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Cypherpunk mailing list
by Hendra Halim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: CHALAKKI(a)worldnet.att.net >X-Sender: CHALAKKI(a)postoffice.worldnet.att.net (Unverified) >To: Cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Cypherpunk mailing list >Date: Wed, 6 Nov 1996 22:38:08 +0000 >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >Please put me on your mailing list > > >Please unsubcribe me from your list Hendra

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Re: FW: Dr. Vulis is not on cypherpunks any more [RANT] (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, There is one important legal aspect which the operator of the Cypherpunks mailing list has opened themselves up for with this action. In short they have now opened themselves up for defamation and liable suites by imposing an editorial policy on the contents of this list (1). This opens up the potential, for example, for Tim May to sue the operator of the Cypherpunks mailing list now for posts from users (even anonymous ones) which defame or otherwise liable his character, reputation, or ability to pursue income in his chosen field. In short the operators of the list becomes publishers and distributors of the material. It is the legal difference between a bookstore and a book publisher. Censorship is censorship, irrespective of the source of the limitation. Free expression is impossible in an environment of censorship. The right to speak not only implies a right to not speak, it also implies the right to emit complete mumbo jumbo. The actual content of the speech is irrelevant. The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and press. This does not imply in any way an abrogation of responsibility by the party speaking or distributing it. Only that they would not have limitations on their actions imposed by the federal government. ARTICLE I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. And just to make shure it is clear, the right to put something on the paper (ie speech) is distinctly different from being the one doing the actual printing. I have argued in the past that this list is a defacto public list because of the way it is advertised and to the extent it is advertised. All the protests by the operator to the contrary will not convince a court. Hope you folks have a good lawyer. (1) ;login:, Oct. 1996, V21N5, pp. 27 Jim Choate

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(Fwd) Re: Euro Key Escrow
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the SSL-users mailing list. ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Subject: Re: Euro Key Escrow To: ben(a)algroup.co.uk Date: Thu, 7 Nov 1996 13:42:16 +0100 (NFT) Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com, ssl-talk(a)netscape.com, ssl-users(a)mincom.com, ietf-pkix(a)tandem.com, ben(a)gonzo.ben.algroup.co.uk From: um(a)c2.net (Ulf =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=F6ller?=) > It is, apparently, true that the EC is considering schemes for key escrow, by > "trusted third parties" There is an extensive survey at the European Cryptography Resources page, http://www.modeemi.cs.tut.fi/~avs/eu-crypto.html The EU commission's group DG XIII has been discussing key escrow for quite some time, but they have not yet been able to agree on a position. Jerome Thorel has posted some rather scaring interviews with EU official David Herson who is in favor of a key esrow scheme. Victor Mayer-Schoenfelder reports that crpyo regulation is likely to be delegated to the more liberal DG XV. A number of member states, such as Denmark, very unlikely to accept key escrow. > ftp://ftp.dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk/pub/Chris.Mitchell/istr_a2.ps Ross Anderson has analyzed Mitchell's scheme, drawing the conclusion that "The GCHQ protocal is very poorly engineered." See ftp://ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/euroclipper.ps.Z > I'm informed that this is likely to be introduced into EC legislation, though > my understanding is that members are not required to actually incorporate the > legislation. No doubt France will embrace it with happy shouts. The final decision will almost certainly with the member states, because cryptography is considered essential for national security.

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Re: FW: Dr. Vulis is not on cypherpunks any more [RANT] (fwd)
by networks＠vir.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Choate Wrote: > Hi all, > > There is one important legal aspect which the operator of the Cypherpunks > mailing list has opened themselves up for with this action. In short they > have now opened themselves up for defamation and liable suites by imposing > an editorial policy on the contents of this list (1). > > This opens up the potential, for example, for Tim May to sue the operator of > the Cypherpunks mailing list now for posts from users (even anonymous ones) > which defame or otherwise liable his character, reputation, or ability to > pursue income in his chosen field. In short the operators of the list > becomes publishers and distributors of the material. It is the legal > difference between a bookstore and a book publisher. It seems that, like a bookstore, the cypherpunks mailing list has the right to choose the content it distributes and who it distributes the content to. Bookstores are free to select what titles they offer for sale, and can even refuse to sell a book to a particularly annoying customer if they so choose (my legal knowledge is lacking, but I think this is correct). To extend the analogy, what has happened in this particular case is that Dr. Vulis is now forced to buy all his books by mail order :) Thanks, Alan Majer networks(a)vir.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:39 AM 11/8/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 9:50 AM -0800 11/8/96, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >>At 11:29 AM 11/8/1996, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >>> Furthermore, terrorrim and etc do not depend upon secure >>> communications to work. People tend to be able to talk face-to-face in >>> isolated environs, this is just as effective as a good public-key >>> cryptosystem. Crypto won't suddenly protect the types of people who >>> are professional killers/terrorists from scrutiny. It meerly would >>> allow them to communicate securely over distances of more than 10 >>> feet. This, IMO, is not much of a win for them. >> Face-to-face communications in isolated environs does not a cryptoanarchy >> make. > Yes, but you're the one talking about bombings, mass killings, Sarin gas > attacks, and other such examples of "terrorism." You cite the presence of > these things as why the Constitution will effectively be suspended and why > neighbors will cheerfully conduct vigilante raids on their suspected > terrorists. > Crypto anarchy is not the same thing as terrorism. Calling terrorism > "crypto anarchy" does not make it so. I could not agree with you more. What I am working with is the hypothetical Four Horsemen scenario which you have described above. I am not endorsing that scenario. If that were the outcome of cryptoanarchy, and some people think it will be, would it be a manageable problem or would the technology just sort of get away? I believe it would be easily managed if there were broad public support. Jeremiah correctly pointed out that you don't need strong cryptography to commit terrorist acts. That just puts us where we are today - not in a cryptoanarchy. I don't think that strong cryptography helps terrorists much. Let's face it, biowarfare and sarin gas don't have anything to do with cryptography, no matter how much the GAKers will try to show that they do. But, if I am wrong and for some reason the availability of strong cryptography leads to these scenarios - as the GAKers say - then there would be broad public support for the suppression of strong cryptography. This effort would be successful. It would not dramatically erode the structure of the Constitution or our legal system in the short term. The effect of strong cryptography and the Net is that it makes it possible for people with common interests to find each other more easily and to develop long distance relationships. That's fine when we are talking about scientists, mathematicians, or cypherpunks. But, it also brings together people with less savory interests. It's undesirable for serial killers to find each other and trade notes on how to evade capture. (I think this usually happens now through the prison system.) Strong cryptography makes it harder for governments to manage ideas and relationships between people. There are many implications of this and I think they are almost entirely good. The Constitution may not survive GAK in the long run. If the world were to stay in 1996 and we outlawed strong cryptography this would not necessarily be the case. But the world won't stay still. Computer assisted population management technologies have been getting more effective and cheaper all the time. In the past it was hard to give everybody unforgeable internal passports and ear tags. In a GAKed future that is unlikely to be the case. Segments of the USG probably have the doctrine worked out. We've heard a lot about "the responsible use of cryptography" from the GAKers. In fact, it is highly irresponsible to propose GAK at this time when there is no evidence whatsoever that it is needed. These people may have moved beyond any concern with ideas such as "responsibility." Right now there is a tremendous opportunity to the elites of the world to enslave everybody else. Once you know everywhere somebody goes, everything they read, and everybody they talk about, you can manage their behavior quite effectively. Only a small number of people would be needed to tweak the "justice" computers to punish indiscretions, such as meeting a cypherpunk on the street. Many people would be happy to enslave their fellow citizens if it meant tremendous wealth, power, and prestige for themselves and their children, possibly for a long time. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:18 PM 11/7/1996, Ted Cabeen wrote: >At 02:38 PM 11/7/96 -0800, you wrote: >>>Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >>>ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) writes: >>> Well, once I've got my strong crypto and electronic commerce, and 20 >>> or so virtual identities to do things for me, and the gub'ment can't >>> tell what money I'm making and spending, so they can't tax me. So if >>> they can't tax me, and they can't tax lots of folks, then they can't >>> pay their jack-booted thugs. So the goverment becomes irrelevant. It >>> can't support a huge police state infrastructure, and certainly can't >>> but mega-crays to break my crypto, so how're they going to retain >>> control? >>> When we say anarchy, we mean anarchy. >> This only works if there are large numbers of people who think it is >> a good idea. Otherwise, the resources of the Federal Government >> may be directed quite effectively against a small number of people. >> If you can get a life prison term for your strong crypto you may >> hesitate to use it. If not, then you may get to be an example >> for everybody else. > That's why we have to develop stealth PGP and good stego so that the > government doesn't even know that you're using the strong crypto that has > been outlawed. If they can't prove that there's actually a message in the > picture of the catsgills you just downloaded off of > alt.binaries.pictures.nature, you can't get a life sentence in jail. What happens when they find it on your disk? Remember, you don't have an encrypted virtual disk, or if you do, the consequences are the same if you didn't. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:37 PM 11/7/1996, Daniel T. Hagan wrote: > On Thu, 7 Nov 1996, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >> If strong cryptography were unpopular and highly illegal, very few >> people would be using it. This makes it easy to identify suspects. > I think the reasons are probably tied closely to your second point. > Unless strong cryptography was easily distinguishable from weak > cryptography without taking the time to break it, then how would they > (law enforcement) recognize that someone was using strong cryptography? > Or suppose that some one uses strong cryptography and then wraps it in > weak cryptography. The outer shell would seem legal, and the authorities > can't go around randomly breaking people's keys (or so one would assume), > and even if they did, it wouldn't necessarily be legal as evidence anyway. In the extreme case, everybody would be sending messages in the clear. In the case of mandatory GAK, it would be easy to open a bunch of messages and see if what was inside looked like cryptography. The privacy violation could be minimized by requiring a Congressionally approved test program to applied without any human reading it. If the test program said it was cryptography, then this could be considered just cause for a judge to issue a warrant to the authorities for the study of the actual message. The laws regarding what is considered legal evidence are easily changed if there is a need for it. Probably they don't need to be changed all that much. If you see a lot of PGP messages coming from somebody, you get a warrant and search their computer for illegal software. When you find it, you lock them up forever. > And finally, you have to consider the possibility of whether a person can > be identified merely by the fact that there is a message that is > intercepted that has strong cryptography in it. I don't know enough about > remailers and internet protocols/servers to say whether this is a > reasonable objection or not, perhaps someone else does? In the absence of strong cryptography, remailers do not offer much anonymity. > So, unless I'm incorrect about one of the above points (and I admit that I > may well be), once cryptography reaches a certain strength, there is no > reason to relinquish that strength, particularly if you are using it for > criminal activity. If the penalties for the use of cryptography are significantly greater than the penalties associated with the crime, you may opt not to use cryptography. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:56 PM 11/7/1996, Andrew Loewenstern wrote: > ...<several excellent points>... > People will outright demand strong crypto. > This is already happening. Despite intense pressure from TLA's for GAK, > savvy businesses are demanding strong crypto (the idea that no crypto at all > will be used is utterly ridiculous, it will either be strong or GAKed but > there will be crypto). Hardly anyone is bowing to the pressure. It will >take > a mandate from congress to get people to actually use GAK, and the more > businesses and congresscritters begin understand the benefits of strong >crypto > to the bottom line, the less likely such a mandate would happen. This implies that there is a dramatic political opportunity for those who have not yet taken a strong stand on the issue, young congresspeople please note. Federal interference has probably delayed the onset of large scale net commerce by at least a year. The Zimmermann case alone, I suspect, has had a dramatic chilling effect on the development of good security technologies. It is interesting to speculate on the career consequences for those who are currently on the wrong side of the fence. People like Jim Exon will, at most, find their way into an embarrassing footnote in the history books. What about Albert Gore? Since the '92 election his political stock has fallen dramatically amongst people I know. Before his "Information Highway" activities, a few people were suspicious of his wife's inclinations towards censorship, but he was not generally hated. A lot can happen in four years. My guess is that the general public and even the reporters ;-) will have caught on to the issues surrounding strong crypto by the next election which will not be good for Gore's naked ambition. It's also interesting to wonder what will happen to certain institutions which have not been very well behaved. Certainly the ATF is not well loved. That is not lucky for long range funding. I suspect the NSA will be able to salvage their reputation by sticking the blame on the Clinton administration and anybody else who is handy. They seem to be playing both sides of the fence right now. There is a tremendous institutional opportunity for the NSA as the demand for secure systems is growing exponentially and they probably know it. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> If I understand the reasoning, people beleive it is easier to prevent the > release of strong crypto. techiniques than to remove them once they are > released. The reasons underlying this are what I don't completely understand. > Once a terrorist has strong crypto, why should they stop using it if it > becomes illegal? Use of strong crypto would be a tip off that one is a terrorist. If strong cryptography were unpopular and highly illegal, very few people would be using it. This makes it easy to identify suspects. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:24 PM 11/7/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > At 6:56 PM -0600 11/7/96, Andrew Loewenstern wrote: >> middle men). Weak Crypto (i.e. GAK) does not offer these features because >> the >> weak point in the chain becomes a mostly disinterested low-wage employee at >> the KRC, which is likely to be operated by a foreign government! Any >> businessman can immediately understand why this is unacceptable, especially >> with all of the economic espionage stories going around corporate america. > And the GAK advocates have never clarified how an international system will > work. Even if one accepts the dubious hypothesis that the U.S. has a > noncorrupt, benign government, what of other countries? Is Ghaddaffi the > keeper of keys in Libya? How about the military government of Burma? > I can imagine no scheme which could possibly solve this problem. None. The > problem of "rogue governments" (and maybe all governments are rogue to at > least some other governments) means no simple solution. And the > Administration has done nothing to clarify how this will all work. I cannot speak for the GAK advocates. However, you could establish a system where messages between two countries are encoded with keys which are made available to only the two countries in question. A really simple scheme to do this would be for each country to publish a public key. You would be required to encrypt the key to the message with the national public key. That scheme would be fast to deploy. In a more complicated and secure scheme, you would be given a public key from each country that was unique for your communications at the same time you were granted your international communications license. The unique public key would be managed by a small group of people. This means that if it was ever compromised, most message traffic would be secure and those who were responsible would be easy to find. The only way you are at the mercy of the Libyans is if you do business in Libya. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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