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A Chronology on crypto bans
by banisar＠epic.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone asked why is there such a flurry recently on banning crypto in recent months. This is not a recent issue. There have been almost non-stop attempts for the last 15 years. I've been finishing up this chapter in the book Bruce Schneier and I are writing on crypto battles. Every so often a new FOIA document floats in from some request I made 3-4 years ago hat makes me have to revise it again. Here s a small chronology based on the chapter. ------ Attempts to ban encprytion 1977-1995 1977-1980 NSA Director Inman calls crypto born secret. Should be restricted. Attempts to use Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 to patent inventions by academic researchers. Attempts to use export control laws to limit scientific discussion. NSA Threates NSF over grants for crypto studies. 1981 American Council on Education committee recommends voluntary submissions of cryto papers to NSA 1984 National Security Decision Directive 145. Gave NSA authority over all govt crypto and computer security development. 1986 NSTISSP. Attempted to extend NSDD-145 to private sector. USe to justify visits to LEXIS/NEXIS, Dialog, public libraries etc. 1987 Congress passes Computer Security Act. Gives crypto authority to NIST. 1989 NIST signs MOU with NSA giving back authority to NSA. NIST starts development of new public key system to do both signatures and key exchange. 1990 After pressure by NSA. NIST adopts El Gamal for signatures only. NSA secreatly designs "algorithm on a chip" for key exchange. FBI, NSA and NIST also begin "National Cryptgraphic Review". 1991 FBI asks Senator Joseph Biden to introduce "Sense of Congress" to recommend backdoors in all encpryption, telephone systems. Provision removed after public outcry. Later evolves into digital telephony proposal. October 1991, NSA, FBI, CIA meet to discuss possible legislation on encryption. 1992 NIST memo - "FBI working on draft legislation to control and liscense all cryptography" 1993 Clipper Proposal introduced. Interagency working group formed by Presidential Review Directive 27. According to NSA memo on IWG "FBI proposed legislation to authorize the FCC to regulate common carriers, PBX operators, and manufacturers of encryption devices available for use in the US to ensure such systems and devices are compatable with law enforcement electronic surveillance interests....the interagency working group revied proposed legislation and concluded that ....legislation to authorize regulation of encryption product manufacturers would be considerably more difficult [than passing the digital telephone proposal] and required further study." 6 options were discussed including prohobiting all other encprytion besides Clipper. The other five have been classified "top secret". -------- Dave David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org Washington, DC 20003 * HTTP://epic.digicash.com/epic

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"Just write code"
by an250888＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Just write code. For whatever platform you like writing code for. And while you're at it, make it as platform-independent as possible. Porting to another platform or system involves writing code, no? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. If you reply to this message, your message WILL be *automatically* anonymized and you are allocated an anon id. Read the help file to prevent this. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: Mods to Dining Cryptographers: legal questions...
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I'm sorry if I was a little mysterious about my reference to >another use or mode of a DC-net; I'd _love_ to tell the rest of >you flat-out, and put the idea in the public domain, but I'm >not sure I _CAN_. > You should investigate an idea known as the provisional patent that is relatively new to the United States. They're supposedly shorter and designed to give you some claim to the ideas as well as some time to develop them enough to file a real patent. I can't give you any other advice except to tell you that my patent agent is also curious about them because they're new. -Peter

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NSA and NatSec Looks
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's a pretty good recent overview of NSA -- history, organization, operations and, best, facilities -- at: URL: http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/fas/irp/nsa/ This is part of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) web site, cited here by Jim Gillogly in connection with the VENONA papers. There are links to a bounty of other information on national security and governmental secrecy. Among many sweetmeats, the homepage on "Cyberstrategy" may be of interest (John Pike's project): URL: http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/iswg/cyberstr.html

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Mods to Dining Cryptographers: legal questions...
by monty.harder＠famend.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PF> spend on software patents. I don't, and don't mean to say that _he_ PF> goes around stealing ideas from other people and patenting them.) PF> PF> How do I do this and protect myself from the people who do have the PF> money to go through the intellectual property courthouse game? IANAL, but... Create a detatched signature certificate of your idea, and post =that= here. Get some of us to sign it I, _______, a resident of _______ County, __________, do hereby attest that I recieved the above certificate on _____ ___,1995. [plaintext for non-crypto-aware folks] and email to you. Also, make two hard copies, including hard copies of our notarizations you recieve back . Put one of them in an envelope with a 3.5" floppy of everything, and address the =back= to yourself. Go into the post office, and ask the clerk to hand-cancel the envelope, so that the cancellation goes half across the flap and the rest on the envelope. When you get this from yourself in the mail, you put it in your safety- deposit box or equivalent. This way, when you open the envelope in the presence of the Judge/Jury you have the word of the US Postal Service that you had X idea on Y date, not to mention the corroborrating e-signatures. If Z were to claim authorship, you could ask Z to prove it by forging your signature on another document. This could go a long way toward proving the value of PGP signature to the Unwashed Masses, =and= illustrate the danger of GACK + corrupt gummit agent (in the light of the Ruby Ridge and Waco hearings, people will be =quite= sensitive to the fact that agents can and do abuse their power). In fact, the ability for us to be able to attest to your possession of Document X on Date Y, without any of us ever seeing X itself, is one of the most powerful uses of digital signatures. I can see Phil Z. being called as an expert witness, to establish the mechanism involved. Joe Sixpack needs to hear Dan Blather mention this on the Evening News. OK, not Blather, but Koppel would do it. Maybe even John Stossel on 20/20. This is what we need to be pushing to the Luddite crowd: The very new technology that frightens them, because they percieve it as out of their control, brings with it new means for people to take control. Even if you lost your case on some other grounds, it would be one of the best PR bits for PGP I can think of. * Don't say "Gun Control", it's "Victim Disarmament". --- * Monster(a)FAmend.Com *

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PGP FAQ
by ENRIQUE S. IGNARRA 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone here politely send me some email on where i could get an updated PGP FAQ? I have an old one for v2.3a. I'd like to get an updated one. But where the old one says to go, the directory no longer exists. Thanks! Enrique s0496872(a)dominic.barry.edu

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.taylored.com This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp. hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp reord mix post"; $remailer{"tower"} = "<remailer(a)tower.techwood.org> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash mix cut ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"crown"} = "<mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut mix ek reord"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mixmaster(a)gondolin.org> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. 21 Apr 1995: The new version of premail (0.33) is out, with direct posting, perl5 and better MH support, and numerous bug fixes. Last ping: Mon 17 Jul 95 6:00:03 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl *+*+****+*** 14:18 99.99% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com +++++++++++* 49:27 99.99% spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net ********--** 1:32:17 99.99% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ++++++++-+++ 57:13 99.99% syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org -------+--- 1:44:52 99.99% replay remailer(a)replay.com *+*+**+*+*** 13:59 99.95% vox remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl -..--.-.---- 12:41:56 99.99% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu .**+*#*###*- 54:07 99.90% crown mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net --------+- 1:12:09 99.89% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com *****#*##### 2:18 99.82% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *****#*#*#*# 3:02 99.82% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net -**+** ++*** 20:02 98.62% gondolin mixmaster(a)gondolin.org -**-**++*--- 1:17:43 98.56% c2 remail(a)c2.org -*++++++-++ 42:52 98.03% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com -..--.-_ -- 14:50:37 97.80% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com _ --...... 17:04:28 96.35% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de #-#+# 1:52:55 96.09% hroller hroller(a)c2.org ++***# +*-++ 12:53 94.98% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi --+++-- --++ 2:59:39 92.16% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org -_++_.-+--+ 15:25:46 91.39% rahul homer(a)rahul.net *++*+++*##+- 10:33 99.94% tower remailer(a)tower.techwood.org 6:44 1.46% For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Mixmaster@obscura.com back with new keys.
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mixmaster(a)obscura.com is back. Obscura crashed last weekend, taking all data with it. The remailer is running again but the secret keys were lost. This remailer is running Mixmaster 2.0.1 and the latest Ghio type1 remailer for cypherpunk messages. Here is the mixmaster key: mix mixmaster(a)obscura.com db91418edac3a4d7329feaee0b79c74f 2.0.1 -----Begin Mix Key----- db91418edac3a4d7329feaee0b79c74f 258 AATL25WGQY5CMM0/xBjYtuN6IT75h+aBQwwKqZZc isOrqdsl8HWAzARrB0iAtcr34c2qqPBzSRNa5UE8 d3jOYu/wp9K9M5abUSRogcDl7gkPlqxc+e72SdKd 2Gdgib8VDGVLpJdaPk4uSY/pkmsYB30OaQH3W8dU PPciTvSJKAYcTQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- and here is the pgp key: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQBtAzAGIaQAAAEDAJpPdFihCI1Cfpc8njkqOSma/GVvS5nodpTnnff3B3RuZWJN bEvxC3s8TATo6f5JdXqOkZBXQCK+aHke4LKw+MGNNXBYeWH60NZ0IihVThHeyYqL f4ZQNJHlMlFfDrQEgQAFEbQqTWl4bWFzdGVyIFJlbWFpbGVyIDxtaXhtYXN0ZXJA b2JzY3VyYS5jb20+iQEVAwUQMAnzn/Pzr81BVjMVAQEzRQgAk3ansqZb2y8orEim 0igHJpA22J15l6tu5ZihHpnBbXJEqdDKvsp6P/LG+ZDBXa8bGGg7RxZ1xXFqVWSO kkv9iqcoMWB14VHzC5A6MckhkpUGqPt+HMyUEW/JnGzZ202Z4aaVXOjXMsLf5jo1 VIp94/8nQen+QJThpJLmaNGgl8z60skyXzbtoz93Wy6IZAQYYImeswSrYukO1wC6 FXy0/a3AkDjd7mJiCtA2m7tTxCZr2EBlSu4VemG1APmCTjh2f/wyXNU1iXmTDb7N QcplTAwpROrdvtBeslE+bzYqWZqipcFHHyW9W6YUVIr18cojt6k5GEVzI9WCEgAO v+kA1YkAlQMFEDAJ82xVZJN3Wse4ZQEBc7gD/izVs3+jXs3Ze+U+ZVmfO6guUcMU RB4VsNS6n5BHRm6KS7qXCXxHYc0tehkuHVuGD0riSaS232P0NNmp1D4dzXtUVQCY BZfMbWX4EooqHGGRAoqPGZuke8pZYfVGARUKFQB8+zqKGhCum8z1sbUPUgzR5bie Un9sktwsWEJEIcNoiQB1AwUQMAnxfeUyUV8OtASBAQF/5gL+OksEqwyBE+pUZCmN 1AXAmKlRxkd6gybJJl8lXOOa4KVGmSEroYW8pac+TlraJb6j90LvbqJ+7PHuMtHT 84uRna183HDqKOd6NMdwTTimE6ZGueGBB7mwIysaTU8oCZ66 =0s+r -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -Lance -- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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Re: ECM list.
by Bryce Wilcox 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > For example, you might be holding $85.73 in digicash (having played the > various slot machine pages, maybe bought a sky photograph from the Bradford > telescope). That's just about right. > What would it take for you to buy more digicash? How about to sell it? Right now I am thinking of e$ as a "collectors item" or a fun thing to brag about in some distant year. I'm offering US$1.00 for e$15.00, but I will quit offering that price once I run out of US$ or decide that I have enough e$! I think that the ecm market is probably composed of very few people who mostly want to buy, and is therefore not a high-volume market! If the ecm market got a link from the DigiCash home page (which I'm sure it could do) then you would probably get lots of people who just got their free e$100.00 and who are willing to sell part of it after having experienced the wonders of the slot machines and the "e$0.01-per-move tic-tac-toe" games. Could we set up a WWW version of the ecm market, listing latest offers to anyone with a WWW browser? Things might really pick up-- at least for us buyers! I'm also considering other strategies for gaining e$-- offering a service on the DigiCash "cybershops" page, or just going to all my e-mail using friends, showing them how to get their free e$100.00, and then begging them to give me half of it. (Finder's fee? Friendly gift?) Possibly I shouldn't have posted the above and given my e$-collecting competitors the idea, because eventually DigiCash is going to quit giving out freebies! Hopefully my friends will get on the ball and acquire their freebies before that point! :-) [mental note to add some of said friends to the Cc: line...] Bryce P.S. Oh great. My "friends" are asking for the $1.00 for e$15.00 deal... signatures follow /=============------------ Bryce Wilcox, Programmer [THIS SPACE FOR RENT] bryce.wilcox(a)colorado.edu ------------=============/ E-mail is between you and me-- use PGP! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBMAoTRZCUT4gUihHlAQEBMgQAueueOvkxSsVRBS20k49zUhOr8wa/CKcD vqsKLhHoeWhrXuYMKV5KTGgQ86TLwiu5n1C0fjomcJ+86UT1Py09i+yfeBj956hH sMFoGHgu4jKtQPZ94FsmsCzfDXPF6htnuOnQYjSrAydckomZoiQfPICDFRGeiSTp FbXeDMRMrMs= =1z8A -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: A Chronology on crypto bans
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:08 PM 7/16/95 -0400, Dave Banisar wrote: >Someone asked why is there such a flurry recently on banning crypto in >recent months. This is not a recent issue. There have been almost non-stop >attempts for the last 15 years. True, though there have been more and louder calls for banning crypto as it becomes more widely used, and as the Internet and electronic commerce make its use more relevant. The number of cats running around outside of bags has been increasing, so the effort of the politicians to herd them back in has become more and more noticeable. A lot of it has been good public relations but the Good Guys as well - back in the late 70s, when I started following it, crypto was mostly for spooks, bankers, and academic math nerds*; PGP and the government's persecution of Phil have made a lot of people aware that the stakes are high and the Bad Guys are serious, and the Clipper Chip sounded enough like "The Feds want to tap my phone" that the general public could understand, a bit, that this was something that affected them... It's also been technology - real crypto needs computers, and computers have gone from million-dollar room-fillers that you might use at work or university to appliances you can buy at WalMart, like tv sets, which your kids use for school, if you don't count game machines, which your kids can buy at K-mart... Suddenly a third of the country's got a machine they can do real crypto on, and for 10 bucks a month they can be on a world-wide email network. And it's mostly the _rich_ third of the country, who might want to do their home banking somewhere a bit less taxing than before. Oh, yeah, there's also drugs - folks might want to use the Home Shopping Internet for more than just fake jewelry :-) * at the time, I was an academic math nerd designing banking networks at the phone company, and my department also did studies for spooks... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com

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