs up digital money?
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Perry E. Metzger > >Alan Horowitz writes: >> I will put forth the proposition that Federal Reserve "Notes" are not >> notes. > >Probably true, but not relevant here on cypherpunks. ...................................................................... Perry, here's a question for you, and I am seriously interested in your answer: I agree that discussing the past history of money in relation to whether the Federal Reserve should exist, or has the authority to issue "Notes", and whether the Notes are actually worth anything, is too involved and political and complex a discussion to pursue on this list. But since electronic cash does involve encryption, and since this does have social/political repercussions for the future of mankind, and since the list does involve itself with an acute awareness of what this means for life, liberty, and the pursuit of international wealth, and since you know a lot about the place of free banking and currency in the world economy (not to mention the Peruvian economy <g>), and since it is a valuable exercise therefore to examine the logical, valid perspective that one should have on this matter in order that one be correct, rather than mistaken, on just how a fluid medium like electronic currency could exist within this new cyber-world order while not yet losing the attributes which have made it acceptable in the past, what, then, would you yourself consider proper for discussion here? A brief outline would be sufficient, to create a context to keep in mind, within which to contain & limit discussion, as we ponder the subject. Perhaps something which could be re-sent when newbies bring up the question again. Thanks. .. >Blanc >

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Re: What backs up digital money?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) > At 1:46 PM 3/27/96, Scott Schryvers wrote: > >Question. > >If e-cash were backed by gold would that make it more reliable than say the > >dollar? > > This question, and much of the debate that appears here about digital money > in its many and confusing forms (e-cash, digicash, bitmarks, e$, > cypherfrancs, chaums, etc.), displays a "type error" in thinking about > digital money. > > No form of digital money extant is an actual currency in the conventional > sense. Nor does this seem likely. Nor necessary. Nor useful. Nor important. > > Rather, think in terms of _checks_ or _wire transfers_ and the like. An > order to transfer funds from one account or place of holding to another. Tim is right when he goes on to say that digital money is not exactly like any of the traditional financial instruments. However I think it is more like cash, and for that matter more like currency, than like other things. Here are some of the ways it is like cash. It is basically anonymous, with neither buyer nor seller able to learn the identity of the other, even with the help of the bank. It is untraceable; there is no way to know, given a piece of cash, under which transaction it was withdrawn from the bank. It is a bearer instrument; anyone can hold it, and whomever presents it gets the value (that is, it is not "made out" to a certain individual). A piece of dcash is an asset, a claim on the bank. When dcash is withdrawn, the bank must debit (reduce) the customer's account immediately. Likewise, when it is deposited, the depositor's account gets credited. Between those times the net amount of money in bank accounts was reduced, by exactly the amount of circulating dcash. When the money supply is counted, circulating dcash will need to be included with traditional currencies like cash and coins (I think that is M1), since it is not counted in the bank accounts. The difference with checks and wire transfers is that in those cases there is a direct transfer of assets from one account to another. These are not bearer instruments; in fact wire transfers aren't really financial instruments at all, and do not carry value. There is normally no anonymity or untraceability either, with these kinds of transactions. So I see them as being very different from dcash. The best analogy to dcash is the private currency which was issued by banks and other financial institutions prior to about 1850 (in the US). Until that time the US government did not issue paper money, it was all private. A bank would issue bank notes, which would circulate in its local area as money. They were backed up by "real money", specie, metallic coins, which the bank kept in its vaults. The digital cash issued by Mark Twain bank is in many ways a throwback to these old bank notes. There are differences, of course. A lot of attention is focussed on the non-transferrability, the fact that you have to deposit the cash at the bank after each transaction. Some people say that this means that the cash doesn't circulate, hence is not a currency, hence must be more like checks, etc. But I disagree. I view this aspect of dcash as superficial and unimportant. First, it may not be technically necessary. Some cash systems have been proposed which allow for transferrability. But second, even if it is necessary to exchange cash after each transaction, that can be done completely automatically. In fact, the agency which does so doesn't even have to be the bank, as far as the financial aspects go. The exchange has no financial impact on the bank's accounting procedures. And it can be completely automated for users. They don't even have to be aware of it. Their software can turn in received dcash at the bank for fresh banknotes, anonymously and automatically. So I view dcash as a circulating currency, where the act of transfer in some implementations requires some technical assistance from an agent of the bank able to make digital signatures on its behalf. It is more than simply a mechanism for transferring funds from one account to another (unless you think of government currency in those terms). I view it as possessing real value, as being a genuine asset in the same sense as other forms of cash. Hal -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAwUBMVnJehnMLJtOy9MBAQGoxwIAiFRtBo215dXzlRWR1drH8dQR63zKkPoQ 5EDk85YM8fxIaDg/cYrGEzl+bDlF2qOJisjrCl9XkTJEBrifHavrEQ== =792N -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The syslog problem is fixed in baseline SunOS 5.5. Sun and HP are apparently doing what the stupid law mandates - and they should do so, whether someone at NSA (or whatever) is on their case or not. :) They should also have someone in their respective legal departments bucking ITAR very hard. "tres-dangerous" must have been typed with a snear, no? ECafe Anonymous Remailer wrote: > > I noticed that Sun's latest libc patch (101759-04) is empty. Previous > versions contained the complete U.S. version of libc, including the > tres-dangerous DES and crypt functions. In the current rev only the > README remains, presumably because: > EXPORT INFORMATION: This patch includes code which performs > cryptographic functions, which are subject to U.S. export > control, and must not be exported outside the U.S. without > prior approval of the U.S. government. Prior export approval > must be obtained by the user of this patch. > > So, you might ask, what fixes is Sun not distributing??? > (Rev 04) > 1190985 gethostbyname() can trash an existing open file descriptor. > 1182835 portmapper silently fails with version mismatch by PC-NFS > client > 1219835 Syslog(3) can be abused to gain root access on 4.X systems. > > Yup, that's right. The syslog hole that was so well publicized by > CERT will remain open indefinitely because the ITAR makes it illegal > for Sun to distribute the fix! > > So did HP and Sun spontaneously, simultaneously develop crypto awareness, > or is some gummint dweeb whispering threats in their ear?

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:06 PM 3/29/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Fri, 29 Mar 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> At 05:32 AM 3/29/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >> >On Thu, 28 Mar 1996, jim bell wrote: >> > >> >> At 03:46 PM 3/28/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >> >> >You clearly don't understand. You are an ass making an assumption that a >> >court cares or believes that the witness can actually produce the >> >requested information or not. Fines tend to be imposed regardless. >> >> Bullets don't care that a judge was justified in his decisions, either. > >God I hope you keep talking like this. The list might not have to endure >you anymore unless you get a cushy prison cell with internet hookups. As far as I know, the 1st amendment to the US Constitution is there to protect unpopular, as well as popular, speech. And while it may be a surprise to you, my kind of speech is getting far more popular and has been for the last few years. Much of the reason for this has been the abusiveness that you describe but don't seem to try to do anything about. In any case, the "clear and present danger" standard to speech such as mine is not satisfied. Nobody is under the illusion that anybody else is going to rush right out and kill someone as a consequence of my comments. It is, therefore, protected speech. (Not that I really have much respect for the distinction, anyway. The issue is, is there some OFFICIAL distinction, and there apparently is.) >> Ultimately, your repeated argument is simply, "The legal system can be >> abused by those who work in it." > >I wouldn't call fines imposed on a third party who clearly was complicit >in the destruction of material evidence to a proceeding "abuse." Since you keep inventing these straw men and knocking them down, it is really questionable whether you have any kind of good judgment as to who is "clearly complicit in the destruction of material evidence." It would be far more effective and credible if you would at least admit that not every action by a third party which has the effect of frustrating some court is actionable. The simple action of FAILING to store information that may later be wanted by the officials is an excellent example, for instance. Naturally, you won't like this either. And you certainly won't want to rise to my challenge and draw a distinct line, because that would put you to your proof, and you have none. > I don't challenge this claim, in fact my >> position depends on its truth; my assertion is that the current legal situation is >> out of the control of people faithful to the meaning of the Constitution, >> and has been so for a long time. One of the main reasons I promote a >> de-facto (and unofficial) death penalty for recalcitrant politicians and >> other government employees is because the traditional "checks and balances" >> system seems to no longer be working for the interests of the average citizen. > >Yadda yadda yadda. What?!? you don't have a better response to this? >> >> And in any case, I consider it highly doubtful that anybody would contract >> >> with an escrow agent and identify himself by name >> > >> >The same way no one creates Panamanian companies with their own name. So >> >what? Third parties are still fined heavily. >> >> Any specific examples? > >Sure, several. See my large note on the subject of asset protection. Well, you're trying to change the subject. It's "escrow agents." And the question is, "must an escrow agent always know the identity of the people for whom the information is kept." The simple answer, invoking existing software technology, is, "no." So now you need to explain why courts are going to be able to force a third-party to give what he doesn't know he has, and in fact nobody else knows either. You'll fail at this task, of course, because the answer is not politically correct by your standards. >> >And simpler for courts to fine them out of existance (which happened to >> >several banks, trust companies and agents in Cayman and Panama. >> >> I guess you really don't realize that every claim you make demolishes the >> justification for your obvious hostility to a system which prevents exactly >> the kind of abuses you list. (Although it really isn't clear whether you >> would classify them as "abuses.") > >My hostility is for a system that allows mob mentality and murder run the >streets like a bad day in Beruit. A position which fails to do anything about the current problems in society. Show me that my solution is worse than the status quo, and you'll have a point. Until then, you're just a complainer. > >> >They need only suspect or have reason to suspect it might be exculpatory. >> _ ^^^^^^^^^^^ >> Sloppy word usage. I think you meant, "incriminating." Typical for you. > >Actually I should have said "material." Still sloppy. Classic Unicorn. >> In this day and in this country, "going to law school" is basically >> synonymous with "learn to get along with the current legal system." It >> should have been obvious long ago that I don't consider the current legal >> system to be worth living with. > >Suicide is always an option. I take great pains and give them to others. Anyway the reason suicide is a silly option is that it assumes that the problem lies with me, not others. Obviously, other people are complaining about the same situation, so the problem is not my fault. But I'm hoping to be part of the solution. You REALLY won't like this! >I don't much like the system in the United States either. But there are >two ways around it. Ways that work, and ways that don't. There are not ONLY "two ways around it." There are also clearly "ways that Unicorn likes" and "ways Unicorn doesn't like." It is possible that if they were studied carefully a person would discover that (warning! Set theory terms coming up!) intersection between the two groups, "Ways that work" and "ways that Unicorn likes" is zero. As if by design. >Encouraging random murder and mob justice is, in my view, in the second >field. I've never encouraged "random murder." Quite the opposite: It would be far more accurate to say that I encourage VERY SELECTIVE killing. It is not, however, GOVERNMENT SPONSORED killing, which is why you won't like it. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: [NOISE] Cable-TV-Piracy-Punks
by kooltek＠iol.ie 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>"David K. Merriman" <merriman(a)arn.net> writes: > > > At 01:34 AM 03/28/96 +0000, you wrote: > > >> I've been looking for a file on how to make PPV > >> descramblers and havn't found any. Commercial descramblers > >> cost around $200 base price. If anyone has a file on how to > >> make them please e-mail me one. Thanks. > > > This is cypherpunks. Not Cable-TV-Piracy-Punks. > >ObCrypto: Scrambling TV signals sometimes makes use of >encryption, so perhaps a brief discussion of how this is done >could be tolerated. > >If you are talking about recovering signals from completely >encrypted digital MPEG-2 streams, such as those used by the DBS >folks, you are probably out of luck. The relevant processing in >the decoder exists on a small card which has so far resisted >attempts at reverse engineering. > The DSS smart card has been reverse-engineered for at least six months now and pirate devices are in the market. The encryption used on those systems is good but it does not stand up to a well financed attack. In the European version of the system, the encryption routines were using a hashing function. The input packet also carried the authorisation data so it was using this as an input packet. The DSS routine is probably based on a similar hashing routine. >There are a variety of techniques for scrambling audio. The most >expensive is to DES encrypt the sound and place it in the >horizontal blanking interval. The regular sound channel can then >be used for advertising. This requires a bit of processing at >both ends, and is generally used for satellite to ground >transmission of cable signals. The other common method is to >modulate the sound on a subcarrier, usually the one transmitted >in phase with the missing sync. > Using DES to encrypt the audio on the fly is an old technique and was used in the VideoCipher II system. Most of the more recent systems use a PRNBSG EXORed with the digital audio data stream. >Of course, once television transmission goes completely digital, >and strong encryption is used on both audio and video, the >opportunity for such simple attacks will vanish. > The problem of piracy will still exist on digital systems. The DSS system is a completely digital system and it too is hacked. Admittedly some of the elements of security in the DSS are good, most can be rendered void by hackers. The problem for DSS is that the smart card they used is not secure enough. It was a Motorola 6805 type. What appears to be the pattern with the hacks on more recent smart card systems is an inversion of the original pattern on the simple analogue systems. The original pattern was that some hobbyists would figure out how to hack the system and then the hack would be commercialised. With the smart card hacks - the pattern is inverted so that it becomes a trickle down pattern. The professional hackers reverse and emulate the smart card and then the code is sometimes hacked from the emulator card and then distributed among hobbyists. The most dangerous thing in all this is that the smart cards that have been hacked in Pay TV systems throughout the world are also used in other applications. The expertise and the knowledge of reversing smart cards is now more common in the Pay TV piracy business. There is always the possibility that these skills could be applied elsewhere. Regards...jmcc ******************************************** John McCormac * Hack Watch News jmcc(a)hackwatch.com * 22 Viewmount, Voice&Fax: +353-51-73640 * Waterford, BBS: +353-51-50143 * Ireland ******************************************** -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAzAYPNsAAAEEAPGTHaNyitUTNAwF8BU6mF5PcbLQXdeuHf3xT6UOL+/Od+z+ ZOCAx8Ka9LJBjuQYw8hlqvTV5kceLlrP2HPqmk7YPOw1fQWlpTJof+ZMCxEVd1Qz TRet2vS/kiRQRYvKOaxoJhqIzUr1g3ovBnIdpKeo4KKULz9XKuxCgZsuLKkVAAUX tCJKb2huIE1jQ29ybWFjIDxqbWNjQGhhY2t3YXRjaC5jb20+tBJqbWNjQGhhY2t3 YXRjaC5jb20= =sTfy -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: [NOISE] Why there are so many cluless people
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:11 PM 4/12/96, Andrew Loewenstern wrote: >I heard that Internet Privacy Guaranteed is coming out with their own set of >cassette tapes... ;-) > >"Become a cryptanalyst in 21 days, while you sleep, or your money back!" This is old news. "Subliminal channels" have been around in crypto for a long time. --Klaus! von Future Prime

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Re: NYT: Chaotic Encryption: a Solution in Search of a Problem
by nyap＠mailhub.garban.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> There has been research into developing chaos based encryption, but none of > the systems developed are nearly as strong as block ciphers such as IDEA and > 3DES. Chaos encryption is more like steganography than encryption. > The chaos encryption schemes that I know of use a driving circuit to generate > the carrier wave for the transmission. If a person on the other end knows the > driving circuit used, then that person can remove it. The output of a chaos > encryption mechanism is similar to static, but I don't think that it is > particularly strong. With proven strong encryption, the only advantage I can > see to using chaos encryption would be to encrypt analog data. I've actually been thinking about using chaos to sporadically add noise to some information before the info is encrypted. After decryption, the receiver would then have to separate the noise from the real content. Has anyone else thought about this? Please respond directly to nyap(a)garban.com 'cos I'm no longer on the cypherpunks list.

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Re: "Contempt" charges likely to increase
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"jimbell(a)pacifier.com" "jim bell" 7-APR-1996 03:10:38.36 >Over time, technology is dramatically increasing our protections: From >locks to alarms to monitoring systems to remote cameras, with bank accounts >that are secure from ordinary criminals, we are becoming less and less >dependant on government for our security. Since the ostensible purpose of >courts is nominally to protect us, if those protections begin to be replaced >by technology the logical conclusion is that courts will become less >numerous and less powerful. The problem is, that isn't happening, and the >reason is that organizations tend to act in ways to protect their own power >and influence. In fact, the average citizen is subject to far more theft of >his assets BY THE GOVERNMENT than by common criminals, so at some point we >have to realize that the government is now a net problem, rather than being >a net solution. Quite. I can see clear justifications for, say, allowing whatever money is spent on private security as a tax deduction. Unfortunately, the PC egalitarian types who don't seem to realize that inequality is a fact of life will claim that this will give the poor worse security than the rich. Yes... and the rich are the ones who need the most security. One, they're the banks: they're where the money is. Two, the rich tend to be the smarter ones, and thus the most valuable. >I think that most crimes that subpoenas would normally be used for are >probably not crimes at all, and are probably "malum prohibitum," not "malum >in se" crimes. And in the future, they would likely be used to harass >political enemies, as harassment was done in the 1950's and 60's. This >means, for anybody of a libertarian bent, that it would actually be better >if the government could be rendered incapable of enforcing them. Naturally, >governments and courts will resist, but that will be irrelevant. I would guess that most instances of violations of banking secrecy, wiretaps, et al fall into this category also. -Allen

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Re: A MODEST PROPOSAL (fwd)
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>This happens any time anybody signs up with an an######(a)anon.penet.fi address. >>Ideally, someone could, in their copious spare time, hack majordomo >>to automatically translate all subscription requests of that form to >>na######(a)anon.penet.fi ; as an alternative, if majordomo has some sort >>of subscription blocking list an*(a)anon.penet.fi belongs on it. > > In other words, majordomo is broken. I should have suspected as much, No, it's not broken, it just interacts badly with anon.penet.fi. Of the two of them, majordomo is doing the obvious unsurprising thing, while anon.penet.fi needs a bit more complicated support because of difficulties with its implication and the workarounds it uses. Somebody did comment that they modified majordomo to handle this, but presumably vanilla majordomo can at least pattern-match block an######, and if it can't, you can always pre-process with egrep or sed. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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Re: Known Plaintext attacks on symmertric algorithms
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:09 PM 4/12/96 -0400, you wrote: >Now maybe I have this all wrong, but it is my understanding that a known >plaintext attack is when the cracker knows part of the plaintext of an >encrypted file. Then he/she uses that and runs the inverse of the >algorithm to calculate the key. Some algorithms have usable inverses, but good ones try not to; one class of known plaintext attack is working your way back through the algorithm to discover the key bits using the known parts. Another kind of attack is just to brute-force the key, assuming the algorithm or key length is short enough to do that quickly. > Whether or not I am right about what known plaintext means, isn't the >entirely possible on all of the symmetric algorithms out there? If I >grab a file that I know is, say, a standard credit card transaction >form, and I know what the first 256 bytes are because they are always >the same, shouldn I always be able to find the entire key that >corresponds with those 256 bytes? (assuming the key is 2048 bits or >less) And then with that key decrypt the whole file? Algorithms vary widely on their susceptibility. Consider a one-time-pad: even if you know the first 256 bytes of the transaction, all that does is let you recover the first 256 bytes of key, which will never be used again, even in the second half of the message. Pretty useless, usually. On the other hand, consider a simple "xor with the key, repeating as often as needed"; if the key's no longer than your known plaintext, xor again, find the key, repeat as often as needed, and you've got the whole message. Using the same technique with DES will be left as an exercise for the reader :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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