- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Real-time surveillance of the police
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim wrote: >(The longer-than-I'd-planned section above is meant to show that even >a cop-disliking skeptic like me can be convinced that some good is >done is by them, and that not all cops are bad. Perhaps my on-day >exposure co-opted me the way certain folks in D.C. got co-opted?) Yup! -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Standard Packet size.
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am about to release Mixmaster as a beta test. Before I do, I would like some input on what size message packet to standardize on. Each message includes twenty 1k headers, and a block with the message text. Right now I have the text block size set to 4k. That seems small, but I am worried about mail systems choking on big messages. Messages over the minimum size are sent separately (through the same chain), and only recombined by the last remailer in the chain. Previous remailers do not know that the message parts are associated. This is quite secure, but not as good as a single packet, so the fewer messages that get split up, the better. Mixmaster compresses the contents of the text block. So, any thoughts on what size the text block should be? BTW Mixmaster still only runs on Sun. Several people are working on porting it to linux. Help with porting to PC and Mac would be appreciated. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLu1Ml1Vkk3dax7hlAQHWfAP+Kj2LyWBySVHfI0QTBBhEvF3b+ru/hywm kALdnXWUkbcSgRHQAMdSpwYza44M7Tc6sX++kDASSjwWyV80cTPHqFEPFmoEcbRV 1BPJB7SAkhwHGpRB5e0daLe0LAuS9KRHbTQcN//n0pUrbqMS2sVJCrDQ7kwrFC8L 3QEzCjWHsAQ= =Dc4G -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Encrypted mail welcome. Home page http://nately.ucsd.edu/~loki/ Home of "chain" the remailer chaining script. For anon remailer info, mail remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu Subject: remailer-help "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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L.A. cpunx meeting
by Agorist003＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Yep, still hosting the weekly L.A. Cypherpunks gathering at the: California Coffee House 4455 Overland Avenue Culver City, CA 90230 (310) 559-8868 Defend Your Privacy! from: "Big Brother" Government and "Dark Side" Hackers - ---------------- L.A. Cypherpunks Help create an "Infotopia," don't support an "Automatic Gestapo." Fight the Clipper "Snitch Chip." Drop in any time between 12 & 5PM Saturdays (excluding holidays). Let's plot and conspire, or at least exchange PGP key fingerprints. Tune Out (media lies), Turn Off (freeway), and Drop In (for coffee). Share information and sell stuff if you wish. I'm trying to get political types to show up, in addition to us computer geekazoids. Show up and get the latest brochure! I'll be there this Saturday, but not the 24th and possibly not in early January (I did say "excluding holidays"). But don't let that stop you unless the coffee house is closed. Kent - jkh(a)story.com (not yet) or agorist003(a)aol.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLuzgeA4ciVn87Ra9AQHHtQP/dTcF9HG+eB6RLqv9F0Q1/aTfRBMIC0i7 8S5/LxUlv9JiKEOqtLuN7cYMLaEKnVUJbrJU8EH2IJH4VecUk+nDCiMOLC6cNIKj FAGJl6CXDRbaA18Ibuye8u1kNpZckxfOBDhlYCArBHiCvRN3hfqHQzgnMpom1Zba 4Gq+nu7c3Zk= =E2Hr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: HTTP security
by ekr＠eit.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I sent a slightly less polished version of this to Perry, and then realized he'd cc'ed Cypherpunks.. but it was gone by then... Perry Metzger sez: >Eric Rescorla says: >> In the email world, you don't necessarily have any sort of prior >> relationship with the person you're communicating with and that public >> key cryptography is relatively cheap. (When it takes minutes to >> ship mail across the net, who's going to notice a second or two >> of signature verification?) However, in the case of the Web, >> things are very different. >Since one can sign pages just once (they are written once and read >often) and one can pick one's signature algorithm to speed up >verifications relative to the signatures (using small exponents is the >usual trick fo this), I'm not sure its that big a problem. You are of course correct. I should have chosen the example of encryption, where you can't preenhance. >I'd like these algorithms to support the serving of signed pages from >hosts that do not know the keys that the pages have been signed with >-- offline signature schemes like the one I just described will >support that nicely. Yes. Conveniently, we've anticipated this requirement. The content type of an SHTTP message can be set to indicate that the enhanced content is actually an enhanced document rather than an enhanced HTTP request/reply. So, you just cons up some headers and drop in the presigned page... But this is a very good point. I'm glad I'm not the only person who thinks this is an important requirement. Details on this can be found in the current SHTTP spec (Section 2.3.3) <http://www.commerce.net/information/standards/drafts/shttp.txt> -Ekr

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Re: Clarification of my remarks about Netscape
by marca＠mcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <9412121811.AA55359(a)amanda.dial.intercon.com>, amanda(a)intercon.com (Amanda Walker) wrote: > > As for the IETF standards process, we are pushing the > > document into the RFC process. > > Precisely. Rather than working with others in the industry and research > communities, you are trying to push your proposal into the standards track. Amanda, we're not trying to push anything into the standards track. We're publishing SSL as an informational RFC, and we have separately submitted SSL as a proposal to the W3O working group on security (in parallel with SHTTP and a handful of other proposals). Nothing is being pushed into the standards track. We are trying to work with others in the industry and research communities, via the above actions, by publishing SSL on our server, by participating in this forum and others, etc., and we are generally succeeding, judging from the overall high level of feedback we're getting from people genuinely interesting in discussing the issues. Marc -- Marc Andreessen Netscape Communications Corp. Mountain View, CA marca(a)mcom.com

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Re: Clarification of my remarks about Netscape
by marca＠mcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199412130318.TAA00912(a)largo.remailer.net>, eric(a)remailer.net (Eric Hughes) wrote: > From: "Kipp E.B. Hickman" <kipp(a)warp.mcom.com> > > If this hadn't been made clear already, then hopefully this will: > > Our intention is to support any development effort attempting > to implement an SSL conformant implementation. We will work with > you to repair the spec as needed to eliminate any errors or > ommisions, and help you test your implementation to ensure that > it interoperates with ours. > > It's clear to me. "We're going to use some security, as long as it's > called SSL and our authorship is on the document." No, he didn't say that -- you're jumping to conclusions based on a statement he's making on a separate topic. We're going to support security mechanisms as they are required and accepted by the market -- functionality, protocols, formats, etc. -- whether or not they are called SSL and whether or not our authorship is on the document. Marc -- Marc Andreessen Netscape Communications Corp. Mountain View, CA marca(a)mcom.com

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THREAD X: subject y
by ddt＠lsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "And Now, For Something Completely Different" I wish all subject fields in msg headers had two parts: 1. the THREAD begin referred to. 2. the SUBJECT of that particular msg. That way, I might be able to follow some of these discussions better. Sure, I can hear you saying it right now: "Jeeze, Dave, dontchaknow MIME can do that?" Sure, but we all know that's beside the Real Issue. We on this list once, looong ago, experimented with META: prefixes to do this, but no one here (or anywhere, to be fair) seems disciplined enough to stick to this. I don't have any proposal anymore. I gave up on trying to fix the world a long time ago. I just struggle along with everyone else and occasionally whine a bit to my Congressperson. No that's a lie: I'm MAD as hell and I'm not gonna take it anymore! Yeah! That's it! dave _________________________________________________________________________ "You can put your shoes in the oven, but that don't make 'em biscuits." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLu04r6HBOF9KrwDlAQEZ/wP/WSrC5jbPDgfwAEjrMwqY2EB6aIJ9E15+ mx2M1nH+UHFlHkes+MuYzmOeDtxQYeYq6dz/mnSycP/gpUdCZI/WibteShQNdzL3 jccSed/5T7CL0aX+1qThajoB/BRB0cBU+L6kaWdZJyCV0I88xw2OdYG9Gkhsp0sp 1NGLfYAaQOI= =b53r -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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re: IPSP and Netscape
by John Giannandrea 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Hughes writes: > It may be that IPSP is not the quickest or best way to link security, but > that is not the point I am making here. The original denial of IPSP's > potential utility was made in complete ignorance Widespread acceptance of IPSP may well make SSL irrelevant. I do not believe that anyone at Netscape is claiming otherwise. Nonetheless, widespread implementation of IPSP simply does not exist at this time. We need a solution for our customers _today_. SSL is one working solution to the problem of link security. By publishing our specification of SSL we are inviting others to share in our work, or criticize us for being foolish. I do not believe that we are either arrogant nor ignorant in creating SSL. The market will, of course, help decide. -jg

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Re: Hal Finney & Bob Rae and Ontario's Parliament
by jgrubs＠voxbox.norden1.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Richard Martin ( frodo ) <g4frodo(a)cdf.toronto.edu> writes: > Mea culpa. I was thrown by the US government's free use of it (I think > they get that, don't they?). On a silly note, my government is not > currently making money, and could hardly be classified as being in > business. ;) At least yours isn't planning a going out of business sale.... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLu3PWd74r4kaz3mVAQHJ5AP/WbDZL2bM1Dn8GuNcOSRkM9PTR75oGOwb fg2dwp95pojg9DWsmRuhiydX4l+Jb0tXdCNn/J/Xou5/ABBQ7vngyVbK90Inv6Sq Dahptd8jXKyHQvz0xex3Jmd81+KXhM4DIR7f8dMEs3NDVzwgORnUlCvJQg116dJO j+kTyHCzGd0= =vPKv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment of men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding." - Justice Louis Brandeis -- jgrubs(a)voxbox.norden1.com (James C. Grubs, W8GRT) Voxbox Enterprises, 6817 Maplewood Ave., Sylvania, Ohio 43560-1956 Tel.: 419/882-2697

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Re: Clarification of my remarks about Netscape
by kipp＠warp.mcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199412130729.XAA01473(a)jobe.shell.portal.com>, you write: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > It is nice to have a lot of people on the list from Netscape. > Here is a question about SSL relating to the use of certificates: > > + The issuer name must resolve to a name that is deemed > acceptable by the application using SSL. How the application > using SSL does this is outside the scope of this memo. > > What does Netscape actually do about this? If I want to make a server > which will interoperate with existing Netscape clients what kind of > certificate do I need, and what kind of name should be in there? > Thanks - > > Hal Finney > hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6 > > iQBVAwUBLu1NOxnMLJtOy9MBAQGItwIAr4eerI+FSmPpOIcwITepnXzcUUFkPwsK > +Rz2FC4Y6hV0HoDEt1JnpvCPVV5N74Jtc9xMmF8CcRlBybk25PkxVQ== > =LOql > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Because online directory services are not one of the extant solved problems on the Internet, Netscape uses a simple approach - a small set of "important issuer" certificates are compiled into the browser. A future release will support "key rings" ala PGP. This is all we had time for in this release... All you need to do is get your server certificate from one of several places, including: RSA (commercial CA or server CA) Netscape (not likely; we can't afford the liability) MCI (I don't know if they are selling this). So the short answer is: it's hard to do right now. In six months it should be a very different scenario. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Kipp E.B. Hickman Netscape Communications Corp. kipp(a)mcom.com http://www.mcom.com/people/kipp/index.html

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