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Wired News' War Correspondent on kiddie porn
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Full text: http://www.wired.com/news/culture/story/4437.html Hacker Vows 'Terror' for Child Pornographers by Steve Silberman 2:32pm 13.Jun.97.PDT After 17 years in the hacker underground, Christian Valor - well known among old-school hackers and phone phreaks as "Se7en" - was convinced that most of what gets written in the papers about computers and hacking is sensationalistic jive. For years, Valor says, he sneered at reports of the incidence of child pornography on the Net as "exaggerated/over-hyped/fearmongered/bullshit." Now making his living as a lecturer on computer security, Se7en claims he combed the Net for child pornography for eight weeks last year without finding a single image. That changed a couple of weeks ago, he says, when a JPEG mailed by an anonymous prankster sent him on an odyssey through a different kind of underground: IRC chat rooms with names like #littlegirlsex, ftp [...] On 8 June, Se7en vowed on a hacker's mailing list to deliver a dose of "genuine hacker terror" to those who upload and distribute such images on the Net. The debate over his methods has stirred up tough questions among his peers about civil liberties, property rights, and the ethics of vigilante justice. [I was not aware that he'd sent it to DefCon first, with cypherpunks as a secondary distribution. That explains the language barrier Lizard noticed.] Se7en claims to have already "taken down" a "major player" - an employee of Southwestern Bell who Se7en says was "posting ads all over the place." Se7en told Wired News that he covertly watched the man's activities for days, gathering evidence that he emailed to the president of Southwestern Bell. Pseudonymous remailers like hotmail.com and juno.com, Se7en insists, provide no security blanket [...] A couple of days after submitting message headers and logs to the president and network administrators of Southwestern Bell, Se7en says, he got a letter saying the employee was "no longer on the payroll." The hacker search for acceptance Se7en's declaration of war received support on the original mailing list. "I am all for freedom of speech/expression," wrote one poster, "but there are some things that are just wrong.... I feel a certain moral obligation to the human race to do my part in cleaning up the evil." [...] Pitching in to assist the Feds just isn't the hacker way. As one poster to the DefCon list put it, "The government can't enforce laws on the Internet. We all know that. We can enforce laws on the Internet. We all know that too." The DefCon list was not a unanimous chorus of praise for Se7en's plan to give the pornographers a taste of hacker terror, however. The most vocal dissenter has been Declan McCullagh, Washington correspondent for the Netly News. McCullagh is an outspoken champion of constitutional rights, and a former hacker himself. [Wired forgot the (tm).] "Few people seem to realize that the long-standing federal child-porn law outlawed pictures of dancing girls wearing leotards," McCullagh wrote - alluding to the conviction of Stephen Knox, a graduate student sentenced to five years in prison for possession of three videotapes of young girls in bathing suits. The camera, the US attorney general pointed out, lingered on the girls' genitals, though they remained clothed. "The sexual implications of certain modes of dress, posture, or movement may readily put the genitals on exhibition in a lascivious manner, without revealing them in a nude display," the Feds argued - and won. [Declan fails to recognize that everybody here already knows this, and agrees that Knox was the victim of hysteria.] The menace of child porn is being exploited by "censor-happy" legislators to "rein in this unruly cyberspace," McCullagh says. The rush to revile child porn on the DefCon list, McCullagh told Wired News, reminded him of the "loyalty oaths" of the McCarthy era. [With James Donald, on the other hand, no analogies are necessary.] But McCullagh is not alone. As the debate over Se7en's declaration spread to the cypherpunks mailing list and alt.cypherpunks - frequented by an older crowd than the DefCon list - others expressed similar reservations over Se7en's plan. "Basically, we're talking about a Dirty Harry attitude," one network technician/cypherpunk told Wired News. Though he senses "real feeling" behind Se7en's battle cry, he feels that the best way to deal with pornographers is to "turn the police loose on them." [ROFL. I insisted on not being identified because I didn't want any conflict with Declan, and here he has me AGREEING with him. Cool! And in context, a good addition to the story.] It's not JPEGs of clothed ballerinas that raise his ire, Se7en says. It's "the 4-year-olds being raped, the 6-year-old forced to have oral sex with cum running down themselves." Such images, Se7en admits, are very rare - even in online spaces dedicated to trading sexual imagery of children. "I know what I'm doing is wrong. I'm trampling on the rights of these guys," he says. "But somewhere in the chain, someone is putting these images on paper before they get uploaded. Your freedom ends when you start hurting other people." [I.e., we ain't talking about Knox or Angeli, folks.] -rich http://www.stanford.edu/~llurch/

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Re: Wired News' War Correspondent on kiddie porn
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> http://www.wired.com/news/culture/story/4437.html > > Hacker Vows 'Terror' for Child Pornographers > by Steve Silberman [...] > "Basically, we're talking about a Dirty Harry attitude," one network > technician/cypherpunk told Wired News. Though he senses "real feeling" > behind Se7en's battle cry, he feels that the best way to deal with > pornographers is to "turn the police loose on them." Grr. Didn't notice that on first reading. Of course I meant evidence of criminal child abuse that Mike Godwin considers illegal, not "pornography." Since he snipped my name on request, though, I suppose I can't really complain. -rich http://www.stanford.edu/~llurch/

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Netscape Security Flaw is a Feature
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Many of us have been watching the CNN reports--headline reports at that--that all past and current versions of Netscape on all platforms have reportedly carried the bug that allows any Web site being hit by Netscape to examine files on the user's hard disk. (A demonstration by the Danish team was compelling. CNN-FN generated a text file, placed it on their hard disk, and accessed the Danish site. Moments later, the Danes read back the text file. Over and over for more examples. They _could have been_ the NSA Web site, and the files could have been history files, passphrase files, etc. History files are common, and give captured kestrokes, of course.) But how could such a massive, massive flaw have gone undiscovered for so long? The answer, "It's a feature, not a bug." According to Netscape spokesmen, this feature was added to the kernel of Mosaic, then Navigator, in 1993, as part of the Clipper Key Recovery Program. As James Clarke put it an interview tonight on MSNBC, "Dorothy Denning asked us to insert the "remote read" capabilities to ensure that the legitimate needs of law enforcement are met. No person cruising the Web has any expectation of privacy, as even Declan McCullagh has pointed out." Marc Rotenberg commented, "Privacy at the individual user level is unimportant, just so long as a Privacy Ombudsman can decide on the legitimate needs of law enforcement." Meanwhile, Microsoft has acknowledge that all lines to its Redmond site are clogged by people dumping Navigator and trying to download Explorer. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: There's no general right to privacy -- get over it, from Netly
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- William H. Geiger III <whgiii(a)amaranth.com> wrote: > Well this is rather a poor example. The requirment of a census was written > into the costitution and with good reason. Many of the government actions > are based on demographics congressional districting is a prime example. > > There is a fight going on in cogress right now as the current > administration wants to be able to gestimate the census rather than doing > an actuall head count so it can manipulate the figures any way it wants > (ie change the figures in key congressional districts so they can re-draw > them to favor their supporters). Not that I feel strongly either way, but the other way to look at this is that the current Congress likes its cozy little districts and likes restricting the census to people with permanent addresses, which tends to bias the figures in favor of suburbia. I certainly agree with the fundamental points that censuses and districting have always been important, and hence political[ly corrupted]. Anyone here descended from 3/5ths people? - -rich http://www.stanford.edu/~llurch/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBM6HgHJNcNyVVy0jxAQEmsgH+IWGzDmFvmlCIKSxw26xaP4+tBRHhdRDu BT572zIvqjQfh/4B31qOzOjjWh6cFCEREXE/9bzHaRmyOYA3YfP+EQ== =8mJR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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EFF Analysis of Leahy/Edwards Digital Telephony Bill
by dance＠cicero.spc.uchicago.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hope this is helpful (and not too out-of-date, 9 days ago!). It's the EFF's justification.... --------------------------Begin Message----------------------------- Date: 10 Aug 1994 16:58:23 -0500 From: mech(a)eff.org (Stanton McCandlish) Subject: EFF Analysis of Leahy/Edwards Digital Telephony Bill EFF SUMMARY OF THE EDWARDS/LEAHY DIGITAL TELEPHONY BILL ======================================================= OVERVIEW -------- The Edwards/Leahy Digital Telephony bill places functional requirements on telecommunications carriers in order to enable law enforcement to continue to conduct authorized electronic surveillance. It allows a court to impose fines on carriers that violate the requirements, and mandates that the processes for determining capacity requirements and technical standards be open and public. The bill also contains significant new privacy protections; including an increased standard for government access to transactional data (such as addressing information contained in electronic mail logs), a requirement that information acquired through the use of pen registers or trap and trace devices not disclose the physical location of an individual, and an expansion of current law to protect the radio portion of cordless telephone conversations from unauthorized surveillance. SCOPE OF THE BILL. WHO IS COVERED? ----------------------------------- The requirements of the bill apply to "telecommunications carriers", which are defined as any person or entity engaged in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic communications as a common carrier for hire (as defined by section 3 (h) of the Communications Act of 1934), including commercial mobile services (cellular, PCS, etc.). The bill also applies to those persons or entities engaged in providing wire or electronic communication switching or transmission service to the extent that the FCC finds that such service is a replacement for a substantial portion of the local telephone exchange. The bill does not apply to online communication and information services such as Internet providers, Compuserve, AOL, Prodigy, and BBS's. It also excludes private networks, PBX's, and facilities which only interconnect telecommunications carriers or private networks (such as most long distance service). REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ON CARRIERS -------------------------------- Telecommunications carriers would be required to ensure that they possess sufficient capability and capacity to accommodate law enforcement's needs. The bill distinguishes between capability and capacity requirements, and ensures that the determination of such requirements occur in an open and public process. CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS ----------------------- A telecommunications carrier is required to ensure that, within four years from the date of enactment, it has the capability to: 1. expeditiously isolate the content of a targeted communication within its service area; 2. isolate call-identifying information about the origin and destination of a targeted communication; 3. enable the government to access isolated communications at a point away from the carrier's premises and on facilities procured by the government, and; 4. to do so unobtrusively and in such a way that protects the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted (Sec. 2601). However, the bill does not permit law enforcement agencies or officers to require the specific design of features or services, nor does it prohibit a carrier from deploying any feature or service which does not meet the requirements outlined above. CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS --------------------- Within 1 year of enactment of the bill, the Attorney General must determine the maximum number of intercepts, pen register, and trap and trace devices that law enforcement will require four years from the date of enactment. Notices of capacity requirements must be published in the Federal Register (Sec. 2603). Carriers have 4 years to comply with capacity requirements. PROCESS FOR DETERMINING TECH. STANDARDS TO IMPLEMENT CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Telecommunications carriers, through trade associations or standards setting bodies and in consultation with the Attorney General, must determine the technical specifications necessary to implement the capability requirements (Sec. 2606). The bill contains a 'safe harbor' provision, which allows a carrier to meet its obligations under the legislation if it is in compliance with publicly available standards set through this process. A carrier may deploy a feature or service in the absence of technical standards, although in such a case the carrier would not be covered by the safe harbor provision and may be found in violation. Furthermore, the legislation allows any one to file a motion at the FCC in the event that a standard violates the privacy and security of telecommunications networks or does not meet the requirements of the bill (Sec. 2606). If petitioned under this section, the FCC may establish technical requirements or standards that: 1) meet the capability requirements (in Sec. 2602); 2) protect the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted, and; 3) encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public. ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES ------------------------- In the event that a court or the FCC deems a technical standard to be insufficient, or if law enforcement finds that it is unable to conduct authorized surveillance because a carrier has not met the requirements of this legislation, the Attorney General can request that a court issue an enforcement order (an order directing a carrier to comply), and/or a fine of up to $10,000 per day for each day in violation (Sec. 2607). However, a court can issue an enforcement order or fine a carrier only if it can be determined that no other reasonable alternatives are available to law enforcement. This provision allows carriers to deploy features and services which may not meet the requirements of the bill. Furthermore, this legislation does not permit the government to block the adoption or use of any feature or service by a telecommunications carrier which does not meet the requirements. The bill requires the government to reimburse carriers for all reasonable costs associated with complying with the capacity requirements. In other words, the government will pay for upgrades of current features or services, as well as any future upgrades which may be necessary, pursuant to published notices of capacity requirements (Sec. 2608). There is $500,000,000 authorized for appropriation to cover the costs of government reimbursements to carriers. In the event that a smaller sum is actually appropriated, the bill allows a court to determine whether a carrier must comply (Sec. 2608 (d)). This section recognizes that telecommunications carriers may not be responsible for meeting the requirements if the government does not cover reasonable costs. The government is also required to submit a report to congress within four years describing all costs paid to carriers for upgrades (Sec. 4). ENHANCED PRIVACY PROTECTIONS ---------------------------- The legislation contains enhanced privacy protections for transactional information (such as telephone toll records and electronic mail logs) generated in the course of completing a communication. Current law permits law enforcement to gain access to transactional information through a subpoena. The bill establishes a higher standard for law enforcement access to transactional data contained electronic mail logs and other online records. Telephone toll records would still be available through a subpoena. Under the new standard, law enforcement is required to obtain a court order by demonstrating specific and articulable facts that electronic mail logs and other online transactional records are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation (Sec. 10). Law enforcement is also prohibited from remotely activating any surveillance capability. All intercepts must be conducted with the affirmative consent of a telecommunications carrier and activated by a designated employee of the carrier within the carrier's facilities (Sec. 2604). The bill further requires that, when using pen registers and trap and trace devices, law enforcement will use, when reasonably available, devices which only provide call set up and dialed number information (Sec. 10). This provision will ensure that as law enforcement employs new technologies in pen register and trap and trace devices, it will not gain access to additional call setup information beyond its current authority. Finally, the bill extends the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) protections against interception of wireless communications to cordless telephones, making illegal the intentional interception of the radio portion of a cordless telephone (the transmission between the handset and the base unit). CELLULAR SCANNERS ----------------- The bill makes it a crime to possess or use an altered telecommunications instrument (such as a cellular telephone or scanning receiver) to obtain unauthorized access to telecommunications services (Sec. 9). This provision is intended to prevent the illegal use of cellular and other wireless communications services. Violations under this section face imprisonment for up to 15 years and a fine of up to $50,000. IMPROVEMENTS OF THE EDWARDS/LEAHY BILL OVER PREVIOUS FBI PROPOSALS ------------------------------------------------------------------ The Digital Telephony legislative proposal was first offered in 1992 by the Bush Administration. The 1992 version of the bill: * applied to all providers of wire or electronic communications services (no exemptions for information services, interexchange carriers or private networks); * gave the government the explicit authority to block or enjoin a feature or service that did not meet the requirements; * contained no privacy protections; * contained no public process for determining the capacity requirements; * contained no government reimbursement (carriers were responsible for meeting all costs); * would have allowed remote access to communications by law enforcement, and; * granted telecommunications carriers only 18 months to comply. The Bush Administration proposal was offered on capitol hill for almost a year, but did attract any congressional sponsors. The proposal was again offered under the Clinton Administration's FBI in March of 1993. The Clinton Administration's bill was a moderated version of the original 1992 proposal: * It required the government to pay all reasonable costs incurred by telecommunications carriers in retrofitting their facilities in order to correct existing problems; * It encouraged (but did not require), the Attorney General to consult with telecommunications industry representatives and standards bodies to facilitate compliance, * It narrowed the scope of the legislation to common carriers, rather than all providers of electronic communications services. Although the Clinton Administration version was an improvement over the Bush Administration proposal, it did not address the larger concerns of public interest organizations or the telecommunications industry. The Clinton Administration version: * did not contain any protections for access to transactional information; * did not contain any public process for determining the capability requirements or public notice of law enforcement's capacity needs; * would have allowed law enforcement to dictate system design and bar the introduction of features and services which did not meet the requirements, and; * would have allowed law enforcement to use pen registers and trap and trace devices to obtain tracking or physical location information. * * * Locating Relevant Documents =========================== ** Original 1992 Bush-era draft ** ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/Old/digtel92_old_bill.draft gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/FBI/Old, digtel92_old_bill.draft http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/Old/digtel92_old_bill.draft bbs: +1 202 638 6120 (8N1, 300-14400bps), file area: Privacy - Digital Telephony; file: digtel92.old ** 1993/1994 Clinton-era draft ** ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94_bill.draft gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/FBI, digtel94_bill.draft http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94_bill.draft bbs: +1 202 638 6120 (8N1, 300-14400bps), file area: Privacy - Digital Telephony; file: digtel94.dft ** 1994 final draft, as sponsored ** ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94.bill gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/FBI, digtel94.bill http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94.bill bbs: +1 202 638 6120 (8N1, 300-14400bps), file area: Privacy - Digital Telephony; file: digtel94.bil ** EFF Statement on sponsored version ** ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94_statement.eff gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/FBI, digtel94_statement.eff http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94_statement.eff bbs: +1 202 638 6120 (8N1, 300-14400bps), file area: Privacy - Digital Telephony; file: digtel94.eff --------------------------End of Message----------------------------- _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ The strongest reason for the _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/ _/ people to retain their right to _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ keep and bear arms is, as a last _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ resort, to protect themselves _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ against tyranny in government. _/ --Thomas Jefferson

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timestamp.c
by weidai＠eskimo.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- /* timestamp.c - Automatic PGP Time Stamper v0.1 * by * Wei Dai <weidai(a)eskimo.com> * * Put the line "|timestamp" in your .forward file, and this * program will automaticly scan all your mail for a certain subject heading * and if found, will sign the body of that mail with PGP, and send it back. * Otherwise, the mail goes to your regular mailbox. * This is probably most useful as a "trusted" time stamping service. * * Use for experimental purposes only. Feel free to modify it, but please * send me some e-mail if you do more than change the #defines. */ #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <fcntl.h> #define MAILBOX "/usr/spool/mail/weidai" #define MAILLOCK "/usr/spool/mail/weidai.lock" #define PGPPATH "/u/w/weidai/.pgp" #define LOG "/u/w/weidai/.timestamp.log" #define COMMAND "Time Stamp This Mail" #define MAXLINE 1024 #define FROM "From " #define SUBJECT "Subject: " void Remove_nl (char *); main() { char sLine[MAXLINE], sFrom[255], sFile[255], sTmp[255]; char *p; FILE *fOut, *fMail, *fLog; int bDoIt, fd; fLog = fopen(LOG, "a"); sprintf(sFile, "/tmp/pts_%d", getpid()); fOut = fopen(sFile, "w"); sFrom[0]=0; while (fgets(sLine, MAXLINE, stdin) != NULL) { fputs(sLine, fOut); if (strncmp(sLine, FROM, strlen(FROM)) == 0) { fputs(sLine, fLog); for (p = sLine + strlen(FROM); *p && *p != ' '; ++p); *p = '\0'; strcpy(sFrom, sLine+strlen(FROM)); Remove_nl(sFrom); } else if (strncmp(sLine, SUBJECT, strlen(SUBJECT)) == 0) { fputs(sLine, fLog); bDoIt = (strncasecmp(sLine+strlen(SUBJECT), COMMAND, str } else if (strlen(sLine) <= 1) break; } if (sFrom[0]==0) bDoIt=0; if (bDoIt) { fclose(fOut); fOut = fopen(sFile, "w"); while (fgets(sLine, MAXLINE, stdin) != NULL) fputs(sLine, fOut); fclose(fOut); sprisFile); system(sTmp); fputs(sTmp, fLog); fputs("\n", fLog); unlink(sFile); sprintf(sTmp, "/usr/ucb/mail -s 'Time Stamp Output' '%s' < %s.as system(sTmp); fputs(sTmp, fLog); fputs("\n", fLog); sprintf(sTmp, "%s.asc", sFile); unlink(sTmp); fputs("*** time stamped ***********\n\n", fLog); } else { while (fgets(sLine, MAXLINE, stdin) != NULL) fputs(sLine, fOut); fclose(fOut); while ( (fd=open(MAILLOCK, 0)) != -1) { close(fd); sleep(5); } fd=creat(MAILLOCK, 0600); close(fd); fOut=fopen(MAILBOX, "a"); fMail=fopen(sFile, "r"); while (fgets(sLine, MAXLINE, fMail) != NULL) fputs(sLine, fOut); fputs("\n", fOut); fclose(fMail); fclose(fOut); unlink(MAILLOCK); unlink(sFile); fputs("--- personal mail -----------\n\n", fLog); } fclose(fLog); return(0); } void Remove_nl (char *string) { int i=0; while(string[i]!='\n' && string[i]!=0) i++; string[i]=0; } -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLlRcjjl0sXKgdnV5AQEv2AQAid9urvFjtaQjPYvpqcwhWLy8CCH2OI+O 9mWNnubDZuReH97upNvFYWbDQkFew2Gjfbsj7RwrYSe85gQm+RV0F+/ud64lTCe1 eoPuFrBy2kXugbtJVtp+HB2BGSNc2GtgxIfc61Z3x3E6F4eDagZxtAn2m3ht9Vib n41IQtRk1uA= =ojFS -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- PGP Public Key available

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Re: Are \\"they\\" really the enemy? (Systems commentary)
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We have met the enemy, and it is not the system. Responding to msg by jdd(a)aiki.demon.co.uk (the real Jim Dixon): Regardless of how this discussion began originally, the only part that I was commenting on had to do with John's remark that since governments & societies are both beastly, composed of people of that sort of character, what is it that we think we are going to do if the governing system of operations is overthrown? From this I read: what difference does it make if the present system (the best in the world) is removed, since the objections to it are not also resolved by that action, seeing as how the character of its parts (the people) remains the same; and what is thereby left, if it is successfully un-done? (anticipation: more of the same, but worse, and more difficult for the individual to deal with the consequences)? This was said in the context of a discussion of systems, with reference to what the system which we are governed by (controlled) offers, and how this compares to the feasibility & success of systems per se to accomplish desired ends. It is true that systems are of different kinds & types: from the non-conscious physical which existed prior to the presence of humans on the planet, to fully conscious, reasoned plans of action (as you said: designed). A family may be conceived (by some people) as a system of operations and sometimes it functions that way, although lately they seem to be mostly dis-functional. Families are started whether anyone is fully self-aware, or in control of, their nature; it's usually the result of other motivations unrelated to wanting to control mankind so that it can be morally improved and will function cooperatively as a harmonious whole. But a system designed for the purpose of corralling the disparate energies of a large group of diverse individuals (who are not necessarily in the family) cannot (should not) merely "bumble along" in a mindless sort of way, supposing that everyone is going to agree to and abide by every decree which is delivered to them, for the satisfaction of a purpose which they may not fully appreciate. Human beings are pretty adaptable, but if the governors blithely promulgate measures for living which grates on the sensibilties of the constituency, this is the time when surprising aspects of 'human nature' rears a heretofore invisible head. This is when they begin to 'raise hell'. This is when you realize that it would have been better for someone to know a little more about the facts & the truth & the real nature of mental beings, so that these problems could have been prevented (but nooooooooooooo, there have to be loud, angry debates and arguments and fights and wars, etc.) Apparently, SomeBody didn't know what to expect, didn't plan on it, or didn't care. I don't just propose that a person exercise, develop, and use their own judgement: I recommend it. One may be caught in a system which they were just born into and seems to be 'just there'. But exceptional people, like Thomas Aquinas, might decide to devote their life to reason and seek to know what lies beyond the immediate given. A system is useful for coordinating efforts towards a particular goal, if all of those who participate in the activities are rewarded by the results. Whether it was there when you first became conscious of being alive or whether it is a recently bright idea, if it does not bring satisfactory results & returns, what could it make sense to suffer it? You may not have a choice initially about the system within which you find yourself, but you will be led to the felt need to make alternative choices by your unhappiness with it; you will have to decide what to do about it - stay or go, improve or tear down? You will have to think about what you depend upon (or whom) for the realization of your requirements or desires (something the Bengalis realized subconsciously), and you will have to take a measure of your happiness/disatisfaction and try to determine what will work better. Covertly or otherwise. Blanc I really don't mean to prolong a discussion which lies so far away from the list topics; I do think, however, that there are reasons for the way things are & the way things work, and the better grasp that one has of these reasons, the better that one can compute regarding the right actions to take or the judgements which one will bring to bear upon the actions of others as they affect oneself.

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There's no general right to privacy -- get over it, from Netly (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 12 Jun 1997 18:58:37 -0400 > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > Subject: There's no general right to privacy -- get over it, from Netly > likes to say "Privacy is not an absolute right, but a > fundamental right." But in truth, privacy is not a > right but a preference: Some people want more of it > than others. A right is not a question of popularity or amplitude, it is a question of existance. It is or it isn't. Some people want more guns than others (obvious even to you) so you seriously hold that there is no fundamental Constitutional right to own firearms? Or speech, we don't all want to use it to the same amount, we therefore don't have a right to free speech? Or (oh my god!) crypto, we don't all want to use it to the same degree therefore we don't have a right to use crypto? Serious boo-boo. I hope it ain't gone to print yet... ____________________________________________________________________ | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Quadratic residues
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C. Maya's wee-wee is so tiny that only his mommy is allowed to touch it. __o _ \<_ Timmy C. Maya (_)/(_)

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Responses to "there's no general right to privacy"
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

************** Date: Thu, 12 Jun 1997 19:27:45 -0400 From: Barney Wolff <barney(a)databus.com> > Date: Thu, 12 Jun 1997 18:58:25 -0400 > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)pathfinder.com> > > ... But in truth, privacy is not a > right but a preference: Some people want more of it > than others. Free speech is not a right but a preference. Some people want more of it than others. Because your job would be easier if there were less privacy, we all should suffer? Consider yourself flamed. Barney Wolff <barney(a)databus.com> ************** Date: Thu, 12 Jun 1997 22:43:59 -0400 From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic(a)well.com> To: declan(a)well.com, fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu At 6:58 PM -0400 6/12/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: >************** > >http://pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,1050,00.html > >The Netly News >June 12, 1997 > >Privacy? What Privacy? >by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) > > I have a confession to make: Unlike many of my >civil libertarian colleagues, I believe you have no >general right to privacy online. I endorse Declan's comments here, and most of what he says about privacy -- in particular that there is no general (read "universally applicable") right to privacy. There are, however, some particular rights to privacy in the United States that are worth maintaining and protecting into the next century. As against the government, these include (but are not limited to) one's 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendment rights that limit what the government can do to violate your privacy. As against other individuals and private entities, these include (but are not limited to) the rights protected under the invasion-of-privacy torts, and the restrictions on private companies' secondary use of transactional data. These carveouts from the general presumption articulated by Declan are generally supported by the American public, and have been reasonably well harmonized with First Amendment law. And they've stood the test of time. Most privacy advocates I know, when they're talking about privacy, are talking about these carveouts -- both as they exist now and as they will need to evolve in the decades to come. It should be noted that efforts like the EFF-originated ETrust program (now called Trust-E thanks to a trademark dispute) are not based on "rights," but on the creation of incentives to inform the public about the use of their personal information. As such, they sidestep the "right to privacy" discussion altogether. Which is probably just as well, given the quasi-theological taste such legal discussions tend to have. --Mike ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 'Indeed, the Government's asserted "failure" of the Internet rests on the implicit premise that too much speech occurs in that medium, and that speech there is too available to the participants. This is exactly the benefit of Internet communication, however. The Government, therefore, implicitly asks this court to limit both the amount of speech on the Internet and the availability of that speech. This argument is profoundly repugnant to First Amendment principles.' --Judge Stewart Dalzell, ACLU v. Reno. Mike Godwin, EFF Staff Counsel, can be reached at mnemonic(a)eff.org or at his office, 510-548-3290. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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