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Re: Unofficial Release
by trollins＠debbie.telos.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry says; >Yup, you have it on me. I guess it is important to lower the >possibility of someone cracking your key by brute force from lower >than the odds that all the oxygen atoms in the room you are in will >spontaneously end up on the wrong side of the room to lower than the >odds that all the oxygen atoms in the world will end up on the wrong >side of the planet. After all, we are fooling with lives. Perry, I don't know the probability of oxygen atoms moving to Japan or anywhere else. (who said Japan was the wrong side of the planet) And, I don't think that anyone will attack my keys by brute force. I do think that someone will be trying to crack messages on a random basis. That is by trying IDEA keys with otherwise idle cpu time on a large base of message trafic. (not my one little pathetic message). Given estimates that the IDEA algorithem is equivlent to a 3000-bit rsa key. I am bringing the rsa part of PGP up to par with the IDEA part of PGP. (just hitting on the weakest link first) So, call me paranoid or joe, I will strive to reach MY crypto comfort level. And that seems to be a higher level of crypto than you have. Who cares ! Use whatever crypto you want. tom

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Re: Unofficial Release
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:27 PM 06/22/94 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Fine. However, you are, you realize, a fool. There is no point in I was wondering if you had recently lost an appendage, or maybe had bad hemorrhoids or something.

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EXPAT WORLD ARTICLE
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, I've been asked to post the /Expat World/ crypto article to the Cypherpunks Channel. Here 'tis: S a n d y * * * EXPAT WORLD June 15, 1994 "How Big Brother Wants to Listen, Too" (copied without permission) Recently, the White House sent Stewart A. Baker, general counsel for the National Security Agency (NSA), to the annual Computer, Freedom and Privacy Conference in New York City to speak about the Clinton Administration's desire to safeguard the government's ability to eavesdrop on every American. At that conference, Mr. Baker posed the question: "Do you want to live in a world where law enforcement cannot do its job because of the need for privacy?" Everyone who cherishes his constitutional rights should answer, "Absolutely." The Orwellian, or Al Gorewellian, technology that would foster the government's ability to eavesdrop on its cit- izens is essentially a microcircuit that the Administration want all American telephone and computer companies to install in their products. The microcircuit, dubbed the "Clipper" chip, scrambles all electronic communications between individuals, resulting in gibberish to outsiders--all outsiders, that is, but the federal government. The plan to implement the Clipper chip is an insult to the American people and its realization would erode the Fourth Amendment rights of all citizens. As usual, presuming Americans have no more sense than Yahoos, the administration has presented the Clipper chip in the guise of a plan to protect individuals from invasions of their privacy. According to the NSA, because telephone conversations and compu- ter transmissions are becoming so easy to tap, the White House would like to offer the Clipper chip to shield everyone from such unwanted interferences. In reality, the Feds want to see a uniform standard in the type of computer software that secures electronic communications. The reason for this is that people are already protecting their con- versations with a variety of privately-supplied devices, and the FBI, CIA and NSA cannot and will not be able to penetrate such security. With the Clipper chip, everyone has the same lock on his communi- cations. Unfortunately, the government has the keys. The Amer- ican people can do without the overwhelming generosity of this administration. When Charles Freeh, FBI director, testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, he said that the chip is necessary because the police and national security agents are falling behind advances in criminal technology. How- ever, no one has offered evidence that a trend of criminals or terrorist using scrambled communications to pass unlawful plots exists, or reasons why a criminal sophisticated enough to use cryptography would be dumb enough to use an American made tele- phone or computer containing the Clipper chip. Worse, the implementation of the Clipper chip would erode the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. According to the President's plan, both the Commerce and Treasury Department would hold keys to unscramble electronic communications, operating as a "key escrow" system. The government would no longer be aiming wiretap technology at specific individuals or specific locations. The presumption would be that everyone is a criminal. Because only two keys partition people's privacy from governmental seizing electronic documents without prior notification is great. If the White House truly desires to use technology for the bene- fit of all, it should mandate the use of a different computer chip. How about one called the Clinterceptor that would act as a sort of modern-day Paul Revere. Through the information super- highway, the Clinterceptor would forewarn the public that the government is about to invade their privacy. Thus, the next time President Clinton and his college roomies are burning the midnight oil and come up with a hair-brained idea like the Clipper chip, an alarm will sound and alert the American people to the government shaking the shackles of the Constitution. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Unofficial Resease
by trollins＠debbie.telos.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry says: >Fine. However, you are, you realize, a fool. There is no point in >building a house with 3 foot thick steel doors and walls made from >paper. After 2^10 or 2^11 bits or so the key is no longer the weak >link, and is not what people will attack since it no longer has a >reasonable possibility of success. You are entitled to your opinions, >of course. Excuse me, What is your point. My 4096-bit rsa key is (last I looked 4096 == 2^12) over your 2^10 or 2^11 estimate and thus NOT the weak link. Why would you want the rsa key to BE the weak link? After all the rsa key will decrypt all your messages and the IDEA key is for (1) message only. -tom

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Re: e$: Geodesic Securities Markets
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Changes in ownership are reflected by offseting book entries. Ah, the > wonders of double-entry bookeeping. BTW, 1994 is the 500th anniversary of the invention of double entry bookkeeping (by a monk). Made capitalism possible. Ah yes, "Swedish Accounting Techniques" as my Economics lecturer used to call it :) G

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Re: Unofficial Release
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jamiel(a)sybase.com (Jamie Lawrence) says, >At 3:27 PM 06/22/94 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > >>Fine. However, you are, you realize, a fool. There is no point in > >I was wondering if you had recently lost an appendage, or maybe had bad >hemorrhoids or something. Like a lot of bright people on this list, Perry doesn't like to repeat himself too much. Like a lot of other people on this list, he gets grouchy when the ritalin wears off... (Damn, I can't find it *anywhere*. Excuse me, there's a tongue around here somewhere... ah. There it is. It's now in my cheek, see? A joke. Levity, even...) Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: e$: Geodesic Securities Markets
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy Sandfort says Me>> |>> Oddly enough, an e$ certification scheme reverses that paradigm. The book |>> entries disapear, the certificates proliferate, and the clearinghouse |>> becomes a referee, "blessing" the trade. > >I don't think so. The book entries still exist. The book is the only >place securities ever really exist. E$ certificates--and even physical >certificates--are nothing more than receipts evidencing ownership as >defined by the book entry. Remember, securities are "intangible" assets >by definition. (Ditto for dollars, yen, pounds and francs, by the way.) > Well, yes. You're right. In a sense. However, in this scenario, it is possible for the clearing house to operate more like a, since "referee" didn't work before, how about "notary", with an official cc: to the security's issuer. The issuer could keep books, if it was important (as Perry said a while back, the Feds would have to have a "confirm", so someone would keep records of the transaction). Of course, the parties to the trade could keep their books, too. On the other hand, if, like those famous asian anonymous equity markets we heard about (from Eric?) there's no recording requirement (assume a frictionless waterbed <g>), very interesting things can happen. All the new owners of the security care about is the ability to sell it later, or collect interest from the payer of any interest, etc. All the sellers want is cash. My contention is that the sellers can get cash in a market by presenting the e$-based certificate. Cashing out interest "coupons" from the issuer happens in the same fashion. Perry had a point a while back. This is cryptography based, but not cryptography, and most c-punks are probably skipping this thread. I'm *really* interested in this stuff, and will talk to all comers about it, off-line. A couple of people have already sent me e-mail to start the ball rolling... Thanks, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: Unofficial Release
by trollins＠telos.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Parry says: >Because it isn't cheap, first of all. If you wanted to run a >completely secure internet, for example (a problem I am currently >working on) the cost of all those RSAs really DOES show up, and fast. Parry, It looks like you have your own agenda in which large rsa keys doesn't fit your time constraints. Don't implement large keys for your secure net. And don't convince yourself that it be COMPLETELY SECURE. -tom

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Hardware RNG's
by John A. Thomas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger asks if the hardware random-number generator I described in a post just before the list crashed could be modified to use serial output. Sure. It was just easier to use the parallel port. I know the original IBM PC stupidly omitted bidirectional ports, but they are available now. Roger Bryner asks if there is any ready-made hardware RNG device. Yes. A few years ago, at least, AT&T was selling such a chip. The data book says: "The T7001 Random Number Generator (RNG) integrated circuit produces random bits based on the phase jitter of a free- running oscillator. The output data stream is truly random, not pseudo random. The T7001 RNG is processed in CMOS technology, requires a single 5 V supply, and is supplied in a 32-pin plastic DIP." The output is 536-bit numbers, available in 8-bit bytes. There are probably others available; I haven't looked lately. John A. Thomas b858jt(a)utarlvm1.uta.edu 75236.3536(a)compuserve.com PGP public key available.

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MAIL: Using "nobody"
by ghio＠cmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I don't understand: why can't the somebody do a telnet to port 25 and > "vrfy nobody" to see if it points to /dev/null? Or find out if mail > is piped to a script? Try that on andrew.cmu.edu

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