- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Police prepare stunning end for high-speed car chases
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A: How possible is it to insulate cars from these effects? B: If it can't be insulated from with reasonable levels of effort, it would appear to be perfectly usable against cop cars. If the emitter is in a transparent baloon 1000 feet up, I doubt they're going to be able to track back to the user. -Allen

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The Ostrich Method of dealing with ITAR: PGP from OnNet
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This message is sent from an evaluation version of FTP OnNet32 2.0, which has PGP- compatible encryption built-in. This software is distributed from http://www.ftp.com/mkt_info/onnet32/mail/mail_dl.htm which doesn't have a hell of a lot as technical enforcement of ITAR goes. You may download the software through the Anonymizer, www.anonymizer.com, if you wish. Unfuckingbelievable. By the way, encrypting and decrypting large messages with OnNet is about 10 times faster than with Private Idaho/PGP for DOS on my P6-200 running NT 3.51. The user interface is pretty good, too. Somebody pinch me. - -rich -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.9 iQBVAgUBMhEXDJNcNyVVy0jxAQHDXQH/aQSrU3ZqhOJXGanSDnS/o+DdsH2GMKcI 6A8J3cGZAZ3ESK30GxwozdHpBjJRHIww4i/rrxK9aBNpzm/vQnovXg== =8dGx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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addenendum
by Brett Killins 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The link on http://www.gatech.edu/lcc/idt/Miscellaneous/Glass_Houses/Organizations/Cyph… that points to the hotwired article on the cypherpunks has changed from http://www.hotwired.com/wired/1.2/features/cryptorebels.html to http://www.hotwired.com/wired/1.2/features/crypto.rebels.html. Or perhaps a typo? You may also want to include a link to http://www.hotwired.com/wired/1.2/features/crypto.rebels.sidebars.html Brett

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key escrow idea from David Satelin of MIT Lincoln Labs
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My comments included below Rivest's message. -matt ------- Forwarded Message Received: from amontillado.research.att.com (amontillado.research.att.com [135.104.21.154]) by nsa.research.att.com (8.7.3/8.7.3) with ESMTP id QAA04438 for <mab-local(a)nsa.research.att.com>; Tue, 13 Aug 1996 16:17:05 -0400 (EDT) Received: from research.research.att.com (research.att.com [135.104.117.5]) by amontillado.research.att.com (8.7.5/8.7) with SMTP id QAA24830 for <mab(a)issr.research.att.com>; Tue, 13 Aug 1996 16:20:09 -0400 (EDT) Received: from theory.lcs.mit.edu by research; Tue Aug 13 16:17:17 EDT 1996 Received: from swan.lcs.mit.edu by theory.lcs.mit.edu (5.65c/TOC-1.2S) id AA05040; Tue, 13 Aug 96 16:16:20 EDT From: rivest(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu (Ron Rivest) Received: by swan.lcs.mit.edu (5.65c/TOC-1.2C) id AA00335; Tue, 13 Aug 96 16:16:20 EDT Date: Tue, 13 Aug 96 16:16:20 EDT Message-Id: <199608132016.AA00335(a)swan.lcs.mit.edu> To: jim(a)rsa.com, gnu(a)toad.com, whitfield.diffie(a)eng.sun.com, mab(a)research.att.com, denning(a)cs.georgetown.edu Cc: staelin(a)ll.mit.edu, mld(a)hq.lcs.mit.edu Subject: Crypto Policy Variant Hi -- Here is another MIT professor's (Dave Staelin's) suggestion for a national crypto policy. I thought you might be interested in seeing it; given the difficulty of the debate, any variant, even if only slightly different from previous ones, should be considered. Feel free to pass this note around, or to post it... Here is Staelin's idea: (1) You can use any crypto you want, but you must keep a record of the crypto keys you used. (2) The government can ask for the crypto keys later, if they have a court order, just as they can ask for any of your other papers or documents. You must give the key(s) to them, just as you must turn over your private papers in such a situation. (There would have to be an appropriate penalty for losing the key...) The attractive feature of this proposal is that it puts encrypted communications in the same category as private papers; the government is required to give notice to (at least one of) the affected individual(s) _before_ the search can be undertaken. This cures what is in my mind a defect in the current wire-tapping laws. DISCUSSION In a variant of Staelin's proposal (my twist) you could append to each encrypted message an encrypted form of the message key. The encryption could be with the public-key of a trusted third party who will not (and legally may not) reveal the message key without notifying you first (or ensuring that you have been appropriately served with the corresponding warrant). For example, the ACLU might be such a TTP. This protects the government's right to access and protects the individual from the penalties (or benefits) of losing the key. This procedure is technically simple; what is more complex is ensuring that the TTP's are appropriately registered and protected from undue government influence. The use of such a TTP would in any case be optional; the communicants need not use a TTP if they understand their obligation to keep the crypto keys around for some period of time afterwards. In Staelin's proposal government gains access to the communications, but does not gain "real-time access" as desired by the FBI. This loss may be tolerable, given the benefit obtained (forcing access to be made in accordance with the Constitutional requirements for notification before search). The use of wiretapping encrypted communications as a preventive measure might be severely limited, but its use as a means of gathering evidence to force a conviction would be preserved. For international communications, each communicant might be required to use a TTP that is bound to honor the laws of his country (which TTP to be used should be the choice of the communicant). It may be seem a bit strange to force individuals to keep around information (keys) that they no longer really need. However, this is more-or-less the case for financial records right now. CONCLUSION The fundamental idea is to give the government a right to access encrypted communication in return for a guarantee that access may not be obtained until there is BOTH proper legal authorization AND proper prior notice to (at least one of) the communicants. Is this workable?? ------- End of Forwarded Message [Matt's comments follow] The requirement to store your keys for some period of time would, I think, be very unusal, legaly. As far as I know there are virtually no records that an ordinary individual is required to keep today under criminal penalty of law. One has to keep tax records if one expects to be able to document deductions if audited, but for people without deductions, no records need be kept (and even those who do but who destroy their records risk having their deductions disallowed, but face criminal penalties only if the govenment can prove you intended fraud. Not having records does not by itself constitute fraud, as far as I know). According to the original message: The attractive feature of this proposal is that it puts encrypted communications in the same category as private papers; the government is required to give notice to (at least one of) the affected individual(s) _before_ the search can be undertaken. This cures what is in my mind a defect in the current wire-tapping laws. Yes and no. True, it makes it impossible to recover communication without the knowledge of one party. But it still goes well beyond the norms for private papers. The vast majority of private papers are, according to the law, just that - private. One is under no obligation to maintain "private papers" in any particular manner or for any period of time. Only very limited types of private papers (none for most people) have to be maintained at all. While, in general, the government can get a court order to force one to turn over documents that exist, one is not obligated to keep documents that are otherwise of no use in order to be ready should a court order happen sometime in the future. One can burn one's old love letters any time one feels like it. But enough philosophy. There are technical reasons to consider this proposal a bad idea. The main technical problem with the Staelin proposal is the requirement that the user maintain a large store of no longer useful but highly sensitive data in a secure manner for a period of time. This introduces an obvious storage burden (how does an encrypting phone or network connection store old keys?) that would make many kinds of otherwise simple encryption hardware and software far more complex and difficult to design and expensive to implement and operate. Consider a secure phone (like the TSD 3600 or STU III). A critical design feature of these devices is that they never have to emit secret keys outside their internal security boundaries. Consider, too, software that runs on PCs and workstations. Ordinarily, software that establishes, say, a secure Internet connection has no need to store any secret associated with the session anywhere. And that's a good thing - the file systems on most computers aren't secure enough to store keys, so including the key storage feature required by the Staelin scheme would entail implementing some kind of secure storage system that isn't otherwise needed by the application. Even if the design complexity is solved, there is the problem of maintaining the stored keys in a secure manner, introducing what would in most cases be a more serious security vulnerability than any other aspect of the application (since the keys would continue to exist long after the secure session has ended). Under the Staelin proposal, the design, implementation, and use of encryption software and hardware becomes much more complex, so complex that I honestly don't think we know how to do it. I touch on these points in discussing key escrow in general in my Senate testimony, ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/testiomny.txt

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resend: key escrow idea from David Staelin of MIT Lincoln Labs
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My first send of this message was garbled and truncated. Here it is again. Sorry. My comments included below Rivest's message. -matt ------- Forwarded Message Received: from amontillado.research.att.com (amontillado.research.att.com [135.104.21.154]) by nsa.research.att.com (8.7.3/8.7.3) with ESMTP id QAA04438 for <mab-local(a)nsa.research.att.com>; Tue, 13 Aug 1996 16:17:05 -0400 (EDT) Received: from research.research.att.com (research.att.com [135.104.117.5]) by amontillado.research.att.com (8.7.5/8.7) with SMTP id QAA24830 for <mab(a)issr.research.att.com>; Tue, 13 Aug 1996 16:20:09 -0400 (EDT) Received: from theory.lcs.mit.edu by research; Tue Aug 13 16:17:17 EDT 1996 Received: from swan.lcs.mit.edu by theory.lcs.mit.edu (5.65c/TOC-1.2S) id AA05040; Tue, 13 Aug 96 16:16:20 EDT From: rivest(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu (Ron Rivest) Received: by swan.lcs.mit.edu (5.65c/TOC-1.2C) id AA00335; Tue, 13 Aug 96 16:16:20 EDT Date: Tue, 13 Aug 96 16:16:20 EDT Message-Id: <199608132016.AA00335(a)swan.lcs.mit.edu> To: jim(a)rsa.com, gnu(a)toad.com, whitfield.diffie(a)eng.sun.com, mab(a)research.att.com, denning(a)cs.georgetown.edu Cc: staelin(a)ll.mit.edu, mld(a)hq.lcs.mit.edu Subject: Crypto Policy Variant Hi -- Here is another MIT professor's (Dave Staelin's) suggestion for a national crypto policy. I thought you might be interested in seeing it; given the difficulty of the debate, any variant, even if only slightly different from previous ones, should be considered. Feel free to pass this note around, or to post it... Here is Staelin's idea: (1) You can use any crypto you want, but you must keep a record of the crypto keys you used. (2) The government can ask for the crypto keys later, if they have a court order, just as they can ask for any of your other papers or documents. You must give the key(s) to them, just as you must turn over your private papers in such a situation. (There would have to be an appropriate penalty for losing the key...) The attractive feature of this proposal is that it puts encrypted communications in the same category as private papers; the government is required to give notice to (at least one of) the affected individual(s) _before_ the search can be undertaken. This cures what is in my mind a defect in the current wire-tapping laws. DISCUSSION In a variant of Staelin's proposal (my twist) you could append to each encrypted message an encrypted form of the message key. The encryption could be with the public-key of a trusted third party who will not (and legally may not) reveal the message key without notifying you first (or ensuring that you have been appropriately served with the corresponding warrant). For example, the ACLU might be such a TTP. This protects the government's right to access and protects the individual from the penalties (or benefits) of losing the key. This procedure is technically simple; what is more complex is ensuring that the TTP's are appropriately registered and protected from undue government influence. The use of such a TTP would in any case be optional; the communicants need not use a TTP if they understand their obligation to keep the crypto keys around for some period of time afterwards. In Staelin's proposal government gains access to the communications, but does not gain "real-time access" as desired by the FBI. This loss may be tolerable, given the benefit obtained (forcing access to be made in accordance with the Constitutional requirements for notification before search). The use of wiretapping encrypted communications as a preventive measure might be severely limited, but its use as a means of gathering evidence to force a conviction would be preserved. For international communications, each communicant might be required to use a TTP that is bound to honor the laws of his country (which TTP to be used should be the choice of the communicant). It may be seem a bit strange to force individuals to keep around information (keys) that they no longer really need. However, this is more-or-less the case for financial records right now. CONCLUSION The fundamental idea is to give the government a right to access encrypted communication in return for a guarantee that access may not be obtained until there is BOTH proper legal authorization AND proper prior notice to (at least one of) the communicants. Is this workable?? ------- End of Forwarded Message [Matt's comments follow] The requirement to store your keys for some period of time would, I think, be very unusal, legaly. As far as I know there are virtually no records that an ordinary individual is required to keep today under criminal penalty of law. One has to keep tax records if one expects to be able to document deductions if audited, but for people without deductions, no records need be kept (and even those who do but who destroy their records risk having their deductions disallowed, but face criminal penalties only if the govenment can prove you intended fraud. Not having records does not by itself constitute fraud, as far as I know). According to the original message: The attractive feature of this proposal is that it puts encrypted communications in the same category as private papers; the government is required to give notice to (at least one of) the affected individual(s) _before_ the search can be undertaken. This cures what is in my mind a defect in the current wire-tapping laws. Yes and no. True, it makes it impossible to recover communication without the knowledge of one party. But it still goes well beyond the norms for private papers. The vast majority of private papers are, according to the law, just that - private. One is under no obligation to maintain "private papers" in any particular manner or for any period of time. Only very limited types of private papers (none for most people) have to be maintained at all. While, in general, the government can get a court order to force one to turn over documents that exist, one is not obligated to keep documents that are otherwise of no use in order to be ready should a court order happen sometime in the future. One can burn one's old love letters any time one feels like it. But enough philosophy. There are technical reasons to consider this proposal a bad idea. The main technical problem with the Staelin proposal is the requirement that the user maintain a large store of no longer useful but highly sensitive data in a secure manner for a period of time. This introduces an obvious storage burden (how does an encrypting phone or network connection store old keys?) that would make many kinds of otherwise simple encryption hardware and software far more complex and difficult to design and expensive to implement and operate. Consider a secure phone (like the TSD 3600 or STU III). A critical design feature of these devices is that they never have to emit secret keys outside their internal security boundaries. Consider, too, software that runs on PCs and workstations. Ordinarily, software that establishes, say, a secure Internet connection has no need to store any secret associated with the session anywhere. And that's a good thing - the file systems on most computers aren't secure enough to store keys, so including the key storage feature required by the Staelin scheme would entail implementing some kind of secure storage system that isn't otherwise needed by the application. Even if the design complexity is solved, there is the problem of maintaining the stored keys in a secure manner, introducing what would in most cases be a more serious security vulnerability than any other aspect of the application (since the keys would continue to exist long after the secure session has ended). Under the Staelin proposal, the design, implementation, and use of encryption software and hardware becomes much more complex, so complex that I honestly don't think we know how to do it. I touch on these points in discussing key escrow in general in my Senate testimony, ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/testimony.txt . While Ron's twist decreases some of the burden on the user it eliminates the main benefit of the Staelin proposal - that one cannot obtain cleartext without the knowledge of at least one party. The TTP could be compelled (as the phone company is now for regular wiretaps) to keep the request secret, under court order. And the design complexity problem doesn't even go away - in fact, it gets worse, since now there's a protocol with a third party involved. -matt

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Re: India, Productivity, and Tropical Climes
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:31 PM 8/13/96, Arun Mehta wrote: >At 13:15 11/08/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >Sorry, the response took a while: George Fernandes, who was the >industries minister at the time, is an acquaintance, so I thought >I'd get the story from the horse's mouth. Thanks for supplying more details. I'm not convinced, though, of all the points. India still royally screwed itself, reputation-wise. >>As attractive as this sounds, historically this has not happened. And as >>many will tell you, the climate of the Bay Area in particular and >>California in general is extremely benign and delightful. The average >>winter temperature is only about 10C cooler than summer temperatures. > >Didn't Mark Twain say that the coldest winter he had ever >experienced was a summer in San Francisco? I do agree, SF and >environs are great: but US immigration laws being what they are, >not everyone can move there -- some day, "routing around" might >make those places more attractive which have the least >restrictive immigration laws. Here I feel compelled as a Loyal American to point out something that often gets lost in the comments about America doesn't let enough immigrants in, how it discriminates against immmigrants, etc. The thing to remember is that virtually none of the countries which the most vocal critics are from have anything approaching the U.S. policy about immigration! Mexicans and U.S. critics of U.S. policy cite the "border problem." However, Americans cannot work in Mexico except under extreme limitations. Americans in Mexico cannot send their children to Mexican public schools. And so on. This was described in "The Treasure of the Sierra Madre," where two Americans are stranded in Mexico, unable by law to work. Things haven't changed much. And what about immigration to Japan? Or Hong Kong? Or Taiwan? Ask the boat people still rotting in camps, or turned back to sea to sink. How about immigration into Switzerland, or Sweden, or France? I don't have any knowledge about the situation on immigrating to India--I don't know too many Americans who have, except some friends of friends who moved to Goa some years back. Personally, I favor open borders--but no public schooling, no tax-funded handouts, no welfare, no child support, no public hospitals, etc. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Anguilla story...
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim >Vince: > >In a nut shell, taxbomber.com was on my system in Anguilla. He was > >selling "camoflauge passports". One David Evans of Bloomberg Business > >News wrote an article where he quoted taxbombers page saying something > >like "it is illegal to use these passports to open up bank accounts, but > >there is little chance of getting caught". I got a call from my lawyer who > >had seen the article (along with just about everyone else in Anguilla) and > >he told me that was illegal in Anguilla and I should cancle the account. > >I did and taxbomber moved to another provider in another country. > > > >1) A number of cypherpunks are dissapointed that I did not fight to my > >death to defend this guy. > > I think you're overstating the case made by some of us, or, at least, by me. Your not dissapointed? > What I said was that your policies need to be spelled out, and that I saw > little evidence of "fraud" in what the guy was doing. Ok. I now have a link from my main page to a page with my policy. What I said (or meant to) was that MY LAWYER SAID IT WAS ILLEGAL IN ANGUILLA. In my first post I quoted the wrong part and said "this is fraud by taxbomber - he did sell fake passports". I meant to quote a part where he said something like "I never sold fake passports". It may be covered in the anti-fraud sections of the laws. > And that if you cut > off accounts (without warning, it sounds like) He got a little warning, then only web access was cut off. And I forwarded his email and was the nameserver for his domain name so that he could move right away to another site. Then he sent a message to the Internic to move the management of his domain to another site. > based on fairly flimsy (it > seems to me, and to Duncan, and to others) advice, then certain > reputational consequences are likely to follow. Understood. > By the way, from what you quote this guy as saying ("it is illegal to use > these passports to open up bank accounts, but there is little chance of > getting caught"), I _still_ see no fraud. Not saying that is fraud. The most I said was encouraging fraud. It has been pointed out that under common law using another name is not fraud. However, under certain countries laws using a fake passport to open a bank account may be defined as fraud. > >2) If the guy did not mention where his site was, the reporter probably > >would never have mentioned Anguilla and me in the article. > > Is this the real issue, that what he was doing brought bad publicity to you > and to Anguilla? It is both a lesson to be learned, and part of the overall situation. > These issues need to be aired. Of course you have every right to run things > as you wish, modulo contractual arrangements you may have entered into with > your customers and your Internet providers. But we on this list have > certain ideas about what an "offshore information provider" should provide. Sure. And you can run your offshore services as you wish. I like mine better. :-) > Contrast this case with the well-publicized cases recently where Neo-Nazi > material is being hosted on U.S. web sites. If selling fake passports is illegal in Anguilla, and the US has freedom of speech, they are not comparable. -- Vince ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Vincent Cate vince(a)offshore.com.ai http://www.offshore.com.ai/vince/ Offshore Information Services http://www.offshore.com.ai/

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WinSock Remailer Now Available By E-Mail
by Joey Grasty 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The first alpha release of the WinSock Remailer is now available via e-mail. Due to problems setting up user authentication on my homepage at http://www.c2.net/~winsock/ I have decided to distribute it via e-mail until I can get user authentication working. In order for you to receive the WinSock Remailer, I have to be reasonably sure that you are a US or Canadian citizen or permanent resident. Therefore, you will need to review a copy of the License Agreement and fill out the required information. Then clear-sign the agreement with PGP and mail it to me at jgrasty(a)gate.net. Don't forget to tell me where I can find your PGP public key so that I can check the signature. No signed license agreement, no remailer. In order for me to have a good feeling that you are not a foreign national, I need to have the following information check out: a. Verify that your address is within the boundaries of the US or Canada. I will do this by checking if you are in a public address database such as "88 Million Households Phone Book". b. Verify that your name and e-mail address is the same as in your public key. This is basically the same method that Netscape is using at: http://wwwus.netscape.com/eng/US-Current/ to verify citizenship or permanent residency, but the process is not automated. I don't like having to enforce clearly unconstitutional ITAR regulations, but I'm not ready for an extended stay at Club Fed. - ---------------------------cut here----------------------------------- WinSock Remailer License Agreement This is the license agreement between Joey Grasty and the end user of the WinSock Remailer. Name of User: <your name> Street Address: <your street address> Town, State, Country: <town>, <state or province>, <country> Phone Number: <your phone number> E-mail Address: <your e-mail address> Where to find your PGP Public Key: <instructions> 1. Joey Grasty grants to you a non-exclusive, non-sublicensable, license to use this Alpha version of the WinSock Remailer (the "Software"), in binary executable form for evaluation and trial use purposes only. 2. JOEY GRASTY MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT THE SUITABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ABOUT ANY CONTENT OR INFORMATION MADE ACCESSIBLE BY THE SOFTWARE, FOR ANY PURPOSE. THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED 'AS IS' WITHOUT EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR NONINFRINGEMENT. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED GRATUITOUSLY AND, ACCORDINGLY, JOEY GRASTY SHALL NOT BE LIABLE UNDER ANY THEORY OR ANY DAMAGES SUFFERED BY YOU OR ANY USER OF THE SOFTWARE. JOEY GRASTY DOES NOT HAVE ANY OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT THIS SOFTWARE OR ISSUE ANY UPDATES IN THE FUTURE. 3. While Joey Grasty intends to distribute a commercial release of the Software, Joey Grasty reserves the right at any time not to release a commercial release of the Software or, if released, to alter prices, features, specifications, capabilities, functions, licensing terms, release dates, general availability or any other characteristics of the commercial release as he sees fit. 4. Title, ownership rights, and intellectual property rights in and to the Software shall remain in Joey Grasty and/or its suppliers. You agree to abide by the copyright law and all other applicable laws of the United States including, but not limited to, export control laws. 5. Joey Grasty may terminate this License at any time by delivering notice to you and you may terminate this License at any time by destroying or erasing your copy of the Software and notifying Joey Grasty of this action forthwith. This License is personal to you and you agree not to assign your rights herein. This License shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida and, as to matters affecting copyrights, trademarks and patents, by U.S. federal law. This License sets forth the entire agreement between you and Joey Grasty. 6. Use, duplication or disclosure by the Government of any locality, state or country, its elected officials or employees, is forbidden. 7. You may not download or otherwise export or reexport the Software or any underlying information or technology except in full compliance with all United States and other applicable laws and regulations. In particular, but without limitation, none of the Software or underlying information or technology may be downloaded or otherwise exported or reexported (i) into (or to a national or resident of) Cuba, Haiti, Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia, North Korea, Iran, or Syria or (ii) to anyone on the US Treasury Department's list of Specially Designated Nationals or the US Commerce Department's Table of Deny Orders. By downloading the Software, you are agreeing to the foregoing and you are representing and warranting that you are not located in, under control of, or a national or resident of any such country or on any such list. 8. JOEY GRASTY OR ITS SUPPLIERS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR (a) INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, SPECIAL OR INDIRECT DAMAGES OF ANY SORT, WHETHER ARISING IN TORT, CONTRACT OR OTHERWISE, EVEN IF JOEY GRASTY HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES, OR (b) FOR ANY CLAIM BY ANY OTHER PARTY. THIS LIMITATION OF LIABILITY SHALL NOT APPLY TO LIABILITY FOR DEATH OR PERSONAL INJURY TO THE EXTENT APPLICABLE LAW PROHIBITS SUCH LIMITATION. FURTHERMORE, SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, SO THIS LIMITATION AND EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. 9. HIGH RISK ACTIVITIES. The Software is not fault-tolerant and is not designed, manufactured or intended for use or resale as on-line control equipment in hazardous environments requiring fail-safe performance, such as in the operation of nuclear facilities, aircraft navigation or communication systems, air traffic control, direct life support machines, or weapons systems, in which the failure of the Software could lead directly to death, personal injury, or severe physical or environmental damage ("High Risk Activities"). Joey Grasty and its suppliers specifically disclaim any express or implied warranty of fitness for High Risk Activities. Clear-sign this agreement with your PGP public key and e-mail it to jgrasty(a)gate.net. - -------------------------------cut here------------------------------------ Thank you for your patience with this crude form of distribution. Regards, -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMhE2UsODO2V89BZZAQGOLAL9GU15R4N/6xIZCJGYaQ0Vlw4e7rqP06+d YH5806om50v/+8P9OKrxBOECEHPJLirFQcITXsYMn/DkVAcTVTrz9rKfJdzToeyB Bwr4vgpMqKw4oZnFGJa1PvUotSjTnETT =Arts -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Joey Grasty jgrasty(a)gate.net [home -- encryption, privacy, RKBA and other hopeless causes] jgrasty(a)pts.mot.com [work -- designing pagers] "Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin." -- John Von Neumann PGP = A7 CC 31 E4 7E A3 36 13 93 F4 C9 06 89 51 F5 A7

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Anguilla...etc.
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While Tim may be right that nobility is lost when backing down to the authorities, the fact is that this game has little to do with noble purposes. Check that, obvious noble purposes. While most on this list would agree that free flow of information is noble we have all seen that this is otherwise with people in power. As I stated in my last post, the Swiss have maintained thier "haven" for many years by playing both sides. In accomodating everyone they avoid harassment. This way the Swiss maintain a good system and live to fight another day. ??????????????????????????????????????? Greg Kucharo sophi(a)best.com "People want chaos for about 5 minutes. Then they want some money and a backrub." -Bruce Sterling ???????????????????????????????????????

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Re: Anguilla...etc.
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:21 AM 8/14/96, Greg Kucharo wrote: > While Tim may be right that nobility is lost when backing down to the >authorities, the fact is that this game has little to do with noble >purposes. Check that, obvious noble purposes. While most on this list >would agree that free flow of information is noble we have all seen that >this is otherwise with people in power. As I stated in my last post, the >Swiss have maintained thier "haven" for many years by playing both sides. >In accomodating everyone they avoid harassment. > This way the Swiss maintain a good system and live to fight another day. Let me be clear that I am not talking about "noble motives." In the sense of somone sacrificing himself for the good of the herd, blah blah. Rather, there is an "archetype," if you will, of what a "remailer" is, what a "data haven" is, what a "tax shelter" is, etc. While we cannot reasonably expect a remailer to exactly match the archetype, we can point out obvious deficiencies. For "data havens," we have very few examples, compared to operational remailers. We have the fictional form in Bruce Sterling's "Islands in the Net," some of whose plot twists have some parallels to the current Anguilla situation. Another is the form described in Ross Anderson's "Eternity Service." What might we expect of a true data haven? I've tried to describe several of the attributes in my earlier posts, mainly by asking questions about specific examples (bomb-building instructions, "Kill the monarchy" screeds, etc.). Interestingly, with several of these examples, Vince has said that he is not interested in having this kind of material on his site. His invitation for Multi-Level Marketers to avoid U.S. and other laws by locating on his service has now been withdrawn, from his latest comments. (To the person who sent me mail explaining that MLM schemes are not illegal in the U.S., indeed, some are legal and some are not. I said as much. And for those which are legal in the U.S. or France or wherever, they would hardly have any need to use Vince's service, would they? I surmised from his invitation that he was encouraging MLM/pyramid scheme operators to avoid their parochial fraud laws and use the services in Anguilla.) I plan to do more looking at just who is left, who is using Offshore Information and what kinds of services they are offering. Not to harass Vince, of course, but to better look at the envelope of what is considered OK and what is not. If i find that all the "juicy" stuff is gone and all that is left is booking sailing cruises around the Carribbean, I'll hardly call it a "data haven." Which is not to say it's not still a useful and profitable business for Vince, just that it has no Cypherpunk relevance. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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