- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

(fwd) Digital Signature Patent
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For those as get Info Week... Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Mon, 13 Nov 1995 08:08:47 -0500 To: rah(a)shipwright.com Subject: Digital Signature Patent for your information... ----------------------------------------------------------------------- RSA WANTS LICENSE FOR DIGITAL SIGNATURE TECHNOLOGY RSA Data Security claims it owns the dominant patent covering digital signature technology, and wants other companies and government agencies to pay them license fees for using it. The U.S. government is fighting RSA's claim, saying the digital signature algorithm it uses in its digital signature standard is covered by a different patent. If RSA can make its claim stick, the government will owe the encryption company royalties for use of its digital signature standard. source: Information Week 13 Nov 95 p20 via edupage --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 958-3971 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://www.webstuff.apple.com/~vinnie/Rah >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (robo syrinx c2) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ----------- 1:32:59 99.95% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com -_.-------- 5:58:20 99.94% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com +++ ++++++++ 39:25 99.92% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ---+------- 6:09:10 99.86% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org #*#*# #--*+* 38:11 99.86% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *+*--***+* * 13:43 99.63% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ****++-++* * 17:07 99.62% replay remailer(a)replay.com **+**+*++* * 11:27 99.60% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net **-*+*+ **+* 14:30 99.38% robo robo(a)c2.org #*#*####** * 4:30 99.26% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl **+**+**** * 10:30 99.26% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net *****+-++* * 23:14 99.25% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net + +**++*** * 20:38 99.21% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #**--+#* * 13:15 99.08% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu *##++ ##** * 7:53 99.01% c2 remail(a)c2.org * -++++++ 45:17 96.60% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de _ . _ _- 53:08:59 93.60% rahul homer(a)rahul.net +-**----**+* 15:00 99.98% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com .--..-* 11:56:59 84.16% syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org --++++-+- + 7:07:35 79.75% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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New feature for the Cryptography Technical Report Server
by David J. Bianco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yes, it's still there! 8-) I posted a note to this list a few months ago announcing that I had set up such a service, and though we've only got a few reports I'm up to a couple o' hundred visitors a week. To me, the amount of activity indicates interest in the subject, but the lack of reports tells me that either authors are not interested in contributing, it's too difficult to contribute, or they don't know about service. I took some time this weekend and wrote a script to handle online submissions. This should make things easier on the authors, I think. If you have a technical report, journal article or book you'd like to index in CTRS (abstract only submissions are supported as well as full-text submission), point your browser at: http://www.itribe.net/CTRS/add-entry.cgi If you try this, please let me know how you liked it. I'm interested in making the submissions process as painless as possible. As always, the main CTRS page is http://www.itribe.net/CTRS/ or https://www.itribe.net/CTRS/ -- ========================================================================== David J. Bianco | Web Wonders, Online Oddities, Cool Stuff iTribe, Inc. | Phone: (804) 446-9060 Fax: (804) 446-9061 Suite 1700, World Trade Center | email: <bianco(a)itribe.net> Norfolk, VA 23510 | URL : http://www.itribe.net/~bianco/

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Re: New World Encryption
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:49 AM 11/11/95, James M. Cobb wrote: > > >Friend, > > >An item in 11 09 95 Edupage summarizes a NY Times new- >sstory revealing Clinton's wish to spy on the world: > >OPPOSITION TO ADMINISTRATION'S ENCRYPTION STAND "Friend," I'm sure your intentions are good in forwarding this and other similar items to the Cypherpunks mailing list, but if you are reading the list, you should surely know that this item--including both summaries and the complete article--have already been posted to the Cypherpunks list. Two days ago, in fact. If for some reason you are _not_ reading the CP list, or not paying attention, then you really should not be forwarding stuff to it. I'm copying the CP list on this to remind folks to "stay on the page" as to what's already been posted. We are already becoming a kind of "automatic cc:" for a variety of announcements, spams, and other earthshattering items. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Timed-release crypto - Proactive security plug
by Amir Herzberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A small note/plug: the schemes by Tim and Michael are based on `long lived' secret sharing, i.e. you trust each share of your secret to a server for a really long time. Some people may be concerned that such a long time would allow an attacker to break into most servers and reconstruct the secret (key). A solution to this is proactive secret sharing, as described in [HJKY95]. In this protocol, the secret shares are periodically refreshed (i.e. new shares are computed distributively and then the old shares are erased). In this manner, an attacker has to break into most servers during the same period; shares from one period are worthless on the next period. Best, Amir [HJKY95] `Proactive Secret Sharing', A. Herzberg, H. Krawczyk, S. Jareski, M. Yung, Crypto 95. > At 12:09 AM 11/7/95, Michael Shields wrote: > > >In the May proposal, when you have a message to be encrypted, you > >encrypt it with a session key, optionally split that key with an n-of-m > >scheme, and then send the key into a network of escrow agents, which are > >instructed to hold the message for a given period of time. You then > >hold onto the encrypted message, though you need not keep it secret. > >Conceptually, you have encrypted a message and then remailed the key to > >yourself in such a way that it will take X length of time to arrive. > > --Tim May > > Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. How do you know that? :-)

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Re: Photuris Primality verification needed
by Phil Karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I don't know. Maybe the right thing to do is require conforming >implementations to support a large modulus but include recommended >smaller moduli. Then Alice can always force Bob to use the large >modulus but, if both agree, they can use something smaller from the >standard or even their own home-grown modulus. Thanks. That's pretty much what we are doing -- requiring a particular 1024-bit modulus but recommending several others as options. There's a 2048 bit optional modulus and may even be a 4096-bit option if I can find one in reasonable time. There was going to be a 512-bit optional modulus but the group has reacted so strongly to it that I'm willing to withdraw it. Phil

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URL Version for ALPHA.C2.ORG FAQ
by Andre Bacard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello Remailer Users, Due to popular demand, I've created a URL version of my ALPHA.C2.ORG Remailer FAQ. Please link to this address: http://www.well.com/user/abacard/alpha.html See you in the future, Andre Bacard ====================================================================== abacard(a)well.com Bacard wrote "The Computer Privacy Stanford, California Handbook" [Intro by Mitchell Kapor]. http://www.well.com/user/abacard Published by Peachpit Press, (800) Enjoy your privacy... 283-9444, ISBN # 1-56609-171-3. =======================================================================

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Re: Diffie-Hellman in GF(2^n)?
by David A Wagner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <Pine.SUN.3.91.951110184600.19312B-100000(a)eskimo.com> you write: > Most Diffie-Hellman implementations currently use the multiplicative group > of prime fields. However, the multiplicative group of finite fields of > characteristic 2 (GF(2^n)) can also be used and should be easier to > implement. Is there any reason why they should not be used? Does anyone > know the asymptotic running time of the best algorithm for calculating > discrete logarithms in GF(2^n)? I remember that the discrete log problem is quite a bit easier in GF(2^n), but I don't remember how much easier. Let me try to look it up... A. Odlyzko has a paper recommending that people should not use GF(2^n) for discrete log applications; in it he states that you will need at the minimum n > 800, and probably n > 1500. (And you also need to choose n carefully.) A quote from the abstract: ``Hence the fields GF(2^n) out to be avoided in all cryptographic applications.'' I don't know enough about number theory to judge for myself; but you can read the (long) paper yourself at ftp://netlib.att.com/netlib/att/math/odlyzko/discrete.logs.ps.Z I hope this helps!

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Re: POTP Security
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We ordered POTP based on the initial blurbs by Kahn and others. It took a while to get it, we talked to Elementrix HQ and got voicemail, stutters and recordings saying be patient. We read c'punks' slash and burns in the waiting period. When the boxes appeared, we read the extra-thin documents -- mostly PR gush -- reflected, decided to leave the red white and blue boxes At No Time Padded. Later a POTP distributer's rep called to ask how we like the product. We said, haven't tried it, because we learned a bit from reading cryptography lists. We wondered if he knew what was being said. He said, yes, we know, but they're all wrong, it's a fabulous product, totally secure. How you gonna prove it, we asked, to consumers like us who don't know who to believe? You know, we're reading more these days about hacks of cryptography and we want to know more than press releases. The people you're citing for endorsement aren't cryptographers. Yes, he said, that's what we're hearing, that's why I'm calling you, we looking for users to endorse the program while we're waiting for patent approvals, and trying to get the crypto authorities to sign NDA's. Sorry, we said, we're can't take a chance on your product. Call us back after you get the crypto fuck-authorities to hack at it in public.

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Re: DejaNews all over again
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 11 Nov 1995, Ray Cromwell wrote: >> I think "Jeff" ... Mr. unofficial not speakng for the company Netscape >> spokesperson, I think that you should rethink what you're suggesting. >> Your tactics won't serve your personal interests on this one. I really >> would recommend that you come clean. This is not about "gloating". I >> really take very little pleasure in this. > > Jeff, I think it's in your best interest to not waste your time > responding to this moron (who bears many features in common with > Detweiler) I'm sure that most lawyers are probably advising Netscape's founders to not respond -- just like Fuhrman, they should take the fifth on this one. Hopefully everyone's D&O premiums are fully paid up ... 'cause to me this smells like a failure to disclose a material event. Netscape stock has advanced almost 50% since the Bugs Bunny post. Some investors are gonna be mighty pissed. Then again, what would I know ... Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... ...hunters... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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