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Re: Wiretap Article by Dorothy Denning
by geoffw＠nexsys.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From toad.com!owner-cypherpunks(a)cdp.igc.org Mon Sep 27 08:42:26 1993 > Return-Path: <ssteele(a)eff.org> > Date: Mon, 27 Sep 1993 11:12:44 -0400 > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: ssteele(a)eff.org (Shari Steele) > Subject: Wiretap Article by Dorothy Denning > Content-Length: 499 > X-Lines: 10 > Status: RO > > Hi everyone. > Dorothy Denning sent me a rather lengthy article entitled, "Wiretap Laws > and Procedures: What Happens When the U.S. Government Taps a Line," which > she wrote with Don Delaney of the NYS Police, John Kay of the Monmouth > County (NJ) Prosecutor's office, and Alan McDonald of the FBI. I'm willing > to send a copy to this list, but I wanted to make sure that I'm not in > violation of list ettiquette to send a long (2 e-mail messages) post. > What's the proper course of conduct here? > Shari > > I'd definitely like to se it.

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Denning paper (Post it!)
by ferguson＠fiber.sprintlink.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 27 Sep 1993 11:12:44 -0400, <ssteele(a)eff.org> Shari Steele writes - > Dorothy Denning sent me a rather lengthy article entitled, "Wiretap Laws > and Procedures: What Happens When the U.S. Government Taps a Line," which > she wrote with Don Delaney of the NYS Police, John Kay of the Monmouth > County (NJ) Prosecutor's office, and Alan McDonald of the FBI. I'm willing > to send a copy to this list, but I wanted to make sure that I'm not in > violation of list ettiquette to send a long (2 e-mail messages) post. > What's the proper course of conduct here? Post it! _____________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson Mindbank Consulting Group fergp(a)sytex.com Fairfax, Virginia USA ferguson(a)icp.net

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Challenge: break the MPJ Encryption Algorithm
by Michael Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like as many of you as are interested to take a serious look at a private key block encryption algorithm that I invented and let me know if there is any weakness in it that you can discover. No, I will not insult you with a block of random data as a challenge text. I have published the full algorithm, including source code, in my Master's Thesis. It is available to callers in the USA only on my BBS at 303-938-9654 (local to the Denver/Boulder calling area) as CRYPTMPJ.ZIP and MPJ_PS.ZIP. CRYPTMPJ.ZIP contains a plain ASCII text version of my thesis, full Pascal source code, and an executable program CRYPTMPJ.EXE that was used to test it. MPJ_PS.ZIP contains a PostScript version of my Thesis so that you can print out the pictures and see the equations more normally. Other sources: CompuServe, IBMSYS forum, as CRYPTM.ZIP; anonymous ftp to soda.berkeley.edu; and on the disks bound in the back of the book "Network Security Secrets" by David Stang and Sylvia Moon (ISBN1-56884-021-7; published by IDG Books Worldwide, Inc.). Here is a short description of the algorithm: 1. Using a convoluted key expansion process, expand a 128 bit (16 byte) key into 160 different, reversible 256 byte substitution boxes. 2. Execute ten rounds of encryption, where each round consists of (1) alter each byte of the input by replacing it with the value obtained by using the input byte as an index into the corresponding substitution box, then (2) perform a fixed "wire crossing" bit selection such that each output byte is a function of one bit from each of 8 different input bytes. Each substitution box is used only once in encrypting a block. Block size is 16 bytes (128 bits). Attacks I have considered: 1. Brute force (both exhaustive key search and precomputation). Good luck. 2. Analytical solution for the contents of the substitition arrays with a chosen plain text attack. With 10 or more rounds, the complexity of the matrix of boolean equations required and the quantity of known or chosen plain text required seems to make this impractical, but I may be missing something. 3. Differential cryptanalysis. Since the structure of the cipher algorithm has no simpler subkeys than the arrays themselves, this can't be done in the same sense as Biham and Shamir have discussed for DES, IDEA, etc. There may be a related attack, but I haven't thought of one yet (hardly a proof of nonexistance!) 4. Attack of the key expansion algorithm to simplify an analytical attack of the contents of the substitution arrays. This seems to me to be worse than a frontal attack on the arrays, given the complexity of the key scheduling algorithm. Then again, I suffer inventor's blindness in this area. The only complaints anyone has made so far are not fatal, in my humble opinion: 1. The key is fixed length. OK, the key expansion could be done differently to make this variable, but 128 bits is enough to preclude exhaustive key search within the budgets of anyone I anticipate worrying about for the next 10 years, at least. That assumes growth in computing power of a few orders of magnitude, too. 2. It is a symetric key algorithm, not a public key algorithm. Guilty as charged. On the other hand, you don't have to pay royalties to PKP (or anyone, including me) to use the algorithm in your own code or hardware. 3. The user interface to CRYPTMPJ.EXE is confusing, archaic, and not as simple as it should be. True. I plan to fix this some day, but it is still not a problem with the algorithm. 4. The source code is in Pascal, not C. Easily fixed by porting. If anyone does this before I do, please send me a copy. I wish I had the resources to offer a cash reward, but I don't. On the other hand, If you break the MPJ encryption algorithm and post your solution, then you will have the satisfaction of having beaten me in an intellectual game. If no one succeeds in breaking the MPJ encryption algorithm after reasonable effort has been applied, then there will be a secure, royalty free, unpatented block cipher available for use in the USA. (Where else would math be patented?) -- Mike Johnson (mpj(a)csn.org) This message contains speech and writings protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America.

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Re: Wiretap Article (2 of 2)
by stig＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In <9309271841.AA08215(a)snark.lehman.com>, "Perry E. Metzger" wrote... > > Stig says: > > > > > > THIS IS THE SORT OF NOISE THAT'S BETTER KEPT OFF THE LIST. Private messages > > should be sent via private email. > > > > stig > > What? This is the fist bit of substantive stuff on a list filled with > noise for months. What do you think the list is for? To provide a > place for conspiracy theorists to jerk each other off? > > Ms. Steele, it was perfectly appropriate. This is exactly the sort of > thing the list is for. > > Perry Ms. Steele's forwarding of the Denning article was entirely appropriate. Two people publicly asking Ms. Steele to forward it when email would have sufficed was noise. I replied to Paul, not Shari, so I figured that a careful reader would be able to properly disambiguate my pronouns.... Oh well. Stig ;; __________________________________________________________________________ ;; Stig(a)netcom.com netcom.com:/pub/stig/00-PGP-KEY ;; It's hard to be cutting-edge at your own pace... 32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A ;; Bullet-proof code cannot stand up to teflon bugs. A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F

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ACTIVIST ALERT -The Clock is Ticking!
by ssimpson＠eff.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

That's right - the clock is ticking. The deadline to get things to cryptnow(a)eff.org is 8:00pm EST. It is now just before 4pm - that's 4 short hours to go. Don't let this deadline pass! Please note - my previous message offered a sample letter directed to "Mr. Director". NIST's director is actually a woman, so please omit the "Mr.". ============================= And because time is so tight, EFF has set up an Internet address where you can send your electronic comments in lieu of mailing them through the U.S. Postal Service. Send your letters to: cryptnow(a)eff.org We will be printing out all letters and hand-delivering them before the deadline, so please make sure to send us any letter you want included no later than 8pm on Monday, September 27. If you would like additional background materials, you can browse the pub/EFF/crypto area of our anonymous ftp site (ftp.eff.org) The original solicitation of comments can be found there and is called NIST-escrow-proposal. DO NOT WAIT TO WRITE YOUR COMMENTS! TIME IS SHORT! ====================== <<your name>> <<your organization>> <<your street address>> <<your city, state, zip>> <<date>> National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) ATTN: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard Technology Building, Room B-154 National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Mr. Director: I am writing to oppose the Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) for and Escrowed Encryption Standard, docket # 930659-3159. Encryption is vital for the protection of individual privacy in the Information Age. As more and more personal information flows around electronic networks, we all need strong encryption to safeguard information from unwanted intrusion NIST should not be moving forward with technical standards specification until critical policy decisions are made. These policy issues include: o Continued Legal Use of All Forms of Encryption: When the Clinton Administration announced the Clipper Chip, it assured the public that this would be a purely voluntary system. We must have legal guarantees that Clipper isn't the first step toward prohibition against un-escrowed encryption. o Legal Rights of Escrow Users: If people choose to deposit their keys with the government or any other escrow agent, they must have some legal recourse in the event that those keys are improperly released. The most recent draft of the escrow procedures specifically states, however: "These procedures do not create, and are not intended to create, any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through electronic surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other objection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence lawfully acquired." Leaving users with no recourse will discourage use of the system and is a tacit acceptance of unscrupulous government behavior. o Open Standards: People won't use encryption unless they trust it. Secret standards such as Clipper cannot be evaluated by independent experts and do not deserve the public trust. In addition, the current proposed technical standard is incomplete. It should not be approved until futher comment on the complete proposal is possible o Operating Procedures Unclear: The full operating procedures for the escrow agents has yet to be issued. Public comment must be sought on the complete procedures, not just the outline presented in the draft FIPS. Even the government-selected algorithm review group has declared that it needs more information on the escrow process. o Identity of Escrow Agents: The identity of one or both of the escrow agents has not been firmly established. o Algorithm Classified: Asking for comments on an algorithm that is classified makes a mockery of citizen participation in government decision-making. NIST will be involved in making many critical decisions regarding the National Information Infrastructure. The next time NIST solicits public comments, it should be ready to accept reply by electronic mail in addition to paper-based media. Sincerely, <<name>> <<title>> ****************************** Sarah L. Simpson Membership Coordinator Electronic Frontier Foundation 1001 G Street, NW Suite 950 East Washington, DC 20001 202/347-5400 tel 202/393-5509 fax

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PGP Business Week article
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In case anyone is interested, there is a very sympathetic article in the Oct. 4, 1993 "Business Week" magazine about PGP and encryptation in general. It's on page 43. I'll just hit the highlights, but check it out. >Oddly, the crackdown on software {re:PGP} comes just as the administration is >loosening export controls on computer hardware. But the schizophrenia may be >more apparent than real."I don't think they've got the export policy together >enough to be split", says a key congressional staffer..... "This is an area >that has essentially been turned over to the spooks". >Meanwhile, there is growing concern in congress about possible damage to >exports. Quality encryptation software, "is available from foreign >manufacturers... and is easily transmitted using only a long-distance >telephone line and a modem," complained Representative Sam Gejdenson >(D-Conn.) and a high-powered bipartisan group of collegues in a Sept. 20 >letter to the President. >Still, the NSA can't stave off the inevitable for long. Gejdenson hopes to >produce legislation by early next year to revamp government policy on high- >tech exports. The result will probably include looser restrictions on >encryptation software- and a victory for Phil Zimmermann in his battle to >keep snoops out of his cyberspace. Hee-Hee, write Rep. Gejdenson via compuserve or any other way and let him know you support him on this one. I think if we keep at it we win. Scott G. Morham ! The First, Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu ! Second ! and Third ! Levels of ! Information Storage and Retrieval ! DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace

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Re: Verilog encryption broken
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bruce R Koball <bkoball(a)well.sf.ca.us> said: >P.S. Does anyone on this list know if the offending post was made >through an anonymous remailer? -brk In looking at the newsgroup in question, it appears that someone cancelled the controversial article, but it is clear from responses that the poster was "an33929(a)anon.penet.fi". Doug

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Phil Zimmerman on 'The Death of DES'
by Christian Void 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found the following on Usenet, and was curious as to the validity of the statements made. If anyone has any other information regarding this, please post or mail it private. I don't know if any of it already floated through here, but thought you might be interested in it. --- Seen on the PRIVACY FORUM mailing list: ----------------------- Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 13:13:12 -0400 From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex(a)media.mit.edu> Subject: DES is a dead dog... From: Philip Zimmermann <prz(a)columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU> Subject: Re: DES Key Search Paper (fwd) Michael Weiner presented a paper at Crypto93 that describes a fast DES key search engine that uses a special inside-out DES chip that he designed. This chip takes a single plaintext/ciphertext pair and quickly tries DES keys until it finds one that produces the given ciphertext from the given plaintext. Weiner can get these chips made for $10.50 each in quantity, and can build a special machine with 57000 of these chips for $1 million. This machine can exhaust the DES key space in 7 hours, finding a key in 3.5 hours on the average. He works for Bell Northern Research in Ottawa, and says they have not actually built this machine, but he has the chip fully designed and ready for fabrication. This is a stunning breakthrough in the realization of practical DES cracking. BTW-- note that PEM uses straight 56-bit DES. --- Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | VMResearch, Inc. cvoid(a)netcom.COM | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213 Tel. 1+415-807-5491 | -Erwin Schrodinger (1887-1961) | SF, CA 94117 * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *

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Easy cracking
by technopagan priest 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you found out you could easily crack a commercial "protection" method, what do you do? First, you stay anonymous, because otherwise they will try to get you, no matter what your intentions are. I think it is best to send the information, anonymously, with a working example to the company. But chances are that they will sit on it due to fear of loosing market share or being sued by users. So the question is, is it more ethical to allow the userbase to have their information cracked by "bad guys," possibly without their knowledge, or publish the information so that the userbase is aware of the security breach, and can do something about it? It depends on the situation, of course. But no one will believe you if you say "I can crack xyz programs 'protected' data" without showing how it works. When it comes right down to it, individuals have to be responsible about the cryptosystems they use. And you are much better off knowing that your data is possibly crackable rather than not knowing it, and having hackers crack it without your knowledge. Hopefully this whole incident will get software companies thinking more seriously about using scholarly-tested secure cryptosystems. -Thomas

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Contributions to Zimmermann--Where??
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm preparing to write out a check for the Phil Zimmermann defense fund (lawyers, fees, even in advance of an indictment, and hopefully to head one off), but I seem to have lost the address of the lawyers--this was in a posting in the last couple of days here. (I also looked in various threads in sci.crypt, talk.politics.crypto, etc., but I can't seem to find it.) So, I'd appreciate it if someone could send it to me, or, even better, post it again on the List....sort of a reminder that this case means a lot to our future. If Phil--who appears to be the main target, never mind that the _document subpoena_ was not directed at him this time around--is successfully indicted, sent to trial, etc., then this will have a chilling effect on others. I'll have more to say about this after I've actually put my check in the mail. -Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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