- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Dear Cypherpunks /from NHK Clew
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sorry I can't drive the 500 miles to the meeting, but in Los Angeles, the USA's #2 city, there are NO meetings. Sad but true. People in Los Angeles just don't comply with censorship as well as those in the Bay Area, apparently. Anyway, please don't base the whole story on what goes on at the meeting, since the people who show up at the meeting are the ones who most agree with John and Sandy. Do you know what I mean? There's an assumption in the USA, which even the cypherpunks share, that the rogue elements of the government are to be considered "innocent until proven guilty", even after the fact when they are caught and never prosecuted. Someday, when we have enough research data on this current series of events, we will be able to expose the money trail which demonstrates the motivations of the "list" owners. In the meantime, I trust you'll not be taken in by the sweet-talk you'll get in San Francisco. Sh.Hanabusa wrote: > We are a film crew from NHK, Japanese Public Television (Japan's largest > TV network). As you may have all seen the announcement posting, we would > like to attend tomorrow's CP physical meeting for filming. > We consider the "Crypto War" you are all fighting, not only a U.S domestic > issue. It is a historic process which would effect the basic order/system > of the global network society for the 21st century. > In the midst of the ongoing changes of the idea of how a nation, a corporation > and an individual ought to be, we would like to portray your assertions and > proposals through the discussions of tomorrow's CP meeting, demonstrations, > speeches and booings(just kidding..). > We assure you all that we will do our best not be of your distractions. > (I know you won't, but) I hope you don't show up with a tie and a three > piece suit just because you'll be on TV... ;-) > We look forward to the usual (or perhaps more than ever) Cypherpunkish > meeting tomorrow!

1 0

The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
by Against Moderation 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Well, folks, tonight I have witnessed the frightening dangers of moderation and censorship first-hand, and would like to tell you what has happened. I think there is an important lesson to be learned from these incidents. Before I explain what has happened, I want to make one thing absolutely clear. Though I've thought the moderation of cypherpunks was a terrible idea from the start and am even more convinced of it now, I don't assign any blame to Sandy. I believe he offered to moderate the list with the best of intentions, and I sincerely appreciate his efforts to try to revive what was once a fantastic mailing list, even if in my opinion those efforts have backfired. Sandy has been a valuable advocate of cypherpunk beliefs and a lively contributor to cypherpunks list for a long time. Though the moderation experiment has resulted in some terrible consequences, we can't blame him for what has happened. If the events I have witnessed tonight occured with such a high-standing member of the cypherpunks community in charge, the cause of them can only be the very nature of moderation and censorship. I don't think any of us could have done much better in Sandy's shoes. Now, what happened tonight? As some of you may recall, a month or so ago I vehemently argued against the elimination of the cypherpunks-unedited mailingt list. Some people (though no one associated with toad.com) were claiming that 3 mailing lists might be too much load, and that having cypherpunks and cypherpunks-flames would be enough. I argued that not only would the delay of waiting for a decision put alternate cypherpunks moderators at a disadvantage, it would make it farm more difficult to convince people of the moderator's honesty as there would be no guarantee that messages made it to either list. Fortunately, cypherpunks-unedited did get created (it seems no one "in charge" ever intended not to create it). Well, as it turns out, a number of messages have made it neither to cypherpunks nor to cypherpunks-flames. Making matters worse, however, not only are certain messages being suppressed from both lists, but even messages mentioning that fact get suppressed from both the cypherpunks and the cypherpunks-flames lists! Here's exactly what happened. I was beginning to believe that Dmitri Vulis had sent an (admitedly objectionable) message to the cypherpunks mailing list, but that the message had gone to neither the cypherpunks nor the cypherpunks-flames lists. Since I was under the impression that every article was supposed to go to one list or the other, and many people probably still believe that, I mentioned this somewhat startling fact on the cypherpunks mailing list, I believe in response to a post by Tim May on the same subject. Tim replied (in a message Cc'ed to cypherpunks--though I don't think it went anywhere but to -unedited), asking me in the message, "Can you send to the list, with a copy to me, the articles CENSOREDCENSOREDCENS OREDCENSOREDCENSORE?" I therefore went back through my mail archives and found a copy of the message that I believed had gone to neither mailing list. I sent it to Tim and to cypherpunks. I prepended a few paragraphs in which I asked people to confirm that the message had gone to neither mailing list. Among other things in those paragraphs, I stated that Vulis's message was "verifiably false". It was clear from the context that I was forwarding this message to ask people which lists it had gone to, not because I believed the content to be correct or even at all convincing or interesting. That message I sent, quoting Vulis's, immediately follows this message, after the line '========'. Then, tonight, I received a message from Sandy, which I include below a second '========' marker. In that letter, Sandy had explicitly aknowledged not only that he had sent Vulis's letter to neither mailing list, but that he wouldn't send my letter to either mailing list, either! He claimed that he couldn't forward Vulis's message because it was libel, and accused me of committing libel simply by quoting Vulis's message, even though I explicitly stated that Vulis's message was verifiably false. Well, this travesty must exposed, even if I can't make known all the details for fear of libel charges. I am therefore forwarding everything I can to the cypherpunks mailing list, for all to see. As you can see, Vulis made unfounded and incorrect charges that a particular system contained a security hole. Believe me, if I could get into the details of the case I could convince you easily that his claim is not true. However, since even quoting that claim apparently opens me up to charges of libel, I can't give you the details. Thus, I have censored (by overriting original text with the letters CENSORED) any portion of quoted messages that might give you an indication of what system Vulis actually claimed had a security hole. This censorship should not, however, affect my main point, and the lesson that I hope we can all take away from this. When it comes down to it, the details of this case do not matter. What does matter is that even when the "good guys" attempt benign censorship, it can have frighteningly far-reaching effects on people's ability to discuss otherwise reasonable topics such as the mechanics of the cypherpunks list. I generally dislike censorship and moderation, but the consequences of the cypherpunks experiment have gone far beyond anything I could have imagined. In closing, let me reiterate that I don't think most of this is Sandy's, John's, or anyone else's fault. Given the knowledge I have of this case, I believe Sandy has unwittingly found himself ensnarled in a nasty legal situation where, for fear of legal reprisal he must block articles that he has a moral obligation to send to cypherpunks-flames. I certainly don't envy his position. [To moderator Sandy: I believe we must get the content of this message to the main cypherpunks mailing list. I have done everything I can to ensure that the message contains no libel. If, for some reason, you still can't send it on to the main cypherpunks mailing list, can you please tell me specifically which parts cause problems. I will the CENSOR them out and try again. This message contains important, highly relevant information for the cypherpunks community. Please help me do what it takes to get it accepted by the moderation process. Thanks.] ======== To: tcmay(a)got.net CC: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Chain: nym=antimod In-reply-to: <v03007802af21505d61f5(a)[207.167.93.63]> (tcmay(a)got.net) Subject: Re: Is Sandy really censoring criticisms of CENSORCENSOREDCENSOREDC? Okay, I went through my old mail, and I'm fairly sure this is the message. I'm convinced it never went to the flames list, and now that I've found out I'm on the -unedited list after all, I think it probably didn't go to the regular cypherpunks list either. Can people on the various lists confirm this for me? Given the total lack of technical content, the flamey nature of the article, and the fact that it is verifiably false (CENSOREDCENSOREDC ENSOREDCENSOREDCE), I can see people arguing it should have gone to - -flames (though I would probably disagree). However, I don't want to debate that. What I object to more strongly and think is wrong is the fact that it went to *neither* list. A lot of people out there are subscribing to the cypherpunks-flames and cypherpunks lists thinking that they will see everything that gets rejected (albeit with a substantial delay). If this is not the case, it should be made clear. Otherwise, it's not moderation, but dishonesty. - -- >From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Thu Jan 30 17:26:50 1997 From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) Subject: Security alert!!! To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Thu, 30 Jan 97 16:15:21 EST Organization: Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y. Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id OAA18833; Thu, 30 Jan 1997 14:17:05 -0800 (PST) Received: from uu.psi.com (uu.psi.com [38.9.86.2]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with SMTP id OAA18824; Thu, 30 Jan 1997 14:16:39 -0800 (PST) Received: by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via UUCP; id AA02017 for ; Thu, 30 Jan 97 16:57:10 -0500 Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) via UUCP; Thu, 30 Jan 97 16:19:19 EST for cypherpunks(a)toad.com Comments: All power to the ZOG! Message-Id: <aw5c2D4w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Lines: 19 WARNING: There's a rogue trojan horse out there on the internet CENSOREDCENS OREDCENSOREDCENSOREDCEN. It's actually a hacked-up version of CENSOR with a backdoor, which allows hackers (or whoever knows the backdoor) to steal credit card numbers and other confidentil information on the Internet. Be careful! Always use encryption. Do not send confidential information 9such as passwords and credit card numbers) to any site running the trojan horse CENSOREDCENS. In general, beware of "snake oil" security products and hacked-up versions of free software. Please repost this warning to all relevant computer security forums. - --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps ======== X-From: sandfort(a)crl.com Sat Feb 08 00:56:23 1997 Date: Fri, 7 Feb 1997 16:45:31 -0800 (PST) From: Sandy Sandfort <sandfort(a)crl.com> To: Against Moderation <antimod(a)nym.alias.net> Subject: Re: Is Sandy really censoring criticisms of CENSOREDCENSOREDCENSORE? In-Reply-To: <19970207220720.15530.qmail(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hi, On 7 Feb 1997, Against Moderation wrote: > What I object to more strongly and think is wrong is the > fact that it went to *neither* list. Unfortunately, it's not as simple as that. As soon as I can arrange it with John, I am going to stop moderating the list. In the interim, I *will not* be sending your post onto either the Flames or the Moderated lists. This is done for legal reason. As it is, you have already published a libel on the unedited list by repeating Dimitri's libel. This exposes you to legal liability, but as an anonymous poster, you are somewhat insulated from the consequences of your act. If you would like to PRIVATELY discuss this matter with me, I would not mind going into more detail with you. Suffice it to say, I any re-publication by me of Dimitri's libel would expose John and myself to legal liability and could also act to insulate Dimitri from liability as a result of CENSOREDCENSOREDCE NSOREDCENDOREDCENDOREDC. Take care, S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ======== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMvwBkICHQnqYPZ9VAQGf+gP/cCw3gs23pL36RIi7OTRpZaM8E7D55hVE I7H8VX4u9TdWpPJPw0Q+ZqftRxn2Ancf/6RzqZA03jSnNCqUqkEhrPSTnq4qmZmx M+BGMI/3Y3Gl3Aj7YQhpcQLEaCLMMkQ4ddG5VVujeFwMs8gWt8Zi80aytD5dLenF ykV0cj2DsWs= =ezEz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Re: More on digital postage
by Kent Crispin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jim bell allegedly said: > > > No, you're taking the issue to ridiculous extremes. That's why we have > doors, and locks, etc. And, for that matter, "No trespassing" signs. > > But having an address, and a walkway, and a doorbell is generally considered > if not explicit permission, but at least toleration of the idea that > somebody can walk up and knock on the door, etc. But if someone leans on my doorbell for 4 hours solid, I can call the police and have them carted away. Carried to extremes, it's criminal trespass. > Having a telephone with a > number that anyone can dial is going to result in some level of intrusion. > Having a fax machine is a similar issue, unless technology provides a way to > block unwanted faxes. > > I certainly don't claim that we shouldn't try to do anything about these > limitations! Quite the opposite, technology should be employed to protect > privacy. But faxes are not fundamentally different than telephones, > doorbells, and walkways: They facilitate interaction, even potentially > undesirable interaction. And, just as in the case with my doorbell, when the undesirable interaction gets past some reasonable limit, legal action can be taken. > > Nope. Sure I realize that they _can_, but that doesn't make it right, > >and it doesn't make it legal. > > "Legal" is an arbirary concept; the opposite, "illegal," is merely what some > bunch of brainless legislators get together and disapprove. Arbitrary or not, it has real world consequences. But then most things with real world consequences are arbitrary, unlike libertarian fantasies, which enjoy the luxury of unreality. -- Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited", kent@songbird.com,kc@llnl.gov the thief he kindly spoke... PGP fingerprint: 5A 16 DA 04 31 33 40 1E 87 DA 29 02 97 A3 46 2F

1 0

(fwd) DES challenge organisation
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An announcement forwarded to me (due to being on des-challenge mailing list I think) of proposed organisation for breaking RSADSI's DES challenge. Those interested in participating might wish to join the lists mentioned. In addition the list: des-challenge(a)muffin.org is for discussion of the DES challenge, and can be subscribed to by sending email to majordomo(a)muffin.org. -Adam ====================================================================== Subject: Announcement: Organisation Committee From: ths(a)rz.tu-ilmenau.de (Thomas S.) Date: 15 Feb 1997 18:27:40 +0000 Hi! The six volunteers who answered the call for a committee of management have got together to try to help 'steer' the DES challenge. We have considered the available options of proceeding, and we kindly ask everyone interested in this project to follow our proposals, to avoid waste of efforts. 1. The attempt to break the key will be coordinated. We chose this mainly because we can make a political statement. We don't want it to be a race for money. Each task will be handled by logically separate servers, some of which with be replicated and run as a hierachy. The protocol will use UDP, although there will be gateway servers for other protocols (such as HTTP, SMTP, FAX, etc). We hope that one of the first requests for a key range will be from parties interested in using a "random" approach -- we would appreciate some discussion on how large their ranges should be. 2. There will be one consistent WWW structure for the project. It does not have to managed by a single person. This structure should provide statistics, information for developers, interested users and perhaps even for the press. Several mirrors and translations will be started soon. The starting point is: http://www.des.crypto.org/ [fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk/des/] The url in brackets has to be used till we get the final subdomain. Likewise for the rest of this document. 3. The work of the different groups should be stated and coordinated on the page http://www.des.crypto.org/people.html. [fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk/des/people.html] This is to avoid uncoordinated parallel developmemt. Please write to Thomas S. <webmaster(a)mail.des.crypto.org> [webmaster(a)fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk] if you what want to be mentioned on this page. 3a. Several mailing lists have been set up for the different groups: des-coding for the actual DES routine and optimisation des-networking for the network code and protocol des-www for www contributions and mirrors des-pr for press contact, translations etc (like challenge-pr) des-misc :-) des-announce moderated, important information for users of the client List address: <list>@lists.des.crypto.org [@xtn.net] To subscribe, send mail to majordomo(a)lists.des.crypto.org [@xtn.net] with in the body of the message (several actions allowed): subscribe <list> Achives available (see homepage). 4. The actual DES routine has to be written and optimised. We ask developers to participate and coordinate their efforts using the mailing list des-coding. For obvious reasons, developers outside the USA are prefered, but "publication" of algorithms seems to be a legal way go get around. Please do not use this list to distribute crypto code. 5. The prize money will be split equally between Gutenberg and EFF. There is a possibility of using part of it for stickers or something similar, but don't count on it. We hope to get a working system up and running ASAP. The fact alone that DES is seriously challenged (with a reasonable time frame) should give us quite some publicity (by the time the system is ready). If we can make use of that, we will have significantly more client than for the 48 bit key. The organisation committee: Piete Brooks <Piete.Brooks(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> Jered Floyd <jered(a)mit.edu> Tim Newsome <drz(a)froody.bloke.com> Germano Caronni <caronni(a)tik.ee.ethz.ch> Thomas Roessler <Thomas.Roessler(a)sobolev.rhein.de> Thomas S. <ths(a)fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk>

1 0

Re: Fuck UseNet (fwd)
by Kent Crispin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

E. Allen Smith allegedly said: > > From: IN%"ravage(a)EINSTEIN.ssz.com" "Jim Choate" 15-FEB-1997 07:11:54.43 > > >Perhaps in addition to the X-foo structures we have discussed already we > >might consider adding, > > >X-distrib-policy: foo > > >Where foo might be, > > > Public Domain > > All rights reserved, contact author for redistribution > > Distribution for non-commercial uses permitted > > Refer to authors header > > Copyleft > > etc. > > >or whatever the policy might be for a given remailer. This would > >significantly aid folks in their shopping around. > > The basic difficulty with this idea is that _senders_ generally > don't have much of a choice where the messages go, once you've decided > to accept them. In other words, just because you've decided to accept > a message doesn't mean it suddenly becomes > copyleft/public domain/whatever. Now, if you, say, announced that only > subscribers to your particular list, subscribers to any other lists > adopting the same idea, and those who'd sign a consent agreement could > post through your list, that wouldn't be a problem... although I > suspect you wouldn't get many subscribers. > -Allen That wouldn't be the way it work -- Jim operates one of the cp remailers; I operate another. Jim has a standard policy concerning public domain/copyright that is different than mine. So *I* put an X-distrib-policy header in all the cp mail I forward to him. More precisely, all of my incoming mail for "cypherpunks(a)songbird.com" gets the header. This protocol needs a bit of refinement, and perhaps some hacking at majordomo, but seems fairly straightforward. Jim's policy is actually very reasonable. It has a rational basis, though one might disagree with it, and it is easy to deal with it this way. A more extreme policy -- "The operator of this mailing list claims an exclusive copyright on every piece of mail sent to it; by sending to it you agree to this policy", for example -- would be harder to deal with. -- Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited", kent@songbird.com,kc@llnl.gov the thief he kindly spoke... PGP fingerprint: 5A 16 DA 04 31 33 40 1E 87 DA 29 02 97 A3 46 2F

1 0

Re: (fwd) DES challenge organisation
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:02 PM +0000 2/15/97, Adam Back wrote: >Thomas S <ths(a)fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk> writes: >> [...] >> >> 5. The prize money will be split equally between Gutenberg and EFF. >> There is a possibility of using part of it for stickers or >> something similar, but don't count on it. > >Not a good idea. > >How can this be enforced? The RSADSI DES challenge is open to all >comers, and how do you prove that someone who finds the key found it >through this group effort? > >I have a suspicion many people would be tempted to fill in the RSA >challenge form and email it in themselves. $10,000 is a fair amount >of money. Once again, the advantages of an "uncoordinated search" should be mentioned. An uncoordinated search, in which people randomly search chunks of keyspace is obviously less efficient than a coordinated search where no part of the space is searched two or more times. However, an uncoordinated search is only less efficient by a small factor of two or three, with a 95% probability that the key will be found with an effort "only" 3 times greater than with a coordinated search. (The Poisson probability distribution is what's involved here, and the math is fairly easy to work out.) A 2-4x factor is significant, and may warrant a coordinated search. However, the various problems implicit in coordinated searches are factors, too. Also, an uncoordinated search solves the "prize" problem, as whomever finds the key makes the contact with RSADSI. One of the problems with a coordinated search, if the remaining keyspace to be doled out is publically announced, is that as the keyspace is searched and a key _not_ found, the remaining keyspace is increasingly more tempting for "independent searchers" to search. Sort of the way the odds on some lotteries actually become "acceptable" as the lottery pot grows. The organizer of the coordinated search must then, I surmise, keep the assignments secret and dole out keyspace securely. Having the prize money go to the finder of the key, as opposed to some artificial division between EFF, Gutenberg, etc., is also an incentive for people to contribute more CPU time. --Tim May >I know I would be tempted. I have been running Svend Olaf's DES code, >and my intention in the unlikely event that I hit the key had been to >claim the money. > >How does it hurt the publicity if the actual individual who finds the >key takes the money? Surely it adds excitement to the story? > >In fact it would provide people with a possibly more powerful >incentive to try to break the key in the first place -- in the hopes >of winning the prize! $10,000 means more to a lot of people than >opposing ITAR/EAR, and participating in a technical challenge. To >start with a lot of people who's CPUs we could be using don't even >know what ITAR/EAR are! > >> We hope to get a working system up and running ASAP. The fact alone >> that DES is seriously challenged (with a reasonable time frame) >> should give us quite some publicity (by the time the system is >> ready). If we can make use of that, we will have significantly more >> client than for the 48 bit key. > >I would have thought announcing that $10,000 can be won by running >easy to use windows software on a wide selection of newsgroups would >get you lots of CPUs! > >Adam >-- >print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> >)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc` Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside" We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: (fwd) DES challenge organisation
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thomas S <ths(a)fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk> writes: > [...] > > 5. The prize money will be split equally between Gutenberg and EFF. > There is a possibility of using part of it for stickers or > something similar, but don't count on it. Not a good idea. How can this be enforced? The RSADSI DES challenge is open to all comers, and how do you prove that someone who finds the key found it through this group effort? I have a suspicion many people would be tempted to fill in the RSA challenge form and email it in themselves. $10,000 is a fair amount of money. I know I would be tempted. I have been running Svend Olaf's DES code, and my intention in the unlikely event that I hit the key had been to claim the money. How does it hurt the publicity if the actual individual who finds the key takes the money? Surely it adds excitement to the story? In fact it would provide people with a possibly more powerful incentive to try to break the key in the first place -- in the hopes of winning the prize! $10,000 means more to a lot of people than opposing ITAR/EAR, and participating in a technical challenge. To start with a lot of people who's CPUs we could be using don't even know what ITAR/EAR are! > We hope to get a working system up and running ASAP. The fact alone > that DES is seriously challenged (with a reasonable time frame) > should give us quite some publicity (by the time the system is > ready). If we can make use of that, we will have significantly more > client than for the 48 bit key. I would have thought announcing that $10,000 can be won by running easy to use windows software on a wide selection of newsgroups would get you lots of CPUs! Adam -- print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<mix(a)mix.nymserver.com> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 17 Feb 97 6:46:40 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- wazoo remailer(a)wazoo.com ++++++++*+++ 37:37 100.00% nym config(a)nym.alias.net *#*##**++#*+ 4:23 99.99% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -__.+-..---+ 7:52:03 99.93% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ** *++++++*+ 35:11 99.89% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com .++--.+--- 2:08:12 99.85% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de +++++++++++ 1:06:36 99.77% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ***-* *#+# 4:10 99.62% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de + ++++++ + 1:04:02 99.05% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net #*##*+* **+ 20:23 98.49% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net .++ -- +++ 1:16:02 98.36% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com +++++++ +++ 42:18 98.28% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -------- -- 5:19:42 98.21% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ++++ + -- 2:16:10 97.36% replay remailer(a)replay.com ---+** ---* 1:27:53 88.59% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ## *### *# 1:38 84.09% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ******* ** 8:25 82.44% shaman mix(a)mix.nymserver.com 11:03 22.27% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com *+ 22:42:38 21.62% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

2 1

Re: The Offending Stronghold posts...
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here're wee additions to your archive: I subbed to cp-unedited from the first, so could compare the unedited messages with the edited. Some of mine(*) were edited, including a few on the Stronghold topic. But to me that's not as big a deal as some want to make of it. For example, in response to Tim's request to repost DV's Stronghold ploy, I did so, and it was edited. Sandy sent me a courteous email stating that he was not forwarding the message. I answered that that was okay with me because I thought that DV was using the issue as a ploy to undermine Sandy. Hey, there were no legal or other threats made to me, darn it! Another of my edited messages stated that there had been good discussion on the unedited list about DV's Denial of Service attack on Cypherpunks. Another noted that DV had been admirably successful in drawing others into his fight -- in support and in opposition -- as part of his DoS. Another questioned "Who's Censoring Who?" and offered the opinion that "censorship" rhetorically exaggerated Sandy's moderation. (I still believe that's the case.) For what it's worth, I oppose moderation, but favor experimentation, in the recognition that humans are near-endlessly adaptable and near- uncontrollable no matter what control mechanisms are employed -- anarchy is the norm whether advocated or not. So, I think the moderation experiment was a success, in that it has led to an unexpectedly constructive reconfiguration of Cypherpunks -- and not the last, that's for sure -- and showed that any archy is wishful dreaming of tortured hearts and minds and loins. A one hand applause to Dr. V and archy-demolishers for vibrating the c'punks house the way SATAN did bigger shoddy piles. Two hands to TCM for more memorable quaking of structure-bunkered c'punks and others. ----- * I'll supply copies of messages cited if you like.

1 0

Re: More on digital postage
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:33 PM 2/15/97 -0600, snow wrote: >Mr. May wrote: >> At 11:40 AM -0600 2/15/97, snow wrote: >> > That is a ridiculous argument. The door to my home is connected >> >to the street,m and I know full well that that makes it easy for anyone >> >to come wandering in to my home. Is it legal, just because I have my >> >home hooked to the street, for someone to come in and help themselves to >> >a beer out of my fridge? >> >> The proper parallel is to _knocking on the door_. Talking about "unwanted >> phone calls" or "unwanted faxes" as being equivalent to entering a house >> and wandering around is incorrect. > > With phone calls, yes. With unwanted faxes no. With Phone Calls, >and knocks on the door I have the option of simply not answering. Faxes >(in certain enviroments) you can't do that with. That's a technlogical problem, and deserves a technological solution. > >> Our society fairly reasonably allows tort relief for, say, having one's >> doorbell rung frequently or at odd hours. On the fax issue, similar tort >> relief could be obtained if a person or business was truly "under attack." >> (Purists, like me, would probably prefer technological solutions even in >> these cases. Leave a phone on answering machine mode, only switch on the >> fax mode when a fax is expected, etc.) > > Or simply a societal acceptance of retaliation(sp?) Someone who >constantly wakes you up in the middle of the night, well you just arrange >it so they get no sleep. Well, I've proposed such a system before... >> These tort actions are a far cry from proposals that anyone whose knock on >> the door, or phonecall, or e-mail, or fax is subject to criminal >> prosecution under proposed new laws. >> (I think the courts are already clogged enough, and I have faith that no >> court in the land will accept a case where no real harm was done. A friend >> of mine got mailbombed with 25,000 e-mail messages in one day, shutting >> down his account until the mess could be cleaned up, and it's not even >> likely he'll ever get any relief.) > > I (I think like you) feel that almost no one will get convicted >of these "crimes" unless the attacker simply goes too far. Which is why my first choice is, uh, and alternative method of "justice." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0