- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: TCM: mafia as a paradigm for cyberspace
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:43 PM 5/18/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >what amazes me about people who tend to have a warped mindset is that >they think new technology, such as cyberspace, creates a new morality. >suddenly murdering, violence, drug dealing, or whatever are supposedly >thrust into some new reality in which old rules no longer apply. >you and Jim Bell are unbelievably similar, as much as either of you >would hate to admit it. I resent that implication! Tim May is always far more restrained, introspective, controlled, and cautious than I. He approaches the subject of cyber-anarchy with nervous concern, I'm the one who jumps in with unrestricted glee. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Rumor: DSS Broken?
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 19 May 96 at 21:48, Tim Dierks wrote: [..] > PPS - Any chance the original rumor surrounded RCA/Hughes' DSS satellite TV > system, and not the Digital Signature Standard, and we've all been barking > up the wrong tree? Hm. Check the cable/satellite tv newsgroups. Rob. --- No-frills sig. Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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WELCOME TO THE NEW ROMAN EMPIRE
by qut＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> On Sat, 18 May 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: > > > It was understandable to be poor when all the world was poor. It is > > understandable to be poor in those nations today that make the > > accumulation of wealth a crime for most people. It is not understandable > > to be poor (for long) in the US where one can reliably get out of poverty > > simply by doing three simple things: > > > > 1) get a high school diploma EVERYONE GETS A HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA --> HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMAS BECOME WORTHLESS EVERYONE GETS A PHD --> PHDS BECOME WORTHLESS > > 2) get married EVERYONE GETS MARRIED --> MARRIAGE BECOMES SPIRITUALLY BANKRUPT > > 3) get any job EVERYONE GETS A JOB --> EVERYONE TAKES THE PAYCUT > > Only about 2 tenths of 1% of those who satisfy those three requirements > > incomes below the official poverty line. HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE TENS OF MILLIONS IN APPALACHIA WHO GRADUATED MARRIED AND WORK IN POVERTY > > Like most libertarians, I dislike the government. I don't care what a > > person's income is. When I was self-supporting on an income of $200 a > > month in 1979, I was below the poverty level for a single person myself. > > I am not enamored of the rich or poor members of the dependendant classes > > of course. IT DOESNT MATTER WHAT THE GOVERNMENT IS DOING WRONG ITS BRAIN IS BUSINESS > > I try and keep in mind that 80-90% of the "take" in government > > programs for the "poor" goes to unpoor government employees. IT DOESNT MATTER WHAT THE GOVERNMENT IS DOING WRONG ITS BRAIN IS BUSINESS > > DCF > > > I've done all these things - and rather more in the way of education. But > while I don't fall on or near the poverty line, I'm still poor as a church > mouse. What am I doing wrong? YOUR WHITE LIKE THE 100000000S SUFFERING IN POVERTY IN THE NEW ROMAN EMPIRE > Sean Gabb.

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 18 May 96 at 13:06, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > >> 2. there is no good way to deal with spams or other so-called "abuse" > > > > Nor should there be. What's one person's abuse is another person's > >free speech. Internet traffic should not be censored based on contents. > > pardon me, but a rather shallow response. [stuff i kind of agree with deleted] I have my own mini-solutions... for personal mail, I use a kill file. For Usenet (when I'm really stuck with too much free time and actually read it) FreeAgent and Agent have some ignore thread/kill-file abilities (my setup only retrieves headers... so I have that luxury for now). How to deal with the problem as an admin is an entirely different story. Solutions? --- No-frills sig. Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: Fingerprinting annoyance
by jpps＠voicenet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Senator Exon wrote: > ... i just need a working method. Clorox can take them off. Applied sparingly it could be used to obsure portions of the whorls. jps -- Jack P. Starrantino jpps(a)voicenet.com http://www.voicenet.com/~jpps

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Re: Rumor: DSS Broken?
by Tim Dierks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:41 PM 5/18/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >>I was talking to someone who was talking to someone (have I said this is a >>rumor yet?) who was solicited for comment by a Very Famous Reporter about >>the fact that DSS, the Digital Signature Standard, promulgated by NIST, I >>believe, had been broken. > >MD5 is at least weakened, maybe broken; there's an abstract by Hans Dobbertin >that says something about generating collisions, and gives an example DSS uses SHA, which isn't affected by the Dobbertin finding. I believe that you would have to solve the discrete logarithm problem to break DSS; this would imply being able to break Diffie-Hellman and a number of other crypto algorithms. (However, I'm not certain that it's been shown that breaking DSS is equivalent to breaking discrete logarithms.) - Tim Tim Dierks - Software Haruspex - tim(a)dierks.org "That's the trouble with technology. It attracts people who have nothing to say." - Muffey Kibbey, mother [Wall Street Journal, May 10 1996]

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

More on what is adding to the current crisis: * Fact: For _most_ people, there is no compelling (or even casual) need for remailers. (No, I'm not arguing against remailers. Just pointing out a basic economic fact, to be factored in.) * Fact: The value of having remailers goes up when certain kinds of activities (which do not yet exist in any significant form) become more available. * Fact: The danger to remailer operators goes up when these kinds of activities become more widespread. (Another way of putting these last two points is this: The more valuable a remailing function is, the more danger or liability a remailer faces.) * Fact: Most remailers are being operated in the United States, and by persons with only casual commitment to their continued operation. ("Casual" should not be construed in a derogatory way.) * Fact: There have been no definitive court rulings in the U.S. clarifying the role of remailers. (In fact, no court cases involving remailers at all, yet.) Until this is decided, remailer sites which appear to be the emanation point (the last link) for the posting of, say, copyrighted material, will find themselves ordered to cease and desist. (The Church of Scientology involvement is beside the point. Brad Templeton of Clarinet would likely do much the same thing if Clarinet-carried articles were being posted to Usenet through remailers. So would "Time," and so, probably, would "Wired." We always knew that _something_ like this would put remailers to a severe test.) Conclusions: - Remailers will continue to disappear as pressures are applied. Absent a basic court ruling that remailer operators are not responsible or liable for what is sent through their sites, they will fall under attack. Once one falls, and a new site is used, it will become the target. - Very few ordinary people use remailers. This will change as remailers continue to get easier to use, but clearly most people feel little need/threat. - Ironically, if some sort of more restrictive regime comes to the fore, and more people feel the need to use remailers (e.g., CDA is upheld and abortion information becomes illegal to send over the Net), then this will make the operators of remailers feel even more heat. Is there an "equilibrium" point in all this, a "market clearing" point at which remailers are badly enough needed, despite threats and pressures, so as to provide a market for them? An interesting question. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RE: The Crisis with Remailers
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Bruce Baugh >hence my comments from here from time to time that the technological >problems of anonymity are not the true obstacle to widespread use. >there are deeper problems that cpunks skirt around but fail to grasp >because of numerous prejudices. While I hate to lend support to anyone as much a twit as Vulis is, he's got a point here. I don't think most cypherpunks realize how anonymity is perceived out in the net at large. ...................................................................... Bruce: Vulis is not the twit who wrote that paragraph. Vulis is not Vlad. Vulis: "Vlad" is not Vlad. You all need to go out to LD's web site and refresh your memory. .. Blanc

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Instant Remailers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:38 AM 5/19/96, Mark M. wrote: >It is possible for someone to operate an anonymous remailer anonymously. >Just get a UNIX shell account under a fake name, pay with cash, and set up >the remailing software. The identity of the operator of such a remailer >would be difficult, if not impossible, to discover. I'm always surprised that this hasn't been happening; maybe it will when the new clients become available. (Doesn't Sameer's system offer such accounts? Couldn't there be dozens of remailers based at c2.org? Of the 16 Type-1 remailers listed in one of Raph's recent reports, only 2 were at c2.org.) Now, can a site which "offers" such accounts be held liable? If the site drops an account when presented with _appropriate_ legal papers (a court order, such as an injunction), and if it takes a "hands-off" policy with respect to what customers run in their accounts, then it ought to be safe from actual liability. (I am not a lawyer, but it seems that having no prior knowledge of acts committed, and complying with court orders, reduces the likelihood of successful suits to near zero. Note that Netcom did _not_ cancel the COS-related accounts, and so extended its legal hassles.) The advantage of "pliable" remailers (which go away when hit) is that: Cost of preparing case to stop a remailer >> cost of setting up a new remailer Thus, it might cost the Church of Scientology $10,000 in various fees to get "account42666(a)c2.org" to stop remailing, but only $20 (or even less) to create "account98410(a)c2.org." Ideally, such remailers should require no involvement at all by the account holder. Just a "start" command, by the account holder. (Not the site administrator, as this could be construed as involvement by him.) But an "instant remailer" (just add water) is needed. Recent questions here on the list about what it takes to run a remailer may mean some advice is needed. Running a remailer function should never be thought of as being the same as running a site. Most of the existing remailers are certainly not being run on machines _owned_ by those running the remailers. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Interactive Week exclusive - White House to launch "Clipper III"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bottom Line: In a way, I am hoping that "Clipper III" is proposed, as it will energize us once again. Historically, the "Cypherpunks antibodies" have had their most vigorous growth when faced with a government antigen. At 8:09 PM GMT 5/18/96, Will Rodger wrote: >The White House is about to answer recent attempts to liberalize encryption >exports with a proposal of its own. > >Documents obtained by Interactive Week show the Ciinton Administration has >been lobbying key Republican committee members to compromise on encryption >through a policy that looks very much like previous commerical key escrow >efforts. ... >The URL for the complete article is: >http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/daily/960518y.html > >Will Rodger >Washington Bureau Chief >Interactive Week Many thanks to Will for passing this on the Cypherpunks list. Our opposition to Clipper I and Clipper II was strong and, I expect, will continue with CIII. A question for Will Rodger: Is this "White Paper" ("The newest proposal is contained in a 24-page White Paper, a draft of which hit Capitol Hill earlier this week") related in any way to the one being prepared by Herb Lin and a bunch of other folks? It was due out about this time, and the topic seems similar. A bunch of us gave input to Herb and his panel at the CFP in '95...if this is the same White Paper, looks like we might just as well have saved our breath. I read the stuff at the URL, and at first blush it looks to say nothing about _domestic_ (within the U.S. and Canada) encryption. I'll be anxious to see what the White Paper says about domestic encryption. (To be clear, there are currently _no_ laws whatsoever about the types of crypto a citizen (or resident alien, or, for all intents and purposes, anyone) may use, nor about the key length, nor about any form of GAK, etc. Even Clipper I did not actually mandate allowable forms of crypto, though many of us thought that this was the desired end-state, down the road. So, I am tentatively assuming that Clipper III, if passed, will not diretly impinge on domestic encryption policy, about which the government currently says nothing.) However, as with other proposed crypto laws and "trial balloons," there are several questions which arise: 1. Will there be pressures put on the browser companies (Netscape, Microsoft, etc.) and the e-mail companies (Qualcomm, Microsoft, Claris, Lotus, etc.) to produce a "world version" that meets export standards with a single shrink-wrapped package? (Recall that last fall some of the various companies stated as their goal having a single package that could be shipped worldwide. Some of them claimed having two versions, a domestic U.S. version and an international version, was too onerous. I am skeptical of this, given that they have multiple platforms to support, multiple operating systems, etc. But they claim it is.) 2. Interoperability. How will U.S. users exchange messages with international users? Will a U.S. user have to register with the Authorities to get the proper credentials, protocols, etc.? Will the U.S.-sold versions of Netscape or Explorer, for example, contain the international GAKed versions for use with international users? 3. With products like PGP, there are already international users (lots of them). Thus, no "export laws" are involved. So, will I be able to communicate with them using my existing PGP methods? (If not, then my right to use an encryption product is in fact being limited, contrary to the putative wording of what Clipper III is supposed to be. To make this clear, I'm _already_ communicating with PGP, so no "export version" is needed.) And if U.S. users can continue to interoperate with international users as they are now doing, this puts the lie to claims about how key escrow will be useful for law enforcement. 4. And of course there is always the issue of _superencryption_. How a GAKked program can detect that superencryption is being used has never been adequately explained (to my satisfaction at least). Entropy measures won't do it, and forbidding any encryption of messages already containing "BEGIN PGP" will clearly just be a klugey bandaid. 5. What about U.S.-based corporations with offshore offices? Is a company supposed to replace its entire intranet corporate network with a GAKked system if even a single user is outside the U.S.-Canada? (I fear that this is indeed the proposal. The effect will then be to make all corporations GAKked.) 6. What about U.S. persons travelling abroad? 7. What about packets zinging around the world? Lots of complications if GAK is insisted upon. And lots of new avenues for "packet laundering." 8. The issue of why other countries would insist that their citizens GAK their keys when U.S. citizens don't have to!! ("Yes, Herr Glomlutz, we are insisting that all Germans using Netscape 4.0 must deposit their keys mit der Key Authority. No, we are not requiring our own citizens to do this." I don't think this will fly too well.) I can't see how other countries will go along with this. And what about the usual problem of "rogue nations" like Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Israel, and Liberia? 9. Many other issues. (They never answered the similar questions raised the last time, so I doubt they will this time.) Clipper III, if it turns out to be another worthless proposal which is laughed out of Washington, will be no real threat. If Clipper III actually outlaws or places limits on domestic use of crypto (as I think it must, else it can be too easily circumvented completely), then it will be a rallying cry which will likely see our membership increase still further, the anti-Washington rhetoric escalate, and likely some new developments in the war. In a way, I am hoping that "Clipper III" is proposed, as it will energize us once again. Historically, the "Cypherpunks antibodies" have had their most vigorous growth when faced with a government antigen. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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