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Guardian: Screw the Internet
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Authentication-Warning: fma66.fma.com: majordomo set sender to owner-espam(a)lists.espace.net using -f X-Orig-From: rah-web <rah(a)shipwright.com> X-e$pam-source: Various X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Sat, 20 Sep 1997 14:15:00 -0400 To: espam(a)intertrader.com From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: Guardian: Screw the Internet Sender: owner-espam(a)lists.espace.net Precedence: bulk Reply-To: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- This mail is brought to you by the e$pam mailing list --------------------------------------------------------------------- From: rah-web <rah(a)shipwright.com> Reply-To: rah(a)shipwright.com MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: Guardian: Screw the Internet http://go2.guardian.co.uk:80/theweb/874505219-crypt.html Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; name="874505219-crypt.html" Content-Disposition: inline; filename="874505219-crypt.html" X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by lbo.leftbank.com id LAA08197 [Image] Spooks on both sides of the Atlantic are intent on retaining their power to monitor the world's telecoms traffic, writes Duncan Campbell Screw the Internet INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES in the US have stepped up their campaign to control the flow of information over the Internet, counterattacking an unholy alliance of civil libertarians and business chiefs who back the introduction of secure encryption technologies to protect personal privacy and commercial data online. Last Thursday in Congress, lobbying by the FBI and the National Security Agency won amendments to a draft pro-encryption law known as Safe (Security and Freedom through Encryption). The House Intelligence Committee replaced rights to sell effective encryption systems to the world with regulations to ban even US citizens from using them. The agencies and their political backers are now demanding that any American whose electronic communications cannot immediately be read by US intelligence should, after January 2000, face up to five years imprisonment. Furthermore, they want the US to use its political and industrial power to force the rest of the world to follow suit. Battle resumes in Washington a week today, when the likely more sympathetic House Commerce Committee will provide its review of the Safe law for Congress to consider. That done, Congessional leaders and the White House will have to negotiate which version of the Safe bill is to be taken ahead. If the new version of the bill succeeds, it will be illegal in the US to make or sell encryption systems unless the government can break the code and have "immediate access" to the contents of messages or phone calls. In Britain, the new government has soon to decide what line to take in this little-understood war that has almost paralysed the development of electronic commerce. Under pressure to formulate standards, New Labour has to decide if it wants to face the economic penalties of giving in to the spooks. If the secret agencies win, the losers will also be ordinary users of electronic commerce or e-mail. Without encryption to scramble the contents of messages, reams of Internet traffic can be read easily, not just by intelligence agencies, but by miscreants with direct access to the Net through routers or local area networks. E-mail is less secure than an ordinary telephone call, since ordinary telephone calls are connected "point to point" by a precise route rather than being broadcast between routers and into networks. Without encryption, e-mail containing sensitive private information or financial details, such as credit card numbers, can be read at numerous points as messages pass through the Net. This complex but fundamental issue for everyone in the information society has been made politically more difficult by an initiative launched in the dying days of the last government. Just before the election was called, the Department of Trade and Industry unveiled its version of the US system for ensuring that the government could read everyone's private communications. The DTI's version is a network of licensed agencies that would provide (and keep copies of) everyone's encryption codes, or keys. If sent a warrant, these Trusted Third Parties, or TTPs, would hand over keys at one hour's notice - a less demanding requirement than the latest US plans, but no less absurd or impossible to engineer, say Internet specialists. Plans to hold everyone's keys in central registries have also been slammed for creating a huge security threat, because everyone would be at risk if crooks were able to get into the central database. DTI officials were unprepared for the torrent of protest, abuse and reasoned objection that has arrived on their desks since early this summer. The former government's proposals have, it is understood, attracted not a single unqualified supporter. They were condemned out of hand by industry leaders, academics and civil libertarians alike. David Svendsen, head of Microsoft in the UK, says that "the DTI's plans are unworkable, unwieldy and unacceptable. Setting up a bureaucratic structure to regulate encryption services will isolate the UK from global electronic commerce. It will force us all to look elsewhere for barrier-free encryption technology, while UK plc will foot the bill." The battle in the US Congress follows setbacks for the intelligence agencies, which have been fighting to stop effective encryption systems from being exported. Classifying encryption software as "munitions", the US government banned the export of systems with key lengths (see Cracking the code, opposite) long enough to make them uncrackable. Thus, while Americans who use Web software browsers to make "secure" credit card purchases benefit from built-in encryption with strong 128-bit keys, Europeans have until now been permitted to use only weakened and insecure 48-bit keys. In August, the US government gave in to commercial pressure to relax restrictions, and non-US users of software to browse the Internet are already being offered upgrades to provide full 128-bit security. The catch, which is not being advertised, is that the licencees must provide the US government with backdoor access to the new systems. The extent to which this area of information technology has been held back is already remarkable. It's now 20 years since fundamental advances in mathematics created unique but simple new ways of encoding messages, known as public key cryptography, that did away with the need to exchange keys or codebooks before encrypted messages could be sent. In 1977, long before the Net reached its modern form, three mathematicians - Rivest, Shamir and Adelman - showed how to implement this revolution. Their RSA algorithm allows users to create separate "public" and "private" keys. To use a public key crytopgraphy system to, say, send a private message to OnLine, you would first obtain OnLine's published key. Many Net users (but not yet OnLine) publish such keys on their Web sites or in directories. You then scramble the message using the public key, and send it. The message can be decoded using only a matching private key, which only Online would have. The RSA algorithm is available for use on the Net, or for file protection, using a program called Pretty Good Privacy, or PGP, whose inventor, Colorado computer consultant Phil Zimmermann, is a Net legend. His reward for inventing PGP was not scientific accolade, but arrest and prosecution by the FBI. For having created PGP, he was accused of exporting munitions. Charges against Zimmermann were dropped only last year. Recognising that there could never be uniform international agreement to lock away cryptography as nuclear weapons are locked away, governments and information acquisition agencies have tended instead to attempt covertly to regulate encryption. This has taken the form of patent secrecy orders, attacks on research funding, the undermining of the international standardisation of cryptography, the harassment of inventors and commercial organisations, and legislative campaigns to restrict their work. In the shadows behind these events hide communications intelligence agencies - the US National Security Agency and Britain's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). For 50 years, they have harvested intelligence from monitoring the world's international communications network. This activity is threatened by large-scale encryption. Historically, huge codebreaking resources have been used to try to break the codes of hostile states. But to use the same methods and resources against the mass of ordinary international communications would be costly and futile. The scale of NSA operations is staggering. Tens of billions of messages are intercepted every year. All international communications by satellite or undersea cable, and many domestic communications can be collected by taps or via satellite interception stations. GCHQ's interception station at Morwenstow near Bude, Cornwall, was built almost 30 years ago to spy not on the Soviets but on the West's international communications satellites, Intelsat. NSA's and GCHQ's electronic tentacles still reach round the world, and into the heart of Western policy making. Within the DTI, the director of technology policy and innovation, David Hendon, makes no secret that a substantial input to his work comes from GCHQ. At the European Commission, a former official of GCHQ's Communications Electronic Security Group, David Herson, has been steering EU policy on information security. Critics such as Ross Anderson, the computer security specialist based at Cambridge university, have accused them of being stooges for NSA. The DTI has hired consultants to summarise the responses to their TTP proposals, and hope to publish a summary in the autumn, together with policy proposals. The risk is that officials are still locked into the same Neanderthal security agenda that once branded the Home Secretary a subversive threat to the nation. Advice to ministers trying to understand this most complex part of the IT brief will need to balance the UK's national economic interest against the concerns of security officials anxious to maintain the intelligence service's "special relationship" with the US. Until last week's events, US attempts to control strong encryption had faced setbacks. Three weeks ago, a federal judge in San Francisco ordered the US government not to take action against Chicago academic Daniel Bernstein if he published encryption software on the Net. Export restrictions, said Judge Marilyn Patel, violated Bernstein's constitutional right to free speech. And US attempts to lobby the European Union and the OECD into backing an international system of cryptographic controls have failed. Despite US support from Britain and France, both organisations have backed and encouraged open use of cryptography (albeit with qualifications). The continued campaign against effective cryptography is still being fuelled by the raising of alarms about the potentially antisocial use of the Net, including those which Net enthusiasts cynically dub the "Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse": terrorists, drug traffickers, paedophiles and organised crime. But the argument is specious. Forcing honest individuals and companies to turn over their keys or to use only licensed keys will not prevent criminals from using strong encryption outside of the mandatory system. Labour's policy, formulated before the election, had it right : "It is not necessary to criminalise a large section of the network-using public to control the activities of a very small minority of law-breakers." (http://www.labour.org.uk/views/info-highway/content.html) Last year, EU adviser and ex-GCHQ official David Herson was astonishingly candid about the real reason for playing on fears about the Net activities of terrorists and paedophiles. "Law enforcement is a protective shield for all the other governmental activities," he told two European journalists. "We're talking about foreign intelligence . . . that's what this is all about. Law enforcement is a smoke screen." If New Labour sticks to the policy adopted before the election, it should have little difficulty reaffirming its view that attempts to control the use of encryption technology are "wrong in principle, unworkable in practice, and damaging to the long-term economic value of the information networks". But if intelligence agency dinosaurs get their way, they will jeopardise not just personal privacy but the economic rewards of Net commerce. The winners will be those countries, such as Germany and many of those in Asia, that by rule of law or through commercial instinct stay resistant to NSA's and GCHQ's intelligence imperatives. [Duncan Campbell is a freelance writer and broadcaster, and not the Guardian's crime correspondent of the same name] 17 September 1997 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion http://www.hyperion.co.uk info(a)hyperion.co.uk --------------------------------------------------------------------- Like e$? Help pay for it! See <http://www.shipwright.com/beg.html> Or, for e$/e$pam sponsorship, <mailto:rah@shipwright.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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US Crypto Laws cripple Euros
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Authentication-Warning: fma66.fma.com: majordomo set sender to owner-espam(a)lists.espace.net using -f X-Orig-From: rah-web <rah(a)shipwright.com> X-e$pam-source: Various X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Sat, 20 Sep 1997 14:15:15 -0400 To: espam(a)intertrader.com From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: US Crypto Laws cripple Euros X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by lbo.leftbank.com id OAA08597 Sender: owner-espam(a)lists.espace.net Precedence: bulk Reply-To: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by pop.sneaker.net id QAA18355 --------------------------------------------------------------------- This mail is brought to you by the e$pam mailing list --------------------------------------------------------------------- From: rah-web <rah(a)shipwright.com> Reply-To: rah(a)shipwright.com MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: US Crypto Laws cripple Euros http://www.techweb.com:80/wire/news/1997/09/0917crylaws.html Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; name="0917crylaws.html" Content-Disposition: inline; filename="0917crylaws.html" X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by lbo.leftbank.com i d LAA08231 [Image] [Image][IBM VisualAge for Java. Voted Best of Show Select at Windows NT Intranet Solutions Conference.] [CMPnet] [Image] [Image] [Image] [TechWeb] Search Archives: Advanced Search Sections News Finance Tips & Tools Product Reviews ActiveX/Java Careers Events Directory Opinion Humor Support Encyclopedia Information Feedback E-mail Newsletters Sponsored by: Featured Sites Net Newsmakers NetGuide Shareware Games Horoscopes [CMPnet Resources] Home Site Map Search Ad Info Sponsor Index [Click here to visit Network Computing's Interactive Report Card] [Image] [Image] [Image] [TechWire] TechWire All Home Stories Features Internet VideosCommunicat ions TechInvestor Home Apple Hardware Software Chips Internati onal U.S. Crypto Laws Cripple Euros, Expert Says (09/17/97; 5:00 p.m. EDT) By Douglas Hayward, TechWire [Image] CAMBRIDGE, England -- The U.S. government's Related strategy of monitoring the computer networks Stories: of hostile governments is damaging the communications infrastructure of its allies, The a leading encryption expert said. Governmen t Eyes The American enthusiasm for using Encryptio n "information warfare" strategies has resulted in a weakening of the U.K. and European Capitol H ill civilian communications, said Ross Anderson, Girds For Key an academic at Cambridge University, at the Clashes O ver International Symposium on Economic Crime Encryptio n held in Cambridge, England, on Tuesday. Computer Information warfare -- the act of monitoring Industry or sabotaging an enemy's communications and Riled Up Over computing infrastructure -- gained widespread FBI Chief 's attention during the Gulf War when the U.S. Suggestio n military hacked its way into Iraqi communication networks. FBI Insis ts On Crypto Anderson was a co-author of a highly critical Access report published in May that attacked the Clinton administration's encryption export Criminal control policies. The report, written by a Informati on group of encryption experts, said an attempt On The Wi res to prevent users from getting access to uncontrolled encryption products would result [*] = L ink to in substantial sacrifices in security and cost. our tech The Clinton encyclope dia -------------------administration, advised for more "We have to by the U.S. National info. question the Security Agency (NSA), [Image] wisdom of wants to be able to introducing continue monitoring the weaknesses into communications of our national potentially hostile infrastructures." countries or groups. To -- Ross Anderson do this, it wants to Cambridge prevent these groups from University using unbreakable -------------------encryption programs. This policy, dubbed Offensive, means the U.S. government insists on maintaining strict controls over the export and use of encryption to ensure that hostile governments and groups don't get access to strong [[Image] encryption tools. But this NSA-backed policy on restricting the spread of strong encryption software has held back the development of secure commercial and governmental communications networks in Europe, Anderson said. Civilian communications networks whose security has been weakened as a result of U.S. policy include the Europewide Global System for Mobile Communications telephone networks, commercial banking networks, and television broadcasting. "We have to question the wisdom of introducing weaknesses into our national infrastructures," Anderson said. Europeans are going to have to take more control over industrial aspects of encryption, he said, and develop policies with less input from the people in the Pentagon. "In the long term, the United Kingdom and its European partners have to start thinking carefully about the defensive vs. offensive aspects of this business, Anderson said. "The time is right for a fundamental realignment of resources in this field." Restrictions on encryption use mean the British Patent Office has to use a weak form of encryption when communicating with its counterparts overseas, Anderson said. "They use the size of keys I give to my students to break as exercises," Anderson said. The result is that highly confidential information, including very valuable details of intellectual property, can be intercepted and decoded, he said. [TW] Search Archives [Image] C M P n e t S P E C I A L R E P O R T S · Upgrading your operating system is nerve-wracking, [Ima ge] but we all have to face the possibility sooner or later. · What are key Microsoft execs and product managers saying [Image] [about IE 4? · Keep your laptop safe with this state-of-the-art safety feature. · What's wrong with a Java network computer? Java. [Image] · There's more to remote access than modem banks. [CMPnet] [Image] [Click here to visit Seagate Software.] [Image] --------------------------------------------------------------------- Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion http://www.hyperion.co.uk info(a)hyperion.co.uk --------------------------------------------------------------------- Like e$? Help pay for it! See <http://www.shipwright.com/beg.html> Or, for e$/e$pam sponsorship, <mailto:rah@shipwright.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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FIPS for KMI
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's worth looking closely at the Cryptography Key Recovery System (CKRS) documents published recently as part of the FIPS KMI program. A meeting is scheduled next month. See the listing of the August Meeting reports at: http://csrc.nist.gov/tacdfipsfkmi/ They show how far the key recovery program has advanced.

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San Diego CPunk Physical meet this Thursday
by Christian Claborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This Wednesday!!! San Diego Area CPUNKS symposium Wednesday, Sep. 24, 1997. Topic: What action do we take if the situation get's out of hand (See message below from Mark H. below). It is my belief that any group, no matter how small, can accomplish great things if they apply themselves. Cypherpunks are not just "users", they poses several additional quanta of the stuff that enables creative thought, and skill. Don't forget to bring your public key fingerprint. If you can figure out how to get it on the back of a business card, that would be cool. If you want the suspicious crowd there to sign your key, bring two forms of ID. Place: The Mission Cafe & Coffee Shop 3795 Mission Bl in Mission Beach. 488-9060 Time:1800 Their Directions: 8 west to Mission Beach Ingram Exit Take west mission bay drive Go right on Mission Blvd. On the corner of San Jose and mission blvd. It is located between roller coaster and garnett. It's kind of 40s looking building... funky looking (their description, not mine) They serve stuff to eat, coffee stuff, and beer + wine stuff. See you there! New guy, bring your fingerprint. Drop me a note if you plan to attend... 2 -- C -- - ------------------------ Date: Fri, 12 Sep 1997 16:04:22 -0700 (PDT) From: Mark Hedges <hedges(a)infonex.com> To: all-at-infonex(a)infonex.com Subject: federal cryptography legislation Sender: owner-all-at-infonex(a)infonex.com - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A bill called "SAFE" (HR-695, "Security and Freedom with Encryption") in the U.S. House of Representatives would have allowed U.S. software companies to export strong cryptography, and would have promoted privacy in all U.S. communications. Cryptography is mathematical means of making a message secret. Now, this bill has been rewritten to introduce more restrictive cryptography legislation than ever before seen in the U.S. Public support for cryptography use and export is very strong, as evidenced by the California state legislature's unanimous vote 9/5/97, calling on Congress and the President to revise and relax export laws (SJR-29). Companies world-wide already produce strong cryptograpy software, and U.S. buisness is rapidly losing ground in the world-wide software and telecommunications market. The House National Security Committee this week voted to continue export restrictions in the SAFE bill and to install "key escrow" proposals of the defense and intelligence organizations. This would not only continue the status quo legislation, it would strictly regulate and restrict domestic use of cryptography, an unprecedented act. Key escrow legislation in SAFE would mandate government "back doors" in all communications software before the end of the millennia in the United States, imposing criminal penalties for use of secure cryptography. Effectively, every citizen would be required to give law enforcement involuntary and transparent access to all communications, including financial, business, and personal messages. Key escrow also exposes all U.S. communication to a single point of failure, which a hacker, spy, or corrupt official could exploit to gain access to all personal, industry, and financial information. More information is available in our most recent press release. Press releases can be viewed at http://www.anonymizer.com/press/. Please, call your congressional representatives and senators and encourage them to oppose restrictive legislation on cryptography and mandated government access to all communications. Names and phone numbers for your local legislators can be obtained from www.house.gov and www.senate.gov. Sincerely, Mark Hedges Anonymizer Inc. Infonex Internet Inc. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNBnJhBVo2SUWMp6NAQFyNQP/UuogfBfcjRw7q5rda8+1BrGkMEHpixau J7JfbhKyv5yWdPZsnh8F3m/kaUahLEaSdLCcmAJzbroKApGBjUtT6bRacOtVps3X TzZXLO2NZd4UBsksUC1f3WWnnRl8+03jiQMboSpBvUVmHqA1sFiz3OQpJVWv1yge jEEk7R2Maeg= =VrfI - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNCRRAIP1MBWQ+9udAQHNuAf/Wf/vf7O7A3iZhd9BjlzyI0FvcOTelUOs 5JhxXN0w86YWzoluZue8jY7uKmxGVuySdikQSw4OxLS5wZG05nByoIQlhlzLPYIl vrQuQZ0EeGIOycwS7IuNLFFyx+C1E7HxcdX0UR3qMDgEiiFb09DlcuDHeSp52RZW s6t7AFR7ZoVz28KanihgDRQdk9QTw0HuaZV3hHNl11610HaPURRe4SX7zgR1cHAf naoTZI70GqVoUVYVrm+oVHln7HsdFqnrO/1GAVpLzKpEnzfT9C0d0o7T4t/WX4CM yeeO2UZUwfg01VyCHORpFYbx1SrFlW4rZNZqOJMP2lA2cNDZBsLrhg== =/sWk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... __o .. -\<, Claborne(a)CYBERTHOUGHT.com ...(*)/(*)._ Providing thoughts on your computing needs. http://www.CYBERTHOUGHT.com/cyberthought/ PGP Pub Key fingerprint = 7E BF 38 3F 24 A7 D1 B0 54 44 96 AA 10 D0 5D 51 Avail on Pub Key server. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! Dreams. They are just a "screen saver" for the brain.

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info
by Alexis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone help me out or tutor me in Hacking, phreaking, cracking, and cryptography, I know that you need to know all for to become a good hacker, I also heard that you guys don't mind teaching others. THanks Alexis.

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17 Dec '03

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17 Dec '03

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Rep. Loretta Sanchez Hits Crypto Controls
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Sanchez statement is from House Report 105-108, Part 3, published September 12 by the National Security Committee, which describes the Weldon-Dellums amendment to SAFE. See the full report at: http://jya.com/hr105-108-pt3.htm The report includes a cost estimate by the Congressional Budget Officefor implementing SAFE. However, as far as I can tell, the estimate does not include the cost of a GAK system, and covers only the cost of export controls. Thus, it appears to be vastly misleading. SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ Many of us when we think of encryption imagine the ``ENIGMA'' code breaking machines of World War Two or the American Indian ``code talkers'' that helped us anticipate and defeat Nazi and Imperial Japanese attacks. Those methods were mechanical or human-based, and often depended on simple arithmetical slight of hand to trick the enemy. Today, encryption is complex mathematical algorithms that have become an entirely new branch of mathematics involving intense academic study. Until recently encryption was limited to governments and large companies through U.S. export limitations and by the limitations of existing hardware and software technologies. All that began to change as the desktop computer became more prevalent and the computing power available to the average user jumped by leaps and bounds every year. When discussing the power of the PC observers of the information technology industry often predict that the computing power of microprocessors would double roughly every 18 months. Because of this the rapidly developing speed and growth of computers, the age of the ``unbreakable code'' has long since passed. Manufacturers of encryption technology are engaged in a rapidly accelerating race to develop the newest and strongest code that can withstand attacks from the increasingly powerful computers of the day. And it isn't just big companies and governments that have the technology to break codes. Last January, a graduate student broke a 40-bit code in just three- and-a-half hours, the toughest code form American companies at the time were allowed to export. Today, American companies are the world leaders in encryption technology, but other companies and nations are catching up. Strong encryption products and knowledge about the science of cryptography is not limited to the United States. A savvy computer user anywhere in the world can with just a few clicks of the mouse find U.S. export-embargoed encryption. Many freelancing code hackers maintain off-shore Internet meeting sites to discuss the newest holes in encryption products. The proposed export controls which the Administration argues helps to keep strong encryption out of the hands of foreign adversaries will have little or no effect. Strong encryption is available abroad and US companies are being put at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace. With this bleak and seemingly hopeless picture in mind how do we protect ourselves from the threat of rogue nations and other adversaries cloaking their communications from American National Security efforts? The only viable solution is through supporting a robust and aggressively competitive cryptography industry in the United States. We must ensure that the United States continues to maintain the deepest pool of cryptographic experts in the world. American export limitations will only serve to create a brain drain of these precious resources as leading scientists leave our shores for more lucrative and accommodating surroundings. All of us care about our national security and no one wants to make it any easier for criminals and terrorists to commit criminal acts. But we must also recognize encryption technologies as an increasingly sharp double-edged sword. It can also aid law enforcement and protect national security by limiting the threat of industrial espionage and foreign spying, but only when Americans are able to produce the sharpest swords and the strongest encryption. I would also like to state for the record that for the reasons stated above, I do not support the Dellums-Weldon Amendment to H.R. 695, and would have voted against it. Loretta Sanchez. ----------

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Re: cipe - encrypting IP tunnel, version 0.5.2
by Damaged Justice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- forwarded message -- Path: wmich-news!gumby!newspump.wustl.edu!rice!bcm.tmc.edu!news.msfc.nasa.gov!news-spur1.maxwell.syr.edu!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newsfeed.internetmci.com!169.132.11.200!news.idt.net!news.voicenet.com!gsl-penn-ns.gsl.net!news-stkh.gip.net!news.gsl.net!gip.net!news3.funet.fi!news.funet.fi!news.cs.hut.fi!news.clinet.fi!liw.clinet.fi!not-for-mail From: olaf(a)bigred.inka.de (Olaf Titz) Newsgroups: comp.os.linux.announce Subject: cipe - encrypting IP tunnel, version 0.5.2 Followup-To: comp.os.linux.networking Date: Sun, 21 Sep 1997 07:26:10 GMT Organization: private Linux site, southern Germany Lines: 57 Approved: linux-announce(a)news.ornl.gov (Lars Wirzenius) Message-ID: <pycola.874826770.5102(a)liw.clinet.fi> NNTP-Posting-Host: liw.clinet.fi NNTP-Posting-User: liw X-Server-Date: 21 Sep 1997 07:26:12 GMT Old-Date: 19 Sep 1997 11:08:19 +0200 X-No-Archive: yes X-Auth: PGPMoose V1.1 PGP comp.os.linux.announce iQBVAwUBNCTMFDiesvPHtqnBAQExRAH/SYzWcsQWNuCf0W6wMQqrVWgV7eTRWQ6p ULgjcGGbiqKYNQsaw7gwAqfh+zhkfywvqStuB3XwP5LJCRz6KgK7qw== =2N7/ Xref: wmich-news comp.os.linux.announce:1629 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- CIPE is a system for simple, yet reasonably secure IP encryption. It sends encrypted datagrams encapsulated in UDP. It is not compatible with IPSEC or anything else (except my other prototype implementation). Very lightweight and easy to handle. Comes with full description of the protocol and usage examples. GPLd and distributed from outside the USA. Developed and tested on the Linux 2.0 series on i386 platform. In theory it should run on other platforms; don't know about 2.1. This package can be used to build "virtual private networks", i.e. secure interconnection of subnetworks on top of the Internet. I use it in such a situation for some months now. Changes since 0.4.2: - - Now supports routing over a SOCKS5 relayer. - - Wrote a real manual. Olaf Titz <olaf(a)bigred.inka.de> Here's the LSM: Begin3 Title: cipe Version: 0.5.2 Entered-date: 12SEP97 Description: A network device that does encrypted IP-in-UDP tunneling. Useful for building virtual private networks, etc. The package consists of a kernel module and driver program. Keywords: encryption, routing, tunnel, VPN Author: olaf(a)bigred.inka.de (Olaf Titz) Primary-site: ftp.inka.de /sites/bigred/sw 65k cipe-0.5.2.tar.gz Copying-policy: GPL End - -- This article has been digitally signed by the moderator, using PGP. http://www.iki.fi/liw/lars-public-key.asc has PGP key for validating signature. Send submissions for comp.os.linux.announce to: linux-announce(a)news.ornl.gov PLEASE remember a short description of the software and the LOCATION. This group is archived at http://www.iki.fi/liw/linux/cola.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBNCTMEoQRll5MupLRAQHjBgP+JHAkG4j/Ut3++Vy2eskaXvlXEMriVIcg dWarg3p8liSNMpaPXk0zGJPGq+gkUMgPiiVXxV0oy+ukH9UWJ0HoAcLMbRZuX/3D sHSQoQ5R4D77LbgKLWjvxcut+s27wAVToz7HEDdwA/8nscqhbXr3ak3GKFqf+18s OuASqKdpbB4= =H9Vz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- end of forwarded message --

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Re: US Senate bans laptops
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green wrote about banning lapdancing on the Senate floor: Banning laptops continues a long tradition of congressional resistance to technology, the Senate moreso than the House. The Architect of the Capitol, an office as well as a person, has to deal with a heritage of Luddites who have resisted, as examples, removal of cuspidors; installing women's facilities of all sorts: putting in air-conditioning (mechanical ventilation as well as cooling), electric lights, subterranean trams, elevators, smoke alarms, telephones!, telegraphs, electro-mechanical quorum and roll calls (bells, lights and pagers!), wheelchairs (just recently), and more -- virtually every invention has been delayed in the Capitol, along with compliance with the laws imposed on the country but not on hallowed halls. Ex-AoCs sometimes leak the stupifying arguments the solons make for maintaining their supposedly superior lifestyles free of demanding gadgetry and popular fad: their preference is for human servants over devices in order to maintian deniability, for while flesh and blood is what the beasts know best how to cajole, seduce and terrorize it is also the reason they remain ever ready for betrayal and opportunistic one-night-stand switching of lifetime fidelity. Blinking, recording, error-archiving, machines scare the shit out of the the fork-tongue power-aphrodisiacal nymphomaniacs, not to say that the rest of us would act so differently given a seat in inner circles of jerks getting lapdanced on a magic carpet -- who wants that in the National Archives of Perfidy? Often the reason folks oppose new technology is that it threatens their network of operations based on old technology, as the case with encryption. Still, it's worth considering what leaked Senate plaintext (gov, pol, illicit) would induce the secrecy-obsessed senators to support strong crypto for their own privacy of stashed wealth and squelched Paulas? Often new technology is resisted because that it threatens networks of successful operations of barely legal scams based on old technology, as the case with encryption, tv, radio, telephone, telegraph, printing, highways, roads, trails, stars, evil eyes, body stench, intuition, fear, mother's milk, amniotic warmth, egg and dart, downhole non-existence. To be sure, there are disclosures of red-faced liaisons, the sort recorded in hallowed halls and red-flocked boudoirs, that the TLAs (mirroring the KGB) may be threatening Congress with, in the eye-opening publications of Kalliste. See: http://www.aci.net/kalliste/

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