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Re: Does this seem illegal to you?
by George A. Gleason 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sprint TeleMap: You've been after this woman who gives you the ultimate hard-on, but she won't play. Every night you write her another letter, pouring out your heart, begging for her hand, telling her all the lucious things you'll do with her once she comes to her senses and lets you into her life. Lately you've been getting your letters back,"return to sender, no such addressee" in purple Post Office ink. But no matter, you call her number, and get the recording with her new number. You've been getting angrier lately, as she's changed her number three times now. If only she would let you into her life, you'd make wonderful music together by the moonlight- but No!, she just won't play. The anger has been building, and lately you've been taking to leaving more and more desperate messages on her answering machine. She's really getting to you now, you want to teach her a lesson, a lesson she'll never forget. You've been trying to follow her car home from work, but for some reason she's not driving the same car or taking the same route; she might even have changed jobs. Boy oh boy, you'll teach *her* a lesson, teach *her* to say No to you! You feel inside your jacket, where your .38 is carefully tucked. Yeah, teach her a lesson for sure! And lo, a Sprint payphone! You dial the 1-800 number and ask for directions... give them her last known phone number... the seconds tick by, your head whirling with the things you're going to tell her and make her plead with you.... a second or two later, the operator comes back on the line. Go right at Harbor... left at Main... two blocks down to Third, second house on the left. Aha, there we go. Thank you, operator. A warm bulge rises in your pants as you contemplate your next move. Boy are you going to teach her a lesson! This special moment brought to you by Sprint TeleMap. ,

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Re: reporter seeking interview subjects
by remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:35 AM 9/19/93 -0400, Stanton McCandlish wrote: >> > looking for interesting "case studies" that I can use to horrify >> > my listeners out of their complacency. My most immediate need is >> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >> >> Just what I love from the media, using sensationalism to convey a >> preconceived idea instead of looking at the facts and reporting it. >> Does it matter that he is reporting on our side and not the other >> side? > >Why of course it does. No wishing and praying will make the media suddely >become pure and holy. This is a propaganda war, and there's no reason >for both sides not to get in on the act. Otherwise, it's like fighting >guns with slingshots. No horror, no story. Who wants to hear a story about how they're perfectly safe letting the world look at their medical history? If that was true, no one would want to hear about it on the radio.

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Re: Lotus Notes RSA Implementation Question
by eli＠GS160.SP.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <+cmu.andrew.internet.cypherpunks+kkcsTXG00UfAE0ynIq(a)andrew.cmu.edu> Charlie Kaufman writes: >Notes V3 (the one currently deployed) uses 512 bit RSA keys in both >the USA and exportable versions. 512-bit RSA is exportable? I'm surprised. It would be interesting to CJR a known-secure binary for 512-bit RSA, attempting a little differential cryptanalysis on the NSA's practices. A fair test would require that you have the political clout of Lotus/IBM, though. -- Eli Brandt eli+(a)cs.cmu.edu

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Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge"
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: khijol!erc(a)apple.com (Ed Carp) >Thanks for the definition (but I knew that, anyway). Sorru I wasn't clear - >what I was looking for was examples of how zero-knowledge proof techniques >could make source code impenetrable. An arbitrary algorithm can be translated into a zero proof theory model that is intractable to functionally analyze. Its operations on inputs and outputs can take place within the realm of the intractable model, with the inputs and outputs being transformed from the encoding of the outside realm into an encoding useful to the realm of the model. The inputs and outputs are the queries and answers of zero proof theory. With such a thing, knowing every detail of the registers and instructions being executed at all times still wouldn't tell you what you really wanted to know. I'm unsure whether this has been published, let alone implemented; I just thought it was an obvious corollary back when ZPT itself was first published. It might have been discussed in the literature at the time, but if so, I've forgotten. I'm also not claiming this is necessarily a useful approach in practice, because the obvious ways of implementing such a thing would be more than a little slow. I suspect that it could be done efficiently with a little algorithmic cleverness, but I don't have evidence of that this instant. I'm currently designing something with very much the same flavor, but with somewhat different goals, and computational expense of the operators in the model is precisely the difficulty with that, too, so far. Doug -- Doug Merritt doug(a)netcom.com Professional Wild-eyed Visionary Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow Unicode Novis Cypherpunks Gutenberg Wavelets Conlang Logli Alife HC_III Computational linguistics Fundamental physics Cogsci SF GA VR CASE TLAs

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re: more deranged lunatic ravings ...
by Tiffany Lee Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The recent flood of rantmail between Perry Metzger, E. Carp, etc., started as an interesting and relevant argument but has degenerated to the point of annoyance. The former suggested calming down and writing some code - perhaps he could go off and do just that, rather than wasting his time (and ours) trying to keep folx from encouraging others to engage in personal investigation of an issue which concerns them. If you think writing code's the only thing to do - go do it. If you think getting people riled up about the situation is important - go do it. Yammering at each other ain't gonna make the world a safer and more private place. -magdalen

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Re: Yvette
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just another Detweiler Tentacle...... Love Always, Carol Anne Tentaclefinder >> I'm wondering if Yvette from Smithfield, Va is as fine as most people say she >> is... -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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Cypherbusts, etc.
by Alan E. Mason 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just heard about the grand jury BS going down around PGP, etc, via the EFF forum on the Well and would like to do whatever I can to support the defense effort (when it comes) etc. I am a writer with some small access to local media and a big interest in the outcome of this test of our 1st amendment rights. I would also like to get on your "mailing list" if you have one. Mail should be sent to vznquest(a)netcom.com Thanks, and keep up the good work! Alan Mason

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Re: Who needs time vaults anyway?
by droelke＠spirit.aud.alcatel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > As for real time-release - how about just using conventional encryption, > and require it to be brute-forced? > > Depending on how fine grained you want the release to be, you could also > take the inverse of Moore's law, work out how big a key you need to have > it unbreakable in less than the desired time, add in whatever fudge > factors you feel like based on how much it would be worth to the opponent > to get early access, then lock up the secret and throw away the key. > The problem here is that it is probablistic when they are going to be able to unlock it. If the search space will take a total of 10 years to exhaustively search, there is a 50% chance that they will find the key within 5 years, 10% chance that it will be found in 1 year, etc. So, if you are lucky, it will be found in about the time you want it to be. If you aren't it will be found in a few milli-seconds. There is also the problem that your intended recipeient will need to expend just as much work as your advesary to decrypt the message. This might not be a disadvantage in the case of a "broadcast" message, but otherwise it might be. Good idea - but I would say not pratical.... Now, if we just had an objects between 1 and 10 light years away that you could bounce lasers off of...... ;-) Dan ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX

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[NOISE] The State will wither away?
by Anonymous.ReMailer＠f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dale Worley (worley(a)world.std.com) >It has become fashionable these days to say "The government can't suppress ><whatever>", usually with the smug implication that the speaker is getting >away with <whatever>, and thus is more studly than the government. However, >these people are almost always wrong. The correct statement is "The >government isn't willing to expend the effort to suppress <whatever>." >Anyone who wishes to disprove this is invited to sell heroin in Singapore. Hey Duncan Frisell! Any kind words for this guy AFA risk assessment? ================================================= This message has been forwarded by an anonymous remailer. It is not from where it appears. For more information, send a message to HELP at 1:216/21. --- ReMail RML00.03

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Re: Timed-release crypto and information economics
by shields＠tembel.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199511091852.NAA01172(a)bioanalytical.com>, Beavis B. Thoopit <beavis(a)bioanalytical.com> wrote: > initialize buffer to '12#fjKL3_*(ASDdj1ll3_13 asdfasd-1-3!#!23' > do forever /* actually until the plaintext spews out */ > sleep 1 unit > for each element in the buffer > buffer[ element ] = magictransform( buffer[ element ] ) But the "sleep one unit" part is vulnerable, unless (a) the whole device is physically armored, which is probably not easier than armoring a memory chip; or (b) the process -- the whole device, not just a clock -- is based on some basic principle of physics that has time in the equation. -- Shields.

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