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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
by eli+＠gs160.sp.cs.cmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney writes: >I think the best way to approach this problem is to first try to solve >it assuming there are only two robbers rather than 20. Right. Of course, you're implicitly assuming not only that this bunch of bank robbers is rational, but that they're familiar with mathematical induction. :-> -- Eli Brandt eli+(a)cs.cmu.edu

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Limbaugh and "Soul Train"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:20 PM 7/25/96, Paul S. Penrod wrote: >On Wed, 24 Jul 1996 hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu wrote: >> And why did the networks put Rush on so late? Could it be that >> he did not pull in the viewers? > >Syndicated shows are scheduled by the local broadcasters. They decide >when and if to run them. It only makes sense that if you have control >over your material but are at the mercy of the broadcaster, that is not a >sound business position to remain in. As an interesting point of comparison, the program "Soul Train," featuring predominantly black music, has been in syndication for more than 25 years. And it usually aired late at night. (I learned this by watching a "Best of 'Soul Train'" program on VH1. The show's creator and director pointed out that being on at 11 p.m. or 1 a.m. made it tough for many of the show's fans to watch it.) My point? Controversial material is often shoved to the end of a programming schedule. This makes room for the "Wheel of Fortune" and "Adam-12" shows in prime time. I'm obviously not arguing for regulatory intervention in scheduling, for either Limbaugh or "Soul Train," merely noting that shows with strong-but-limited appeal often find themselves playing second fiddle to "The Dating Game." Yes, I think Limbaugh has "limited" appeal. I watched him a few times. Sometimes funny, often controversial. But mostly for "dittoheads." --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Freeh Testimony 7/25/96
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is the written testimony of FBI Director Freeh before the Senate Commerce Committee on S 1726, the Pro-Code legislation. Freeh called for the adoption of an universal key escrow system that would facilitate law enforcement access.Several Senators were critical of Freeh's testimony and asked why he and the other panelists believed that savy criminals would use escrowed encryption. Others questioned the possibility to any kind of world wide agreement could be reached. Director Freeh admitted in responding to one Senator that he would seek legislation to ban non-escrow cryptography if it were not widely adopted. He said, "we are not at the point yet that volutary is not vialble. At that point, we would look at mandatory controls." He also stated that he would also ask for import controls to be imposed "if the country was flooded with foreign robust encryption." A html version of this document is available at http://www.epic.org/crypto/export_controls/freeh.html ------------ U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Office of the Director Washington, D.C 20535 STATEMENT OF LOUIS J. FREEH DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ON JULY 25, 1996 BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION UNITED STATES SENATE REGARDING IMPACT OF ENCRYPTION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee for providing me with this opportunity to discuss with you an issue of extreme importance and of great concern to all of law enforcement, both domestically and abroad -- the serious threat to public safety posed by the proliferation and use of robust encryption products that do not allow for timely law enforcement access and decryption. First and foremost, the law enforcement community fully supports a balanced encryption policy that satisfies both the commercial needs of industry and law abiding individuals for robust encryption products while at the same time satisfying law enforcement's public safety needs. On the one hand, encryption is extremely beneficial when used legitimately to protect commercially sensitive information and communications. On the other, the potential use of such robust encryption products by a vast array of criminals and terrorists to conceal their criminal communications and information poses an extremely serious and, in my view, unacceptable threat to public safety. Recently, the President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police sent a letter to President Clinton expressing support for a balanced encryption policy that addresses the public safety concerns of law enforcement. Additionally, the National Sheriff's Association enacted a resolution last month also expressing their support for a balanced encryption policy and opposing any legislative efforts that would undercut the adoption of such a balanced policy. Since 1992, when AT&T announced its plan to sell a small, portable telephone device that would provide users with low-cost but robust voice encryption, public policy issues concerning encryption have increasingly has been debated in the United States. Since then, people concerned about privacy, commerce, computer security, law enforcement, national security, and public safety have participated in the dialogue regarding cryptography. On the international front, this past December, the multi-national Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) meeting in Paris, France, convened an Experts Group to draft global cryptography principles, thus reflecting an increased global interest in and concern about the use and availability of encryption that can be used to endanger a nation's public safety and national security. In addition, several Members of Congress have also joined this public discussion by introducing legislation which essentially would remove existing export controls on encryption and which would promote the widespread availability and use of any type of encryption product regardless of the impact on public safety and national security. However, the impact of these bills, should they be enacted, has not been lost on other Members of Congress as reflected in the letters to the sponsors of both Senate encryption bills by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Senators Specter and Kerrey indicated in their letters that they had concerns regarding these bills and expressed the opinion, which I fully endorse, that there is a "... need to balance U.S. economic competitiveness with the need to safeguard national security interests." To that balance, I would also add public safety and effective law enforcement. Without question, the use of strong cryptography is important if the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) is to fulfill its promise. Data must be protected -- both in transit and in storage -- if the GII is to be used for personal communications, financial transactions, medical care, the development of new intellectual property, and a virtually limitless number of other applications. Our support for robust encryption stems from a commitment to protecting privacy and commerce. But we are also mindful of our principal mission responsibilities: protecting America's public safety and national security in the myriad of criminal, terrorist, and espionage cases that confront us every day. Notwithstanding the accepted benefits of encryption, we have long argued that the proliferation of unbreakable encryption -- because of its ability to completely prevent our Nation's law enforcement agencies from understanding seized computer files and intercepted criminal communications which have been encrypted and then being able to promptly act to combat dangerous criminal, terrorist, and espionage activities as well as successfully prosecute them -- would seriously and fundamentally threaten these critical and central public safety interests. The only acceptable answer that serves all of our societal interests is to foster the use of "socially-responsible" encryption products, products that provide robust encryption, but which also permit timely law enforcement and national security access and decryption pursuant to court order or as otherwise authorized by law. Law enforcement is already beginning to encounter the harmful effects of conventional encryption in some of our most important investigations: - In the Aldrich Ames spy case, where Ames was told by his Soviet handlers to encrypt computer file information to them. - In a child pornography case, where one of the subjects used encryption in transmitting obscene and pornographic images of children over the Internet. - In a major drug-trafficking case, where one of the subjects of one of the court-ordered wiretaps used a telephone encryption device which frustrated the surveillance. - Some of the anti-Government Militia groups are now advocating the use of encryption as a means of preventing law enforcement from properly investigating them. It is important to understand, as one can see from the cases I have cited, that conventional encryption not only can prevent electronic surveillance efforts, which in terms of numbers are conducted sparingly, but it also can prevent police officers on a daily basis from conducting basic searches and seizures of computers and files. Without an ability to promptly decrypt encrypted criminal or terrorist communications and computer files, we in the law enforcement community will not be able to effectively investigate or prosecute society's most dangerous felons or, importantly, save lives in kidnappings and in numerous other life and death cases. We simply will not be able to effectively fulfill our mission of protecting the American public. In a very fundamental way, conventional encryption has the effect of upsetting the delicate legal balance of the Fourth Amendment, since when a judge issues a search warrant it will be of no practical value when this type of encryption is encountered. Constitutionally-effective search and seizure law assumes, and the American public fully expects, that with warrant in hand law enforcement officers will be able to quickly act upon seized materials to solve and prevent crimes, and that prosecutors will be able to put understandable evidence before a jury. Conventional encryption virtually destroys this centuries old legal principle. There is now an emerging opinion throughout much of the world that there is only one solution to this national and international public safety threat posed by conventional encryption -- that is, key escrow encryption. Key escrow encryption is not just the only solution; it is, in fact, a very good solution because it effectively balances fundamental societal concerns involving privacy, information security, electronic commerce, public safety, and national security. On the one hand, it permits very strong, unbreakable encryption algorithms to be used, which is essential for the growth of commerce over the GII and for privacy and information security domestically and internationally. On the other hand, it permits law enforcement and national security agencies to protect the American public from the tyranny of crime and terrorism. We believe, as do many others throughout the world, that technology should serve society, not rule it: and that technology should be designed to promote public safety, not defeat it. Key escrow encryption is that beneficial and balanced technological solution. American manufacturers that employ encryption in their hardware and software products are undoubtedly the technology leaders in the world. American industry has the capability of meeting all of society's basic needs, including public safety and national security, and we, as responsible government leaders, should be sending a clear signal to industry encouraging them to do so. Key escrow encryption is "win-win" technology for societies worldwide. I know you agree that it would be irresponsible for the United States, as the world's technology leader, to move towards the adoption of a national policy that would knowingly and consciously unleash on a widespread basis unbreakable, non-key escrow encryption products that put citizens in the U.S. and worldwide at risk. Unfortunately, in recent months, the nearly exclusive focus of the public discussion concerning the encryption issue has been on its commercial aspects, particularly with regard to removing export controls. This narrow focus ignores the very real threat that conventional, non-key escrow encryption poses both domestically and internationally to public safety. We continue actively to seek industry's cooperation, assistance, and great expertise in producing key escrow encryption products as a critical part of an overall, balanced, and comprehensive encryption policy that would logically include an appropriate relaxation of export controls for key escrow products. As for export controls, we have had ongoing discussions with industry, and industry has articulated the view that export controls needlessly hurt U.S. competitiveness overseas. But once again we need to carefully consider the facts and balance a number of competing interests. Although some strong encryption products can be found overseas, they are simply not ubiquitous, and, as of yet, they have not become embedded in the basic operating systems and applications found overseas. Importantly, when the U.S. recently let it be known that it was considering allowing the export of encryption stronger than that now permitted, several of our close allies expressed strong concerns that we would be flooding the global market with unbreakable cryptography, increasing the likelihood of its use by criminal organizations and terrorists throughout Europe and the world, and thereby imperiling the public safety in their countries. Ironically, the relaxation of export controls in the U.S. may well lead to the imposition of import controls overseas. The international implications and likely reactions of foreign governments to the U.S. unilaterally lifting such export controls must be fully considered. Given the fact that the use and availability of robust encryption is an issue of concern internationally, it is important to understand what steps other countries are taking to address these concerns. Recently, France, Russia and Israel have established domestic restrictions on the import, manufacturer, sale and use of encryption products, as not to endanger their public safety and national security. The European Union is moving towards the adoption of a key recovery-based key management infrastructure similar to that proposed for use within the United States. This plan, based upon the concept of using a "Trusted Third Party," allows for encryption keys to be escrowed with an independent but non-governmental party, thus allowing for lawful government access to such escrowed key pursuant to proper legal authority. Lastly, we have heard the oft-repeated argument that the "genie is out of the bottle," and that attempts to influence the future use of cryptography are futile. This is simply not true; and we strongly disagree. If strong, key escrow encryption products proliferates both overseas and domestically which will not interoperate (at least in the long-term) with non-key escrow products, then escrowed encryption products will become the worldwide standard and will be used by almost everyone, including the criminal elements, in countries participating in the GII. It is worth noting that we have never contended that a key escrow regime, whether voluntarily or mandatorily implemented, would prevent all criminals from obtaining non-key escrowed encryption products. But even criminals need to communicate with others nationally and internationally, including not just their criminal confederates but also legitimate organizations such as banks. Accessible, key escrow encryption products clearly will be used by most if widely available, inexpensive, easy to use, and interoperable worldwide. In closing, if one considers the broad range of public safety responsibilities that fall upon the law enforcement community, there is only one responsible course of action that we as government leaders must embark upon -- to promote socially#031#responsible encryption products, products that contain robust cryptography but which also provide for timely law enforcement access and decryption -- that is, key escrow encryption. The entire law enforcement community believes not only that the removal of export controls for encryption products that are non#031#law enforcement accessible is unwise, but that such an action would jeopardize our national security and the interests and safety of law-abiding citizens worldwide. We look forward to working with you and your staff on this difficult issue and would be pleased to answer any questions you might have. _________________________________________________________________________ Subject: Freeh Testimony 7/25/96 _________________________________________________________________________ David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.epic.org Washington, DC 20003 * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org

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remailers/kiddie porn
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Internet Child Porn An Issue At Stockholm Congress STOCKHOLM - Distribution of child pornography on the Internet seems destined to top the issues at the world's first conference against sexual exploitation of children opening later this month in Stockholm. Activists are trying to devise ways of keeping pedophiles from peddling such material on the global computer network, which is already used as a billboard to advertise prostitution and sex tourism and to exchange adult pornography. But not everyone agrees that regulating the Internet or its 20 million users worldwide is the right move. Some advocates say the Internet represents free speech. Others argue that the distribution of child pornography on the Internet is not that widespread. Still, many see it as a problem. "The Internet is like heaven for the pedophile," said Toby Tyler, a United States police officer who lectures at the FBI Academy on child abuse. "As far as our ability to restrict the distribution of child pornography and stop the sexual exploitation of children on the Internet...it's not something that can be done." Campaigners are concerned that unless urgent action is taken to stamp out the Internet's distribution of child porn, whether it features real children or just computer generated images, it could spark greater demand for child pornography. "Neglecting to prohibit computer generated images could well re-establish the commercial trade -- filling bookstores with computer images, de-sensitizing society and fueling demand for such material," said campaigner Margaret Healy from Bangkok-based End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism (ECPAT). Tyler said the Internet has ended the days when pedophiles had to make costly cross-border runs to buy child pornography in countries where laws were laxer and penalties lighter. Now they can obtain and distribute films and photos from their own homes on the Internet with little risk of capture. Tyler said the existence of anonymous re-mailers -- computer systems which accept material transmitted over computer lines and send it out again after coding its original address -- concealed the source of pornography on the Internet. "Before on-line sex material was available, you'd to find someone to sell it to you, trade with you, or produce it yourself. The net provides a very high level of safety." Short of denying people access to the network, he added, there was little to be done. Even convicted pedophiles with access to computers in prisons can get the material. However computer experts agree the existence of just one re-mailing system in a country with more lax laws is enough for the global distribution of child pornography on the Internet. Tyler said the most widely used re-mailing system currently operates from Finland, through which about 99 percent of all child pornography with untraceable address codes passes. But Johan Helsingius, who runs a re-mailing system from Helsinki, said he did not think child pornography was a problem on the Internet or that any of the 10,000 messages which pass through his server daily contained child pornography. "To a large extent the net is self-regulating. As soon as you do something that offends enough people, measures will be taken by those who are involved with the net," he said. ECPAT's Healy said in a report prepared for the five-day Stockholm conference that opens on August 27 that the regulation of child pornography on computers presents special challenges and called on governments to fund better training. "The establishment of an international research organization with...specialists in the areas of investigation, law enforcement, behavioral science, prosecution, law and computer technology could be an invaluable resource for the global community," Healy said. Copyright, Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved

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Guilty by definition...
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A poor fool who didn't realize that he had sealed his own fate by responding to someone who had already ratted him out for a shot of Scotch with a beer chaser wrote: >For God's sake, another key; I'm gonna need a separate >floppy to track just you keys. >But it's worth it; we bros. Official Law Enforcement Dictionary bro - 1. Co-conspirator 2. Accessory 3. Poor bastard who just fell in with the wrong company, and will probably spend the rest of his life in prison as a result of innocently replying to a UCE email titled, "How To Make Big $$$ At Home, Licking Your Own Nuts."

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The Company That Pays Me Need Help
by lei＠xaq.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I Make $1,875 every week! Stuffing and Mailing Envelopes at Home. Let me put you in touch with reliable companies who pay up to thousands of dollars when you stuff and mail their sales letters. I'll tell you which offers are misleading and which companies are honest and pay me so much. For More Info mailto:dgp2@hotmail.com Be sure to include your name and address. 9Xc1998

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join
by Salvatore A. Ingaro 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

join

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hi
by YAY383 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: CD Prices and Inflation
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:14 AM 7/26/96, jim bell wrote: >At 05:06 AM 7/26/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >>So, while I "wish" CD prices were even lower, I'm paying a lot less in >>"real dollars" for more music today than I was paying 15 years ago or 30 >>years ago. > >I think you're trying to hide a 5-year effect by immersing it in 30 years of >change. Yes, we've had inflation, but the large spurt of post-Vietnam >inflation was basically over by about 1983, when the CD was introduced. At No, I'm not "trying" to hide anything. What I said is what I meant: CDs today offer more music/dollar than LPs did in 1967. And, in 1975. And, in 1983. (In 1983 I bought my last "audiophile" LP, a direct-to-disk half-speed-mastered album that cost me something like $12.) The complaint that CD prices have not fallen faster than some would like, since 1983, is a different kettle of fish from what my point was, that CD prices in 1983 or in 1996 are a better "deal" than LPs were in the period I described. As for prices not dropping, if customers stopped buying, prices would drop very rapidly. That they are not, and that "mega-stores" are sprouting up all over place tells us that CD sales are exploding. Finally, and most convincingly, nothing in U.S. law prevents Jim Bell or anyone else from setting up his own CD company and undercutting the prices of the Biggies. Hey, if you think you can supply CDs to customers for a lot less money, go for it! --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Cyber Rights Non! -- French Net-Censorship
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 25 Jul 1996 20:38:22 -0500 To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu From: declan(a)well.com (Declan McCullagh) Subject: FC: Cyber Rights Non! -- French Net-Censorship Sender: owner-fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Attached is a portion of the lead article from today's HotWired on the French government's net-censorship. I'm pleased to say I just received word from a French correspondent that the French "Conseil Constitutionnel" has blocked the part of the law creating "Le Conseil SupÈrieur de la TÈlÈmatique" to decide what should be blocked online. (From what I've been able to gather, that court reviews laws to ensure they're constitutional. On June 27, the Conseil heard arguments from senators that the law violated articles of the French constitution.) I have more on other international net-censorship attempts at: http://www.eff.org/pub/Global/Dispatches/ http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~declan/international/ -Declan ----------------------------------- Read the full article at: http://www.netizen.com/netizen/ HotWired The Netizen Cyber Rights Non! by Jerome Thorel Paris, 24 July Early last month, at a time of day when typical netsurfers are just hitting their mouse-clicking stride - around 3:30 in the morning - the French Senate voted on the final version of the new Telecommunications Regulation Act. A little-remarked section of the act, introduced as an amendment a few days before, represents the French legislature's first plunge into the digital ocean. It creates a kind of administrative oversight of Internet speech, Web sites, and online services. The law's effect is to create a council - le Conseil SupÈrieur de la TÈlÈmatique (CST) - to dictate or arbitrate guidelines regarding Internet content. It turned out, however, that the move by Telecommunications Minister FranÁois Fillon, sponsor of the French Telecom Act, was a little hasty. France had been shaken this spring by two investigations into pedophilia and Holocaust revisionism (both considered crimes in France) on the Internet. For months, Fillon had promised French Internet service providers that they would no longer bear responsibility for the content they transmit. The law does settle that question. But no one imagined that this guarantee would include as its condition the creation of the CST. To be safe from indictment, ISPs will be obliged to follow CST's guidelines - a policy typical of France's strong tradition of centralized administration. [...] The French Net-regulation bill became law on 7 June - the same week that US federal judges declared the Communications Decency Act unconstitutional.... [...] Jerome Thorel, a Paris-based freelance reporter, writes frequently about technology and society. Andy Oram, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, contributed to this article. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- fight-censorship is archived at http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/top/

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