- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

revoked transactions/guerrilla fee remailers
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Paul J. Ste. Marie writes: > MC/Visa require the reversibility of transactions as a condition of their > merchant agreements. It's not something peculiar to FV. In fact, under > certain conditions it is mandated by federal law. Escort services have a > similar problem as far as non-returnability goes, but I don't know how they > finesse their way around it. Two plausible tactics for escort services: [0] Price inflation: treat a revoked transaction rather like shoplifting, by passing the costs on to the customers; escort services are not cheap [1] Embarrassment: tip off family and employers of people who accept escorts, then decide not to pay for them; the perceived threat of publicity should keep plenty of folks in line There's not much that can be done to someone who uses an escort service once, revokes the transaction, and doesn't care who knows about it. How might this apply to remailing services ? Right now, with a fairly small customer base, I imagine price inflation would be impractical, but embarrassment might prove fairly effective. In the developed market we envision, presumably operators could get away with price inflation, but embarrassment would lose much of its potential sting. (I assume that once a critical mass of populace uses remailers, an announcement that Josie Worsham has used a remailer would elicit only yawns.) Do others see the resulting applicability of additional regulations to remailers as an issue in having them charge for service ? Within the category of fee-charging remailers, the distinction between non-profit and for-profit operations may be worth considering. I suppose that the IRS and analogous agencies would be inclined to ask questions about it, for starters. My threat model for the remailer bramble includes, at a minimum, a host of typical government agencies obligated to wrap everything in red tape. Look for anti- trust investigations to be launched against a price-fixing cartel of remailers. - - From what I've seen so far, accepting payment would seem to make anonymous _operation_ of a remailer well nigh impossible. Anonymous operation with revenue would require a corresponding level of anonymity in the transfer of money. Until such time as conversion of funds from a net-liquid form to a conventional form becomes unnecessary (or just commonplace ?), financial traffic analysis can't adequately be thwarted. All this bodes ill, IMHO, for the prospect of guerrilla or quasi-guerrilla remailers charging for service any time soon. There's just too much infrastructure to which they'd need to be tied at the moment. -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server "The objective is for us to get those conversations whether they're by an alligator clip or ones and zeroes. Wherever they are, whatever they are, I need them." -FBI Dir. Freeh - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLxHeC2f7YYibNzjpAQGhlQP/fkyvN0QqDkbLhgqecGUaeu3cbCstMd4y lgs/XzCeiXVt6EiQ8tmDVbq4G0QYTGntph/3knciJopGrH+Nu6LVmiqWNiRWFxm8 zJBRenCW2SN9nRixJiI4S2n0yQ//v9C7sOEfmu9SToQDYc+U1CBNSUhhJAveT1GN BD4WNFlm/WY= =VY8W - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxHfcSoZzwIn1bdtAQGyEAGAwKES86hkJ8GkLsYCr+vEAjH1/L2GdrCj jw0b83L7FHA99sUihIYe2zUUxr+Sqb2b =7Aai -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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data havens
by Raul Deluth Miller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The problem with encryption, in general, is that it's an attempt to hide information -- unless the information is trivial, encryption is only a temporary measure. Believe it or not, the government (or, more properly, people associated with the government) is still trying to figure out which industries are Iraqi owned -- one technique being brought to bear is statistical analysis of company activities, with special attention to changes which occurred during the gulf war. The only way to have data havens be acceptable to the U.S. government would be to have them become acceptable to the U.S. population (or some significant fraction of them). This would imply phasing out the DEA and the IRS, at a minimum. [Newspaper article this weekend: how it's so horrible that some people deal in cash and thus are evading the IRS.] More generally, the way to keep a data haven from being located is to make sure it doesn't have a location... This is hard to do without severely impacting latency. -- Raul D. Miller N=:((*/pq)&|)@ NB. public e, y, n=:*/pq <rockwell(a)nova.umd.edu> P=:*N/@:# NB. */-.,e e.&factors t=:*/<:pq 1=t|e*d NB. (,-:<:)pq is four large primes, e medium x-:d P,:y=:e P,:x NB. (d P,:y)-:D P*:N^:(i.#D)y [. D=:|.@#.d

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Privacy markets
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

mkj(a)october.ducktown.org wrote: > Bottom line: Anonymity is the only available tool which puts control > over my own privacy firmly into my own hands, where it belongs, and > does so without infringing on anyone's freedom of speech. Certainly Some months ago I extended this to the concept of privacy markets - where individuals will be able to disclose their 'truename value' to providers of services (such as libraries, publications) whose marketing would benefit, in lieu of cash. I rather think big business is in a better position than government to exploit the 'profiling' fallout of universal use of truenames. In the hope of increasing the declining signal content on the list, I'm reposting my article: ====================== Electric Dreams Weekly column for The Asian Age by Rishab Aiyer Ghosh #35, 31/October/1994: Selling privacy as a commodity It was once said that you should never post publicly to cyberspace what you don't want to see in tomorrow's newspapers. While newspapers are rarely interested in your idle thoughts, others are. Future employers, advertisers and an army of 'user profilers' have begun to exploit the availability of huge data banks of Net traffic, just waiting to be indexed by your names and opinions. It is already possible to buy CD-ROM or tape archives of posts to newsgroups on the Internet. Collecting newsgroup posts as they arrive is trivial. Apart from ordinary Internet connections, all newsgroups are available on one- way, open-access satellite data broadcasts. As traffic flows in, it can be indexed and backed up on extremely cheap storage media such as Digital Audio Tape, for later search and retrieval. While the US National Security Agency is naturally one of the best at hunting for signs of incorrect thinking in cyberspace, several techniques to search large volumes of data by very flexible criteria are publicly available. Electronic writing is one of the best sources for employers to learn the views of prospective employees. The groups people participate in can also form useful inputs to consumer profiles. Some companies have already started offering directory services based on posts to USENET, the semi-official collection of major newsgroups. It is easy to imagine Profiles-R-Us shops that sell dossiers on any individual, detailing political, religious and sexual preferences, and other interesting tidbits - all the nasty things you ever said about Microsoft, for instance! Public discussion is of course just that, and it's ridiculous to attempt to prevent it being put to use for purposes not originally intended. The remedy to an invasion is to build walls; when the invasion is one of privacy, the walls are technological. Some pioneers are already protecting themselves through the use of encryption, digital signatures, and multiple pseudonyms - making it impossible for profilers to associate opinions with real people. In a way, the Invasion Of The Profilers is a good thing - it will make individuals realize what little privacy they have, and teach them the value of privacy. Not everyone will want to seal themselves in private cocoons. Most will not object to some loss of privacy, but in exchange for a (not necessarily monetary) share of the profilers' profits. Individuals will control their privacy and selectively reduce it when it benefits themselves. A particularly useful application of this is in an electronic public library. Once access to data is severely restricted to protect intellectual property rights, the Internet as a source of knowledge for everyone will die, unless libraries are opened to provide information free of cost. Such libraries need not survive on subsidies; rather, they can ask for a copy of any information base in cyberspace from all publishers. By limiting access to individuals who are willing to give up some privacy, the library and publishers will benefit from the sale of users' access records to advertisers. Advertisers will be delighted, as most other inputs for profiling in a privacy- aware society will be unavailable. Finally, users will get free access to information if they so choose, at a cost that they can agree to. While one can be frightened by the ease with which a multitude of Big Brothers can monitor the citizens of cyberspace, technology, as always, has something for everyone. As it becomes easier to search through electronic communications, it also becomes easier to protect privacy to varying degrees. Individuals will be forced to be aware of risks to their privacy. With the opening of markets for profiles, privacy may finally find a concrete value. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh is a freelance technology consultant and writer. You can reach him through voice mail (+91 11 3760335) or e-mail (rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in) --====(C) Copyright 1994 Rishab Aiyer Ghosh. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED====-- This article may be redistributed in electronic form only, PROVIDED THAT THE ARTICLE AND THIS NOTICE REMAIN INTACT. This article MAY NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES be redistributed in any non-electronic form, or redistributed in any form for compensation of any kind, WITHOUT PRIOR WRITTEN PERMISSION from Rishab Aiyer Ghosh (rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in) --==================================================================-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Pornography, What is it?
by root 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: ravage(a)bga.com To: cpunks the world over Hi all, I am very interested in the data haven issue now that I have my site up. The aspect of pornography is a problem that has to be faced. To this end, I would like to ask that we look at how pornography is defined. >From my own view, I fail to see any way to truly define pornography as anything other than the ravings of a neurotic (both on a personal and a societal level). Every example of pornography I have seen has been put in that category because it contravenes some personal or group taboo. Take care.

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Re: for-pay remailers and FV
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- From: Pierre Uszynski <pierre(a)shell.portal.com> > Finally, I do not believe that introducing payment in the remailer > system would curb abuse in any significant way. Significant abuse is > that which causes significant problems for the operators: posting > secret religious technology, forging prime minister mail, harrassing a > member of any number of opposite persuasions, etc... Do you think for a > minute that a 5 cents postage is going to stop these messages now? And > how about when remailers do attain good reliability and untraceability, > for 3 cents? I had suggested an idea a while back where you would try to address the abuse issue directly rather than charging per message. I agree with Pierre that any reasonable per-message charge will not help in many forms of abuse, although it should address the worst spam attacks. The idea is to have a sort of digital cash token, but it is free. The key is that each person just gets one of these, but they are reusable. After a remailer sends a message, it waits and sees if it gets any complaints. If not, the token is re-blinded and made available to the original user via some kind of pool. He can then send another message. But if he commits abuse, he doesn't get his token back. Obviously there are problems with this, the worst probably being how we can keep people from acquiring lots of tokens under different names. Perhaps you could charge some small amount for them, but require VISA payment, and check the names on the VISA cards. (This doesn't hurt anonymity when the tokens are actually used because of the blinding.) To get multiple tokens a person would have to commit some serious real world name trickery, a considerably higher barrier than making up a pseudonym on the net. Another problem is that as stated above, you could only send one anonymous message every day or two. Perhaps we relax the rules and let people have a few of these tokens; they can then abuse the system a few times but each time they lose a token. A similar idea might work for the data haven problem, although I don't understand exactly what is intended there. This approach is a variation on the "is a person" credential, which attempts to make sure that each person only gets one of something. A lot of situations would benefit from such a credential, although some people don't like them. Hal -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAwUBLxIw2RnMLJtOy9MBAQGWCgH6A1SFyzZDDhd/NVrMck5SAf3mS4IOl5On aJNFKUopZi4Fb7tqQfbFukDl/lF+clnBDBNh/yXAsFcABJaWaTUzZA== =pLOT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PRESS RELEASE - RSA Licenses Commercial Distribution Rights to RSAREF (long)
by Christopher Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----- Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR Content-Domain: RFC822 Originator-Certificate: MIICRjCCAdsCBQJTAAAEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAME4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMw EQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlhMSowKAYDVQQKEyFDb25zZW5zdXMgRGV2ZWxvcG1l bnQgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24wHhcNOTQwNjI3MDAwMDAwWhcNOTUwNjI2MjM1OTU5WjCB 4DELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExKjAoBgNVBAoTIUNv bnNlbnN1cyBEZXZlbG9wbWVudCBDb3Jwb3JhdGlvbjETMBEGA1UEERMKOTQxMTQt MzYxNTETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBxMNU2FuIEZyYW5jaXNj bzEeMBwGA1UECRQVNDEwNC0yNHRoIFN0cmVldCCmNDE5MRIwEAYDVQQMEwlQcmVz aWRlbnQxGjAYBgNVBAMTEUNocmlzdG9waGVyIEFsbGVuMHAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB BQADXwAwXAJVKa43Pd6AhLaYGRLMwvGGvZ7dtzK+XpsRtwKYEDQKHE8swS09ViEg MKuMa/+weQXDBpqQ6SDj/xgHGzmwGhkbeitPWr/6Du5gemMLrhhTs8eMhAXLXwID AQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAA1YAEkQDfJmroAMZD5v1F7fPK38y4waoX0FSpdsf jcXf04URcEJc5dCFm0DzrMPMdVpNz5tpSBy0ZUeg/xqbwRfHIW34bMAVLc9kojIi AGXlHL/q8HRCIx== Issuer-Certificate: MIIB6TCCAVYCBQJBAAAKMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAMFwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSAw HgYDVQQKExdSU0EgRGF0YSBTZWN1cml0eSwgSW5jLjErMCkGA1UECxMiQ29tbWVy Y2lhbCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTAeFw05NDA1MDUwMTEwMDRaFw05 OTA0MzAwMTEwMDRaME4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlh MSowKAYDVQQKEyFDb25zZW5zdXMgRGV2ZWxvcG1lbnQgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24wcDAN BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANfADBcAlUpc+2/Ec+bydwsB6enemznB/aQwd4gp2YSI3FW PHl2tc/aa7HZFA0qCL/0Ol6ituC+yUEO3IWKQ5U8hhl1RVqmW7mzwNOr2yeHIFA5 rqXvAvMvlGpvAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQADfgA2QEssX/nG3spHBpbkU4KV oQdVhxtQEmjuIrqBVI9jQRntacJ0tw1m5MsLV6hNMV/mD0yKmDc9ywSF7ZWIipVY tz8E52yQEprR+JxTad+/ZtTI0wEvEM5313jUF4ivF86eOuZDqHd4zbRHk6ggIAGH 86GFbMaWDaKoGUrde2== MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA, J9l0zSgqnVqK8a9QQ3Ml+O6tv58PsVmCELOQTqj1i8HCQoHpJ+bEmayf4WyIbqoY y4xFecAPQfP5hpHPLVoLX4IM7kNT0UhDHW8XklfhhAVE1+Y0Og== Date: Mon, 09 Jan 1995 09:00:00 -0800 Subject: PRESS RELEASE - RSA Licenses Commercial Distribution Rights to RSAREF From: Christopher Allen <ChristopherA(a)consensus.com> Organization: Consensus Development Corporation, San Francisco, CA USA Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Text-Source: ftp://ftp.consensus.com/pub/consensus/pr/RSAREF-PR.txt X-HTML-Source: http://www.consensus.com:8300/RSAREF-PR.html Summary: RSA announces that it is licensing commercial distribution rights of its RSAREF software to Consensus Development, allowing for implementation of commercial Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) applications. Keywords: press release, consensus development corporation, rsa data security, rsaref, commercial license, support, marketing, maintenance, encryption, digital signature, source code, tool kit, PEM, privacy enchanced mail RSA Licenses Commercial Distribution Rights to RSAREF ===================================================== RSA announces that it is licensing commercial distribution rights of its RSAREF software to Consensus Development, allowing for implementation of commercial Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) applications. Press Release - ------------- REDWOOD SHORES, CALIFORNIA--JANUARY 9, 1995--RSA Data Security, Inc. and Consensus Development Corporation jointly announce today at the RSA Data Security Conference that Consensus Development is licensing the commercial distribution rights of RSAREF from RSA Data Security. RSAREF (pronounced "R.S.A. reff") is short for "RSA reference implementation" and is a cryptography source code toolkit designed to allow developers to create PEM (Privacy-Enhanced Mail)software and other encryption/authentication tools. Until now, RSAREF has been an unsupported RSA product approved for use only as part of freeware and not-for-profit software applications. Consensus Development will now be able to market and license RSAREF to commercial software developers, and provide software support and future enhancements to the RSAREF source code library. This announcement is significant because it is the first program of its kind to make the RSAREF implementation of RSA's popular patented authentication technology available to commercial vendors. "Data mailed, posted, or put on servers on the Internet is inherently untrustable today, " said Jim Bidzos, president of RSA. "Tampering with electronic documents takes no special skills, and leaves no trace.With the availability of RSAREF for both free software as well as commercial software there is no need for this situation to continue." Now that a commercial license to RSAREF is available, applications may now be developed and sold that incorporate Privacy-Enhanced Mail's authentication and encryption capabilities. Christopher Allen, President of Consensus Development adds "The PEM standards have been under development for a couple of years and only now are coming to fruition. The ability to offer both freeware developers and commercial software vendors a license to RSAREF will kickstart the adoption of PEM-capable mail software." Consensus Development will be creating an email discussion list for software developers interested in RSAREF. To join the discussion, send a message to <listproc(a)consensus.com> with the body of the message requesting "subscribe RSAREF-DEV-L firstname lastname". Background - ---------- The RSA cryptosystem was invented and patented in the late 1970's by Drs. Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who started RSA Data Security in Redwood City, California, in 1982. Digital signatures are produced using the RSA Cryptosystem, which is a public-key cryptosystem. Each user has two keys - one public and one private. The public key can be disclosed without compromising the private key. Electronic documents can be "signed" with an unforgeable signature by using a document/private-key combination to produce a signature unique to the author and particular document. Anyone using an application that supports RSAREF and has the public key of the author can subsequently verify the authenticity of the document. Applications of digital signatures are endless: expense reports, electronic forms and purchase orders, contract revisions, engineering change orders, even tax returns can be electronically signed to speed electronic document flow and eliminate fraud. Furthermore, digital signatures can also be used to detect any virus before a program is executed, since any change whatsoever is detected. One reason that the paperless office has never materialized is that paper must still be printed so that handwritten signatures can be applied. RSAREF eliminates that necessity. Applications supporting RSAREF could have prevented last year's computer fraud at Dartmouth College, in which students were tricked into missing an important midterm by a fraudulent electronic mail message claiming to be from university faculty. Corporate Profiles - ------------------ RSA Data Security, Inc. <URL=http://www.rsa.com/> is the acknowledged world leader in encryption technology, with over three million copies of its software encryption and authentication installed and in use worldwide. RSA is a defacto standard for encryption and digital signatures, and is part of existing and proposed standards for the Internet, CCITT, ISO, ANSI, IEEE and business and financial networks around the globe. RSA develops and markets platform-independent software developers' kits, end-user products, and provides comprehensive consulting services in the cryptographic sciences. RSA technology has been embedded in the products of many companies, including Microsoft, IBM, Apple, Oracle, General Magic, DEC, Sun, Novell, Lotus, Motorola, Northern Telecom, AT&T, WordPerfect, General Electric, Hughes Aircraft, and many others. The company is headquartered in Redwood City, California. Consensus Development Corporation <URL=http://www.consensus.com:8300/> is a software development and consulting firm specializing in the support of organizations that need long-distance collaboration via wide-area networks and the Internet.Consensus Development has been offering consulting and software tools in the area of collaboration support since 1988 and is based in San Francisco, California. Clients include Aladdin Systems, American Information Exchange (AMIX), America Online, Apple Computer, Attain, Authorware, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Claris Corporation, Component Integration Laboratories, Connectix Corporation, Digicash bv, Group Technologies, InterCon, ON Technology, Portfolio Systems, RSA Data Security, Ronin Publishing, Software Ventures, Visa International, and Xanadu Operating Company. Contact - ------- Kurt Stammberger RSA Data Security, Inc. 415/595-8782 <kurt(a)rsa.com> Christopher Allen Consensus Development Corporation 415/647-6383 <ChristopherA(a)consensus.com> $$ - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ...Christopher Allen Consensus Development Corporation.. ...<ChristopherA(a)consensus.com> 4104-24th Street #419.. ... San Francisco, CA 94114-3615.. ... o415/647-6383 f415/647-6384.. ...Mosaic/WWW Home Page: .. ...Consensus Home Page .. -----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----- Created with RIPEM Mac 0.8.5 b1

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Julf gets some negitive press!!!
by skaplin＠mirage.skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I found this surfing USENET. Very interesting... From: cmfaltz(a)panix.com (Titania) Subject: SIEGAL STRIKES AGAIN -- HEADS UP, FOLKS; CENSORS GETTING READY Date: 5 Jan 1995 09:28:40 -0500 Organization: The Q Continuum Lines: 112 Message-ID: <3egvmo$lfg(a)panix.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com Chck the blurb at the end of this reprint from the San Francisco Chronical -- bitch Siegel is complaining about net hoods again, while supplementing her income providing a how-to book for those hoods -- oh, she would say her book is informative, bringing Net abuses and scams to the public knowledge, but human nature being what it is, how much do you wanna bet scum have been buying up her little tome for ideas? Check 'er out, everyone -- she's the face of the enemy -- get ready. Reprinted from Monday's SF Chronicle *Anarchy, Chaos on the Internet Must End* Martha S. Siegel Elections are over, and, for better or worse, recognized leadership is installed and working in most places. Yet, in Cyberspace, the electronic world dominated by the much vaunted Internet, there is not much order. This huge international computer web tying together about 30 million people is governed by no one. What an amazing state of affairs. The most powerful commu- nication medium ever invented is being left to the equivalent of mob rule. Last year was the year of the Internet in the media. Clearly it is now in the mainstream. Nonetheless, judging by what you read or hear, the key question of who runs it is not even an issue. It is more fun, after all, to contemplate shopping in an electronic mall or how to order a pizza through a modem. No matter, if you scratch the surface of this big, happy party, the need for firm direction is all too obvious. Also reported in the press is an expanding array of Internet problems. Unregulated broadcasting of sexually explicit material that is readily available to children usually heads the list, but on-line sexual harassment, profanity, defamation, forgery and fraud run close seconds. The secretiveness that computer communications allows is a special reason why abuse is easy. National and personal security are serious considerations when anyone can, with complete anonymity, send encrypted information worldwide via the Internet. Such problems are further exacerbated by a computer in Finland called the Anonymous Server, which exists for the sole purpose of laundering computer messages, much like dirty money is laundered through small island nations. Consequently, if you want to, say, threaten someone with death, your risk of retribution is small, courtesy of the Anonymous Server. Nowhere are Cyberspace difficulties more evident than in the inevitable swing toward Internet commercialization. The widely reported turf war rages onbetween academic factions that controlled Internet before it went public and business newcomers who now want to access its huge audience. Electronic attacks on business people by means ranging from computer insults, called flames, to assorted forms of electronic vandalism, persist uncontrolled. Worst of all are the "canceller robots," computer programs meant to erase the communications of anyone the hackers who usually launch them want to silence. These self-styled vigilantes routinely challenge free speech in Cyberspace unabated. Internet access providers, companies that connect people to the Internet for a profit, likewise assume the role of censors, arbitrarily closing accounts of those whom they disapprove. Given its international nature, one obvious way to bring much needed order to the Internet is through diplomacy. The United States should lead in this. A good beginning might be to urge the Finnish government to deactivate the Anonymous Server. Diplomacy could also help to establish an international standard of recognizing laws existing at the point of origin as controlling the message sender. When conflicts arise, governmental diplomacy should again be the answer, just as it is with other trade and communications issues. Next, laws already regulating behavior in the real world should be applied to Cyberspace. This is already taking place on a case-by-case basi, but the process is too slow. The Supreme Court should act to create a precedent stating that crime is crime, even when the criminal instrument is a computer keyboard. In the United States, legislation should be passed making Internet providers common carriers. This will get them out of the business of censorship and under the guiding hand of the Federal Communications Commission. People need safety and order in Cyberspace just as they do in their homes and on the streets. The current state of the Internet makes it clear that anarchy isn't working. If recognized governments don't find a way to bring order to the growing and changing Internet, chaos may soon dictate that the party is over. ** Martha S. Siegel is the author of "How to Make a Fortune on the Information Superhighway" and CEO of Cybersell in Scottsdale, Arizona In any case, the San Fransisco Chronicle may be reached at: Letters to the Editor, San Fransisco Chronicle 901 Mission Street San Fransisco, Ca 94103 or you can fax a letter at (415) 512-8196 - -- ============================================================================== skaplin(a)skypoint.com | Finger skaplin(a)infinity.c2.org for | a listing of crypto related files PGP encrypted mail is accepted and | available on my auto-responder. preferred. | (Yes...the faqs are there!) | E-mail key(a)four11.com for PGP Key or | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard Finger skaplin(a)mirage.skypoint.com | outside a Roman brothel. ============================================================================== Anyone who hates Dogs and Kids Can't be All Bad. -- W. C. Fields -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBLxJtEMlnXxBRSgfNAQGz6gf/bwcCfyl+Cbktb/rGHUoudNWRKgXBjaNC 73V2FADhPRK+GIocliO6n/jNKetgfmvR7vKRkC98DuL5eJ4nek6XBqZ1eMBv0gBU FWSyRulYy3DJghWTUwFFuzm5GgNgC7j3kHOAdoLDys7FPaD7VprxD6esiIZnE/Ao rG2LqXrjQ3ofHqKiCxpldKJv51ttGZaWCbT39IfJOoB9dYs6vPTaDf7aOuqHfUKi +ZgwEwf/tM0x2BX6GuKCNXhFnPjL947kTQuSQ8JEcwHbvqAueMFaehNOtRczqwSj CBtwUYF9NIPmZ1kqEtJBQegDqj71xcD3c17NpjFAVjx1dz4ceIBRVQ== =FTmU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: for-pay remailers and FV
by Nathaniel Borenstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpts from fv: 9-Jan-95 Re: for-pay remailers and FV db(a)Tadpole.COM (2073*) > Also, there is no reason on earth to take FV for payment under > such a scheme, No reason on Earth? Try any of the following: 1. You can actually get paid, in real money, using a system that is operating NOW. 2. It requires no special software for the user of the remailer service, thus preserving a very positive feature of most of today's anonymous remailers. 3. You don't need to have a credit card merchant account (and the technical arrangements for using it) in order to run a remailer service. There are more, but those are probably the top three. > I don't see any reason to get FV involved, unless one were so lame > as to be unable to get signed up directly with the credit card > companies as a merchant -- a process of appropriate complexity > to indicate the posession of at least one (1) clue, which is prob. > desirable in someone who's going to be handling remailer finances Well, I could be wrong, but from the above paragraph I can only infer that you've never actually tried to set yourself up as a merchant. The hardest part is getting approved for a merchant account. Unless you already have an established business or money in the bank, this will *probably* be a showstopper if you want to set up a remailer-for-pay service. Getting a merchant account is never trivial, and getting one in a whole new industry is VERY hard. Once you have a merchant account, establishing the right technical setup to do the actual authorization and purchases is not rocket science, but it certainly requires more than "1 clue" -- in particular, it typically requires hooking up some special hardware, installing and configuring some new software, and some serious thought about the implications for your system's security. None of this is needed if you use FV. Also, as Paul pointed out, the requirement for reversibility applies to ANY credit-card-based service, not just FV. This is NOT an option, it is required by law (reg Z). Excerpts from fv: 10-Jan-95 Re: for-pay remailers and FV Hal(a)shell.portal.com (2603) > Perhaps you could charge some small amount for them, but require VISA > payment, and check the names on the VISA cards. (This doesn't hurt > anonymity when the tokens are actually used because of the blinding.) To > get multiple tokens a person would have to commit some serious real world > name trickery, a considerably higher barrier than making up a pseudonym > on the net. This is workable. It also reinvents a big chunk of what FV does, if you do it yourself. -- NB

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DH testing
by nelson＠crynwr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A DataHaven is only as good as it's been tested. You could pay for a tiger team to attack it, but why bother? Just take some nudie pictures of a girl >=18 years old who looks <18 years old, announce publicly that you have kiddie porn for sale, sit back and let the FBI test your DH for free. Be sure to charge enough for your eventual legal defense... -- -russ <nelson(a)crynwr.com> http://www.crynwr.com/crynwr/nelson.html Crynwr Software | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | ask4 PGP key 11 Grant St. | +1 315 268 1925 (9201 FAX) | What is thee doing about it? Potsdam, NY 13676 | What part of "Congress shall make no law" eludes Congress?

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"safe" Internet access
by nelson＠crynwr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you want to access the Internet in a way that doesn't reveal your physical location (much), buy access from Metricom. They sell Internet access via radios. A small part-15 (900Mhz) $500 radio modem is needed, plus a few dozen bucks/month (thereabouts). If you use a yagi antenna, that will reduce your emissions to mostly one direction. If you're in line-of-sight with one of their poletops, you can point a telescope in that direction, and transmit only when you *don't* see a truck bristling with antennas. Every radio has a serial number, and they record who's got what, so they could cut you off much, much easier than catching you. For more information, see <http://www.metricom.com>. Same thing can be done with radiomail, but the speed is slower and the radios and service are more expensive. And, they can still cut you off. Of course, part-time connectivity is problemmatic, because you need to receive mail at all times. Of course, you could use a mail hub in a "safe" country, but then you're tied to a government again. -- -russ <nelson(a)crynwr.com> http://www.crynwr.com/crynwr/nelson.html Crynwr Software | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | ask4 PGP key 11 Grant St. | +1 315 268 1925 (9201 FAX) | What is thee doing about it? Potsdam, NY 13676 | What part of "Congress shall make no law" eludes Congress?

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