- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

PGP for elm
by Ferreira, Ben 296-4158 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone know if there is a PGP interface or elm version that supports PGP?

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Re: DES & RC4-48 Challenges
by dan＠milliways.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 23 Aug 95 11:53:22 -0500 you wrote: >Dan Bailey writes: >> According to Biham and Shamir's Differential Cryptanalysis of DES, >> "An interesting feature of the new attack is that it can be applied > >If I read this correctly, then the keys used for generation of the chosen >plaintext-cyphertext pairs is irrelevant and once the required computation is >done, one can crack any '...one of the keys can be cputed in real time while >it is still valid.'.. > I haven't read this entire book, mainly because a lot of it is over my head with some pretty esoteric proofs. The impression I got was that if the cryptanalyst is steadily keeping up with the key changes until he collects the required 2^36 from a pool of 2^47 valid plaintext/cyphertext pairs, he then can recover the last key used. I don't understand what constitutes a "valid" pair in this context. Also, I'm not sure if all the computation he's done to get to that point is applicable in his attack on the next key. It appears not. If all of his precomputation was somehow salvagable, I think we'd already have heard about someone actually doing it. But then again, I don't understand how his precomputation could *not* be applicable. He'd just have to drop off the computations done for the first key. Perhaps the difficulty in this problem comes from not knowing when the source is changing keys. According to Schneier, "To get the requisite data for this attack, you have to encrypt a 1.5Mbits/second data stream of chosen plaintext for almost three years." (240) With the massively-parallel nature of Cypherpunks, this is probably feasible, assuming we could figure out what needed to be done. Another angle is cracking a reduced-round version of DES. 8-round DES can be analyzed in 2^9 using differential cryptanalysis. Since I'm sure the press doesn't really understand using multiple rounds in iterated cryptosystems, maybe that little detail would slip by. 2^9 could easily be handled by an Alpha in the evening. Dan >So what, exactly does this mean? Can I do most, if not all of the feeding of >chosen plaintext into my personal DES box in my basement, do the required >computation (admittedly there is a lot of work to do here), then go out and >start breaking wire-transfers with a minimal of chosen plaintext? That is >what the above quotation would seem to imply. > >Seems incredible... I surely must be reading much more into the passage than >is really there... > >andrew > > > ****************************************************************************** "I think, therefore I am" - Descartes Dan Bailey "I don't think, therefore I'm a moustache." - Sartre dan(a)milliways.org Worcester Polytechnic Institute and The Restaurant at the End of the Universe ******************************************************************************

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is there...
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there an online version of Raph's anonymous remailer list for FTP or on the web? I suddenly need to give it to someone. .pm

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Re: e$: The Book-Entry/Certificate Distinction
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:10 AM 8/24/95, Alan Penny wrote: >The other night I heard that some of the rules for selling stock have >been changed to allow companies to sell stock directly to investors. >I have been thinking that this may have the potential to support an >interesting system. My company sold stock to me directly, through a Stock Participation Plan and an Incentive Stock Option Plan. >Imagine "Portfolio Accounts" with a debit-card like access method. I use a debit card which directly accesses my stock account. More on this in a moment. >Instead of paying for an item at a store with money or credit you use >your Portfolio-Account card and buy the item with shares/micro-shares >of stock. Stock brokers may offer this type of service in response the >competition of companies bypassing them. Stock brokers could setup >services that mediate between transactions calculating trades and values >"on-the-fly" (anonymity could be tricky to build into this system). This is where it breaks down. Stock prices are denominated in dollars (or the local currency, as applicable). And local purchases are denominated in dollars. Nobody pays "one microMicrosoft" for a loaf of bread. They pay $1. And Microsoft stock sells for $100, not 100 loaves of bread. >If the company you worked for paid you with stock instead of money this >would complete the loop. The IRS and other tax authorities have this one figured out: barter economies are not generally a way to avoid taxes. >This also has the interesting feature of avoiding all taxes. Until you >"cash out" your account you would not have to pay taxes, if you never >need cash out your account, you never need to pay taxes. I suspect that >our friendly governments would try to "correct" this "problem" in the >long run if they can. If you are paid in barter for some service, taxes are still owed, based on the estimated value of services rendered. By the way, a simpler example than all this talk of partial shares of companies is simply to talk about paying each other in gold, or oil, or any other commodities. Try to convince the IRS that taxes are not owed because one was paid in ounces of gold instead of dollars. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Brute SSL Challenge
by David Neal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just skip this silly little message if you know enough to optimize the brutessl code. Didn't know of a better place to put this, so please no flames. Hopefully everyone on here is accomplished enough to know optimizing the brutessl code helps immensely. If not, well I used gcc -O6 -funroll-loops -fomit-frame-pointer -finline-functions -c search.c gcc -O6 -funroll-loops -fomit-frame-pointer -finline-functions -o brutessl \ brutessl.c search.o To go from 5,000 keys per second to 10,100 keys per second.

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Re: MD5 in DOS
by ab411＠detroit.freenet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nobody wrote: >im looking for a md5 binary that will run on dos. >can anyone give me a pointer? There is a program for DOS called MDx which does both MD4 and MD5, and is pretty fast, too. It can be found at: ftp://oak.oakland.edu/SimTel/msdos/fileutil/xsum11.zip or ftp://garbo.uwasa.fi/pc/fileutil/xsum11.zip Or at mirrors of the SimTel or Garbo archives. I cannot claim to be unbiased, though -- I wrote it (with a little help from Phil Karn's fast assembly MD5 translate function!) xsum 1.1 is freeware. -- David R. Conrad, ab411(a)detroit.freenet.org, http://www.grfn.org/~conrad Finger conrad(a)grfn.org for PGP 2.6 public key; it's also on my home page Key fingerprint = 33 12 BC 77 48 81 99 A5 D8 9C 43 16 3C 37 0B 50 Jerry Garcia, August 1, 1942 - August 9, 1995. Requiescat in pace.

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Australia and Encryption Policy
by denning 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ross Anderson posted a message on the net recently stating that Australia was proposing an encryption policy that would force residents to use weak cryptography while banks would get key escrow. His source was a talk by Steve Orlowski, who is Assistant Director, Security Management, in the Australian Attorney-General's Department. Attached is a copy of an open letter by Mr. Orlowski in response to that post. He is not proposing that individuals be forced to use weak encryption. Key escrow would be an option available to anyone wanting a high level of encryption. Organizations and individuals could escrow their own keys if desired. This message and his letter may be forwarded. Dorothy Denning --------------- Dear Thank you for your comments on the subject of the use of encryption by private individuals. Firstly I would like to make the point that the debate has arisen from one person's interpretation of a paper I gave at a conference on "Cryptography Policies and Algorithms" The full text of that paper is now available on the net at http://commerce.anu.edu.au/comm/staff/RogerC/RogersHome.html The paper carries a disclaimer at the top that the views are mine and do not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Government. The paper sets out the Government's policy on telecommunications interception, which includes the issue of the use of cryptography as: "As a result of the Report, Australia is, among other TI issues, monitoring the impact of encryption in the telecommunications interception area and will re-examine matters in 1997 following the opening of the telecommunications area to full competition." Telecommunications covers both voice and data communications. The last paragraph of the paper says that there is a need to expand the cryptography debate to cover the needs of individual users in the context of the information superhighway rather than current Internet users. The paper also points out that issues suh as cost, convenience and public confidence in cryptography systems will be the main issues. Public confidence is explained in terms that as long as it meets the general requirement for privacy it will be acceptable. I still maintain that the general user of the superhighway in the next century will be satisfied with a lower level of encryption which will meet that and cost and user friendliness requirements. On specific point made in the Internet message, the paper does not suggest, either directly or by implication, that individuals should be banned from using encryption. Regarding the use of higher level encryption, the paper supports the concept of commercial key escrow where organisations hold their own keys but may be required to provide them in response to a court order. The same would apply to individuals who could either hold there own keys or store them with a commercial body. Access to those keys would be by court order and in that respect is no different to existing procedures for the interception or seizure of telephone conversations or paper records. There is no suggestion that these basic principles, and protection of individual's rights in general, should be changed If individuals were to use lower level encryption there would be no need for them to maintain copies of any keys for such systems. To my mind this is preferable to a requirement for keys to be maintained for all encryption systems, which could be the result if universal key escrow were introduced. Finally on the question of interception, the general public expects a reasonable level of law enforcement to ensure the protection of their person and property. Governments are required to find a balance between this and the rights of individuals to privacy. Part of this balance is to ensure that law enforcement authorities convince a court that there is a need to carry out an interception. There is no suggestion that this fundamental approach should be changed. The paper certainly does not suggest tha the Attorney-General's Department should become a centralised interception authority. In fact such a role would not be consistent with its role as a source of advice to Government. I hope the above clarifies both the Government's policy and my personal views on these matters. I consider this to be an open letter and have no objection to it being used as such. Yours sincerely Steve Orlowski

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Shared secrets, virtual corporations
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

< Collective holding of signer keys > There are protocols that allow a group of people to collectively hold a key. A message is passed down the line, each person in turn operating on it, and at the end it has been signed. In this way the board of directors can sign a message without any one person having the key. These protocols can probably be combined with a secret-sharing system, so that a message can be signed if a certain percentage of the key-share holders collaborate. This allows voting, with the object of the vote getting signed only if >50% vote for it. Taking a share away from someone is a bit of a problem. If someone needs to lose his voting privileges, you probably have to generate a new key and sign it with the old one, then revoke the old one. Mike

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brloop not working
by Jyri Kaljundi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just dont seem to get brloop working. It says: Command failed -- brutessl missing ? what seems to be wrong is that it tries to execute command: brutessl - although brutessl does not have a command line option '-'. Why is the '-' there after brutessl ? <o Jüri Kaljundi e-mail: jk(a)digit.ee o< >o tel: +372 6308994 o> <o DigiTurg http://www.digit.ee/ o<

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Re: is there...
by dmandl＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:56 PM 8/23/95, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Is there an online version of Raph's anonymous remailer list for FTP >or on the web? I suddenly need to give it to someone. > >.pm http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html --D. -- Dave Mandl dmandl(a)panix.com http://wfmu.org/~davem

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