- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: AT&T bans anonymous messages
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:35 PM 6/25/96, Hal wrote: >The wording of this restriction is a bit ambiguous. Technically if I >choose to resend someone else's mail I am not transmitting it anonymously >or under a false name, especially if I make clear what I have done. >He is anonymous, not I. .... >If I run an anonymous remailer on my home PC, connecting to WorldNet to >download the mail, decrypt it, scramble it, and re-send it under my name >but with a disclaimer attached telling what I have done, I have not >posted or transmitted anything anonymously or under a false name. The >source of the material I choose to transmit, as long as it is legal, is >not something under AT&T's control. I agree with Hal's points, but I suspect that these technicalities will be ignored when the first _complaint_ reaches the DeathStar's administrators. "Your account has been cancelled." I suspect other major ISPs will adopt similar language, absent a vocal lobbying group for anonymous messaging capabilities. On the other hand, what happens to the AT&T customers who are using anonymous message services for the "politically correct" uses? Namely, to post messages to rape support groups, child-abuse groups (so-called "survivors," in modern PC parlance), and homosexuality groups? Will AT&T cancel their accounts for hiding under a veil of pseudoanonymity? (Or just require that their identity be "escrowed"?) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: domain name zapping threat by Internic
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Washington Post, June 25, 1996. Domain Delinquents Get Day's Reprieve Firm Delays Suspension of Internet Service to Process Flood of Fees By David S. Hilzenrath The Herndon company that assigns the basic addresses on the Internet said yesterday it would delay until this evening a plan to cut off the service of address holders who haven't paid the required fees. Network Solutions Inc., which registers addresses under an arrangement with the federal government, had planned to cut off the delinquents yesterday, but postponed the action as it processed a flood of last-minute payments. The cutoffs involve about 10,000 of 400,000 "domain" names -- the portion of the Internet address that follows the "@" symbol -- whose holders have not paid Network Solutions a $100 registration fee. Network Solutions spokesman David Gravff said the company would suspend service for those domain holders that had not paid by 5 p.m. on Sunday. The service of those who pay between that time and tonight will be suspended, but the company will soon reinstate it. The cutoff involves domain holders that registered their addresses between Sept. 14, when Network Solutions began charging new users, and Feb. 28. Domain names may be held by companies, universities, individuals, government agencies or other organizations, and a single domain name might be used by many people. People using domain names that are suspended would not be able to receive electronic mail. Similarly, people would not be able to connect to World Wide Web sites using suspended domains. The company two weeks ago estimated that 25,000 domain names would be suspended, but it reduced the total as last-minute payments arrived. The company will wait 60 days before reissuing the suspended domain names to new users, giving delinquent users another chance to pay and reclaim them, Graves said. ----- For More Information: Is your domain name available? Find out by visiting The Post's site on the World Wide Web at: http://www.washingtonpost.com [End]

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Appology
by chris.liljenstolpe＠SSDS.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings, I appologize for copying the whole list on my letter to Bruce. I just changed mailers and the meaning of r and R have been reversed :( -=Chris -- ( ( | ( Chris Liljenstolpe <Chris.Liljenstolpe(a)ssds.com> ) ) (| ), inc. SSDS, Inc; 8400 Normandale Lake Blvd.; Suite 993 business driven Bloomington, MN 55437; technology solutions TEL 612.921.2392 FAX 612.921.2395 Fram Fram Free! PGP Key 1024/E8546BD5 FE 43 BD A6 3C 13 6C DB 89 B3 E4 A1 BF 6D 2A A9

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Re: AT&T bans anonymous messages
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:46 AM 6/25/96 -0700, Rich Graves wrote: >On Mon, 24 Jun 1996, WorldNet User wrote: >> (ii) Members may not post or transmit any message >> which is libelous, defamatory or which discloses >> private or personal matters concerning any person. >> Members may not post or transmit any message, >> data, image or program which is indecent, obscene >> or pornographic. >> >> http://www.worldnet.att.net/care/terms/#oppol > >"Discloses private or personal matters concerning any person"? I guess any >discussion of political figures is out. Hell! My email to my family is also ruled out. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Tales from the UK: Basel Part IV
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Received: from toad.com [140.174.2.1] by alcor.process.com > with SMTP-OpenVMS via TCP/IP; Tue, 25 Jun 1996 11:11 -0400 > Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id HAA10621 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Tue, 25 Jun 1996 07:04:53 -0700 (PDT) > Received: from mailhost.IntNet.net (mercury.IntNet.net [198.252.32.180]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with SMTP id HAA10616 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Tue, 25 Jun 1996 07:04:46 -0700 (PDT) > From: winn(a)Infowar.Com > Received: from 198.252.40.157 by mailhost.IntNet.net (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) > id KAA24757; Tue, 25 Jun 1996 10:06:02 -0400 > Date: Tue, 25 Jun 1996 10:06:02 -0400 > Message-Id: <199606251406.KAA24757(a)mailhost.IntNet.net> > MIME-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type: text/plain > Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > Subject: Tales from the UK: Basel Part IV > To: Nmunro(a)access.digex.net > X-Mailer: SPRY Mail Version: 04.00.06.17 > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > June, 1996: Basel, Switzerland > More on the London Attacks: Part IV winn writes: [...] > The perpetrator(s) would first place a call to the upper management of the > intended victim announcing his/her intention. "We will take down your bank (or > financial organization) unless you pay us a lot of money not to." > > The intended victims each sluffed off the threats. Shortly thereafter (within a > day or two) their financial systems would seemingly collapse for no reason at > the prescribed time and as promised by the caller. Banking services and/or > trading would come to a halt, for about an hour or so, and then the affected > systems would come back on line. Backups were ineffective; typical disaster > recovery methods, I was told, just didn't work. [...] > I was told unequivocally that all of the four attacks used the same methodology: > malicious software was somehow injected into the systems but neither was either > forthcoming or knowledgeable about the specifics. They specifically denied that > HERF techniques were used. But many questions remained, and I was unsuccessful > at getting what I would call good answers to these and more queries: > > - Which systems were affected exactly? > - How were the backup/redundancies disconnected? > - Exactly what do you mean by remote control? > - Did you ever find the offending software? > - Was it an insider job? > - Was it pure hacking? > - Was is mission critical application software gone awry? > - And so on . . . . [...] > Winn Schwartau - Interpact, Inc. > Information Warfare and InfoSec > V: 813.393.6600 / F: 813.393.6361 > Winn(a)InfoWar.Com I used to work in a major money center bank (late, lamented Irving Trust). I find this account highly improbable, considering the precautions I've seen used in these situations. The only possibility seems to be an inside job, inserting a logic bomb into some crucial piece of software, and then setting it off either through an inside collaborator, or by sending an appropriate message through the system from outside: "if you see a transfer from acct 346769 to 56789 of $3,141,592.65, shut down for an hour". Inserting a bomb like this would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, at IT. Code modifications were always checked by more than one programmer, and an extensive 'backout' mechanism existed which permitted us to go back to older versions of the software in a matter of minutes. Cracking the system from outside is also unlikely - the operational machines had no internet connection, dial in, or connection to our development or administrative lans, nor did they run any of the usual demons through which attacks are made. They were connected only to other parts of the operational system. Even the developers did not have direct access to them - putting on new software involved writing it to a removable HD which was then physically transfered to the operational systems. Only the operators were permitted to touch the consoles of the operational systems. Finally, we maintained a 'hot site' duplicating most of our capability, at a location about 100 miles away, in case of catastrophe. Switching to that would have taken a few hours, but was certainly doable. >Thereafter, a second call would be made to senior executives of the victim >firms, and the extortion demands for payment made again. In these cases, >electronic payments to Switzerland were made, and the monies were then >secreted from their temporary Swiss home within seconds - destined for >places unknown or unannounced. I also find the claim improbable - the Swiss authorities are quite cooperative when there is good reason to beleive a crime is being committed. If it's an inside job, then it's not much of a threat, since each financial institution would need to be penetrated separately. The only way in which this might NOT be an inside job would be if a logic bomb was inserted into some piece of commercial software used by all of the targets, such as a message database. If so, then there is no reason not to identify the package. Until names get named, I'm going to view this story with extreme skepticism. Finally, people may wish to look at the source of the posting. Mr Schwartau is a consultant who makes his living by advising institutions on how to protect themselves against attacks of the type claimed in this story. Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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[Announce] New version of Systemics crypto library for Perl
by Gary Howland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Systemics Cryptix crypto library for Perl is now available for download at http://www.systemics.com/software/ Apart from much tidying up, there have been several signigicant additions to the library, include a Blowfish implementation, RSA encryption (including key generation routines), CFB and CBC block cipher mode modules, and a cryptographically secure random stream generator. This library is not currently on CPAN, since several modules are not in a suitable state for CPAN distribution. However, if anyone can rectify this, then we are happy to place them on CPAN. Enjoy! P.S. - PGP library on it's way soon (hopefully this weekend!) CRYPTIX LIBRARY FOR PERL (V1.1) _________________________________________________________________ Description This library contains a suite of cryptographic and mathematical modules for Perl. Many of the more CPU intensive algorithms have been implemented in C as Perl extensions. Features Perl extensions All of the following have been implemented as Perl extensions in C: * Crypt::Blowfish module (Blowfish implementation by A.M. Kuchling). * Crypt::DES module (DES implementation by Eric Young). * Crypt::IDEA module. * Crypt::MD5 module (based on an implementation by Neil Winton and Data Security, Inc.) * Crypt::SHA module (based on an implementation by Uwe Hollerbach and based on code from NIST and Peter C. Gutmann) * Math::BigInteger module (based on code from Eric Young). This module implements arbitrary length integers and some associated mathematical functions. * Math::PRSG - Pseudo random sequence generator This module implements a 160 bit LFSR for use in generating pseudo random sequences. * Math::TrulyRandom module, based on code from Don Mitchell and Matt Blaze (AT&T). This module generates "truly random" numbers, based on interrupt timing discrepancies. Perl modules All of the following have been implemented in Perl: * Crypt::CBC module This module implements CBC block cipher mode. * Crypt::CFB module This module implements CFB block cipher mode. * Crypt::CSRandomStream module This module implements a cryptographically secure random stream. It implements the Stream::DataInput interface. * Crypt::DES3EDE module This module implements triple DES (EDE mode). * Crypt::HashMD5 This module implements an MD5 hash, which derives from Crypt::MessageDigest. * Crypt::HashSHA This module implements an SHA hash, which derives from Crypt::MessageDigest. * Crypt::MessageDigest This module implements the Crypt::MessageDigest base class. * Crypt::RSAKey This module implements the RSA key base class. * Crypt::RSAKeyGen This module is used for the generation of RSA key pairs. * Crypt::RSAPublicKey This module implements an RSA public key, which derives from Crypt::RSAKey. * Crypt::RSASecretKeyPair This module implements an RSA public/secret key pair, which derives from Crypt::RSAKey. * Math::MPI module This module implements the reading and writing of Philip Zimmermans MPI format large integers. * Math::PseudoRandomStream module This module implements a pseudo random data stream. It implements the Stream::DataInput interface. * Math::Random module This module contains a collection of various random number routines. * Math::TestPrime module This module is used to test the primality of an instance of Math::BigInteger. * Stream::DataEncoding * Stream::DataInput * Stream::DataOutput * Stream::FileInput * Stream::FileOutput * Stream::Streamable * Stream::StringInput * Stream::StringOutput Copyright This library includes (or is derived from) software developed by (and owned by) the following: * Peter C. Gutmann * Uwe Hollerbach &ltuh(a)alumni.caltech.edu> * A.M. Kuchling * Don Mitchell and Matt Blaze (AT&T) * NIST * RSA Data Security, Inc. * Neil Winton &ltN.Winton(a)axion.bt.co.uk> * Eric Young &lteay(a)mincom.oz.au> Other parts of the library are covered by the following licence: Copyright (c) 1995, 1996 Systemics Ltd (http://www.systemics.com/) All rights reserved. This library and applications are FREE FOR COMMERCIAL AND NON-COMMERCIAL USE as long as the following conditions are adhered to. Copyright remains with Systemics Ltd, and as such any Copyright notices in the code are not to be removed. If this code is used in a product, Systemics should be given attribution as the author of the parts used. This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software must display the following acknowledgement: This product includes software developed by Systemics Ltd (http://www.systemics.com/) THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY SYSTEMICS LTD ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be copied and put under another distribution licence [including the GNU Public Licence.] _________________________________________________________________

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Re: Appology
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jun 25, 1996 21:14:56, 'chris.liljenstolpe(a)SSDS.com (Christopher Liljenstolpe)' wrote: >... the meaning of r and R have been reversed Way it is, Chris, The motherfucking Best and Brightest did that to us all time in Nam, granting us a few days to stumble around fuck-you-GIs-it-ain't-our-war Aussieland, with a few stolen hours layover, hungover puking up poison, in Thailand, then back to eating their Ivy League shit sandwiches. There it is, live with it -- or frag their pasty asses back to the stoned age.

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Re: Zimmermann's Senate testimony
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:39 AM 6/25/96 -0700, Philip Zimmermann wrote: >Testimony of Philip R. Zimmermann to >the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space >of the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and >Transportation 26 June 1996 >The government has a track record that does not inspire confidence >that they will never abuse our civil liberties. The FBI's >COINTELPRO program targeted groups that opposed government >policies. They spied on the anti-war movement and the civil >rights movement. They wiretapped Martin Luther King's phone. >Nixon had his enemies list. And then there was the Watergate >mess. The War on Drugs has given America the world's largest per- >capita incarceration rate in the world, a distinction formerly >held by South Africa, before we surpassed them during the eighties >even when apartheid was in full swing. Recently, we've seen the >images and sounds of the Rodney King beatings, Detective Mark >Fuhrman's tapes boasting of police abuses, and the disturbing >events of the Ruby Ridge case. And now Congress and the Clinton >administration seem intent on passing laws curtailing our civil >liberties on the Internet. At no time in the past century has >public distrust of the government been so broadly distributed >across the political spectrum, as it is today. > >The Clinton Administration seems to be attempting to deploy and >entrench a communications infrastructure that would deny the >citizenry the ability to protect its privacy. This is unsettling >because in a democracy, it is possible for bad people to >occasionally get elected-- sometimes very bad people. Normally, a >well-functioning democracy has ways to remove these people from >power. But the wrong technology infrastructure could allow such a >future government to watch every move anyone makes to oppose it. >It could very well be the last government we ever elect. Yes, the situation is bad, very bad. And yes, I agree that a political system has to have ways to remove bad people. The odd thing is, some of the people who say that are the same ones who get squeamish when a solution is suggested. <sigh> Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: AT&T bans anonymous messages
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How on earth can a service try to stop anonymous dealings. Well.. i can see HOW... because they say their just going to do it. Now.. I know theres such things as the internet task force....etc... Isnt there any groups out there whose _SOLE_ purpose is trying to protect rights in the online community?

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Re: AT&T bans anonymous messages
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> (ii) Members may not post or transmit any message >> which is libelous, defamatory or which discloses >> private or personal matters concerning any person. >> Members may not post or transmit any message, >> data, image or program which is indecent, obscene >> or pornographic. political figures..yep....out. the most recent Oj or whoever joke...out ANY ethnic joke...out. IE yo mam's so black she went to nightschool and they marked her absent..... OUT This cr*p is so unlimited as to what rights of ours it overruns on. Imagine this: a message posted appeals to 34,000 people that read it. 1 person is offended..complains.. Same thing happens again. The person's user access is cancelled. BS? You decide. My opinion is evident =-}

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