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Cryto article in SJ Mercenary
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's a full page equivalent article on encyption in today's San Jose Mercury News (12E-11E). The article concentrates on public key cryptography, and mixes some good stuff with some silly mistakes. The first page has about 4/5th of the article devoted to a big diagram showing how someone using public key encryption to cover a whole message, and sent it over the internet to someone in Argentina. All this without a mention of using symmetric cyphers, and without even mentioning ITAR. Another 1/8th of this page is given over to a bunch of cypher text that supposedly encodes the address of "Mr Cosmic Kumquat, SSl Trusters etc.." This address looks kind of familiar... but they seem to imply that the cyphertext is the output of an RSA encrpytion, not RC4. They then go on to discuss factoring, and explain the difference between the strength of algorithms in theory, and how Netscape became vulnerable due to "beginners mistakes" in the implementation, and how security is best assured by open disclosure, not security through obscurity. Simon ---- (defun modexpt (x y n) "computes (x^y) mod n" (cond ((= y 0) 1) ((= y 1) (mod x n)) ((evenp y) (mod (expt (modexpt x (/ y 2) n) 2) n)) (t (mod (* x (modexpt x (1- y) n)) n))))

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Perfect Forward Secrecy - is it worth it?
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quick survey; how important is perfect forward secrecy to you? I've asked three people locally so far and gotten four different answers, so in the spirit of spreading divisiveness where'er I go, I'll try and get a few more opinions here :-) In general, schemes offering PFS require a extra PK-op, and an extra round-trip when compared to non-PFS schemes. This cost is incurred once per "session", but can add on the order of seconds to startup times. Should key-management schemes where PK is available always provide PFS, allow PFS, or not provide PFS? The amount of code needed to implement each choice point is similar, if you're using something like BSAFE. Simon --- (defun modexpt (x y n) "computes (x^y) mod n" (cond ((= y 0) 1) ((= y 1) (mod x n)) ((evenp y) (mod (expt (modexpt x (/ y 2) n) 2) n)) (t (mod (* x (modexpt x (1- y) n)) n))))

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Re: Seek-and-Destroy
by Ryan Russell/SYBASE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I tried it... it just seemed to threaten me for about 10 minutes, and then disconnected. Couldn't see any effect. What was supposed to happen? Ryan ---------- Previous Message ---------- To: declan cc: cypherpunks From: snow @ smoke.suba.com @ smtp Date: 07/15/96 04:20:54 PM Subject: Re: Seek-and-Destroy On Mon, 15 Jul 1996, Declan McCullagh wrote: > Do NOT visit: > http://xxx.lanl.gov/seek-and-destroy > So of course I did. Very Interesting. Those guys *rock*. > The sysadmins for xxx.lanl.gov don't like robots visiting their web site, They also aren't real happy with PC's, Mac's, or Netscape. Petro, Christopher C. petro(a)suba.com <prefered for any non-list stuff> snow(a)smoke.suba.com

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From Bill Frezza: Electronic Warfare
by Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 29 Oct 1995 11:33:54 -0500 From: Bill Frezza <frezza(a)interramp.com> To: sunder(a)escape.com Subject: Can you post this? Ray, If you feel it is apporpriate, can you post the attached column to cypherpunks? Since I am not a regular subscriber (I can't keep up with the traffic) I thought it would be best to pass it by you first. Thanks, Bill Frezza ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ To: Cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Electronic Warfare From: Bill Frezza (frezza(a)interramp.com) Dear cyhperpunks, Attached is a column that will appear on the op-ed page of tomorrow's (10/30) Communications Week that was stimulated largely by a report filed here by one of your members. I thought you would find it interesting and thought provoking. I would like to thank and acknowledge whoever it was that filed that report as well as encourage you all to keep me informed about related political developments. (I just don't have the bandwidth to follow the cyhperpunks list in its entirty.) It is my hope to bring the important issues you raise here to the attention of the industry and the general public. Regards, Bill Frezza Communications Week ELECTRONIC WARFARE WAGES ON - AND YOU'RE THE TARGET Although the flap over the Clinton administration's attempt to promote escrowed-key encryption systems like Clipper has temporarily faded, the war on electronic privacy continues. As proceedings at the Fourth International Conference on Money Laundering, Forfeiture, Asset Recovery, Offshore Investments, the Pacific Rim, and International Financial Crimes reveal, there has been no let up in our government's efforts to blockade the cyber-frontier. No, you won't learn much from the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times, written by journalist-generalists who have no clue about where this technology is heading. The Feds have become so skilled at manipulating the Old Media that stories about electronic privacy invariably center on the latest drug kingpin, pedophile, or domestic terrorist. Attacking these universally abhorred enemies of the people not only makes for good headlines but keeps privacy advocates off balance as they are forced to defend abstract rights using loathsome examples. But if you tune in to the Cypherpunks mailing list (majordomo(a)toad.com) you can get some excellent first hand reports from the front. In the relatively short period since the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act, which, among other things, obliges banks to file Suspicious Activity Reports on its customers, banks have become virtual deputies in the treasury department's war on uncontrolled financial transactions. And this war is increasingly spilling into cyberspace. The conference underscored the fact that, paradoxically, we are heading not toward more specific and well defined transaction monitoring regulations, but less. How so? The problem with making regulations precise is that what software algorithms can define, other algorithms can evade. Instead, regulation by "raised eyebrow" is becoming the norm. Federal bank examiners have been given significant latitude to invoke draconian penalties against uncooperative banks. Because bank officers have few due-process protections under this regime, it is no surprise that most of them have become sniveling toadies. The objective is to insure that banks "voluntarily" introduce even more aggressive, unpredictable, and intrusive monitoring than the government would ever dare mandate. And to make sure nothing slips through the cracks, human surveillance will be supplemented with artificial-intelligence agents that can perform pattern analysis on the aggregate flow of electronic transactions, flagging anything remotely suspicious. George Orwell would be impressed. Lest you think that all of this is motivated solely by the drug war, a visit to the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) homepage (http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/bureaus/fincen/facts.html) should open your eyes. This battle is not just about drug prohibition, a crime the Treasury Department would have to invent if it didn't already exist. The real struggle is about the future of tax compliance, and it has you in its sights. A famous Revolutionary War era pamphleteer, writing under the pseudonym "Brutus", perhaps said it best 200 years ago when he wrote - "The national government through its taxing power will introduce itself into every corner of the city and country. It will take cognizance of the professional man in his office or his study; it will watch the merchant in his store; it will follow the mechanic to his shop and his work, and will haunt him in his family and his bed; it will be the constant companion to the industrious farmer in his labour; it will penetrate into the most obscure cottage; and finally it will light upon the head of every person in the United States. To all these different classes of people and in all these circumstances on which it will attend them, the language in which it will address them will be GIVE! GIVE!" What Brutus didn't know and what the cypherpunks foresee is that one day strong encryption will make it impossible to spy on our activities in cyberspace. Heightened conflict is inevitable. Expect the rhetoric to get a lot hotter as the government spinmeisters labor to keep us focused on public enemies while frantically trying to keep its hand in every citizens pocket and its eyes on every bankbook. # # # COPYRIGHT CMP PUBLICATIONS 1995 Bill Frezza is president at Wireless Computing Associates and co-founder of the online forum DigitaLiberty. The opinions expresses are his own. Frezza can be reached at frezza(a)interramp.com. ------------------------------------ | Wireless Computing Associates, Inc. | 704 Stoney Hill Rd., Suite 155 | Yardley, PA 19067 | ph 215-321-0929, fax 215-321-0490 | urgent Email: frezza(a)radiomail.net | bulk Email: frezza(a)interramp.com ------------------------------------

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Keyed-MD5, and HTTP-NG
by baldwin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Simon, There are a few different ways to add key material to MD5 to make it suitable as a shared-secret authenticator function. Some of these are less resistant to attacks than others. For example, the keyed MD5 mechanism that is part of the current IPsec specifications can be attacked using 2**60 chosen messages. Fortunately, the IPsec specs also require that the shared MD5 key be changed every 2**32 messages, so this attack is unlikely to succeed. Specifically, IPsec uses MD5 as follows: X = MD5(key | keypad | Message), where "|" means concatenation and the "keypad" pads out the key to 512 bits. Basically, this function is the same as standard MD5 with a different initialization vector for the compression operation on the first block of the message. RSA Labs recommends that a people use an authenticator like X = MD5(key1, MD5(key2, Message)). This resists the chosen plaintext attacks that were published at the crypto conference in Spring 1995. There are also some very fast MAC algorithms being proposed these days. As Phill Hallam mentioned, you may want to look at the work of Phil Rogaway. At a minimum, make sure that your standard allows people to migrate from a current solution based on MD5 to a future solution based on new functions. However, I would be relunctant to require new functions until they have had a chance to be tested by the cryptographic research community. --Bob Baldwin

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Re: US versions of Netscape now available
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:18 PM 7/15/96 -0700, sameer wrote: > Not like that's tough to figure out. Congrats. It's cool to >actually be able to connect to my webserver using real encryption. >Glad the lawyers don't think Barksdale is going to jail anymore. I'm glad too. So how many minutes did it take to leak overseas? DCF

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If I WANNA I'M GONNA
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I see all the traffic analysis arguments. They are silly. If someone wants something, they will get it. Simple. The only question is how long it will take. Not if! Just how long! Love Always, Carol Anne ps Wanna argue with a loaded gun at your face? SEE! -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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Re: /dev/random for FreeBSD [was: Re: /dev/random for Linux]
by Mark Murray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> In article <199510311715.TAA05821(a)grumble.grondar.za>, > Mark Murray <mark(a)grondar.za> wrote: > > forever { > > cat /dev/random > /dev/null > > } > > > > Severely limiting most decent folk's chance at getting PGP to work. > > Ideally, if two processes are trying to read /dev/random at the same time, > both would get data at half-speed. Doesn't it work that way already? Ideally, yes. However most processes won't swamp (and deplete) /dev/random like this will. Most (well-behaved) processes will (should) just take what they need. The above loop tries quite hard to take all that is there, so any process asking for randomness will be sharing with the above loop on an almost byte-by-byte basis, like you suggest. The above won't leave a "pool of randomness" to act as a buffer for user requests, so will cause a nasty slowdown. M -- Mark Murray 46 Harvey Rd, Claremont, Cape Town 7700, South Africa +27 21 61-3768 GMT+0200 Finger mark(a)grumble.grondar.za for PGP key

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MD5 of CFS131, hacktic
by don＠cs.byu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >From: Andreas Bogk <andreas(a)artcom.de> >Please report any leakage of this software immediately to this list. >From: Mats Bergstrom <asgaard(a)sos.sll.se> >Try ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/crypto/CRYPTOapps/cfs.1.3.tar.gz I diffed 1.3 that CFS that I got from att research. The package arrived to hacktic intact. I sent PGP-signed MD5 of 1.3.1 to utopia, but got this back: >From: Oliver Daudey <traveler(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> >Subject: Re: CFS 1.3.1 >Date: Mon, 30 Oct 1995 15:51:10 +0100 (MET) > >> I have done an md5 on the new cfs. (Everything after the cutmarks) >> Here it is. Hope you have it soon... >> >> 262b4c6fbec7c729e3e10292f5ea8afb cfs.1.3.1 >> >> Don > >Sorry, but I need something which is certified with the SSH distribution- >key (keyID DCB9AE01). Hmmmm ok. Well, I'll sign it again, for you Cpunks. If you get a different MD5 (this is everything AFTER the cutmarks) we can diff it. Don -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMJhTJcLa+QKZS485AQHsIwL/fkh8d39uW8M7Fo/slO6Rbb42j7tneqz2 wcePuYqyjGFN93IfjPI0ew1jjNqnzI+je6C0dBhk4eTjN7xAFczTqe1U6+yAKZX5 DnX2waPV/i8Pva0NB0t5lzRfCaB1OM/r =8IC6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- <don(a)cs.byu.edu> fRee cRyPTo! jOin the hUnt or BE tHe PrEY PGP key - http://students.cs.byu.edu/~don or PubKey servers (0x994b8f39) June 7&14, 1995: 1st amendment repealed. Junk mail to root(a)127.0.0.1 * This user insured by the Smith, Wesson, & Zimmermann insurance company *

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Not that I'm a troublemaker...
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: senator(a)kennedy.senate.gov From: HugeCajones Remailer<hc(a)dev.null> Subject: !!! DEATH THREAT !!! ... [I apologize if you have received this email in error. If you do not wish to receive further email from the Electronic Forgery Foundation then please send an email to "cypherpunks(a)toad.com" with a Subject heading that says, "I Voted For Strong Crypto!"] You should be careful before you do foolish things like making a death threat because it can have really bad results.

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