- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Spam, and how to stop it.
by Steve Shelby 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Wed Sep 04 08:53:00 1996 Hello all. I assist in running an ISP. We recently had a problem with some of the users massmailing from our server. We would have never known, but someone on CompuServe that didn't like it mailed our support email address. We checked into it, and I called the two people voice. It pretty gratifying to be able to talk to one of these spammer massmailer 'get rich quick' scheme people directly. What I'm looking for is a way to monitor the amount of mail leaving the system per user. I'm not interested in poking into users mail, but I would like the ability to spot other users sending out more than x messages per x minutes. If anyone has any tips on this subject I'd like to hear them. Spam and massmailing is one of the major things that's bogging down the net these days, I believe. Thanks -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMi2Xz/uS3FANHwnlAQFDEAQAgj1ngBhFk1J2IEzmWnPROA5RYPgAnkcN iZPCJ+mnaGppts6MqurCbWv4lPvHZ8Mm6RlMXsPVUCQKu2PsHG6Vmik/3bAZ1D67 V6Zin1bq1027fvsE2i0tbg0t2wWTLgZkFl3JOWxz7nExaLNgM2WNxw3FbgqrnKXa Ufm7YICPH2I= =Hr63 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Learning time for you
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From fiction!squirrel.owl.de!mix(a)golden-gate.owl.de Wed Sep 4 03:05:08 1996 Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) via UUCP; Wed, 04 Sep 96 06:45:37 EDT for dlv Received: from golden-gate.uni-paderborn.de by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; id AA10409 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Wed, 4 Sep 96 03:05:08 -0400 Received: by golden-gate.owl.de (Smail3.1.28.1) from fiction with uucp id <m0uyC04-000JP6C>; Wed, 4 Sep 96 09:03 MET DST Received: by fiction.pb.owl.de id m0uyC1m-00005mC; Wed, 4 Sep 96 09:05 MET DST Return-Path: <mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> Received: (qmail-queue invoked by uid 200); 4 Sep 1996 05:33:42 -0000 Date: 4 Sep 1996 05:33:42 -0000 Message-Id: <19960904053342.25462.qmail(a)squirrel.owl.de> To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com From: Squirrel Remailer <mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> X-Comment1: This message did not originate from the X-Comment2: above address. It was automatically remailed X-Comment3: by an anonymous mail service. Please report X-Comment4: problems or inappropriate use to X-Comment5: <postmaster(a)squirrel.owl.de> Subject: Learning time for you Vulis, your comments include the following: >Comments: Dole/Kemp '96 and you have yelled about Harry Browne enough. LEARN TO SHUT UP! This is a Perrygram. Just can the constant noise for a day 'till I get back to my computer at home, where you are killfiled. Keep it down to a reasonable number of messages a day, or you will see others respond as you do.

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Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:41 PM 9/3/96 -0500, Jon Lebkowsky wrote: >The terms "responsibility" and "accountability" are misused, which is >unfortunate, since I think we'd all argue in favor of taking responsibility >for our speech/actions in a positive sense. The negative is in asking me to >sacrifice my freedom because some few behave irresponsibly. This is like >setting an illogical default, assuming that it's a preventive, but it >prevents nothing. > >Getting beyond this discussion of EFF, has any global entity discussed >making remailers illegal? The Leahy crypto bill introduced early this year made (paraphrasing) "the use of encryption to thwart a law-enforcement investigation illegal." I immediately pointed out that while this wouldn't make _encrypted_ remailers illegal, per se, effectively it would because the moment an investigation (even a phony or trumped-up one) is started and is "thwarted" by the encryption used, the remailer operator became guilty of a crime. True, the USG isn't quite a "global entity" (even though it has a nasty habit of behaving like it!), but along with Europe (which would presumably treaty with USG any such restrictions) it's the next closest thing. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Anonymity
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Speaking of anonymous transactions, a fair trading office in London found that mondex is not truly anonymous (they were claiming it for a while until the complaint was filed by PI director Simon Davies). A couple of docs are available at http://www.privacy.org/pi/activities/mondex/ Dave _________________________________________________________________________ Subject: Anonymity _________________________________________________________________________ David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.epic.org Washington, DC 20003 * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org

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RE: Is Knuth's _AoCP_ still the authority on PRNG?
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

check out "On the Efficient Generation of Cryptographic Confusion and Diffusion Sequences" I may have gotten the title less than perfect. AltaVista will find it for you if you try. Excellent piece. ---------- From: eli+@gs160.sp.cs.cmu.edu[SMTP:eli+@gs160.sp.cs.cmu.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 1996 7:54 PM To: coderpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Is Knuth's _AoCP_ still the authority on PRNG? Bryce writes: >I'm reading Knuth chapter 3 on "random numbers". Have there >been any major advances since the publication of the second >edition of _The Art of Computer Programming, Volume 2_ in 1981? A much-referenced article: Marsaglia, G. (1985). "A current view of random number generation". In L. Billard (ed.), _Computer Science and Statistics: The Interface_. A more recent survey, which I haven't read: L'Ecuyer, P. (1990). "Random numbers for simulation". CACM 87, no. 10, 85-97. I read the resulting _NYT_ blurb, but not the paper: Ferrenberg et al. (1992). "Monte Carlo simulations: Hidden errors from `good' random number generators". Phys. Rev. Lett. 69, 3382-4. This is from the "simulation" angle, which is where Knuth is coming from. For crypto you may be interested in the complexity-theoretic approach (things like Blum-Blum-Shub), which is a whole different field. >Are any of the ideas advocated in chapter 3 now considered >inadvisable? I think the Marsaglia paper sank Knuth's recommended generator. "Sank" is a relative term, of course. -- Eli Brandt eli+(a)cs.cmu.edu

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Save the Howitzers (was Re: The Esther Dyson Flap)
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TCM wrote: >And please spare us the "save the howitzers" comment. We talk about what >concerns us. As it happens, our political opponents don't read our words, >whereas a bunch of EFF board members apparently do, and so our criticisms >here may cause EFF to actually confront the issue of anonymity and decide >where they actually stand. I think Tim's comments are generally on-point. EFF board members are paying attention to discussions on the cypherpunks list and the organization would appear to be moving in a direction that will result in a solid pro-anonymity policy. For reference, EPIC's position is: "Our position is that we strongly support anonymity both for speech and for transactions. The right to anonymous speech is a constitutionally protected right (Tally v. California, McIntrye v Ohio) and we believe that it equally applies in cyberspace. Anonymous transactions are a key way (and perhaps the only way that really works) to provide privacy on the net." CDT's current position is: "CDT believes that anonymous political speech is protected under the first amendment and would oppose any effort to restrict or curtail it on the Net." -Declan

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[NOISE^2] Re: Voting Monarchist?
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 3 Sep 96 at 16:06, David M. Rose wrote: > Dimitri, err, Dr. Vulis, or is that Dr. Nuri?, Well, is astonishlingly sounds the same... Makes me think of a rabbid Det<^h^h^h>Rotweiler. :) jfa

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SecurID White Paper
by Peiter Z 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

SecurID Vulnerabilities White-Paper Due to increased recent interest that has been witnessed on the net about the SecurID token cards and potential vulnerabilities with their use, we offer a white paper on some of the vulnerabilities that we believe have been witnessed and/or speculated upon. This paper is being put forth into the public domain by Secure Networks Incorporated and is available at the following URL : ftp://ftp.secnet.com/pub/papers/securid.ps Topics dealt with in the paper include: . Race attacks based upon fixed length responses (still valid even with the current patch) . Denial of Service attacks based upon server patches . Server - Slave separation and replay attacks . Vulnerabilities in the communications with the ACE Server . A quick analysis of the communications with the ACE Server . Problems with out-of-band authentication We hope this paper provides insight, enlightenment, and is helpful to the security community in general. thanks and enjoy, Secure Networks Inc.

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No Subject
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

patrick b cummings <hack5(a)juno.com> wrote: > their is a new mailing list for all you > hackers > just email your name or handle and e-mail address and youll be subscribed > send information to hack5(a)juno.com k00l d00de.... c'mon Varney, we know its you.

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Re: [NOISE] The Doors
by Medea 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vipul wrote: > >The Doors was not only about freedom and love, but about crypto too! >Notice these lines from the song "Five to One" > >Old [cipher] gets old and young get stronger >May take a week baby, may take longer [to crack] >they've [clinton] got the guns and we've got the numbers >gonna win we will take 'em over, com'on. What?! I think you need to stop ingesting those controlled substances.... Medea ======================================== I wonder whatever happened to Jason....

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