Re: Unofficial Release
Perry @ insi.com says:
Way overkill. Remember that 2000 is not just twice as hard as 1000 -- even breakthroughs that improved factoring speed by factors of thousands couldn't break 2000 bit keys any century soon, if ever. I'd worry more about my key management -- before putting in even the effort to crack a 1500 bit key they are likely to just listen in on the emmissions from your keyboard and monitor.
Ahhhh, It is nice to know that people won't even TRY to crack big keys. Cracking, you know, is a lot like the lotto. You MIGHT guess the correct key on the first TRY. But, if you don't TRY, then you won't crack the key. "Gotta play to win" -tom
Tom Rollins says:
Ahhhh, It is nice to know that people won't even TRY to crack big keys. Cracking, you know, is a lot like the lotto. You MIGHT guess the correct key on the first TRY. But, if you don't TRY, then you won't crack the key.
"Gotta play to win"
It is all a question of economics. Its one thing if your idle try has one in 10^6 chance of working, but if its one in 10^70 or something like that the attempt is pretty much pointless -- you are more likely to have a giant sack of gold hit you on the head. Even spending a penny on cracking something that way is uneconomical. Playing the lottery is an economic lose, plain and simple. Your expected return is a loss. Having a small number of your workstations that are otherwise idle trying to crack a DES key that would make you a million dollars is likely cost effective; your expected return is a win. Unless the NSA knows something very interesting about factoring that we don't (not merely an algorithm that is a constant factor of a million faster, say), trying to crack a 2000 bit RSA key is without question an economic lose. They could spend a lot less effort simply getting your key via "practical cryptanalysis". There is therefore no point in using a cryptosystem which would cost the enemy hundreds of billions of dollars to try to attack and then type in your key on a machine who's keystrokes can be monitored using $3000 in equipment. Which way would YOU try to get the keys, eh? Unless you are already doing all your encryption in a Faraday cage, I'd say that there is no conceivable point in using anything over a 2000 bit key -- indeed, there is probably no point in using such a key even if you are doing all your encryption in a Faraday cage. The benefit is minimal, and the cost, in terms of dramatically slowed performance, is very high. Using an 8000 bit key is like claiming you are stronger than the enemy because whereas he only has enough nuclear weapons to vaporize your city 15 times over you have enough to vaporize his 90 times over. Perry
Tom Rollins writes:
Perry @ insi.com says:
Way overkill. Remember that 2000 is not just twice as hard as 1000 -- even breakthroughs that improved factoring speed by factors of thousands couldn't break 2000 bit keys any century soon, if ever. I'd worry more about my key management -- before putting in even the effort to crack a 1500 bit key they are likely to just listen in on the emmissions from your keyboard and monitor.
Ahhhh, It is nice to know that people won't even TRY to crack big keys. Cracking, you know, is a lot like the lotto. You MIGHT guess the correct key on the first TRY. But, if you don't TRY, then you won't crack the key.
"Gotta play to win"
If this was tongue in cheek, I missed it. Nobody in their right mind will try a brute force attack on a 1024-bit key, let alone a 1200- or 2000-bit key. Unless there are flaws in PGP and/or RSA we haven't heard about. As for lotto, simple calculations tell anyone that the best way to win is not to play. The return _at best_ is 30 or 40 cents on the dollar, with the rest going to all the various programs the lotto is supposed to support. The more you play, the more you lose. (I think gambling is a perfectly fine "tax on stupidity," collecting money from the gullible. However, banning gambling by private citizens while having the government run their own casinos and lotteries is crummy. It's government at its worst.) --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."
participants (3)
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Perry E. Metzger -
tcmay@netcom.com -
trollins@debbie.telos.com