- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: something I've always wondered
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Does DES (or name your favorite encryption algorithm) produce as output > all possible cyphertexts of length L, given all possible conbinations of > keys and plaintexts of length L? Choose any cyphertext and a random key and decrypt the cyphertext with that key. Now you have a key and a plaintext which produce this cyphertext. Hadmut

1 0

Re: Unofficial Release
by trollins＠debbie.telos.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry @ insi.com says: >Way overkill. Remember that 2000 is not just twice as hard as 1000 -- >even breakthroughs that improved factoring speed by factors of >thousands couldn't break 2000 bit keys any century soon, if ever. I'd >worry more about my key management -- before putting in even the >effort to crack a 1500 bit key they are likely to just listen in on >the emmissions from your keyboard and monitor. Ahhhh, It is nice to know that people won't even TRY to crack big keys. Cracking, you know, is a lot like the lotto. You MIGHT guess the correct key on the first TRY. But, if you don't TRY, then you won't crack the key. "Gotta play to win" -tom

3 2

C Programmer Wanted for Cryptography Programming
by schneier＠chinet.chinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am looking for a good C programmer who is interested in doing some contract programming for me. Anyone interested? Bruce ************************************************************************** * Bruce Schneier * Counterpane Systems For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1 * schneier(a)chinet.com **************************************************************************

2 1

Unofficial Release
by dcosenza＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm pleased to announce the release of an unofficial version of PGP v2.6ui that allows for key generation up to 8176 bits, thanks are due to Tom Rollins for his diligence compiling the code and also to Mathew at Mantis Consultants in the UK for bringing us all up to 2.6ui. Said material, including source codes and an associated signature, can be found on ftp.netcom.com look in /pub/dcosenza for the following: pgp26ui.zip --> DOS release pgp26uisrc.zip --> source codes pgp26uisrc.sig --> sigfile for pgp26uisrc.zip tom.asc --> Tom's public key, you'll need this to check the sig This patch level is not endorsed or supported in any way shape or form by MIT, so usage of this program might put you in violation. A couple of notes: keys that are larger than 1264 bits will not be readable by previous versions of the software, so users who are interested in larger key lengths are encouraged to move up. Also, considering the enormous amount of time it takes to generate a 4096 bit key on a 486 (10 1/2 hours), an upper limit of 2048 or thereabouts is strongly recommended. Enjoy everybody and Ever forward, David - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- David Cosenza dcosenza(a)netcom.com PGP 2.3a Public Key available by finger _or_ ftp.netcom.com:/pub/dcosenza PGP 2.3a Key fingerprint = BF 6C AA 44 C6 CA 13 3F 4A EC 0A 90 AE F3 74 6D "When encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCzAgUBLgevPSjdpAfJZzihAQFipATwk1jlksS571wBq3p2KySjjpj0PHOY8QJy yc5/S2BYn5ynY4XSp98skAUgWTblU0cT1uFu2JrukpdCqec5pCzCFVuErN2fn9zY MWUhqZKG74v1nTfNrlA+JjfiXd9LWjJJO8bBRfEyZ5ZBMsxALvU/N1j1rCV+KovI OjxtLDdbe5znloT/2GVwlPo2TQUi//cpfT9XNbVDUVCLG934nlw= =BQtC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

5 4

sorry...
by Mikolaj Habryn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

apologies for last message...

1 0

Re: HOW TO MUTATE AND TAKE OVER THE WORLD
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Tue, 21 Jun 1994 12:57:11 -0700 > From: Judith Milhon <stjude(a)well.sf.ca.us> > > I, Judith Milhon, am not a fink. I was at the first meating of this > weird coalescence. I even thought up the name "cypherpunk." I write I wasn't at the first meeting. I wasn't the one who coined the term "cypherpunk". I heard that Andy Hawks did. Cat Shoe

1 0

Paging Eric Hughes
by Eric_Weaver＠avtc.sel.sony.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[apologies to all others; couldn't reach him at any addresses I have seen] Mr. H., Please write me. Thanks.

1 0

Re: e$: Geodesic Securities Markets
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forgive me for *ever* doubting you... Perry Metzger says, >Actually, even in the case of securities largely settled by book >entry, DTC still holds physical certificates. That is not, however, >the point. I know It's Not the Point, but I got curious anyway ;-). After all, I haven't been near a brokerage cage in 10 years (NIDS was big stuff back then), and I thought maybe it's time to learn how the world really works these days... So I called DTC, the Depository Trust Corporation, on Water St. in Manhattan, the Mother of all Securities Clearinghouses. After about five transfers, I talked to a very nice lady in underwriting. She said they really *do* have bales of securities in a vault, and that they have a program called FAST, where securities are stored in banks also. However, she said that a growing number of securities are issued book entry only. Issues of up to $150 million can be issued on a *single* certificate. That certificate is held just like the other securities issues, in a vault. She said that like par value, physical delivery is becoming more and more obsolete. That makes sense. Once a certificate is put into the vault at DTC, it usually never leaves. It might as well not be there at all. Changes in ownership are reflected by offseting book entries. Ah, the wonders of double-entry bookeeping. Oddly enough, an e$ certification scheme reverses that paradigm. The book entries disapear, the certificates proliferate, and the clearinghouse becomes a referee, "blessing" the trade. Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

3 2

Re: e$: Geodesic Securities Markets
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger says, >Its fairly easy to envision a system that directly >matches orders for shares in IBM. Trying to match up buyers and >sellers of swaps might not be that easy. Agreed. I do want to talk my buddy about derivatives, however, because he seems to think that there are ways that e$ protocols could help. Of course, he didn't tell me in any way I could understand... I think it had to do with the authentication of e$ instruments, proving you are who you say you are and you have what you say you have. A WAG: Maybe zero-knowlege stuff has something to do with this? However, like you say it's easy to see how IBM could issue its own shares directly into a geodesic market; maybe even a company could do it's own IPO, with the right rules... When you think about it that way, an investment banker could "sign" an issue (for a fee...), to vouch for it. After all, using that kind of "protocol" on large well established companies is what kept Morgan partners in wood walls and leather wing-back chairs from the time of Glass-Stegall all the way up until the early 70's. In the IPO markets, that's what Hambrecht & Quist does (did? ;-)). The technology changes, but the practice would be the same in a geodesic market. I mean, there's the risk of underwriting the security, but that's pretty much nonexistant these days anyway, and with some modification of the shelf registration idea, a company could "underwrite" it's own offering. Of course when you're underwriting yourself, the term "underwriting" ceases to have meaning, really. >In the foreign exchange market, for instance, most trading >is done on blocks of millions to hundreds of millions of dollars worth >of currency. In the current scheme of things people will only deal >with entities that they know because fails are devistating. It is >possible for third parties to guarantee credit to open up markets, but >they will expect to be paid for this. You can't get rid of the banks >-- someone has to guarantee that you have the money on hand. It seems to me that the issue of capital concentration could be taken care of by the mutual fund analog I used before, the portfolio manager in Marblehead with an e-cash / fund "certificate" exchanger. The restriction of transaction size in the markets is still there, though it might be that the economies of scale would diminish a bit, reducing that required transaction size... The whole idea of avoiding trusted entities is what the DigiCash algorithm is about, right? e$ itself in proper form is proof it is what it says it is. Just like it's possible to spot counterfeit money. It's a pointer to some other stuff, but it can be moved around much better than the stuff it's denominated in, or the market wouldn't create that particular form of e$. >...no matter what you hold, be it dollars, >shares of IBM, or futures contracts for dried silkworm cocoons (a >perfectly real commodity, by the way) you need a bank to hold the >account and guarantee the existance of the thing being held, be it a >figment of the computer's memory or a thing backed by a bar of gold. >The banks will expect to be paid for this service. Try imagining a >digital cash algorithm that DOESN'T involve a bank, and you will >swiftly see that there is a small problem involved... I'm not entirely sure we disagree, Perry. e$ protocols are just pointers (with teeth) to the actual stuff being traded. e$ (cash, mutual fund shares, cocoon futures) has to be issued by somebody and it has to be convertable into something else to be of any use at all. To take one business model that we've pretty much killed, it's easy to see how someone could plug the ATM network into one end of a DigiCash server, and pay out DigiCash to customers on the internet, using encrypted card swipes and PIN numbers for authorization. Banks are necessary in that scenario, because the money the digicash was issued for has to be held in a bank by the issuer, whoever that may be ;-)... Or maybe the issuer buys t-bills (safely) and keeps the interest. Maybe the issuer charges a nominal transaction fee for the conversion from one side of the gateway to another. The money doesn't just disappear or get created. Only governments (or lending institutions) get to do that (both ways, in the case of Uncle Sam). > >This is not to say that transaction costs can't be radically reduced, >and the role of intermediation in fully fungible goods reduced. >However, transaction costs will not go to zero, and banks will not >disappear. Yes. There will still be a need for *some* demand deposits. There will be a need for *some* brokerage accounts. The timescale is certainly nebulous here. But I think that like most successful new technology a superset of the old capital market structure gets created. We still walk, but we fly too. Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

1 0

Re: Thoughts on the NSA's correction to SHA
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>The very fact that this correction had to made offers some >insights into the National Security Agency. > >I believe that releasing DES to the public was the biggest >cryptography mistake that NSA ever made. Consider the state of >research in cryptology before DES. It was simplistic. It was >haphazard. There was little interest. If any results of value >were ever discovered, the NSA could squash them with a secrecy >order. No one cared. > There is one problem with this analysis: IBM created DES. Not the NSA. Sure the NSA could have asked them to keep it hidden, but the NSA was also going to IBM and warning them about Russians evesdropping on IBMs networks. Everyone realized it was time for public cryptography. Especially IBM. It is not clear that a secrecy order would have worked. This is not to say that your analysis is wrong. They classified the design procedures which was their attempt at a compromise. IBM couldn't publish the details of how to make a good algorithm, but they could release the details of the standard.

1 0