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Get rid of this stuff, please...
by an370736＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Welcome to c|net From: anon-remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl (Name Withheld by Request) Date: Tue, 24 Oct 1995 20:10:07 +0100 > From cypherpunks(a)toad.com Tue Oct 24 09:03:00 1995 > Received: from cnet.com (central.cnet.com [204.188.123.10]) by > orpheum.cnet.com (8.6.12/8.6.12) with ESMTP id JAA10708 for > <verify(a)orpheum.cnet.com>; Tue, 24 Oct 1995 09:03:00 -0700 > Received: from longs.lance.colostate.edu by cnet.com via ESMTP > (8.6.12/940518.SGI.central) > for <verify(a)cnet.com> id OAA10916; Tue, 24 Oct 1995 14:53:01 GMT > Received: from [204.131.233.49] (p49.Denver1.dialup.csn.net > [204.131.233.49]) by longs.lance.colostate.edu (8.6.12/8.6.5a (LANCE > Revision: 1.3)) with SMTP id KAA07689 for <verify(a)cnet.com>; Tue, 24 Oct > 1995 10:02:06 -0600 To Someone in charge. Please UNSUBSCRIBE to this stuff for us, please.

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BlackNet Meets Stanford Law School
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:51 PM 10/24/95, Futplex wrote: >On GAK: > "[...] key escrow [...] may sound reasonable, but apply that > reasoning to more mundane areas of life. What the government > is saying is yes, you can put bars on your windows, locks on > your doors and put your jewelry in a safe, but you have to > give us the keys and the combination because you might be a > crook." > >That phrasing sounds rather familiar.... Hmmmhhh...yes, doesn't it though? By the way, I gave a talk at Stanford Law School last week, to Professor Margaret Radin's seminar on "Cyberspace and the Law." They had been reading a bunch of papers and reprints on Clipper, PGP, and crypto policy, including pieces by both me and Michael Froomkin (whose long paper is apparently becoming widely read for crypto-legal discussions). I was using the "curtain" metaphor for key escrow, describing a situation where the government might insist people only install curtains that have a secret invisibility mode, where the curtains become transparent to them only. It's more than just becoming transparent completely, as with key escrow one does not know that one's communications have been rendered readable...unless they eventually tell you, as they are _supposed_ to do with some classes of wiretaps (but not others, as in foreign intelligence surveillance). One of the students came up with a nice extension of this metaphor: using one's own system inside a key escrow wrapper (also called "superencryption") is like adding a second set of curtains inside the first set. An obvious point, but a nice metaphor that makes the point to one and all: the mandatory key escrow system, if adopted, would mandate the use of transparent-mode curtains and would ban (or try to) the use of additional sets of curtains. (What about internal room dividers which obscure the view into one's house that the cops want? The crypto parallels to this are interesting.) By the way, Professor Radin made an interesting comment at the end of the class. I'm paraphrasing, and any loss of her actual intended meaning may be my fault, so don't take this as gospel. She said she had previously thought that the implications of strong crypto would be "handled normally" within the context of markets and courts, but that after hearing my description of many issues (*) she now has doubts that the conventional legal system and conventional market system will be able to handle normally the implications of strong crypto. (By handle normally, I took her to mean in the way that several other recent technological advances have been handled without significant disruptions, in an evolutionary way.) (* The issues are the usual suspects: anonymous digital cash, remailers, information markets, copyrights, markets that benefit from untraceable communication, the BlackNet experience, the utter unbreakability of long-enough keys, and so on.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RE: Sun speaks out - but not to the cyph
by agermain＠cmp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have unsubscribed from this mailing list. Please remove my name from your personal address lists. Thanks. ahg3 ---------- From: Todd Glassey[SMTP:todd@lgt.com] Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 1995 12:52 PM To: David A Wagner Cc: cypherpunks Subject: Re: Sun speaks out - but not to the cypherpunks >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >In article <v02110101acaf51651ef9(a)[204.156.156.4]>, >Todd Glassey <todd(a)lgt.com> wrote: >[ lines marked > > are from fc(a)all.net (Dr. Frederick B. Cohen) ] >> Pardon the flame but I really have just about heard enough of this BS... >[...] >> >> The area where we can (must) build trust is the computing base. >> >> Traditionally, this has been the OS, but in the case of java, it is >> >> the java interpreter (such as netscape 2.0 and hotjava). The browser >> >> is now the TCB (trusted computer base) for all practical purposes... >> > >> >Read: The Java interpreter is supposed to be a TCB. >[...] >> >Who here truly believes that the implementations of Java meet the >> >requirements of a TCB? >[...] >> Dr. Fred, you seem to spend a lot of engery slamming Java and HotJava. >[ ... flame deleted ... ] > > >No, here I think Dr. Cohen's comments are right on the mark. > >The Java interpreter *is* supposed to be a trusted computing base. >Do we have any reason to believe that this trust is well-placed? > >(If you don't agree, go through the Orange Book evaluation criteria, >and pay special attention to the assurance sections...) >- --- >[This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature >means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the >signature and forwarded.] > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.6.2 >Comment: Gratis auto-signing service > >iQBFAwUBMIwG2CoZzwIn1bdtAQEpowGAgHiyk0tTQk5SO/3TR5EZRMFmUy/TjQmu >NbYIt0R/Tf0g9xWbolm5XN0alu947uJs >=UZH0 >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Sorry abopt the above flame-war I caused. My point was almost benign in and of itself. Yes, the Java concept is sound, No, the currently available implementation has some real architectural considerations that must be addressed in order that we can build a stable and secure platform atop it. My real issue is that there is so much time spent on this list knocking the individual spokes that make up this wheel we call Electronic Commerce, that it is more and more costly to filter out the technology from the background noise. Still because of the value of that technology, I and others are forced to spend precious hours reviewing all that comes across our desks. Bluntly being an active member of several Security and Payment Mechanism working groups I view some 150+ pieces of email a day and sometimes get frustrated by the amount of noise, or the roar in the background, about what are to the largest percentage of us, meaningless dribble... Still there is the occaisional golden nugget that makes it all worth while.. Again My apologies to have stirred up this mess. I will retreat under my desktop from the mele' that seems to be unending. Todd Regards, T. S. Glassey Chief Technologist Looking Glass Technologies todd(a)lgt.com (415) 324-4318 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQB1AwUBMFu5E6gNRnWhagU5AQHI+gL+Mwpcd3lAWd8FF06qcG6rnLhIYveHW71a XC7xh1T0uu8qnYX31yMp17OG28jWpKUbWec1IM9/eXOi+gInA7rKICWczV8zo9Z0 0puxjRRN7yO4KfRb3cPpk+r0p6pDg01Y =bTYb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Conference Report?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Did anyone go to the "Worldwide Electronic Commerce Law, Policy, Security and Controls Conference" ? It was in Bethesda October 18 - 20. Just curious. Sponsored by a lot of Big Cheese (ABA, HLS, NIST, UNCITL, SPA, ETC, ETC, ETC). Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Quick commercial package question
by Jonathon Fletcher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a brief question. There's a compression/archiving package on the Mac call Stuffit. It comes in the usual Lite (get free then register) and Deluxe (money first, product later) flavours. It offers, amongst it's options, an encryption option on a 'per archive entry'. This means you can have an archive with a mix of encrypted and unencrypted files and folders, all in the same archive. Question is - does anyone know anything about the strength or trustability of the encryption algorithm used ? It's freely exportable from the US (or so I thought) so it can't be DES. Is it (down) on a level with the MS Word or Wordperfect ciphers, or is it a little better ? How far should I trust it ? -Jon -- Jonathon Fletcher, "these opinions are my own, no-one else's" jonathon(a)japan.sbi.com

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QUERY: dc-nets list?
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please reply to me (or cc me if you respond to list). If anyone happens to know where (if anywhere) the dc-nets list has moved to, and how to subscribed, I'd really appreciate a pointer. Need to update the entry for that in a FAQ I maintain. TTYL. -- <HTML><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech/"> Stanton McCandlish </A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech@eff.org"> mech(a)eff.org </A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/"> Electronic Frontier Foundation </A><P> Online Activist </HTML>

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Re: Quick commercial package question
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:34 PM 10/25/95, Jonathon Fletcher wrote: >Just a brief question. > > There's a compression/archiving package on the Mac call Stuffit. It <...> >from the US (or so I thought) so it can't be DES. Is it (down) on a level >with the MS Word or Wordperfect ciphers, or is it a little better ? How >far should I trust it ? Not at all. Take a look at: http://www.uccs.edu/~abusby/mac_u-g/RemoveIt.sit.bin Ted

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CJR returned to sender
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got the CJR back today, envelope unopened (although the corner was torn so you could see there were t-shirts inside). "Returned to sender", it said, "Refused___, Unclaimed___". The address on the envelope reads: ATTN: Samuel L. Capino - 15 day CJR Defense Trade Analyst U.S. Dept. of State Office of Defense Trade Controls PM/DTC SA-6 Room 200 1701 N. Fort Meyer Drive Arlington, CA 22209-3113 Did I do something wrong, or did the Dept. of State decide it didn't want to deal with this CJR? Raph

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Re: CJR returned to sender
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:13 AM 10/25/95, Raph Levien wrote: > I got the CJR back today, envelope unopened (although the corner was >torn so you could see there were t-shirts inside). "Returned to sender", >it said, "Refused___, Unclaimed___". > > The address on the envelope reads: > >ATTN: Samuel L. Capino - 15 day CJR >Defense Trade Analyst >U.S. Dept. of State >Office of Defense Trade Controls >PM/DTC SA-6 Room 200 >1701 N. Fort Meyer Drive >Arlington, CA 22209-3113 > > Did I do something wrong, or did the Dept. of State decide it >didn't want to deal with this CJR? Raph, I mean no offense, but if _any_ request is ever to be deemed "frivolous," surely submitting a CJR for t-shirts is such a request. I won't belabor the point that the t-shirt is _at best_ comparable to a book, which generally needs no CJR (*), and _at worst_ is an illegible, confusing "work of art." (I personally am miffed at the imprecision of the "This shirt has been declared to be a munition"--or whatever, as I don't have one handy to check--and the language of the sales advertisements.) So the little joke was returned unopened. Not surprising. No offense intended to all those who think a CJR for a t-shirt is a worthy cause, but I think it's a pointless diversion. (* Hal Abelson of MIT says there are possible export problems with the MIT Press book on PGP, and MIT dropped plans for a version in a special OCR font. So, I agree that _some_ books cross the line and look like pure software. However, I continue to maintain that a badly-printed barcode is just a joke, nothing more.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Quick commercial package question
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Marshall Clow wrote not-on-behalf-of-Aladdin-Systems: >I just finished trying this one, though. It doesn't work. That's not really surprising, since the "version controls" on cracks are dubious to say the least; whether it's just bogus, a mangled version, or whatever, is anyone's guess. There are probably others around, maybe just as effective; if I run across any more, I'll forward them to you. >Disclaimer: There is no way that this could possibly be considered an >official statement of Aladdin Systems. <heh heh> Ted

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