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Wired Whitehall
by m5＠vail.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone heard off or seen a report by a UK firm called "Kable" entitled "Wired Whitehall 1999"? I've just been looking at a summary of parts of it, and it seems scary: national ID cards and a concept called "Single Citizen's Account" for management of money flow from (and certainly to) the government. This fits with what Levy described as the low-resistance path most likely to be taken for online money schemes: more visibility, less privacy. | GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5(a)tivoli.com> | | TAKE TWA TO CAIRO. ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX: | | (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |

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Re: Admiral Inman
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I knocked this off Cypherpunks. It has no relevance there, although I was tempted. I'm also responding to both of you in the same message for my convenience. Also, forgive the spelling. For some reason my spell checker keeps bombing today. At 8:39 AM 11/22/94, Connie Sadler (415)725-7703 wrote: >In list.cypherpunks, jgrubs(a)voxbox.norden1.com writes: > >> jamiel(a)sybase.com (Jamie Lawrence) writes: >> >>> It does amaze me that what can be a victimless activity is such ^^^^^^^^^^^ >>> a hotbutton. >> >> Drugs are victimless? What about crack babies, which cost a million ^^^ First, you switched verbs on me. Semantic games are usually pretty pointless, but here you are twisting my meaning. Anyone who doesn't believe that the issue of drugs can be dealt with on a societal level with rationality and respect should read up on or take a trip to Holland (I'm talking drug policy here, not economics or anything else). If you want to talk crack-babies, I'd ask you what are the causes of the situation: some depraved, subhuman need for the drug or an economic and social environment that rapes most people in living it of their self- respect and dignity (I don't see being raised in a U.S. ghetto as being all that far removed from being raised in a totalitarian state, but this is a different conversation topic, and I won't get too into it here). "Gosh, Batman, how can we begin to deal with the root of this issue?" "Well, we have two choices. We can assume that the drug user is a depraved, subhuman beast that deserves to suffer and be incarcerated (and maybe spit on, too), or we can try to find a way to either help them out of a nasty situation, or at least not make their plight any worse than it already is." And we are making it worse, as a nation. As others have noted, legalization would cause prices to fall significantly (less drug related theft), end most related violence (as a smoker, I've never even been *tempted* to mug someone for a butt ;), and probably have significantly better quality, thereby alleviating many of the drug-related health concerns. >> dollars EACH in medical care, btw. > >Exactly! And this is just one example of the victims. What about the extremely ^^^^^^^ If you have this take, look at DCF's comments on the topic. 'Nuff said. >high rate of crime motivated by the need for drugs? I have personally been a Is that 'high rate of crime' attributable to the drugs, the users, the dealers, the economic makeup of the illegal drug industry, the U.S.'s method of responding to what I will agree is a problem, public morality or what? Saying that drugs causes crime is the equivivelent of saying the welfare state causes poverty. Without looking too closely, both statements can seem true, and may have some validity for a particular situation, but is a vast, politically expedient oversimplification that paves the way for a lot of ruthless puritanical moralizing and self-righteous demonization, a lot of public expense in money, human life and human dignity, and a senseless rigidity in response to a situation that can be much better dealt with, any way you measure it. >victim twice (theft of my car and *nice stereo system* and a breakin to my >house where much was taken) in crimes which appeared to be motivated by the ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ So drugs are nasty becuase you have lost something to someone who *might* have stolen becuase of dependency? "Hey - I think that Republican stole my wallet! Republicans should be illegal!" (Yes, I'm being snide, and no, I won't defend it. I think my point, that this is a rather lame, nonempirical appeal, should be clear. I must say that all of this is so basic that I think some sarcasm is not out of line.) >the need for drugs. I don't see where legalizing drugs would motivate addicts >to start working to legitimately pay for their habits. Look harder. >CJS -j

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Brad Templeton, ClariNet, and remailers
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by collins(a)newton.apple.com (Scott Collins) on Tue, 22 Nov 11:5 AM >My summary analysis of Brad is: he'll try to >scare/bully you into getting what he wants by citing >(or imagining) laws upon which he will base >prosecution. Prosecution never follows. If you debate >his law, he resorts to "You are Netcom's customer; >Netcom is my customer; if you want to remain Netcom's >customer then you had better toe my line." Persection >of more or less potency always follows. A couple of months ago a registered threatening letter from who cares appeared near here about my posting a ClariNet article to this list. It was ignored and after a couple of weeks returned itself in shame. End of story. Everyone knows I would never ever post copyrighted material to this list unless an insane over-riding out-of-control compulsion forced me to do so against the scientificly-rational self-preserving law-abiding judgment I've had rammed down my obedient brain since

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Guerrilla Remailers
by skaplin＠skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Has anyone else given thought to "Guerrilla Remailers?" Basically someone obtains an account on one of the freenets or similar free account, sets up a remailer and lets it sit for a while. (Until telnet and/or phone logs are overwritten) After this time frame the address of the remailer is posted. The remailer then would be used until it is shut down by the Powers that be. The account would be set up under a bogus name etc. This would make the remailer the ideal candidate for the last hop in a remailer chain. (After all if they can't find Juanna DuBone or Jack Mehoff they can't apply any pressure to them or hold them responsible. It seems to me the extent of pressure in this case would be just to shut down the remailer) Just keep a few ahead and keep leap frogging, as one is shut down another is put on line. ============================================================================== A man either lives life as it happens to him, meets it head-on and licks it, or he turns his back on it and starts to wither away. -- Dr. Boyce, "The Menagerie" ("The Cage"), stardate unknown ============================================================================== skaplin(a)skypoint.com | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard | outside a Roman brothel. PGP encrypted mail is accepted and | preferred. | Change is the only constant in the | Universe..."Four quarters, please." E-mail key(a)four11.com for PGP Key or | Finger skaplin(a)mirage.skypoint.com | Smile!! Big brother is watching. ============================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtHIWApnimeWAf3FAQGLYAQAgon4d7tKmj1qKJuzSHrZUVhULJKEj7AF vdIA4Ul2H/M3Sv3eP4CPPzCZTVun2ani5k0OhF9pM1cg8coTpepGTF/cGdBEhfN5 /YLkDteMAqqnVu6YxCuLwUDvtHm5QUj1Qj+VM8tTgivfbFnGgcLuu2wx+5XQ7FAP bPSwRLwGGXE= =jOD3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Freemon vs. AT&T
by nobody＠nately.UCSD.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is an excerpt from an Hearing Designation Order adopted by the FCC 20 July 1994 in the case of Freemon vs. AT&T. For more detail, try the FCC Web server: (http://fcc.gov:70/0/Orders/Common_Carrier/orcc4012.txt) I had not seen it mentioned here: >4. The crux of the Freemons' complaint is the allegation that the >AT&T operator who handled Elehue Freemon's May 30, 1988 call improperly >interrupted and divulged the contents of his call and thus violated >Section 705(a) of the Act. According to Mr. Freemon, AT&T's operator >listened to their eight-minute conversation and then interrupted to ask >Lucille Freemon if her son needed medical help. Mr. Freemon claims that >he had already refused two offers of assistance by the operator and that >the operator's subsequent actions were inappropriate. At the outset, AT&T denies that [1] this ever happened and [2] if it did happen the FCC has no jurisdiction in this matter. http://www.fcc.gov/ is the FCC Web Server address. _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. From Thoreau's "Civil Disobedience"

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Re: MEMS
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:15 PM 11/1/94 -0500, John Young wrote: >Benevolent advances on the ankle monitors cherished by >half-free culprits. Position indicators, DNA IDs, body >condition monitors (drugs, anyone), Nicoderm patches, first put >on soldiers for their protection and survival, to ease the way >to more general acceptance, kind of like the G.I. Bill for >tomorrow. One of the first places I read about this personal transponder stuff was in a book by G.K. O'Neill, of space colony fame. The book _2081_ (published in 1981, obviously), talks among other things (he thought magnetic levitated trains in evacuated tunnels were *way* cool) about transponders, and the uses of them in all kinds of computing, including electronic commerce of a sort: pick up the object you want to buy in a store and walk out with it. The store's systems know what the object is, who you are, and sends a message to your bank to deduct the amount from your account. He thought we were going to have to give up privacy to get this boon (and others which I can't remember), but with PKC and blind signatures, we know better now. Of course we also know now that he was copying Xerox PARC ubiquitous computing studies straight into his Apple II, but I had never heard of PARC, much less ubiquitous computing, and was amazed by the idea at the time. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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California Code online
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For the "book disadvantaged" among us, I saw a reference today to the California civil code online. It is at: http://www.law.indiana.edu/codes/ca/codes.html. The form of this URL suggests that other states might be there, too, but I didn't look. This is a very nice presentation, structured with each section in a separate page, and a nice table of contents. I was browsing the commercial code which has lot sof interesting info on commercial paper and other subjects of interest with regard to digital cash. Hal

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cyphertext-only remailers / cryptanalysis code ?
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Alex Strasheim writes: > One solution that I've thought about is only passing messages which are > composed of cyphertext. Does this make any sense? This sounds useful, but I'm curious how you would enforce it. I would think you'd need to do some nontrivial statistical analysis to be reasonably sure you weren't allowing various binaries, uuencoded files, etc. with faked PGP headers, without preventing people from using other encryption schemes. I'd say this is the flip side of the challenge faced by governments trying to outlaw transmissions using strong crypto. Incidentally, I'd love to get pointers to online pieces of code which perform various statistical tests on data to find patterns characteristic of particular encryption schemes, &c. for cryptanalysis. I want to cryptanalyze a couple of encryption algorithms and would like to do some experimental work. Please send me mail directly and I will summarize to the list later on. My starting points are Applied Crypto, the CEB, and Tim's Cyphernomicon. -L. Futplex McCarthy; use "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply PGP key by finger or server; "Better watch what you say, or they'll be calling you a radical...a liberal" --Supertramp "[CIA/KGB mole Aldrich Ames] took information in shopping bags out the front door" --miscellaneous Congressperson -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLtJ3tWf7YYibNzjpAQGOVwQApexTVG/PfeHNQcE+xr5lsCWxtnC13/EL GE8A8T77YavVQDUt3P7zWH8nw05OUosUgwe3QQKu+rRQGV1Y5dLcpxMQIk/iFSE1 3hMzZYCv6L6OQ0wyt8VOuEGmg8ffvBIod9C9i9PndmHZY73j3WPoSbDXLsBXlQu4 my8Oz2NLAP4= =Zxlu -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Admiral Inman
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Our enemies are industriously corrupting the language in order to make the ideas of liberty inexpressible. In particular they are seeking to make the concepts behind the declaration of independence and the bill of rights unspeakably and therefore, they hope, unthinkable. .................................................... Do you think that 'our enemies' are doing this consciously, purposefully, deliberately? Do you think that they know these concepts well enough to apprehend what it is about their meanings that should be corrupted? Do you think that, having understood what these concepts represent, they are in such abhorrence of them that the only thing they can do, short of physical fighting against the promoters of the concepts, is disorient everyone into a confused state of cognitive indeterminancy & inefficacy? Maybe that's what happened to Inman during his rejection speech! Blanc

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Re: DC-Net implementation
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

acspring(a)knoware.nl (Andrew Spring): > >Using a central node to coordinate the DC-net traffic requires that the > >participants trust that central node. If the central node is evil, > A collation of N-1 nodes will always produce garbage; the whole set is > needed for the message to fall out. > Example > ... > A sends 14 - 5 = 9 to Central node > B sends 5 - 11 = -6 Central nodes are not nice for various reasons, including the usual networking and security (trust) advantages of wide distribution. IAC a central node is not necessary; for example, if each node were to output to the next: B sends Anum XOR Brnd (XOR msg) to C where Brnd is B's random number, msg is B's message (if any) and Anum is the similarly generated output of A. This is much closer to the original DCNet _bit_ flipping - the first XOR checks for equality while the second commits the 'lie' In this case whatever number A gets from D is the output of the net. There are lots of interesting cryptographic sub-protocols to make too much trust unnecessary. I also believe that error-correction is best left to lower levels of the network - there's no need for a DC Net not to assume a reliable data channel. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." rishab(a)arbornet.org Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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