- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Armenians want to know...
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ray Arachalian sure gets around... >From AARARATY(a)aua.am Wed Jan 22 07:01:23 1997 >Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) > via UUCP; Wed, 22 Jan 97 07:30:15 EST > for AARARATY(a)aua.am >Received: from fsaua.aua.am (fsaua.aua.am [10.1.0.3]) by ararat.aua.am (8.6.12/8.6.12) with ESMTP id PAA08515 for <cismap(a)dm.com>; Wed, 22 Jan 1997 15:24:30 +0400 >Received: from AMI/SpoolDir by fsaua.aua.am (Mercury 1.21); > 22 Jan 97 15:08:11 +0400 >Received: from SpoolDir by AMI (Mercury 1.30); 22 Jan 97 15:07:39 +0400 >From: "Ara Araratyan" <AARARATY(a)aua.am> >Organization: American University of Armenia >To: cismap(a)dm.com >Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 15:07:36 +0400 >Subject: Request For Information >Priority: normal >X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail v3.22 >Message-Id: <7E1ABE2475(a)fsaua.aua.am> > >Dear Sir, > >If it is not hard for you, please, send me more information about >your organization. > >Sincerely, >Ara Araratyan

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Re: David Kahn advocates GAK
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is indeed a shame, and Carl's response was (of course) excellent. The last chapter of the revised edition of the Codebreakers is reasonably pro-government in the way it lays out the issue of key escrow, so perhaps we shouldn't be surprised. (I'm told that David's sojourn at the NSA museum was unexciting; they wouldn't tell him much.) :) -Declan On Wed, 22 Jan 1997, Carl Ellison wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > It might also be that David's year long sabatical at NSA's crypto museum > which recently ended put him in touch with people who believe in GAK. > > I found it interesting that he noted the argument that each additional > day of government access is a good thing. This is the kind of belief > we know that NSA holds -- a.k.a. "not on my watch" -- but I haven't seen > it publicly admitted before. > > - Carl > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6.2 > > iQCVAwUBMuZ35lQXJENzYr45AQEcfwQAqMftG0DXn1nr6faA6IHeAtqSXYanwnZb > DiwqppU4nJqPtIvtFw8eOVVwyYCzIv046dFtwR2mk8HeL1v8I3R2sWm7waknFjlm > TM84+vLamlVnBNPUAXRYOrFiEhPQm/iitR4GVrcga9mHJ+vrI38XQGzi0lxdg310 > pWjq5Fxahag= > =xhF7 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > +------------------------------------------------------------------+ > |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | > | PGP 2.6.2: 61 E2 DE 7F CB 9D 79 84 E9 C8 04 8B A6 32 21 A2 | > +-Officer, officer, arrest that man. He's whistling a dirty song.--+ > > >

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P.S. David Kahn's editorial today
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I just sent the following P.S. to newsday.com ---------------------- There is another reason to have cellular phones which encrypt only the over-the-air portion of a call, besides the fact that we can leave normal wiretap access procedures in place and not surrender civilian crypto keys to the government. If I have a cellular phone which encrypts over the air (between the phone and the base station) and I call you, while you have a normal wired phone, our call is protected by cryptography from interception off the air. If I use an AT&T Clipper-style cellular phone, as David suggested, and I call you on a normal wired phone, we can't encrypt the conversation and it is vulnerable to interception. The protection works *only* if both parties have encrypting phones while interoperate. - Carl -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMubl6lQXJENzYr45AQEYagQAmVL47KGCHUyee8246VjGqr7+uubTBhHA s/TtgFiMW7a9W5jbni5ov+kjTDeGpRULfrbyEwYR2fd1E1laNeu+EAQkE56KuU9g iiB0S7TBd290MSHJZ6wQUWsDVgCzOi9gHbCQwY+GMQMXKfphuC4kDavwdSxjAXAM MeZsitFRM1w= =TzsP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- +------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | | PGP 2.6.2: 61 E2 DE 7F CB 9D 79 84 E9 C8 04 8B A6 32 21 A2 | +-Officer, officer, arrest that man. He's whistling a dirty song.--+

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Re: Encrypting ZIP drives?
by Vin McLellan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> who is usually answering questions, wrote: >>>I am looking for a transparent (strong) encryption of ZIP drives. >>>Any advice would be appreciated. <snip> >Parallel on Win95. Hi Lucky, RSA has got their Win95 version of SecurPC. That's 128-bit RC4 encryption; maybe 10X the speed of DES. You could encrypt your zip data from Explorer either on demand, or automatically upon exiting WIN95. (It auto-decrypts on startup.) SecurPC doesn't yet have transparent (fully background) crypto, but given the market pressures, it obviously won't be long in coming. SecurPC does have a number of other unusual features that might offset the lack of transparency. My favorite: At least until the next version of ERA;-) RSA's SecurPC permits you to ship data over the US borders encrypted with 128-bit RC4 in a self-extracting file which can be opened by anyone, anywhere -- with the same OS as the sender, and the right (one-time?) password -- even if they don't have a copy of SecurPC. The key, passed out of band, is certainly not up to PKC standards... but for occasional connections, if you duck the dictionary attack, it looks pretty damn sturdy. One-way symmetric-- kinda neat! (Anyone know how it really works? I got a copy of the v1 user's manual from SDTI, where I do a lot of contract work -- but it doesn't really explain the split of functions. I'll have to ask.) Suerte, _Vin

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Re: Dr. Vulis' social engineering experiment
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alec wrote: > :Jane Jefferson wrote: > :> The heart and soul of the problem is that "sin", "freedom", "good", > :> and "evil" are abstract concepts which fluctuate from individual to > :> individual. > Not only from individual to individual. > Please consider the changes in the concepts of "sin", "freedom", "good", > and "evil" which occur over time even within the same individual; to > wit the on and off again love affair with our nation's past "enemies; > individual responses to drug use especially alcohol; premarital sex > (ok for me but not my daughter). > This constant flux within both society and individual makes creation > and implementation of rules extremely difficult and hazardous. The idea that "sin" and "evil" are abstract and somewhat arbitrary is merely a human (and therefore faulty) perception. If God can be perfect by definition (for sake of argument), then "sin" is taking one's attention from God's intent and turning to man's intent, which is inherently selfish. "Evil" is the selfish thing you do, when you should do the unselfish thing. These are not that difficult to understand, but are easily twisted by selfish minds. A gentleman wrote to Southern Partisan magazine a few years ago and said "Real freedom is not the license to do whatever you want, but rather the liberty to do what you ought to do".

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Re: ADSL (Was: GSM technology
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Toto wrote: > > jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: > > A previous poster mentioned that because of the copper wire restriction, that > > they may deploy first in older centers. This would appear to be the case, since > > a Canadian telco (Sasktel) is offering ADSL in Saskatoon for 60$/month with > > unlimited internet access. Saskatoon falls into this category - in my opinion. > > > > I was only is SK briefly over New Years, but perhaps Toto can fill in details. > > James, > SaskTel has, for the most part, always had a monopoly on the telephone > business in Saskatchewan, and used this to keep the phone rates fairly > high. On the other hand, they also used much of the money to position > themselves to keep their monopoly by investing heavily in the newest > technologies. > As a result, they have a lot of fiber-optic, etc., even in the > boondocks, but they also soaked those people $ 6.00 hour for > InterNet access, until Sympatico came in with a competitive rate > of less than $ 1.00/hour, and then they stopped clipping the > sucker/citizens. > SaskTel left the 'upgrading' of the larger centers to last, and > as a result, their 'old' technology seems to be ironically beneficial > to them in being able to offer ADSL in Saskatoon, Regina, and a couple > of other centers. > > Toto

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Micali's rights to lightweight certificates etc.
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 31 Jul 1996 17:28:56 -0400 From: Silvio Micali <silvio(a)sunspot.tiac.net> To: cme(a)cybercash.com, d.adams(a)xopen.co.uk, frantz(a)netcom.com, hallam(a)w3.org, rodney(a)sabletech.com, rsalz(a)osf.org, silvio(a)sunspot.tiac.net, spki(a)c2.org Subject: Micali's rights to lightweight certificates etc. Sender: owner-spki(a)c2.org Precedence: bulk Dear Carl: Last April I was forwarded by Ron (Rivest) the following e-message addressed to you: "[Re: Micali's lightweight certificates with hash chains] The mechanism maybe patented, but who owns the patent? I am aware of claims by two european groups who have payment schemes using a combined s/key and signed cert technique Pghill" As I do not know the context of your conversation, it is hard for me to guess which technology's rights the above question refers to. There are (at least) two possible technologies the question refers to. Let me thus answer it in either case. I would appreciate if you could pass this information to people you feel may be interested in it. (I am trying to CC all the people CCed in the original message, but I am not sure that this reaches all the right people.) RIGHTS INFORMATION My efficient certificate revocation technology is itself based on my off-line digital signature technology. The efficient certificate certificate revocation technology has been invented by me alone. I have filed for patent protection, and the patent is currently pending with the U.S. Patent Office. The underlying off-line signature technology has been invented by Shimon Even, Oded Goldreich and me. The technology is protected by U.S. Patent No. 5,016,274. The rights to this technology are only with me. (The latter technology, among other things, covers the process of separating the signing process into two stages: a OFF-LINE one --that can be performed before knowing what the message to be signed is--- and an ON-LINE one --which is typically performed when one knows exactly what he/she wishes to sign. In the preferred embodiment, in the off-line step, the signer uses the secret key SK of a first, conventional secret-public key pair (SK,PK) to digitally sign the publick key, pk, of a second, restricted but very fast, signature scheme. In the on-line step, the signer uses the second secret key --i.e., the one associated with pk-- in order to sign the desired message. In particular, the second public key, pk, can be obtained by evaluating k times a given one-way hash function on input sk. After doing so, one can sign in an off-line step pk together with a certificate serial number (and other information). Then, in an on-line step, one can sign that a certificate is being valid for at at least i days --where i is between 1 and k-- by releasing the ith inverse of pk; that is, by releasing a value that, hashed i times, yields pk. You can thus see the connection between the two technologies.) Both technologies are available for licensing. If you or someone in your discussion group is aware of a company using either technology, I would appreciate if you could facilitate a contact between me and such a company, so that we can discuss possible licensing arrangements. The Efficient Certificate Revocation Paper is presented in MIT Technical MIT/LCS/TM-542, dated November 95. A better version appears in a March 1996 manuscript. Either version could be obtained from me, if more convenient. Off-Line Digital Signatures also appear in the Proceedings of Crypto 89. A better version can be found in The Journal of Cryptography (1996) 9; pp. 35-67. Any version is also obtainable from me, if more convenient. Hope this helps answering the above ``rights'' question. Thank you also in advance for forwarding the above information to whomever you believe may be interested in it. All the best, Silvio --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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crypto-relevant
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Fascist censorship >Sender: owner-cypherpunks-unedited(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk >I notice that both my highly crypto-relevant, flame-free article and >Igor Chudov's response to it were rejected by the fascist moderator Yeah, that's kinda weak! I have found a few other posts in the 'Error' list that may not have belonged there. Fascist? I'm not sure that's exactly what we are dealing with here. Hidden agendas, yes. >Sandfart and showed up immediately on the cypherpunks-flames address. > >Apparently Sandfart automatically rejects any submissions with my name >in them. Or he's already dead from AIDS and has been replaced by a 'bot. Now, Dr., that's a little bit insensitive. AIDS is a pretty tragic illness. > >I also notice that John Gilmore's employees from Cygnus Support >are flaming me on sci.crypt and accusing me of homophobia. I'll have to start reading that group, to check up on the agents further. > >Please help expose Cygnus Support as a homosexual fraud. > >--- And I thought this next part was pretty funny. Test test is this thing on? > >From: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Fuck Sandy Sandfart >Sender: owner-cypherpunks-unedited(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk >This is a test. This is only a cocksucking test. =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: 415-206-9906

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at least we have some friends...
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- +New encryption bill on way +By Alex Lash +January 22, 1997, 8:45 p.m. PT +see http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C7236%2C00.html?nd +Sen. Conrad Burns (R-Montana) next week will reintroduce legislation +aimed at wiping out most Commerce Department restrictions on the +export of software encryption, his press secretary said today. +The new version of the so-called Pro-Code bill, which died in the +Senate Commerce Committee last year after a series of high-profile +hearings, will be unchanged and should have the same support it +gained in the 1996 session, Burns's press secretary Matt Raymond said. +"The language was not something that was arrived at lightly," Raymond +said. "We should have time for a more robust and considerate debate" +compared with last year's unsuccessful rush to get the bill passed, +he added. +Burns, a leading figure on the Senate Commerce Committee, is set to +appear via satellite Tuesday at the RSA Data Security Conference in +San Francisco to announce the bill's reintroduction. +Foes of the Clinton administration's current encryption regulations, +which became effective on January 1, are looking for Congress to +legislate more liberal export guildelines. Last year, the Pro-Code +bill won the support of many key members of Congress who remain in +office and want to modify Clinton's encryption plan. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: Encrypted with 2.6.3i. Requires 2.6 or later. iQCVAwUBMucJKr04kQrCC2kFAQGcjwP/cjxEQcxixtx1nEg5lC6cBXK85Ff8FIkn 4x176KJokc4RSD1fNWhJkeHUYi1HCrp6nD4VsNP9Ud3c9rC2XNcGtnTEDAwZ0ikS 03kz9fUqptU6GE+Mrjl/FLhcDfSYlTUsFrFKYcTuge2nVJUAz2+kbaFg4qT9njyO 1vro9FplgIw= =ktMy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Anyone have the complete info on CP list alternatives?
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bryan Reece wrote: > > Igor Chudov writes: > > Bryan Reece wrote: > > > > > > It is in place. It feeds from cypherpunks(a)algebra.com. Bryan Reece > > > reece(a)taz.nceye.net runs the posting bot. taz.nceye.net is an open > > > newsserver offering several cypherpunks newsgroups. > > > > > > I am not yet sure if taz is now a part of the mainstream usenet, that > > > is, it may not be connected to the Big USENET. > > > > > > It receives some Big Usenet groups, but only for local users. > > > alt.cypherpunks is open, but there will be long delays, on the > > > order of a day, for articles there (unless someone better connected to > > > Usenet wants to feed me alt.cypherpunks.*---any volunteers?). > > > > > > > I just set up a recipe for using mail2news gateways like this: > > > > :0 c > > | formail -I "Newsgroups: alt.cypherpunks,misc.misc" | \ > > sendmail mail2news(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu mail2news(a)utopia.hacktic.nl > > > > Any objections? > > > > - Igor. > > It would be more mailing-list-like to have the list in a separate, > isolated hierarchy. That would avoid the principal problems of Usenet > (delays and email spam). It is a very good objections. I would like readers to speak up and say their word for or against forwarding the list messages to alt.cypherpunks. If a significant number of people objects (2-3 is enough) I will disable this feature. - Igor.

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