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Re: A lengthy preliminary analysis of the Leahy bill.
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Peter D. Junger" <junger(a)pdj2-ra.F-REMOTE.CWRU.Edu> > From the point of view of one who is concerned with first amendment > rights rather than selling cryptographic software as a commodity, the > really unfortunate part is that this provision authorizes export > contols on ``software''. Now the Leahy bill does not define software, > but there is a definition of lying around in the International Traffic > in Arms Regulations (``ITAR'') that I fear Commerce might adopt---it > may even be the language that the draftsmen of the Leahy bill had in > mind. And this definition of ``software'' includes a great deal of > material that cannot constitutionally be controlled. Here is that > definition from the ITAR \S 121,8(f): ``Software includes but is not > limited to the system functional design, logic flow, algorithms, > application programs, operating systems and support software for > design, implementation, test, operation, diagnosis and repair.'' > [...] > Even if that definition is adopted, the fact remains that software is > still nothing but information, and that it is the communication of > information that is protectected by the first amendment to the United > States constitution. (If you aren't convinced that software is > protected by the first amendment, notice that software is > copyrightable as a ``literary work''.) Note that the paradigmatic > violation of the first amendment is a scheme under which the > government requires publishers to obtain a license before publishing. Are you familiar with the Posey case? That decision by the 9th district court (which oversees export cases) explicitly rejected the contention that restrictions on export of written materials violate the First Amendment. Although I am not a lawyer, I wrote some notes on this case at: <URL: http://www.portal.com/~hfinney/cryp_export2.html>. Below is an excerpt from that court decision in which they make it quite clear that the First Amendment doesn't apply. In this case, the item being exported was a technical manual obtained from the US government itself under the Freedom of Information Act. Surely this is even closer to what the framers of the constitution had in mind when they conceived of the First Amendment, yet the constitutionality of restrictions on its export has been upheld. So you should be aware that the status quo is that the restrictions you fear being legitimized by the Leahy bill are already in place. Here is part of the Posey decision [864 F2d 1487] (the AECA is the Arms Export Control Act, which is what currently forbids the export of encryption devices, and the CAAA is the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which applied specifically to South Africa, where the materials in this case were sent): VII. FIRST AMENDMENT Appellant's final argument is that the First Amendment bars the government from restricting the export of information that is already available to the public. He insists that the data he sent abroad was available under the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore could be legally obtained by virtually everyone in the world. He contends that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the AECA and CAAA to the export of such publicly available information. Our Court has already considered and rejected this argument. In United States v. Edler Industries, 579 F2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978), we rejected an essentially identical challenge to the predecessor of the AECA. The defendant was convicted of exporting certain manufacturing designs that were on the Munitions List but were not classified. He challenged his conviction on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the government could not constitutionally prohibit the export of techno- logical data that was widely distributed within the United States. In rejecting that claim, we explained that even assuming that the First Amendment offers some protection to the dissemination of technical data, the government has a strong interest in regulating the export of military information: The federal government undeniably possesses the power to regulate the international arms traffic.... As a necessary incident to the power to control arms export, the President is empowered to control the flow of information concerning the production and use of arms. The authority to regulate arms traffic would be of negligible practical value if it encompassed only the exportation of particular military equipment but not the exportation of blueprints specifying the construction of the very same equipment. 579 F2d at 520. We accordingly concluded that the government could permissibly restrict the flow abroad of data included in the Munitions List. 579 F2d at 521. Finally, we held that the government's power to issue such restrictions was not affected by the domestic availability of the regulated data: Given the unquestionable legitimacy of the national interest in restricting the dissemination of military information, the claim of public availability in the United States is not a defense recognized by the Constitution. 579 F2d at 522. Appellant attempts to distinguish Edler from the present case by pointing out that the exported data in Edler was "cutting edge" technology and was not widely used in this country. [Citation]. Whether or not this was factually true of the technology at issue in Edler, however, the Edler decision clearly assumed for purposes of its decision that the material was extensively available in the United States. See 579 F2d at 518, 522. Moreover, we believe Edler should not be read as permitting the govern- ment to restrict the export of only that information which is not widely available domestically. Under appellant's reading of Edler, if the government wished to prevent technical data from being sent to foreign powers, it would be required to suppress the information alto- gether, at home as well as abroad. This outcome would blur the fact that national security concerns may be more sharply implicated by the export abroad of military data than by the domestic disclosure of such data. Technical data that is relatively harmless and even socially val- uable when available domestically may, when sent abroad, pose unique threats to national security. It would hardly serve First Amendment values to compel the government to purge the public libraries of every scrap of data whose export abroad it deemed for security reasons necessary to prohibit. We conclude that appellant's conviction does not violate the First Amendment.

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Re: How's that again?
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:43 PM 3/12/96 -0800, Sandy Sandfort wrote: >On Tue, 12 Mar 1996, Dr. Dimitri Vulis wrote: > >> "Cypherpunk" is not a trademarked name. I've seen people say on this list >> (paraphrased)..."I'm hosting a cypherpunks meeting and X will not be >> permitted to come because I don't like his political views". I like >> reading this list, but if these views are compatible with being a >> cypherpunk, then I'm not one. > >No one has ever made an announcement on the Cypherpunks list such >as the one you "paraphrased." The meetings have always been open >to everyone. > >If the good doctor is referring to my univiting of Jim Bell to >a private party held AFTER a Cypherpunk meeting he had better >get his facts straight. Jim Bell would have been welcome at the >Cypherpunks meeting. He would not have been welcome at my party, >though, because of his intemperate bad manners, NOT his politics. Jim Bell is confused. He was assuming that you were refering to the Feb Cypherpunks meeting held in Portland. The meeting was held in a private residence and Jim was asked not to attend because the owner of the apartment did not want to deal with Mr. Bell's poor behaviour. It had nothing to do with his political beliefs. It had everything to do with how he handles himself when his views are challenged. But then, everything that happens in Portland that is not to Jim's satisfaction is somehow my fault... --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

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Re: How's that again?
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jim and interested C'punks, In response to a Jim Bell post I wrote: > >Hey, Jim, don't forget me. You are the only person I have ever > >specifically UNinvited to one of my parties in over a decade of > >hosting same. I guess that makes you special. To which Jim replied: > You're confused. You're describe YOUR reaction to ME, not MY reaction to > YOU. And I am unaware of being invited to a "party," and now that I've > discovered what a sleazy person Alan Olsen and his merry band are, it is > really doubtful that I would have enjoyed what was advertised as a > cypherpunks meeting, but which you now claim was a "party." Your level of > "honesty" is showing. A) It is you who is confused (see below) B) I'm not Alan Olsen (nor a member of his merry band, so I have no idea what you are talking about. C) There was a Cypherpunk meeting followed by a party. The pictures are on the Web. D) It is your level of honesty that is showing. As can be seen from the two messages (below) I sent you at the time. They quote you in pertinent part. >From sandfort(a)crl10.crl.comTue Mar 12 19:04:00 1996 Date: Sat, 20 Jan 1996 22:59:47 -0800 (PST) From: Sandy Sandfort <sandfort(a)crl10.crl.com> To: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> Subject: Re: PARTY-PARTY-PARTY ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jim, You wrote: > Putting the nearest city in the note would have been helpful. Did you try looking at the actual invitation? S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >From sandfort(a)crl12.crl.comTue Mar 12 19:04:17 1996 Date: Sun, 21 Jan 1996 08:24:26 -0800 (PST) From: Sandy Sandfort <sandfort(a)crl12.crl.com> To: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> Subject: Re: PARTY-PARTY-PARTY ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jim, You moaned: > I didn't feel inclined to waste 2-3 minutes of my time cranking > up Netscape, and looking at a homepage or whereever the actual > information was. > > I consider such behavior exceedingly rude. I feel your pain. Invitation withdrawn; problem solved. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ NOW do you remember? S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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LACC: PC Phones Home?
by dch＠uriacc.uri.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Listers, I came across a blurb in the local paper today and was interested if someone here could provide some substance to the story: "Software to the rescue: If somoeone steals your PC, you may be able to get it back because of software that acts as a kind of tracking device. Home Office Computing magazine reports that the software CompuTrace TRS will automatically dial the office of its creator, Absolute Software, if a thief hooks up a stolen PC's modem to a phone line. The software reveals the location of the PC and Absolute Software will call the police" - Providence Journal-Bulletin - March 12, 1996. Any Comments? Regards, Dennis C. Hilliard, M.S. Director/Assistant Professor Rhode Island State Crime Laboratory 220 Fogarty Hall - URI 41 Lower College Road Kingston, RI 02881-0809 Voice: 401-792-2893; Fax: 401-792-2181 ********************************

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Re: Leahy bill, legalize crypto
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

schlafly(a)bbs.cruzio.com wrote: > Obstruction of justice is already a crime. Why add penalties for > using encryption? Intimidate crypto users? Discourage use of > encryption? Give the feds jurisdiction over crypto matters? There are several different interpretations of the most controversial sections of the bill, it is vague and ambiguous. The only interpretation that I have seen that gives effect to the stated purposes of the bill is that if a cop is investigating a felony, he can demand your secret key, and if you refuse to give it to him, you get five years for obstruction. If the objectionable parts mean anything at all, they must *widen* the already alarmingly broad concept of "obstruction of justice". That is to say, of the many possible interpretations of this section, the only one that gives effect to the stated purposes of this legislation, delegates judicial powers to cops. > I see nothing good in this bill, except the export rule relaxation. This bill is a net loss: It gives the software companies considerably less than they thought they were getting, and violates the rights of individuals. The best bill we can hope to obtain is no bill at all. Crypto is profoundly harmful to the vested interest of Washington, and the more attention they pay to it the worse we will be: Any bill that Washington could pass is a bad bill. Any attempt to fix this bill is likely to make it worse. > >Roger --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ James A. Donald jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Commercial Key Escrow as Prerequisite to 64 bit Export
by koontz＠netapp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

SIGNAL, March 1996, page 9: U.S Allows Firewall Export The U.S. government has approved a 56-bit data encryption standard (DES) encrypted firewall for export. The device could create a global virtual private network by encrypting the Internet protocol layer of the communications stream among firewalls. The system's manufacturer has obtained permission to exports its 56- bit, DES-encrypted firewall by incorporating a proprietary commercial key escrow recovery technology into the firewall. The U.S. govern- ment will allow the export of cryptographic products with key lengths of up to 64 bits, provided that a capability allows emergency access to encryption keys for law enforcement and national security reasons. Terms of the export license require the manufacturer, Trusted Information Systems, Incorporated, Glenwood, Maryland, to maintain a commercial key escrow data recovery center in the United STates. --- 1) Is there a market for products overseas that the U.S. government can peer through? 2) Will we ever hear what constitutes a demand for disclosure of keys for "national security reasons"? {please CC: koontz(a)netapp.com, currently not subscribed to cypherpunks}

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Re: Remailer passphrases
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-03-14 01:52:14 EST, you write: >It is probably possible. Put a clip across the CPU chip, and take over >from it by raising it's chip disable will work with some microprocessors. >However, the proper application of various kinds of rubber hose to the >operator should make that kind of attack unnecessary. In general, this is an excellent way to make smoke and big sparks, which (since shorts tend to overtax the power supply and drop voltage levels) is a good way to clear system RAM, thus defeating the purpose of the exercise. Software hacks can do the job just as well, and don't require special breathing apparatus. Jonathan Wienke

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e$: Neal Stephenson's geodesic economy
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Sender: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com Reply-To: rah(a)shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Mime-Version: 1.0 From: rah(a)shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 18:19:49 -0500 Precedence: Bulk To: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com> Subject: e$: Neal Stephenson's geodesic economy -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- e$: Neal Stephenson talks e$ I used to joke that I read science fiction by the yard. I certainly *buy* it that way. I finally got around around to reading Neal Stephenson's The_Diamond_Age,_ or,_A_Young_Lady's_Illustrated_Primer. I thought that his first book, _Snow_Crash_ was marvellous, and thought that, in ability to create utterly er, novel, reality out of whole cloth, he was right up there with Gibson. I was wrong. He's much better. Gibson's first book, _Neuromancer_, was his best. _Diamond_Age_ was an order of magnitude better than _Snow_Crash_ , and I get the feeling that Stephenson's just getting warmed up. Why am I saying all this? Well, I'm in the process of reading _Diamond_Age_, and there, on page 270 of the recent paperback edition, (Copyright 1995, Neal Stephenson), Stephenson describes, in perfect detail, a geodesic economy-- complete with digital cash, payer anonymity, and money as software food. The story concerns a girl named Nellodee, Nell to her friends, an abused waif of no means whatsoever, and her adventures with a very large nanocomputer disguised as a book. The scene in question is about Miranda, a "ractor", an interactive actress, who has been effectively raising Nell interactively through a cleverly disguised Grimm-like fairytale with Nell as the protagonist. Actually, Miranda's just been acting lines provided by the nanocomputer in the book, back through to Nell over the net. After 2 years of this, Miranda decides she wants to meet Nell. She goes to her boss for help... Miranda sat very still for a moment, hypnotized by the colorful flashing lights on a vintage jukebox. "This is related to Princess Nell, isn't it?" "Is it that obvious?" "Yeah. Now, what do you want?" "I want to know who she is," Miranda said. This was the most guarded way she sould put it. She didn't suppose that it would help matters to drag Carl down through the full depth of her emotions. "You want to backtrace a payer," Carl said. It sounded terrible when translated it into that kind of language. Carl sucked powerfully on his milkshake for a bit, his looking over Miranda's shoulder to the traffic on the Bund. "Princess Nell's a little kid, right?" "Yes. I would estimate five to seven years old." His eyes swiveled to lock on hers. "You can tell that?" "Yes.", she said, in tones that warned him not to question it. "So she's probably not paying the bill anyway. The payer is someone else. You need to backtrace the payer and then, from there, track down Nell." Carl broke eye contact again, shook his head, and tried unsucessfully to whistle through frozen lips. "Even the first step is impossible." Miranda was startled. "That seems pretty unequivocal. I expected to hear 'difficult' or 'expensive.' But--" "Nope. It's impossible. Or maybe" -- Carl thought about it a while -- "maybe 'astronomically improbable' is a better way of putting." Then he looked mildly alarmed as he watched Miranda's expression change. "You can't just trace the connection backward. That's not how media works." "How does media work, then?" "Look out the window. Not toward the Bund -- check Yan'an Road." Miranda swiveled her head around to look out the big window, which was partly painted over with colorful Coke ads and and descriptions of blue plate specials. Yan'an Road, like all of the major throughfares in Shanghai, was filled from the shop windows on one side to the shop windows on the other, with people on bicycles and powerskates. In many places the traffic was so dense that greater speed could be attained on foot. A few half-lane vehicles sat motionless, polished boulders in a sluggish brown stream. It was so familiar that Miranda didn't really see anything. "What am I looking for?" Carl was right. At a minimum, everyone had a small plastic bag with something in it. Many people, such as the bicyclists, carried heavier loads. "Now just hold that image on your head for a moment, and think about how to set up a global telecommunications network." Miranda laughed. "I don't have any basis for thinking about something like that." "Sure you do. Until now, you've been thinking in terms of the telephone system in the old passives. In that system, each transaction had two participants -- the two people having the conversation. And they were connected by a wire that ran through a certral switchboard. So what are the key features of this system?" "I don't know -- I'm asking you," said Miranda. "Number one, only two people or entities can interact. Number two, it takes a dedicated connection that is made and broken for the purposes of that one conversation. Number three, it is inherently centralized -- it can't work unless there's a central switchboard." "Okay, I think I'm following you so far." "Our media system today -- the one that you and I make our livings from -- is a decendant of the phone system only insofar as we use it for essentially the same purposes, plus many, may more. But the key point to remember is that *it is totally different from the old phone system*. The old phone system -- and its technological cousin, the cable TV system -- tanked. It carshed and burned decades ago, and we started virtually from scratch." "Why? It worked, didn't it?" "First of all, we needed to enable interactions between more than one entity. What do I mean by entity? Well, think about the ractives. Think about _First_Class_to_Geneva_ . You're on this train -- so are a couple of dozen other people. Some of those people are being racted, so in that case the entities happen to be human beings. But the others-- like the waiters and porters-- are just software robots. Furthermore, the train is full of props: jewelry, money, guns, bottles of wine. Each one of those is also a separate piece of software-- a separate entity. In the lingo, we call them objects. The train itself is another object, and so is the countryside through which it travels. "The countryside is a good example. It happens to be a digital map of France. Where did this map come from? Did the makers of _First_Class_to_Geneva_ send out their team of surveyors to make a new map of France? No, of course they didn't. They used existing data-- a digital map of the world that is available to any maker of ractives who needs it, for a price of course. That digital map is a separate object. It resides in the memory of a computer somewhere. Where exactly? I don't know. Neither does the ractive itself. It doesn't matter. The data might be in California, it might be in Paris, it might be down on the corner-- or it might be distributed among all of those places and many more. It doesn't matter. Because our media system no longer works like the old system- dedicated wires passing through a central switchboard. It works like *that*." Carl pointed to the traffic on the street again. "So each person on the street is like an object?" "Possibly. But a better analogy is that the objects are people like us, sitting in various buildings that front on the street. Suppose that we want to send a message to someone over in Pudong. We write a message down on a piece of paper, and we go to the door and hand it to the first person who goes by and say, 'Take this to Mr. Gu in Pudong.' And he skates down the street for a while and runs into someone on a bicycle who looks like he might be headed for Pudong, and says, 'take this to Mr. Gu.' A minute later, that person gets stuck in traffic and hands it off to a pedestrian who can negotiate the snarl a little better, and so on and so on, until it eventually it reaches Mr. Gu. When Mr. Gu wants to respond, he sends us a message on the same way." "So there's no way to trace the path taken by a message." "Right. And the real situation is more complicated. The media net was designed from the ground up to provide privacy and security, so that people could use it to transfer money. That's one reason that nation-states colapsed-- as soon as the media grid was up and running, financial transactions could no longer be monitord by governments, and the tax colelction systems got fubared. So if the IRS, for example, wasn't able to trace these messages, theen there's no way that you'll be able to track down Princess Nell." "Okay, I guess that answers my question," miranda said. "Good!" Carly said brightly. He was obviously pleased that he'd been able to help Miranda, and so she didn't tell him how his words had really made her feel. She treated as an acting challenge: Could she fool Carl Hollywood, who was sharper about acting than just about anyone, into thinking that she was fine? Apparently she did. He escorted her back to her flat, in a hundered story high-rise just across the river in Pudong, and she held it together long enough to bid him good-bye, get out of her clothes, and run a bath. Then climebed into the hot water and dissovled into awful, wretched, blubbery, self-pitying tears. Eventually she got it under control. She had to keep this in perspective. She could still interact with Nell and still did, everyday. And if she paid attention, sooner or later she would find some way to penetrate the curtain. Barring that, she was beginning to understand that Nell, whoever she was, had become marked out in some way, and that in time she would become a very important person. Within a few years, Miranda expected to be reading about her in the newspapers. Feeling better, she got out of the bath and climbed into bed, getting a good night sleep so she'd be ready for next day of taking care of Nell. Go buy this book. Cheers, Bob Hettinga -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMUipXfgyLN8bw6ZVAQGhfwP/SpOP6F07hLzxTxyR8XpBBZsqUzPKMSRK 3OLc0xYjTLkQvunuhZ6vyGwUqadCu0My2wIMspgSakjhUJkN0dmMBWif2zzWBsLP fSe+WUJiVuT8dJkcLC844pkLE2fjg07rqRMdHRXSbq5TDEMsHllfyBKb5GfW+NM3 TVUgwwiIX/A= =YDVU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------- The e$ lists are brought to you by: Making Commerce Convenient (tm) - Oki Advanced Products - Marlboro, MA Value-Checker(tm) smart card reader= http://www.oki.com/products/vc.html Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion http://www.hyperion.co.uk info(a)hyperion.co.uk See your name here. Be a charter sponsor for e$pam, e$, and Ne$ws! See http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ or e-mail rah(a)shipwright.com for details... ------------------------------------------------- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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AMEX and Netscape
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

American Express Platinum card holders might want to look at the bottom of their statement: CARD USE ON THE INTERNET -- Cardmembers should only conduct transactions over the internet using broswer software that supports industry-standard encryption protocols, such as those offered by Netscape or CyberCash. We anticipate that additional and improved encryption protocols for Card transactions will become available over the next 3-6 months. American Express will keep you informed of new developments in this area. (Any Gold or Green card holders have the same notice?) --- My prefered and soon to be permanent e-mail address: unicorn(a)schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information

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Re: Leahy bill nightmare scenario?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:29 PM 3/11/96, jim bell wrote: >Welcome to prison, Tim. Your optimism will serve you well, there. > >BTW, it is clear that you haven't yet read Mr. Junger's analysis of the >bill. Nobody except a government stooge could read that and not wonder why >anybody would support that bill. A complete re-write is called for. A question, Jim: do you _ever_ just respond calmly to a post you disagree with, or is everyone you disaagree a stooge, a cretin, an agent for the Feds, or someone who should be disposed of with your "assassination politics"? Yes, I read Junger's analysis. A nice analysis. What does this have to do with the points I was making? I'm a government stooge, to use your terms, because of my points about hotel rooms? (On second thought, don't answer. In fact, I hope you take this opportunity to add me to your kill file, the computer version, not the Assassination Poltics (tm) version.)) --TCM Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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