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No Subject
by unknown＠example.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The answer to information is more information.

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INFO: Transcript of Sen. Leahy's RealAudio chat now available! (5/22/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| REALAUDIO TRANSCRIPTS OF LEAHY'S WIREDSIDE CHAT AVAILABLE CLIPPER III RESOURCES AVAILABLE REP. RICK WHITE (R-WA) SCHEDULED FOR HOTWIRED CHAT 6/5/96 9-10PM EST Date: May 22, 1996 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com If you redistribute this, please do so in its entirety, with the banner intact. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents News How to receive crypto-news ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEWS Rave reviews of Senator Leahy's appearance on HotWired's WiredSide chat are coming already. With this appearance, the gentleman from Vermont proves once again that he knows net.politics on a personal level, and can understands the subtleties that we assume many in Congress are just learning. If you missed Sen. Leahy's appearance, arranged by HotWired, the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW), you can still hear the Realaudio transcript from the front page at http://www.crypto.com/ A new Clipper III section has been added to www.crypto.com, with pointers to the online version of the White House proposal and the initial analyses from EPIC, CDT, and John Gilmore of the EFF. DON'T FORGET! Representative Rick White (R-WA) will be on HotWired Wednesday June 5th at 9pm EST at http://www.hotwired.com/wiredside/ You can tune in and listen to the chat with the RealAudio software (http://www.realaudio.com) You can ask questions of the Representative through a moderator and get real, immediate responses. Rep. White is part of the new breed of legislators leading Congress to make better net policy through his leadership in the Internet Caucus, a vanguard group of legislators who have vowed to provide sound leadership and advice to other members of Congress in the area of net.policy. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO RECEIVE CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- End crypto-news =============================================================================

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PROTOCOL: Encrypted open books
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 11:28:14 -0700 >From: Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu> >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: PROTOCOL: Encrypted open books >Status: OR > >Note: I started this reply last week; I've decided to post what I >know, since I don't have a solution and I've run out of simple ideas >for now. > >Hal' criticism that (real) money could leak out of the system is >correct. The problem is that while the books would still balance, >i.e. sum to zero, some fake depositor would have a negative balance, >the net result of taking out more money than you put in. Negative >numbers just aren't allowed in double-entry bookkeeping, but they were >allowed in the first protocol set. > >The first part of the solution is to allow no private accounts on the >left hand (asset) side of the ledger, in other words, no anonymous >loans. A protocol for doing anonymous loans could be invented, but >since the first problem is merely to run a money exchange and not more >complicated financial services, this is acceptable. Most of the money >that left the S&L's was by corrupt loan practices, so I don't consider >this omission a particularly glaring one right now. > >Therefore all the private accounts must be on the right hand side, >that is, they are all liabilities. In layman's terms, the bank owes >you; should you ask for your money, they have to give it to you. If >we can verify that each of these accounts never goes negative, then we >can be certain that if the books balance, that the amounts of money in >each account are accurate. > >Consider this. If money was transferred from your account to another >one, that transaction shows up in the public encrypted transaction >record. If you have due diligence over this record, you can assertain >that no transaction was performed against your will. This case >corresponds to a debit and credit against two customer accounts, >decreasing one and increasing the other. > >Another way that money might end up in a fake account if it were >credited with assets. A debit to an asset increase its value and the >credit to the account increases that value. This is the case of a >deposit; the bank gets cash (+asset) and credits someone's account >(+account). Now if they want to give someone money this way, they >have to do so by increasing the assets somehow; in other words, they >money has to come from somewhere. It didn't come from any of the >customers because they've already verified that. It didn't magically >appear from one of the other asset accounts because these are all >publically audited. > >In summary, we need to ensure that all accounts have positive balance. >Public accounts can be revealed and seen to be positive. Private >accounts need a cryptographic assurance. > >A private account starts off at zero. This can be publically >revealed. Then to the encrypted transaction log and the public cyclic >balances we add publication of the private balances in encrypted form >that allows us to verify to the blinded balance is positive. This >balance is verifiably linked to previous cyclic balances via the >transaction log. It is therefore linked all the way back to the >beginning balance which was zero. > >Consider all the transaction triples for which the first element is >equal to the private account in question, since the account was >opened. Take a product of all of the second elements and a product of >all the third elements. It is clear that these products can be >calculated inductively from the previous cyclic products and the >activity in this cycle. > >The products on second and third elements are equal to > > g^( Sum x_i,j,t + Sum r_i,j,t ), h^( Sum r_i,j,t ) > >where I've added a time index by cycle which was implicit before. The >notation for the inductive calculation is different, of course, and >also obscures the underlying invariant. > >What we want is a certificate that Sum x_i,j,t is positive. Here it >gets a bit hairy. There are likely other solutions to this technical >requirement; here is the one I thought up yesterday and today. > >I thought I had an idea with promise on how to create such >certificates using quadratic residuosity, but it doesn't work. I'm >still thinking about it; this certificate doesn't seem impossible to >create, but the standard ideas that I know about in algebraic protocol >design don't seem to work. > >If anybody wants to work on this technical point off-line with me, >send me mail. The math involved is advanced enough that I'd prefer to >post summaries of work rather than all the detailed discussion. > >Another non-technical attack on the problem is to require periodic >bank holidays, where all private balances will be revealed to be zero >(preferably), or whatever is actually in the account. This doesn't >prevent owner fraud, but does put an upper bound on the time in which >to perpetrate it. > >Eric

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NOISE.SYS and Win95?
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've just got a Pentium and Win95 so I can try to get NOISE.SYS working for both. It seems to crash in Win'95 though... not sure why yet: has anybody used it or had problems with it on Win95/DOS7? (I've gotten it loaded using a device driver loading util from the command line, but the RANDOM$ device produces only one byte and a string of zeros... not good at all. Very bad, actually. URANDOM$ seems to work fine though.)

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Re: FTC online workshop on privacy
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 22 May 96 at 11:16, Rich Graves wrote: > I'd have to see the bill, but I think it's a good general idea, provided > there's the caveats KNOWINGLY and WITHOUT THEIR [parent/guardian's] > KNOWLEDGE. As much as I hate direct marketers, I don't want them subject > to malicious and arbitrary prosecution because one address out of > thousands happens to belong to a kid. When I was on the FTC privacy list a while back there were more details about that. Companies would set of very commercial web sites oriented towards kids, for the main purpose of getting the kids to give information about themselves. So imagine if somebody set up a Barney fan page with all sorts of links and goodies but with the encouragement (if not requirement for access) to fill out personal information, even personal info about family members. Ok... maybe that's within one's right. But while (most) adults would be suspicious, it's not necessarily so with some children... (who'd give out parent's CC#'s if they knew them). Teaching kids basic privacy issues is a whole lot better than legislation. (Caveat emptor aside, fraud and cons are still illegal...). I haven't seen the legislation so I won't rant for or against it (at least not on the list) for now. Rob. --- No-frills sig. Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: MixMaster fair use
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:14 AM 5/22/96 EDT, you wrote: >From: IN%"loki(a)infonex.com" 21-MAY-1996 17:19:02.59 > >>The problem is RSAREF. I can't chose license terms for that. > > Oof... I see the problem. No, it's not you, it's them. The Agreement, as written, covers all of Mixmaster; it would be easier for people to adapt Mixmaster code if you either release a bones version or a license that clarifies that you can't use the RSAREF portions commercially but can do whatever you want with the rest of Mixmaster (if that's what you want) or however much freedom you want to grant (e.g. you may want to say some disclaimerish words about obeying ITAR etc.) Consensus.com is doing commercial licensing for RSAREF now; there may be some reasonably-priced approach to the problem. RSAREF has at least three kinds of legal protection: - contract (if you're using a licensed version) - patent (on doing RSA-method encryption, not on the code itself) - copyright (on the RSAREF code itself.) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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SURVEY: Trading on the Internet
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Sender: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com Reply-To: Ian Grigg <iang(a)systemics.com> (by way of Rachel Willmer) Mime-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 12:37:41 +0100 (BST) From: Ian Grigg <iang(a)systemics.com> (by way of Rachel Willmer) To: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com> Subject: SURVEY: Trading on the Internet Following on from The Spring Street Brewery's successful IPO, I am researching the nature of Internet issues of debt and equity. This envisages the use of electronic token value systems such as Digicash and the digital bearer bonds that Bob talks about. The topic is for a management report that I am writing as the final deliverable in my MBA, and has a lot of bearing on what we are trying to do within the embryonic Internet Financial System. So, making whatever assumptions you like (but please mention them), here goes with some questions: ----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<---- Would your company be interested in the idea of issuing on the Internet? What specifically would attract you to issuing on the Internet? What specifically would worry you? Would you prefer Debt (bonds) or Equity (shares) (or something more exotic)? What sort of products/services does your company sell? Do you think Internet users would be attracted enough to your company to give you money (e.g. are you the Netscape of '97)? If not the general Internet community, who would buy your shares or bonds (local community, funds, family+friends, business contacts...)? ---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---- That's it, thanks in advance for your patience. Please forward to me directly, rather than posting (but post any deeper questions as they will, no doubt, be welcome). I am not interested in direct marketing anything (and please don't ask for a list of respondents), but any interesting answers I would like to follow up by email to develop them. Indicate if you want some summarised feedback (won't be for a few weeks). -- Ian Grigg iang(a)systemics.com --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:04 1996-05-22 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >However, accounting systems DO NOT use 32 bit fixed point arithmetic. > >One client of mine had around $10Billion under management. Do you >think they were doing their accounting on a system that could only >deal with fixed point numbers of 45Million or so? Hell, individual >trades are larger. Sure, but we were really discussing Ecash(tm), not accounting. To quote from the FAPI: /* An EC_Amount is a signed 32-bit integer. It represents an amount * of money in units of the coinage's base value. */ >Accounting systems require exact math -- down to the cent. Come on, we're not talking cents here. Question is, how do you represent a one ITL coin in Ecash(tm) with a USD mint? We are way below the cent level, where no accountant has ever gone before... Regards, Matts

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Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:05 PM 5/21/96 -0500, you wrote: >To make it easy, how about a two part MIME message with the key and the >PGP-encrypted message. The message text would be directions on opening >it up, and breaking the "seal", which constitutes acceptance of the >remailer terms... Is that really any different than delivering the message rot-13? One of the reasons people object to getting anonymous email is spam; sending "You have mail; pick up message-id #2718281828 by midnight tonight!" encourages you to go to some effort to pick up the message, so you'll be even more annoyed if it's spam. Similarly, for hate-mail. PROPOSAL -------- On the other hand, a pickup system could reduce directed spam, if people generally don't pick up remailer pickups unless they recognize the messageid, leaving the remailer system to people who actually want to communicate with each other anonymously, which _had_ been one of the original goals of remailer systems. Protocol support requirements:? We could build in a fancy header, or we could just use the Subject: line, which many remailers know how to paste in anyway, and let the remailer do a messageid. Response mechanisms should probably be an email message to the remailer :: Deliver-Message: 2718281828 A secondary concern is handling multi-casts - should the remailer create one copy for each recipient (secure, easy, space-wasteful), or should it try to get fancy and keep the message for N recipients or D days? Two ways to implement the fancy version are to keep a flag that says not to delete the article upon receipt, while the normal behavior deletes it, or to use different keywords for picking up delete-after-pickup and shared messages. NEGATIVES --------- The big negatives with this approach are that it doesn't support PGP-encrypted messages, since they don't easily fit into one line, while they also encourage people to forget that the header of their message will be delivered insecurely. But it's probably close enough for non-anti-government work. Of course, it also doesn't do chaining; that either needs to be implemented by recognizing well-known remailers and forwarding directly instead of pickup, or by using a standard message format, so other remailers could do pickup. It's probably worth doing both, to support other remailer types transparently and to allow remailers to use pickups without having to be well-known. Adding automatic remailer registration is easy, but requires care to avoid spammers falsely registering victim(a)wherever.com as a remailer and then spamming. SPAM POSSIBILITIES ------------------ That still allows 1-line spams like Subject: <Expletive Deleted>! You <perjorative deleted><ethnic slur deleted>! or Subject: Our new Remail-Spam(tm) system lets you fit 1015 characters in a Subject: line, just like this one, so your whole message can fit through those anti-marketing filters! You can MAKE M0NEY REAL FAST building your downline - send e$1 of Bank Foo ecash to the top three addresses in the Cc: line but at least it cuts down on the annoyance level. It also supports messages like Subject: Secrets of the Scientologists for Sale! Pick up message for free sample and price list! Operate your own Thetan today! which permit direct-e-mail spams, or as some people prefer to call them, marketing opportunities. An interesting security/legality wrinkle is that if somebody is trying to multicast-publish unencrypted contraband data, it's sitting around in the mail-pickup spool, it can be seized by Bad Guys / courts / sheriffs / etc. As with most remailers, there's also a risk that outgoing unicast mail could be seized while in the spool, which is higher for a pickup system because the data may be in the spool longer. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Re: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:20 AM 5/10/96, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: >Hi again. > >Is there anybody that have any idea about a color setting that would >make it more difficult to detect by a Tempest attack? >(I assume that Tempest cannot discriminate between various color guns >and signals in the monitor... Maybe I am completely wrong...) .... I imagine that a color combination that cancels for an antenna in one location will not cancel for another location. Many monitors have separated wires for the separate colors. A color combination that cancels for one antenna polarization may not cancel for the other.

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