- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Elm and premail (long)
by John A. Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have just finished integrating premail 0.30 with Elm on jpunix.com. Since there have been some questions about how to do this type of thing, I thought I'd give a blow-by-blow description of what I did and the pro's, con's and alternatives to what I did. 1) I installed premail as a wedge to the sendmail daemon. In other words, per Raph Levin's instructions in his README file, I renamed sendmail to something else and then renamed premail to sendmail and have it pointing to the renamed sendmail. I realize this requires system admin privs and is a big step to take, but I have testing premail working as the sendmail program with great success and at this point I have no qualms about premail/sendmail being one in the same. 2) I created the ~/.premailrc file in my home directory per Raph's README file. There is an option at the bottom to create aliases and that is what I did at first. Then, I discovered that the alias database created by Elm is compatible with premail!! 3) I edited ~/.elm/aliases.text to make changes similar to the following: The alias raph = Levin; Raph = raph(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu to raph = Levin; Raph = raph@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu^key=raph@cs.berkeley.edu Elm doesn't seem to mind this new alias structure and premail parses it just fine! I could have added a ^chain=3 also, but I decided that I may not want to email Raph through a set of remailers every time. I decided I would add the extra header during message creation. More on this later. What this does is that from now on, whenever I send email to Raph, it will automatically be encrypted with his public key with no further intervention on my part! When I want to chain the message through some remailers, I just take the H)eaders option from the Elm pre-send menu and add a header line: Chain: 3 This causes the message to be chaine through three random remailers before it gets to Raph. I also added two addition Perl scripts to Elm to help in the creation of encrypted messages for people NOT in my alias file, signing messages, and reading PGP encrypted messages that are not MIME compliant. These scripts are mailpgp and morepgp. These Perl scripts were published with version 2.3 of PGP but work fine with 2.4 and up. In Elm, I went to the options menu and replaced the default editor with mailpgp as well as the visual editor. I also replaced the default builtin+ display parameter with morepgp. These two Perl scripts are listed at the end of this message. The mailpgp script will allow you to encrypt and sign messages right before they are sent. The morepgp script will decrypt/verify incoming messages on the fly. The really nice benefit of these scripts is that you can reply to cleartext version of PGP encrypted messages. With the combination of these Perl scripts, Elm (or Pine for that matter) can be turned into an encrypted mail handler with a minimum of fuss. morepgp: #!/usr/local/bin/perl # -*- Perl -*- # written by jason steiner, jsteiner(a)anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu, Jan 1993 # # if you use or make improvements to this program i would appreciate # copies of your modifications & your PGP public key. # # Modified by Greg Spencer, greg(a)graphics.cornell.edu, May 1994 # Mostly just cleaned up things and added stuff like automatic # addition and detection (and ignoring) of keys to be added to keyring, # and signal catching, as well as environment variable control of # most site-specific stuff. # # Must set the following environment variable: # # PGPCOMMAND set to the pgp decryption command # # PAGER set to the desired pager command # # NOTE that this program NEVER writes sensitive data to a disk file. # it will only slurp it into memory, so if you have a HUGE file, you might # have problems. # setup some variables ($pgpcommand = $ENV{'PGPCOMMAND'}) || ($pgpcommand = "/usr/local/bin/pgp"); # just used for tmpfile names... ($logname = $ENV{'LOGNAME'}) || ($logname = "nobody"); # ($pager = $ENV{'PAGER'}) || ($pager="/usr/local/bin/less -i -n -s -S -c -M"); ($pager = $ENV{'PAGER'}) || ($pager="/usr/bin/more -c"); $|=1; $topgp = 0; $tokey = 0; $pgpused = 0; ($tmpdir = $ENV{'TMPDIR'}) || ($tmpdir = "/tmp"); #temporary file name $tmpfile = "${tmpdir}/.pgp1.$logname.$$"; $tmpfile2 = "${tmpdir}/.pgp2.$logname.$$"; # trap signals so we do not leave # garbage around sub catcher { local ($sig) = @_; print "Caught a SIG$sig -- exiting\n"; close (TMPFILE); close (OUTPUT); close (PAGER); unlink ($tmpfile); unlink ($tmpfile2); } $SIG{'INT'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'QUIT'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'HUP'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'KILL'} = 'catcher'; # make sure nobody can read stuff umask 077; # prepare a data area @tmpdata = (); @newkeys = (); while (<>) { if (!$topgp && m/^-----BEGIN PGP .*-----/ && !m/^-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $topgp = 1; $pgpused = 1; unlink ($tmpfile); open (TMPFILE, ">$tmpfile") || (unlink ($tmpfile) && die "Cannot open $tmpfile for output.\n"); } if (!$topgp) { push(@tmpdata, $_); } if ((!$tokey) && (m/^-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/)) { $contains_keys = 1; $tokey = 1; } if ($tokey) { push (@newkeys, $_); if (m/^-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $tokey = 0; } } if ($topgp) { print TMPFILE $_; # OK to write this to a file -- it is encrypted! if (m/^-----END PGP .*-----/ && !m/^-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $topgp = 0; close TMPFILE; open (CLEAR, "$pgpcommand -f < $tmpfile |") || (unlink($tmpfile) && die "Cannot open pipe to PGP.\n"); $blocktype = $_; $blocktype =~s/^-----END (PGP .*)-----/$1/; $blocktype =~s/PGP MESSAGE/DECRYPTED MESSAGE/; $blocktype =~s/PGP SIGNATURE/SIGNED MESSAGE/; chop ($blocktype); push (@tmpdata, "-----BEGIN $blocktype-----\n"); while (<CLEAR>) { push (@tmpdata, $_); if ((!$tokey) && (m/^-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/)) { $contains_keys = 1; $tokey = 1; } if ($tokey) { push (@newkeys, $_); if (m/^-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $tokey = 0; } } } close CLEAR; print STDERR "\n"; unlink ($tmpfile); push (@tmpdata, "-----END $blocktype-----\n"); } } } select (STDIN); $|=1; select (STDERR); $|=1; select (STDOUT); $|=1; # This handles things if we found keys that need # adding to our keyring # note that we are only writing the KEYS to the file. if ($contains_keys) { print STDERR "PGP Keys found, attempting to add...\n"; open (TMPFILE2, ">$tmpfile2"); foreach $_ (@newkeys) { print TMPFILE2; } close (TMPFILE2); # strange things happen if we do not # read/write directly from /dev/tty (perl bug??) system ("$pgpcommand -ka $tmpfile2 >/dev/tty </dev/tty 2>&1"); unlink ($tmpfile2); # get rid of it asap $pgpused = 1; } # copy the contents of @tmpdata to the pager we want to use. open (PAGER, "|$pager") || (unlink ($tmpfile1) && die "Cannot open pipe to $pager.\n"); # do "press any key to continue" # only if we had some output from PGP # (like a verified signature) # again with the /dev/tty thing (weird!) if ($pgpused) { $q=''; open (TTY, "</dev/tty") || (unlink ($tmpfile1) && die "Couldn't open /dev/tty\n"); select(TTY); $| = 1; print STDERR "Press any key to continue...\n"; $q = getc (TTY); select (STDIN); } # output the decoded thing to the pager foreach $_ (@tmpdata) { print PAGER; } @tmpdata = (); close OUTPUT; close PAGER; # cleanup unlink ($tmpfile); mailpgp: #!/usr/local/bin/perl # -*- Perl -*- # written by jason steiner, jsteiner(a)anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu, Jan 1993 # # if you use or make improvements to this program i would appreciate # copies of your modifications & your PGP public key. # # Modified by Greg Spencer, greg(a)graphics.cornell.edu, May 1994 # Mostly just cleaned up things and added stuff like automatic # addition and detection (and ignoring) of keys to be added to keyring, # and signal catching, as well as environment variable control of # most site-specific stuff. # # Must set the following environment variables: # # EDITOR or VISUAL set to editor of choice # # PGPCOMMAND set to the pgp decryption command # # PGPID or SIGNATURE set to the id you wish to # have used for your pgp signatures, etc. # # PREFIX set to the forwarded message prefix that you use # # setup some variables ($visual = $ENV{'EDITOR'}) || ($visual = $ENV{'VISUAL'}) || ($visual = 'pico'); ($pgpcommand = $ENV{'PGPCOMMAND'}) || ($pgpcommand = "/usr/local/bin/pgp"); #($myname = $ENV{'PGPID'}) || ($myname = $ENV{'SIGNATURE'}); ($prefix = $ENV{'PREFIX'}) || ($prefix = "> "); $topgp = 0; $blanks = 0; $paragraphs = 1; $blankcompress = 1; $name=@ARGV[$#ARGV]; #temporary file names $rplyfile = "$name.rply"; $pgpfile = "$name.pgp"; $ascfile = "$name.asc"; $clrfile = "$name.clr"; # trap signals so we don't leave # (possibly sensitive!) garbage around sub catcher { local($sig) = @_; print "Caught a SIG$sig -- exiting\n"; close (OUTPUT); close (PGPFILE); close (CLEAR); close (INPUT); unlink ("$pgpfile"); unlink ("$rplyfile"); unlink ("$clrfile"); unlink ("$ascfile"); } $SIG{'INT'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'QUIT'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'HUP'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'KILL'} = 'catcher'; # parse the input file to see if we're replying to an encrypted message # user may need to type in pass phrase to decode umask (077); open (INPUT, "<$name"); open (OUTPUT, ">$rplyfile") || die "Cannot open $rplyfile for output.\n"; while (<INPUT>) { # make sure to allow printing of key blocks if (!$topgp && (!m/^$prefix-----BEGIN PGP .*-----/ || m/^$prefix-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/)) { if (m/^$prefix*$/) { if ($paragraphs) { if ($blankcompress) { if ($blanks == 0) { print OUTPUT "\n"; $blanks = 1; } } else { print OUTPUT "\n"; } } else { print OUTPUT; } } elsif (m/^[ \t\r]*$/) { if ($blankcompress) { if ($blanks == 0) { print OUTPUT "\n"; $blanks = 1; } } else { print OUTPUT; } } else { print OUTPUT; if ($. == 1 && !m/^$prefix/) { print OUTPUT "\n"; $blanks = 1; } else { $blanks = 0; } } } # make sure to skip key blocks because we already did 'em in morepgp if (!$topgp && m/^$prefix-----BEGIN PGP .*-----/ && !m/^$prefix-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/ ) { $topgp = 1; unlink ($pgpfile); open (PGPFILE, ">$pgpfile") || die "Cannot open $pgpfile for output.\n"; } if ($topgp) { $_ =~ s/^$prefix//; print PGPFILE $_; # make sure to skip key blocks because we already did 'em in morepgp if (m/^-----END PGP .*-----/ && !m/^-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $blocktype = $_; $blocktype =~ s/^-----END (PGP .*)-----/$1/; $blocktype =~ s/PGP MESSAGE/DECRYPTED MESSAGE/; $blocktype =~ s/PGP SIGNATURE/SIGNED MESSAGE/; chop ($blocktype); $topgp = 0; close (PGPFILE); system ("$pgpcommand $pgpfile -o $clrfile > /dev/tty 2>&1"); open (CLEAR, "<$clrfile") || die "Cannot open $clrfile for input.\n"; print OUTPUT "$prefix-----BEGIN $blocktype-----\n> \n"; $blanks = 0; while (<CLEAR>) { if (m/^[ \t\r]*$/) { if ($paragraphs) { if ($blankcompress) { if ($blanks == 0) { print OUTPUT "\n"; $blanks = 1; } } else { print OUTPUT "\n"; } } else { print OUTPUT "$prefix\n"; } } else { print OUTPUT "$prefix"; print OUTPUT; $blanks = 0; } } close (CLEAR); unlink ($clrfile); unlink ($pgpfile); print OUTPUT "$prefix-----END $blocktype-----\n\n"; } } } close OUTPUT; close INPUT; unlink ($name); rename ("$rplyfile", "$name"); system ($visual, @ARGV); while (!$q) { print "\nSign this message? [Y]: "; $q = <STDIN>; $q =~ s/[ \t\n]//g; $q = substr ($q, 0, 1); if (($q eq 'Y') || ($q eq 'y') || ($q eq '')) { push (@opts, '-st', '+clearsig=on'); $q = "y"; } elsif (($q ne 'N') && ($q ne 'n')) { $q = ''; } } # note that it is the default to NOT encrypt, # simply because not everyone has PGP (unfortunately :-) $q=''; while (!$q) { print "Encrypt this message? [N]: "; $q = <STDIN>; $q =~ s/[ \t\n]//g; $q = substr ($q, 0, 1); if (($q eq 'Y') || ($q eq 'y')) { push (@opts, '-e'); $q = "y"; } elsif (($q eq 'N') || ($q eq 'n') || ($q eq '')) { $q = "n"; } else { $q = ''; } } if (@opts) { if ($q eq 'y') { print "Enter receipients, each on a separate line, terminate with EOF or a single `.':\n"; { print "> "; if ($_ = <STDIN>) { chop; last if ("$_" eq '.'); push (@receipients, "$_"); redo; } last; } } system ($pgpcommand, '-a', @opts, "$name", @receipients); if ($? == 0) { unlink ($name); rename ("$ascfile", "$name"); } } - -- John A. Perry - KG5RG - perry(a)jpunix.com WWW - http://jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! Finger kserver(a)jpunix.com for PGP keyserver help. Finger remailer(a)jpunix.com for remailer help. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtvwZ1OTpEThrthvAQFwlAP+MxX6olbMempfh6UYdTDGruTngH+WgRsa BacTB86oNIjlllDfZB55KJyuUs5dpP+gRRDW4BZTK6zyNuzy3tv5iErQnvDiV/Tn PjSKmJJFs7HnC88aC830eQ+ojGaXzZCE2IbaTm/a7R6SU9nLc/KnJYY5pMHjdVx+ uN0xwmRrBYw= =SUyb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Security Services
by Ian Farquhar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From The Australian, Tue 29th November: Secret Service Files Lost in Blaze, by Cameron Steward (Foreign Affairs Writer) "Hundreds of top-secret documents relevant to the Federal Government's inquiry into the Australian Secret Intelligence Service were destroyed by a fire that swept through the ASIS headquarters in Canberra at the weekend." "The fire has erased highly sensitive ASIS files and archives that detailed the activities and operations of the troubled spy agency over the past decade." "The blaze is a big blow to the Government's inquiry into accountability and management of ASIS because it destroyed many of the records needed to adequately assess the organisation's performance." "But despite the suspicious timing of the accident, the Government does not believe it was arson and says that the blaze appears to have been sparked by an electrical fault." "'I can confirm that the fire broke out at 2am on Saturday morning on the fourth floor of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Building,' a DFAT spokeswoman said." "'The damage appears to have been fairly extensive and is believed to have been caused by an electrical fault.'" "Sources yesterday said the area damaged by the blzae was far greater than was originally revealed by the authorities, with the initial damage estimate of about $200,000 ballooning to at least $1 million." "The fourth floor of the DFAT building has housed ASIS for years." "One intelligence source said last night that it was 'highly coincidental' for ASIS to experience such a fire in the midst of a Government inquiry into its operations." "It was rumored yesterday that the fire also destroyed thousands of files that the service was alleged to have kept on Australian citizens." "Two former ASIS officers alleged in March that the organisation illegally held files on thousands of Australian citizens, despite the fact that it is not part of its role involving gaining foreign intelligence." "The former agents also claimed ASIS has bribed politicans in Malaysia and had helped British Intelligence obtain confidential information that harmed Australia's interests." (Small note here which was not in the article: the ASIS jargon for MI6 is 'head office'. Many of the officers were trained by MI6.) "The allegations by the former officers prompted the Government to conduct an inquiry into the control and accountability of the organisation." "The inquiry, headed by former NSW Supreme Court judge Mr Gordon Samuels, is also examining the 'protection of ASIS intelligence sources and methods' as well as the 'resolution of grievances and complaints relating to ASIS." "The inquiry has been in progress for several months. It is still taking evidence and is due to report to the Government early in the New Year." This article was transcribed without permission from the paper, for the purposes of research and study as defined in the "fair use" provisions of the Copyright act. ------- Yet another depressing but compelling reminder that our privacy has as many enemies within the Government as without. BTW, this was the same TLA which I mentioned some weeks ago in connection with the bungled raid on the Sheraton Wentworth Hotel. Ian. #include <std.disclaimer>

2 2

Re: PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM)
by shawn leas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Where can I get this software? Looks kinda cool. BTW... I like the idea of spurring on some pgp usage. It's a good idea. I would not object to having to sign messages. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtwEkqZRyOzqm29xAQEoKgQAywzBTW92lYiDEFQPVfmWxHg3hYnKDN70 c3gRSNjqO6VcJguXhVBHHjA3/ZBpWybys9deML/2FONUwrm50+MKotifo+7wpKnk E6LIrnuzuJdmlMTACR6Qx3FXVpnuQmuDz2jRybxDST+Iob5jItwt2SsZkSuFscDN vdxQHa26VAs= =BmiN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Is Pr0duct Cypher still around?
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Having posted that massive spam asking Pr0duct Cypher for some information, it occurs to me to ask if he has been heard from lately. Has anyone seen anything from him lately? -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Encrypted mail welcome. Home page http://nately.ucsd.edu/~loki/ Home of "chain" the remailer chaining script. For anon remailer info, mail remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu Subject: remailer-help "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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Where to get the latest PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) FAQ
by Michael Paul Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ===============================BEGIN SIGNED TEXT============================= WHERE TO GET THE PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY PROGRAM (PGP) (Last modified: 30 November 1994 by Mike Johnson) WHAT IS THE LATEST VERSION? |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Platform(s) | Latest Version | Distribution File Names | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | DOS, Unix, | Viacrypt PGP 2.7 | disk sets | | Mac, Windows, | | | | or WinCIM/CSNav | | | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | DOS, Unix, | MIT PGP 2.6.2 | pgp262.zip (DOS + docs) | | others | | pgp262s.zip (source) | | | | pg262s.zip source on CompuServe | | | | pgp262.tar.gz (source) | | | | pgp262.gz (same as above on DOS)| | | | pgp262.tar.Z (source) | | | | pgp262dc.zip (documentation) | | | | pg262d.zip (docs on CompuServe) | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Macintosh | MIT PGP 2.6 | MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx (binary+docs) | | | | macpgp26.hqx (same as above) | | | | MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx (source) | | | | macpgp26.src (same as above) | | | | MacPGP2.6-68000.sea.hqx (binary)| | | | mcpgp268.hqx (same as above) | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Mac Applescript | MacPGP 2.6ui v 1.2 | MacPGP-2.6ui-v1.2.sit.hqx | | | | MacPGP2.6ui_V1.2_sources.cpt.hqx| | | | MacPGP2.6uiV1.2en.cpt.hqx | | | | MacPGP2.6uiV1.2src.cpt.hqx | | | | MacPGP2.6uiV1.2.68000.hqx | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Amiga | PGP 2.6.2 Amiga 1.4 | pgp262-a14-000.lha | | | | pgp262-a14-020.lha | | | | pgp262-a14-src.lha | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Atari | Atari PGP 2.6ui | pgp26uib.lzh (binary, docs) | | | | pgp26uis.lzh | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Archimedes | Archimedes 2.3a | ArcPGP23a | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Non-USA version | PGP 2.6.i from | pgp26i.zip | | to avoid RSAREF | Stale Schumacher | pgp26is.zip | | license. | | pgp26is.tar.gz | |_________________|_____________________|_________________________________| WHERE CAN I GET THE PGP VERSION DIRECTLY FROM PHILIP ZIMMERMANN? This is the MIT version. For several good reasons, Phil is releasing the main line freeware PGP through MIT, at net-dist.mit.edu. See a list of sites that also carry this version, below, or use this WWW URL: http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp-form.html WHAT IS PGP 2.6.i? Stale Schumacher <staalesc(a)ifi.uio.no> released an international version of PGP built the "right way." By "right way," I mean that it uses the latest MIT code, but uses a different rsaglue.c to use the mpilib instead of RSAREF for RSA calculations, thus including all the latest bug fixes and features in the main freeware PGP code line, but frees non-USA persons from the limitations of the RSAREF license. This release has been as strongly endorsed by Philip Zimmermann as he can do without incriminating himself. Naturally, by not using the RSAREF code for RSA calculations, this version is not legal for use in the USA (other than limited research, etc.), but is fine anywhere else (like Canada) were RSA patents don't hold. Note that the latest version of Stale Schumacher's PGP is 2.6.i, 2.6i (without the second .) was a beta test version that has been superceded. WHAT IS PGP 2.6ui? The "unofficial international" versions are really just PGP 2.3a, modified just enough to make it compatible with MIT PGP 2.6, but do not include all of the fixes in MIT PGP 2.6 and MIT PGP 2.6.1. They have a "ui" somewhere in their file names. I recommend the use of the "ui" versions only if you are using a platform for which there is no Viacrypt or MIT PGP that works properly. For a version that doesn't use RSAREF, PGP 2.6.i from Stale Schumacher is a better choice, because it is more up-to-date. WHERE CAN I GET VIACRYPT PGP? If you are a commercial user of PGP in the USA or Canada, contact Viacrypt in Phoenix, Arizona, USA. The commecial version of PGP is fully licensed to use the patented RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms in commercial applications, and may be used in corporate and government environments in the USA and Canada. It is fully compatible with, functionally the same as, and just as strong as the freeware version of PGP. Due to limitations on ViaCrypt's RSA distribution license, ViaCrypt only distributes executable code and documentation for it, but they are working on making PGP available for a variety of platforms. Call or write to them for the latest information. The latest version number for Viacrypt PGP is 2.7. Here is a brief summary of Viacrypt's currently-available products: 1. ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS. Prices start at $99.98 2. ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX. Includes executables for the following platforms: SunOS 4.1.x (SPARC) IBM RS/6000 AIX HP 9000 Series 700/800 UX SCO 386/486 UNIX SGI IRIX AViiON DG-UX(88/OPEN) Prices start at $149.98 Executables for the following additional platforms are available upon request for an additional $30.00 charge. BSD 386 Ultrix MIPS DECstation 4.x 3. ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav. A special package for users of CompuServe. Prices start at $119.98 Please contact ViaCrypt for quantity discount pricing. Orders may be placed by calling 800-536-2664 during the hours of 8:30am to 5:00pm MST, Monday - Friday. They accept VISA, MasterCard, AMEX and Discover credit cards. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact: Paul E. Uhlhorn Director of Marketing, ViaCrypt Products Mail: 9033 N. 24th Avenue Suite 7 Phoenix AZ 85021-2847 Phone: (602) 944-0773 Fax: (602) 943-2601 Internet: viacrypt(a)acm.org Compuserve: 70304.41 WHERE CAN I GET THE FREEWARE PGP? These listings are subject to change without notice. If you find that PGP has been removed from any of these sites, please let me know so that I can update this list. Likewise, if you find PGP on a good site elsewhere (especially on any BBS that allows first time callers to access PGP for free), please let me know so that I can update this list. Because this list changes frequently, I have not attempted to keep it complete, but there should be enough pointers to let you easily find PGP. There are several ways to get the freeware PGP: ftp, WWW, BBS, CompuServe, email ftp server, and sneakernet (ask a friend for a copy). Just don't ask Philip Zimmermann directly for a copy. FTP SITES IN NORTH AMERICA There are some wierd hoops to jump through, thanks to the U. S. Department of State and the ITAR, at many of these sites. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu, log in as getpgp, answer the questions, then ftp to net-dist.mit.edu and change to the hidden directory named in the telnet session to get your own copy. MIT-PGP is for U. S. and Canadian use only, but MIT is only distributing it within the USA (due to some archaic export control laws). 1. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/mitlicen.txt and agree to it. 2. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/rsalicen.txt and agree to it. 3. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu and log in as getpgp. 4. Answer the questions and write down the directory name listed. 5. QUICKLY end the telnet session with ^C and ftp to the indicated directory on net-dist.mit.edu (something like /pub/PGP/dist/U.S.-only-????) and get the distribution files (see the above chart for names). If the hidden directory name is invalid, start over at step 3, above. You can also get PGP from: ftp.csn.net/mpj ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/help for more help on negotiating this site's export control methods (open to USA and Canada). ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj ftp://ftp.netcom.com/mp/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj/help for more help on negotiating this site's export control methods. TO GET THESE FILES BY EMAIL, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com containing the word HELP in the body of the message for instructions. You will have to work quickly to get README.MPJ then the files before the ??????? part of the path name changes again (several times a day). ftp.eff.org Follow the instructions found in README.Dist that you get from one of: ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/README.Dist gopher.eff.org, 1/Net_info/Tools/Crypto gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/Net_info/Tools/Crypto http://www.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/ ftp.csua.berkeley.edu (for U. S. or Canadian users) /pub/cypherpunks/pgp/ ftp.wimsey.bc.ca /pub/crypto/software/dist/US_or_Canada_only_XXXXXXX/PGP (U. S. and Canadian users only) See /pub/crypto/software/README for the characters for XXXXXXXX This site has all public releases of the freeware PGP. WORLD WIDE WEB ACCESS http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp-form.html http://www.ifi.uio.no/~staalesc/PGPVersions.html http://www.mantis.co.uk/pgp/pgp.html http://rschp2.anu.edu.au:8080/crypt.html http://www.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/ http://community.net/community/all/home/solano/sbaldwin COMPUSERVE The NCSA Forum sysops have a library (Library 12: Export Controlled) that is available only to people who send them a message asserting that they are within the U. S. A. This library contains PGP. I have also seen PGP in some other places on Compuserve. Try searching for PGP262.ZIP in the IBMFF forum for up-to-date information on PGP in selected other areas. The last time I tried a search like this, PGP was found in the PC World Online forum (GO PWOFORUM) new uploads area, along with several PGP shells and accessories. I've also heard that EUROFORUM carries PGP, but have not confirmed this. Compuserve file names are even more limited than DOS (6.3 instead of the already lame 8.3), so the file names to look for are PGP262.ZIP, PG262S.ZIP (source code), PGP262.GZ (Unix source code) and PG262D.ZIP (documentation only). BULLETIN BOARD SYSTEMS Colorado Catacombs BBS Mike Johnson, sysop Mac and DOS versions of PGP, PGP shells, and some other crypto stuff. Also the home of some good Bible search files and some shareware written by Mike Johnson, including ATBASH, DLOCK, CRYPTA, CRYPTE, CRYPTMPJ, MCP, MDIR, DELETE, PROVERB, SPLIT, ONEPAD, QUICRYPT, etc. v.FAST/v.32bis/v.42bis, speeds up to 28,800 bps 8 data bits, 1 stop, no parity, as fast as your modem will go. Use ANSI terminal emulation, of if you can't, try VT-100. Free access to PGP. If busy or no answer, try again later. Log in with your own name, or if someone else already used that, try a variation on your name or pseudonym. You can request access to crypto software on line, and if you qualify legally under the ITAR, you can download on the first call. For free access: log in with your own name, answer the questions, then select [Q]uestionaire 3 from the [M]ain menu. (303) 772-1062 Longmont, Colorado number - 2 lines. (303) 938-9654 Boulder, Colorado number forwarded to Longmont number intended for use by people in the Denver, Colorado area. The Freedom Files BBS, DeLand Florida, USA 904-738-2691 Exec-Net, New York, NY, USA (Host BBS for the ILink net) 914-667-4567 The Ferret BBS (North Little Rock, Arkansas) (501) 791-0124 also (501) 791-0125 Special PGP users account: login name: PGP USER password: PGP This information from: Jim Wenzel <jim.wenzel(a)grapevine.lrk.ar.us> CVRC BBS 317-791-9617 CyberGold BBS 601-582-5748 Self-Governor Information Resource, 915-587-7888, El Paso, Texas, USA In the UK, try 01273-688888 Other BBS -- check your local BBS. Chances are good that it has any release that is at least a month old if it has much of a file area at all. OTHER FTP SITES ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de /pub/virus/crypt/pgp This site has most, if not all, of the current PGP files. ftp.ox.ac.uk (163.1.2.4) ftp.netcom.com /pub/dc/dcosenza -- Some crypto stuff, sometimes includes PGP. /pub/gb/gbe/pgpfaq.asc -- frequently asked questions answered. /pub/qw/qwerty -- How to MacPGP Guide, largest steganography ftp site as well. PGP FAQ, crypto FAQ, US Crypto Policy FAQ, Steganograpy software list. MacUtilites for use with MacPGP. Stealth1.1 + other steganography programs. Send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com with "HELP" in the body of the message if you don't have ftp access. ftp.ee.und.ac.za /pub/crypto/pgp ftp.csua.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp (DOS, MAC) ftp.demon.co.uk /pub/amiga/pgp /pub/archimedes /pub/pgp /pub/mac/MacPGP ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de ftp.funet.fi ftp.dsi.unimi.it /pub/security/crypt/PGP ftp.tu-clausthal.de (139.174.2.10) (Atari ST/E,TT,Falcon) /pub/atari/misc/pgp/pgp26uib.lzh (2.6ui ttp, 2.3a docs) /pub/atari/misc/pgp/pgp26uis.lzh (2.6ui sources) /pub/atari/misc/pgp/pgp26ui.diffs (Atari diffs for 2.6 sources) wuarchive.wustl.edu /pub/aminet/util/crypt src.doc.ic.ac.uk (Amiga) /aminet /amiga-boing ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de /pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23os2A.zip (OS/2) iswuarchive.wustl.edu pub/aminet/util/crypt (Amiga) nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) /pub/crypt ftp.uni-kl.de (131.246.9.95) /pub/aminet/util/crypt qiclab.scn.rain.com (147.28.0.97) pc.usl.edu (130.70.40.3) leif.thep.lu.se (130.235.92.55) goya.dit.upm.es (138.4.2.2) tupac-amaru.informatik.rwth-aachen.de (137.226.112.31) ftp.etsu.edu (192.43.199.20) princeton.edu (128.112.228.1) pencil.cs.missouri.edu (128.206.100.207) ftp.csua.berkeley.edu kauri.vuw.ac.nz nctuccca.edu.tw /PC/wuarchive/pgp/ ftp.fu-berlin.de:/mac/sys/init/MacPGP2.6uiV1.2en.cpt.hqx.gz Also, try an archie search for PGP using the command: archie -s pgp262 (DOS & Unix Versions) archie -s pgp2.6 (MAC Versions) FTPMAIL For those individuals who do not have access to FTP, but do have access to e-mail, you can get FTP files mailed to you. For information on this service, send a message saying "Help" to ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com. You will be sent an instruction sheet on how to use the ftpmail service. It works with messages something like this: > To: ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com > Subject: Ftpmail request > Connect ftp.csua.berkeley.edu > chdir pub/cypherpunks/pgp/pgp262 > uuencode > get pgp262.zip > quit Another e-mail service is from nic.funet.fi. Send the following mail message to mailserv(a)nic.funet.fi: ENCODER uuencode SEND pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip SEND pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip This will deposit the two zipfiles, as 15 batched messages, in your mailbox with about 24 hours. Save and uudecode. For the ftp sites on netcom, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com containing the word HELP in the body of the message. To get pgp 2.6.i by email: Send a message to hypnotech-request(a)ifi.uio.no with your request in the Subject: field. Subject What you will get GET pgp26i.zip MS-DOS executable (uuencoded) GET pgp26is.zip MS-DOS source code (uuencoded) GET pgp26is.tar.gz UNIX source code (uuencoded) For FAQ information, send e-mail to mail-server(a)rtfm.mit.edu with send usenet/news.answers/ftp-list/faq in the body of the message. IS MY COPY OF PGP GOOD? If you find a version of the PGP package that does not include the PGP User's Guide, something is wrong. The manual should always be included in the package. PGP should be signed by one of the developers (Philip Zimmermann, Jeff Schiller, Viacrypt, Stale Schumacher, etc.). If it isn't, the package is suspect and should not be used or distributed. The site you found it on should remove it so that it does no further harm to others. To be really sure, you should get PGP directly from MIT or check the signatures with a version of PGP that you trust. The copies of PGP on ftp.csn.net/mpj, ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj, and the Colorado Catacombs BBS are direct copies of the ones on MIT, except that the ones on the BBS include a BBS advertisement (automatically added by the system when it virus scans new files) in the outer .zip files. OTHER PGP DOCUMENTATION PGP is rather counter-intuitive to a Mac user. Luckily, there's a guide to using MacPGP in ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/qw/qwerty/Here.is.How.to.MacPGP. There is a Frequently Asked Questions document in ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/gb/gbe/pgpfaq.asc For more information on the "time bomb" in PGP, see ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/pgpbomb.asc More PGP details are at http://www.pegasus.esprit.ec.org/people/arne/pgp.html Windows shells documentation http://www.LCS.com/winpgp.html LANGUAGE MODULES These are suitable for most PGP versions. I am not aware of any export/import restrictions on these files. German * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/PGP_german_docs.lha Italian * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/PGP/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz Japanese * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-msgs-japanese.tar.gz Lithuanian * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp23ltk.zip Russian * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26ru.zip (MIT version) * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26uir.zip (ui version) * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26ru.zip Spanish * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz Swedish * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_swedish.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp_swedish.txt MAILINGLISTE FUER PGP UND VERWANDTES (PGP MAILING LIST IN GERMAN) Die Listenadresse: pgp-friends(a)fiction.pb.owl.de Die *Request*adresse (fuer subscribe/unsubscribe und andere Administra- tiva): pgp-friends-request(a)fiction.pb.owl.de WHAT IS ALL THIS NONSENSE ABOUT EXPORT CONTROLS? For a detailed rant, get ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/cryptusa.zip The practical meaning, until the law is corrected to make sense, is that you are requested to get PGP from sites outside of the USA and Canada if you are outside of the USA and Canada. If you are in France, I understand that you aren't even supposed import it. Other countries may be worse. Make sure you follow the laws of your own country. If you want to officially export PGP, you may be able to get permission in limited cases and for a fee. Contact the U. S. Department of State for information. WHAT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS EXIST IN THE USA? MIT PGP is only for personal, noncommercial use because of restrictions on the licensing of both the RSA algorithm (attached to RSAREF) and the IDEA algorithm. PKP/RSADSI insist that we use RSAREF instead of the mpi library for reasons that make sense to them. For commercial use, use Viacrypt PGP, which is fully licensed to use both the RSA and IDEA algorithms in commercial and corporate environments (as well as personal use, of course). Another restriction is due to an exclusive marketing agreement between Philip Zimmermann and Viacrypt that applies to the USA and Canada only. Viacrypt has exclusive rights to market PGP commercialy in this area of the world. This means that if you want to market PGP commercially in competition with Viacrypt in the USA or Canada, you would have to create a new implementation of the functions of PGP containing none of Philip Zimmermann's copyrighted code. You are free to modify existing PGP code for your own use, as long as you don't sell it. Phil would also appreciate your checking with him before you distribute any modified versions of PGP as freeware. "PGP", "Pretty Good Privacy" and "Phil's Pretty Good Software" are trademarks owned by Philip Zimmermann. This means that if you modify an older version of PGP that was issued under the copyleft license and distribute it without Phil's permission, you have to call it something else. This avoids confusing all of us and protects Phil's good name. WHAT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS EXIST IN CANADA? MIT PGP is only for noncommercial use because of restrictions on the licensing of the IDEA algorithm. Because the RSA algorithm isn't patented in Canada, you are free to use the mpi library instead of RSAREF, if you want to, thus freeing yourself of the RSAREF license associated with the RSAREF copyright, which is valid in Canada. For commercial use, use Viacrypt PGP, which is fully licensed to use the IDEA algorithm in commercial and corporate environments. The exclusive marketing agreement with Viacrypt also applies in Canada. See the section on USA intellectual property restrictions for more details. WHAT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS EXIST OUTSIDE NORTH AMERICA? MIT PGP is only for noncommercial in areas where there is a patent on software implementations of the IDEA algorithm. Because the RSA algorithm isn't patented outside of the USA, you are free to use the mpi library instead of RSAREF, if you want to, thus freeing yourself of the RSAREF license restrictions. The RSAREF copyright holds outside of the USA, even though the RSA patent does not. The IDEA conventional block cipher is covered by US Patent 5,214,703 and European patent EP 0 482 154 B1. IDEA is a trademark of Ascom-Tech AG. Commercial users of IDEA (including commercial use of PGP) may obtain licensing details from Ph. Baumann, Ascom Tech Ltd., IDEA Lizenz, Postfach 151, CH-4502 Solothurn, Switzerland, Tel ++41 65 242828, Fax ++41 65 242847. WHAT IS COMMERCIAL USE? Use some common sense. If you are running a business and using PGP to protect credit card numbers sent to you electronically, then you are using PGP commercially. Your customers, however, need not buy the commercial version of PGP just to buy something from you, if that is the only commercial use they make of PGP (since they are spending, not making, money with PGP). If you are just encrypting love letters or other personal mail (for which you don't get paid) on your own personal computer, that is not commercial. If you are encrypting official business mail on your for-profit corporation's computer with PGP, that is commercial use. Note that there are some gray areas not covered above, and the patent owners of RSA and IDEA may differ from my interpretation in the areas not covered above, so if you are in doubt, you should consider the licensing of Viacrypt PGP (or outside of North America, direct licensing of IDEA) to be cheap legal insurance. Indeed, the license fee is probably a lot cheaper than a legal opinion from a lawyer qualified to make such a judgement. Note that I am not a lawyer and the above is not legal advise. Use it at your own risk. WHAT IS THE "TIME BOMB" IN MIT PGP 2.6? There was a version byte change in MIT PGP 2.6 as of 1 September 1994. See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/pgpbomb.asc for details. ARE MY KEYS COMPATIBLE WITH THE OTHER PGP VERSIONS? If your RSA key modulus length is less than or equal to 1024 bits (I don't recommend less, unless you have a really slow computer and little patience), and if your key was generated in the PKCS format, then it will work with any of the current PGP versions (MIT PGP 2.6, PGP 2.6ui, or Viacrypt PGP 2.7). If this is not the case, you really should generate a new key that qualifies. MIT PGP 2.6.2 should be able to use 2048 bit keys. Generation of 2048 bit keys is supposed to automatically be enabled in PGP 2.6.2 in December, 1994. By then, hopefully, most people will have had a chance to upgrade to a version of PGP that can use them, so longer keys won't be a big problem. On the other hand, 1024 bit keys are probably beyond the reach of most criminals and spies to break, anyway. MORE WORLD WIDE WEB URLs http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/pgp/pgp-mac-faq-hinely.html http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/pgp/pgp.html http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/crypto/cryptography.html http://www.pegasus.esprit.ec.org/people/arne/pgp.html http://rschp2.anu.edu.au:8080/crypt.html http://ibd.ar.com/PublicKeys.html http://www.ifi.uio.no/~staalesc/PGPversions.html WINDOWS SHELLS Several shells for running PGP with Microsoft Windows are available at the same places PGP can be found. MACPGP KIT The MacPGP kit is a user interface for the Mac version of PGP. See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/qw/qwerty ftp://duke.bwh.harvard.edu:/pub/adam/mcip/MacPGP_icons.sit.hqx ftp://duke.bwh.harvard.edu:/pub/adam/mcip/MacPGPkit.hqx ftp://duke.bwh.harvard.edu:/pub/adam/mcip/MacPGPkitSources.sit.hqx BUGS See the documentation that comes with PGP in the latest versions for bugs in the older versions. The latest versions of PGP may not fully wipe all traces of plain text from a file when given the -w option. For more information, see http://www.mit.edu:8001/people/warlord/pgp-faq.html BETSI - BELLCORE'S TRUSTED SOFTWARE INTEGRITY SYSTEM For information on this service, send mail to certify(a)bellcore.com with the subject help, or check http://info.bellcore.com/BETSI/betsi.html HOW DO I PUBLISH MY PGP PUBLIC KEY? There are lots of ways. One way is to use a key server. Send mail to one of these addresses with the single word "help" in the subject line to find out how to use a key server. pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.iastate.edu public-key-server(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu pgp-public-keys(a)cs.tamu.edu pgp-public-keys(a)chao.sw.oz.au pgp-public-keys(a)jpunix.com pgp-public-keys(a)dsi.unimi.it pgp-public-keys(a)kiae.su pgp-public-keys(a)fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de There is also an experimental public key server at http://ibd.ar.com/PublicKeys.html Another way is to upload it to the PGP public keys area of the Colorado Catacombs BBS (303-772-1062). Another way is to just send it to your correspondents. You could add it to your .plan file so that finger returns your key. You could add it to some of your postings. No matter which way you do it, you should have your key signed by someone who verifies that your key belongs to you, so that you don't have someone else generating a key that has your name on it, but that isn't yours. Here is my public key: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.7 mQCNAi4PT2QAAAEEAPPCZnrshEJ9PSnV+mXEwjM4kzJF0kyg2MnLMzo83vWI40ei jogncqdkXT0c2TQWg+Bsu9ckFoXdId0utumYv0aqd8yI/oU/DwJ1zJrqRL2PFbxe ZLofHoKFjvq1TiNiJq9ps3jW6iYS4IU1SzyKhjmyE+K0+WyrPPX0zg8FAL9FAAUR tCdNaWNoYWVsIFBhdWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQGNzbi5vcmc+IG1wajiJAJUCBRAu G3chZXmEuMepZt0BAZtAA/0Rw5mintlUDgHycNbeoyIiMHoLu8jWaCSaiGSt+dDU 1A/bUCo+gorv5TYxOClRf3XHjD6zSooWyUz3ehotrzPYLunhVOE2YBxPU+OvKFOc 37mcZrnXGBlF5NblnSYxp0186tGaTm7WMWx7NDlHT4GvhzHJQSOoo48ykDkKm/mk LIkAlQIFEC4PWbs/ZwY8hTPrxQEBKyMD/A7kv91C1ZZIRtkbC9k9lsWOgOnO8wG8 bGMajaco465Z5llWD+Y8QCMdSWcowtOBGfW0Wv1bZ1uebeCpg1L66pJ7C+BOExrk gPqRVCstLLiVerKGeSOZo3yXtxYKYX7mHQPrHp98ef7fUG4IiKS+S+znmGxpJwrV sHZRlhJ3hXUsiQCVAgUQLg9ZefX0zg8FAL9FAQFBTAQAh4u4Vun7WhPuL6fsXiXm paaGfeLtd3biRj/aOMAG1eHuhVdWejx71ormyKTdNB2YV56bpsE3JQ/KhBuYDo0N SkRnqeM2S+Ef7aZEg6Q44uXG52pqCZUldtCeYfOs3aLCR9SMlc6Y3zmpSwB1wKP0 5+tN9zruNYVKKBLWEIFAY7W0K01pY2hhZWwgUGF1bCBKb2huc29uIDxtLnAuam9o bnNvbkBpZWVlLm9yZz60IE1pY2hhZWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQG5ldGNvbS5jb20+ tChNaWtlIEpvaG5zb24gPDcxMzMxLjIzMzJAY29tcHVzZXJ2ZS5jb20+tCtNaWNo YWVsIFAuIEpvaG5zb24gPG1wam9obnNvQG55eC5jcy5kdS5lZHU+tC1EbyBub3Qg dXNlIGZvciBlbmNyeXB0aW9uIGFmdGVyIDI3IEp1bmUgMTk5Ni4= =rR4q - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Permission is granted to distribute unmodified copies of this FAQ. To get the latest version of this FAQ, get ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj/getpgp.asc or send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com with the line SEND mpj/getpgp.asc in the body of the message. There are many other frequently asked questions. Most of them are covered in the documentation that comes with PGP, and the few that aren't are addressed in documents referenced above. ___________________________________________________________ |\ /| | | | | \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj/README -. --- ----- ....| | ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAgUBLtyzP/X0zg8FAL9FAQFUBAP7BGgnO/ceShksSff/iZ95K2rPgMWBXQ0n fqryrVHVhZJZ+ITQYYnPCfXEFQd5xhRmTE0MGv0ZB/lt5w5tCXr+R3hlJJ4Be/XV YdzJlmojYqKK5mixuKkMp19z7eAXWqSGVGCJuuKppJDVeNG3XNHG0Bc/ZFADFMGM qRuGUZNXUVg= =2gyb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Where to get PGP (short version)
by Michael Paul Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ===============================BEGIN SIGNED TEXT============================= WHERE TO GET THE PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY PROGRAM (PGP) -- ABRIDGED VERSION (Last modified: 30 November 1994 by Mike Johnson) WHAT IS THE LATEST VERSION? |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Platform(s) | Latest Version | Distribution File Names | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | DOS, Unix, | Viacrypt PGP 2.7 | disk sets | | Mac, Windows, | | | | or WinCIM/CSNav | | | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | DOS, Unix, | MIT PGP 2.6.2 | pgp262.zip (DOS + docs) | | others | | pgp262s.zip (source) | | | | pg262s.zip source on CompuServe | | | | pgp262.tar.gz (source) | | | | pgp262.gz (same as above on DOS)| | | | pgp262.tar.Z (source) | | | | pgp262dc.zip (documentation) | | | | pg262d.zip (docs on CompuServe) | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Macintosh | MIT PGP 2.6 | MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx (binary+docs) | | | | macpgp26.hqx (same as above) | | | | MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx (source) | | | | macpgp26.src (same as above) | | | | MacPGP2.6-68000.sea.hqx (binary)| | | | mcpgp268.hqx (same as above) | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Amiga | PGP 2.6.2 Amiga 1.4 | pgp262-a14-000.lha | | | | pgp262-a14-020.lha | | | | pgp262-a14-src.lha | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Non-USA version | PGP 2.6.i from | pgp26i.zip | | to avoid RSAREF | Stale Schumacher | pgp26is.zip | | license. | | pgp26is.tar.gz | |_________________|_____________________|_________________________________| WHERE CAN I GET VIACRYPT PGP? If you are a commercial user of PGP in the USA or Canada, contact Viacrypt in Phoenix, Arizona, USA. The commecial version of PGP is fully licensed to use the patented RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms in commercial applications, and may be used in corporate and government environments in the USA and Canada. It is fully compatible with, functionally the same as, and just as strong as the freeware version of PGP. Orders may be placed by calling 800-536-2664 during the hours of 8:30am to 5:00pm MST, Monday - Friday. They accept VISA, MasterCard, AMEX and Discover credit cards. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact viacrypt(a)acm.org. WHERE CAN I GET THE FREEWARE PGP? There are several ways to get the freeware PGP: ftp, WWW, BBS, CompuServe, email ftp server, and sneakernet (ask a friend for a copy). Just don't ask Philip Zimmermann directly for a copy. FTP SITES IN NORTH AMERICA Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu, log in as getpgp, answer the questions, then ftp to net-dist.mit.edu and change to the hidden directory named in the telnet session to get your own copy. MIT-PGP is for U. S. and Canadian use only, but MIT is only distributing it within the USA (due to some archaic export control laws). 1. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/mitlicen.txt and agree to it. 2. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/rsalicen.txt and agree to it. 3. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu and log in as getpgp. 4. Answer the questions and write down the directory name listed. 5. QUICKLY end the telnet session with ^C and ftp to the indicated directory on net-dist.mit.edu (something like /pub/PGP/dist/U.S.-only-????) and get the distribution files (see the above chart for names). If the hidden directory name is invalid, start over at step 3, above. You can also get PGP from: ftp.csn.net/mpj ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? ftp.csua.berkeley.edu (for U. S. or Canadian users) /pub/cypherpunks/pgp/ ftp.wimsey.bc.ca /pub/crypto/software/dist/US_or_Canada_only_XXXXXXX/PGP (U. S. and Canadian users only) See /pub/crypto/software/README for the characters for XXXXXXXX WORLD WIDE WEB ACCESS http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp-form.html http://www.ifi.uio.no/~staalesc/PGPVersions.html COMPUSERVE GO NCSAFORUM, see library 12. Read the instructions there for access. BULLETIN BOARD SYSTEMS Colorado Catacombs BBS, Longmont, Colorado, USA (303) 772-1062 The Freedom Files BBS, DeLand Florida, USA 904-738-2691 Exec-Net, New York, NY, USA (Host BBS for the ILink net) 914-667-4567 The Ferret BBS (North Little Rock, Arkansas) (501) 791-0124 also (501) 791-0125 Special PGP users account: login name: PGP USER password: PGP CVRC BBS 317-791-9617 CyberGold BBS 601-582-5748 Self-Governor Information Resource, El Paso, Texas, USA, 915-587-7888 In the UK, try 01273-688888 OTHER FTP SITES ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de /pub/virus/crypt/pgp ftp.netcom.com /pub/dc/dcosenza -- Some crypto stuff, sometimes includes PGP. /pub/gb/gbe/pgpfaq.asc -- frequently asked questions answered. /pub/qw/qwerty -- How to MacPGP Guide, largest steganography ftp site as well. PGP FAQ, crypto FAQ, US Crypto Policy FAQ, Steganograpy software list. MacUtilites for use with MacPGP. Stealth1.1 + other steganography programs. ftp.csua.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp Also, try an archie search. FTPMAIL You can get FTP files mailed to you. Send a message saying "Help" to ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com. You will be sent an instruction sheet on how to use the ftpmail service. To get pgp 2.6.i by email: Send a message to hypnotech-request(a)ifi.uio.no with your request in the Subject: field. Subject What you will get GET pgp26i.zip MS-DOS executable (uuencoded) GET pgp26is.zip MS-DOS source code (uuencoded) GET pgp26is.tar.gz UNIX source code (uuencoded) LANGUAGE MODULES German * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/PGP_german_docs.lha Italian * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz Japanese * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-msgs-japanese.tar.gz Lithuanian * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp23ltk.zip Russian * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26ru.zip (MIT version) * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26uir.zip (ui version) Spanish * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz Swedish * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_swedish.txt WHAT IS ALL THIS NONSENSE ABOUT EXPORT CONTROLS? The U. S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations claim to prohibit export of PGP from the USA without a license, except to Canada. Canada has similar rules. Therefore, if you are outside of North America, please get your copy of PGP from a site outside of North America. WHAT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS EXIST IN THE USA? MIT PGP is only for personal, noncommercial use because of restrictions on the licensing of both the RSA algorithm (attached to RSAREF) and the IDEA algorithm. PKP/RSADSI insist that we use RSAREF instead of the mpi library for reasons that make sense to them. For commercial use, use Viacrypt PGP, which is fully licensed to use both the RSA and IDEA algorithms in commercial and corporate environments (as well as personal use, of course). Another restriction is due to an exclusive marketing agreement between Philip Zimmermann and Viacrypt that applies to the USA and Canada only. Viacrypt has exclusive rights to market PGP commercialy in this area of the world. This means that if you want to market PGP commercially in competition with Viacrypt in the USA or Canada, you would have to create a new implementation of the functions of PGP containing none of Philip Zimmermann's copyrighted code. You are free to modify existing PGP code for your own use, as long as you don't sell it. Phil would also appreciate your checking with him before you distribute any modified versions of PGP as freeware. "PGP", "Pretty Good Privacy" and "Phil's Pretty Good Software" are trademarks owned by Philip Zimmermann. This means that if you modify an older version of PGP that was issued under the copyleft license and distribute it without Phil's permission, you have to call it something else. This avoids confusing all of us and protects Phil's good name. WHAT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS EXIST IN CANADA? MIT PGP is only for noncommercial use because of restrictions on the licensing of the IDEA algorithm. Because the RSA algorithm isn't patented in Canada, you are free to use the mpi library instead of RSAREF, if you want to, thus freeing yourself of the RSAREF license associated with the RSAREF copyright, which is valid in Canada. For commercial use, use Viacrypt PGP, which is fully licensed to use the IDEA algorithm in commercial and corporate environments. The exclusive marketing agreement with Viacrypt also applies in Canada. See the section on USA intellectual property restrictions for more details. WHAT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS EXIST OUTSIDE NORTH AMERICA? MIT PGP is only for noncommercial in areas where there is a patent on software implementations of the IDEA algorithm. Because the RSA algorithm isn't patented outside of the USA, you are free to use the mpi library instead of RSAREF, if you want to, thus freeing yourself of the RSAREF license restrictions. The RSAREF copyright holds outside of the USA, even though the RSA patent does not. The IDEA conventional block cipher is covered by US Patent 5,214,703 and European patent EP 0 482 154 B1. IDEA is a trademark of Ascom-Tech AG. Commercial users of IDEA (including commercial use of PGP) may obtain licensing details from Ph. Baumann, Ascom Tech Ltd., IDEA Lizenz, Postfach 151, CH-4502 Solothurn, Switzerland, Tel ++41 65 242828, Fax ++41 65 242847. WHAT IS COMMERCIAL USE? Use some common sense. If you are running a business and using PGP to protect credit card numbers sent to you electronically, then you are using PGP commercially. Your customers, however, need not buy the commercial version of PGP just to buy something from you, if that is the only commercial use they make of PGP (since they are spending, not making, money with PGP). If you are just encrypting love letters or other personal mail (for which you don't get paid) on your own personal computer, that is not commercial. If you are encrypting official business mail on your for-profit corporation's computer with PGP, that is commercial use. Note that there are some gray areas not covered above, and the patent owners of RSA and IDEA may differ from my interpretation in the areas not covered above, so if you are in doubt, you should consider the licensing of Viacrypt PGP (or outside of North America, direct licensing of IDEA) to be cheap legal insurance. Indeed, the license fee is probably a lot cheaper than a legal opinion from a lawyer qualified to make such a judgement. Note that I am not a lawyer and the above is not legal advise. Use it at your own risk. MACPGP KIT The MacPGP kit is a user interface for the Mac version of PGP. ftp://duke.bwh.harvard.edu:/pub/adam/mcip/MacPGP_icons.sit.hqx ftp://duke.bwh.harvard.edu:/pub/adam/mcip/MacPGPkit.hqx ftp://duke.bwh.harvard.edu:/pub/adam/mcip/MacPGPkitSources.sit.hqx FOR MORE INFORMATION Permission is granted to distribute unmodified copies of this FAQ. To get the longer version of this FAQ, get ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj/getpgp.asc or send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com with the line SEND mp/mpj/getpgp.asc in the body of the message. There are many other frequently asked questions. Most of them are covered in the documentation that comes with PGP, and the few that aren't are addressed in documents referenced above. ___________________________________________________________ |\ /| | | | | \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj/README -. --- ----- ....| | ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCUAgUBLtyzV/X0zg8FAL9FAQG1aAP4tukdmfhUqnZh4mE1KdsHaSeSIEySF4Rj YtFlU2dFQB6EUtohFU+fzRKOsIQ7B8N4Xj4fcaKytUfGsqI4aMQHFPFcSEJYQIfj x3xFSRUYOKFlH9ouMqj4ePZdl95sLm8lJRVFojXycN7eUxbTb27/R2+qMtZOgGuF 7W6GioDM4Q== =/lD+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

require digital sigs
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rather than engage in an extended debate (which is interesting I grant, but seems to be disintegrating into an agree/disagree impasse) I say just run the experiment and see the effects. Requiring digital signatures will artificially create the need for better crypto tools to make the whole process more convenient. This should spur progress. Another effect - lower list participatio:; fewer posts (crossposts from other lists, tv show reviews, personal mail sent to the list, Chomsky arguments, etc.)

1 0

Censorship In Cyberspace 1/6
by rarachel＠photon.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a transcript of the FFE's Censorship in Cyberspace forum. This transcript was made possible by funds from John Young. Major thanks John. **** Feminists For Free Expression **** CENSORSHIP IN CYBERSPACE St. Peter's Church, New York City Saturday, October 22, 1994 Moderator: Joan Kennedy Taylor Panelists: Robert Corn-Revere Ellen Lafontaine Gerard Van Der Leun Philip Zimmermann TRANSCRIPT Censorship in Cyberspace The Panelists: Robert Corn-Revere is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Hogan & Hartson, specializing in First Amendment and communications law. He has extensive experience in practice before the Federal Communications Commission and federal courts. Mr. Corn-Revere received a B.A. from Eastern Illinois University in 1977 and an M.A. from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst in 1980. Ellen Lafontaine is completing her doctoral studies at New York University in International Education on a Foreign Language Area Studies fellowship. Her research focuses on the role of intercultural learning networks in the foreign language classroom. Ms. Lafontaine is one of the organizers of YouthCaN '95, an international youth conference for environmental projects via telecommunications. Gerard Van Der Leun is formerly with the Electronic Frontier Foundation. He is a serious hobbyist on the InterNet and has hosted several on-line conferences. Philip Zimmermann is the creator of the controversial "Pretty Good Privacy" encryption software (this "freeware" has spread as far away as Europe) for which he is now under criminal investigation, awaiting possible federal indictment. He lives in Boulder, Colorado. The Moderator: John Kennedy Taylor is the author of "Reclaiming the Mainstream: Individualist Feminism Rediscovered", published in 1992 by Prometheus Books. Her work has also appeared in, among other places, The Wall Street Journal, Success, and Reason. Ms. Taylor was a commentator on the Cato Institute's syndicated radio program, "Byline," for ten years (1979 through 1989). She is also Vice- President of Feminists For Free Expression. INTRODUCTION: Good afternoon, and welcome for joining us. It's an absolutely gorgeous afternoon, so we're very happy to see you here. I'm Trish Moynihan Williams. I'm a member of the Board of Directors of Feminists for Free Expression, and this afternoon I'm actually the voice of Rachel Hickerson, our Executive Director, who unfortunately has a bad case of laryngitis. So I'm speaking for her, but I really hope you won't miss the opportunity this afternoon to say hello to Rachel even though she may croak back, and get to meet our wonderful Executive Director. I wanted to tell you just a little bit about Feminists for Free Expression for those of you who are just getting to know our organization. We are a group of diverse feminists working to preserve the individual's right to read, hear, view and produce materials of her own choice without the intervention of the State "for her own good." I encourage you to learn more about us. There are pamphlets in the entry way as you came in if you haven't picked one up already. And to join us. We are a membership organization, and really need your support. As you see listed on your program this afternoon we have a stunning lineup for our program on Censorship in Cyberspace, and that program is going to be moderated by FFE's own Joan Kennedy Taylor. Joan has been [involved with] feminist issues since the early 1970's. She is the author of Reclaiming the Mainstream: Individualist Feminist Rediscovered, which was published in 1992 by Prometheus Books. In 1993 the Hoover Institution commissioned her to write the essay, "Women's Issues: Feminism, Classical Liberalism and the Future." Among the places where her work has appeared are the Wall Street Journal, Success, The Washington Times and Reason. She is Vice President of Feminists for Free Expression. So I am delighted to turn the program over to her. Joan. * * * KENNEDY TAYLOR: Can everybody hear all right? There is no sound system, but I am told the acoustics are excellent. Okay. This is a very exciting program for me, because so much is going on and so much is changing so quickly that every day brings something new. This is a new age in communications, and it also has its problems. On-line services are becoming gigantic. The InterNet makes national borders irrelevant, which to some people seems a real problem. Torrents of information and misinformation can be received or disseminated by anyone with a computer modem. Security establishments have lost their virtual monopolies on encryption to such an extent that an article in the Times compares trying to enforce a universal coding standard such as the Clipper Chip with trying to enforce prohibition. The U.S. Congress just before it adjourned passed the controversial Digital Telephony Act, a wiretapping bill that requires phone companies to keep their networks accessible to law enforcement wiretaps as they install new technologies. What does this all mean in the age old fight between those who want to control how ideas and expression are communicated and those who believe in the literalness of the First Amendment, that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press? We have asked a number of experts who also believe in civil liberties and the First Amendment to explain why we do not have to abandon these principles as we enter this confusing and exciting communications age. Our guests will speak in alphabetical order, and I hope you all have programs, which give you the back- ground of all our speakers. They will speak for twenty minutes each. Then there will be a brief period for any questions they may wish to put to each other and they will then take questions from the audience. First we turn to the relationship between law and technology. Advances in communications technology have always been greeted with suspicion. Should the law control what we do with them? Can the law control them? Robert Corn-Revere, a Washington lawyer specializing in communications law, looks at the past and the future to give us a legal doctrine for the Information Age. Robert.

1 0

Censorship In Cyberspace 2/6
by rarachel＠photon.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CORN-REVERE: First I'd like to thank Feminists for Free Expression for inviting me to come and speak at this today. I think that the topic is one of the most important that at least those of us who care about communications are dealing with right now and it's one that's going to be developing very quickly. Although I have to say -- I'll apologize in advance. I'm from Washington. I used to work at the FCC, and so to be talking about these issues may seem to be a bit ironic. And to compound that, to have a lawyer to be the first person to speak in a discussion on Censorship in Cyberspace is a bit like having a hall monitor be the keynote speaker at a writer's conference. But it is an area that I have been writing about for some time and have some concern about, and hopefully discussions like this one will help move toward a greater understanding that can actually do some good. Being in Washington I'm always hesitant to say that, but it is possible sometimes. First of all I know it isn't in the program, it doesn't mention the term, but I'm going to just say that I hate the expression Information Superhighway. If there is a single thing that we could do to make some sense of what's going on we would eliminate that forever. I mean not only does it spawn just this avalanche of horrible metaphors -- on ramps, off ramps, toll booths, traffic cops. Name it, they're out there. It's just going to get worse, to the point where the Washington Post finally had a front page story that talked about the Information Superhypeway, which is pretty much what it's becoming. And in a way it I mean it really doesn't convey any information. In a way it's a lot like teenagers and sex. I mean, you know, everyone is talking about it. Everyone's convinced that everyone else is involved in it. The people who are talking about it don't really know much what it's about but are convinced that once they're doing it too it's going to be great! That's a lot of what is going on in the policy discussion in Washington, D.C. But I have a particular reason for disliking that expression, and that is that it tends to focus or it tends to direct peoples' attention to the means of transmission by calling it a highway. So we'll need traffic cops. And when you look at the method of transmission historically, that's been the hook, the jurisdictional hook, for governments to get involved in speech. For that reason I really think we would move a long way toward clarity if we could shift metaphors. As most of you I'm sure know, this year the Congress failed to pass telecommunications legislation wanting to be in the forefront of developing the Information Superhighway, talking about all the vital national policies that are involved. And while I don't discount the importance of the issues, I tend to think it's a little bit dangerous to start the debate and start from the proposition that Congress needs to be fashioning this for us, and I think that that's simply going to lead to more trouble. In really underscoring that, I think it's useful to talk about communications systems and talk about the development of these things from something of a historical perspective, because technology has always been an intimate part of the struggle for freedom of expression. It's no accident for example that the first official censorship bureau emerged shortly after the development of the printing press. None existed before then because none were necessary, and to that extent censorship was the bastard child of technology. You didn't need a central official authority to keep track of scribes. The Church did that very nicely, thank you. And the communications that they produced didn't really pose any kind of a threat to the State. First of all they were produced in small numbers, not mass produced, and in the second place you didn't have the ability to produce multiple volumes of a uniform copy, of a simultaneous transmission of exactly the same words. There were minor errors between them and it took a long time to copy addi- tional copies. But once you had because of the printing press the ability to crank out multiple documents that could all be trans- mitted simultaneously, then the communication tended to pose a threat to official authorities and for that reason you then had this drive to establish social policy, policy that would constrain or in some way control that communication for what were considered by those in power beneficial ends. And so you see that sort of history repeating itself over and over again, and ultimately in the end the technology tends to win. You can look at the successive means of censorship in the 16th and 17th centuries, whether they were official censorship bureaus or the Court of the Star Chamber or the Stationer's Company, and government monopoly licensing and those sorts of things. Each of them failed. Each of them went out of fashion because the technology of the printing press was superior to the ability of the bureaucrats to exert control -- up until the point when you get to the formation of the United States and the adoption of the First Amendment, where the United States became the first nation to embrace new technology as an essential component of its political system. That's what the First Amendment is about. It specifically identifies the press, that new technology of its day, or relatively new to the framers of the Constitution, as an essential component of what this country was about. So technology for the first time rather than just being a hindrance to official authorities became an essential part of what free expression is to be and came to be in this country. Despite that hopeful beginning, and despite the fact that it really took a couple of hundred years, well, 120 years anyway before the courts started to define what the First Amendment was about, technology continued to be something of a problem as new technolo- gies for communications were developed. The Supreme Court first faced this problem in 1915 when it was asked to rule on whether or not the cinema was protected by the First Amendment. And this was before the Supreme Court had actually addressed the issue of the First Amendment and what it meant in any way, but it was presented in this case about a licensing board, a trilogy of cases actually about a licensing board in Ohio. And in that case the Court simply said, "This is not speech. We're talking about film here. It's commerce. And besides, it's dangerous." And so they decided that the First Amendment simply didn't apply to the technology of film. Now thirty-seven years later the Supreme Court reversed itself and film was protected the same as the printed word. But it took thirty- seven years and actually longer than that for the pronouncement of the law to become disseminated through the country, where it wasn't until 1972 that the last film licensing board, municipal film licensing board, in Dallas, Texas, was abandoned. So it does tend to take a long time. The same thing has happened of course with television, and again, as with the Information Superhighway, the focus is on the means of transmission and the government's argument historically has been that we have this medium. It's scarce because you have a certain number of frequencies. If the government doesn't regulate it you'll have people speaking over each other, and so the government has to get involved. And by the way, we're not just going to be traffic cops to decide people don't run into each other in the air waves. We also need to control pretty much what's said in the broadcasting as well. And so again focussing on the way the communication was transmitted created the jurisdictional hook by which broadcasting has had second class rights under the First Amendment. Now that's changing. It's changing because the courts have come to be more sensitive to the First Amendment issues involving broadcasting. Most thoughtful observers recognize that the whole notion of scarcity (a) was created by government in the first place, and (b) if, to the extent it was ever true, because government of course decided how many of those frequencies would be used for communications, to the extent it ever was true it no longer is, again because of increases in technology, both because of digital compression, the ability to get a lot more out of the same band- width spectrum, and also because there are so many other techno- logies that can transmit the same information and more than just broadcasting. Whether it's cable television, whether it's fiber optic transmission, whether you're talking about videodiscs, videotapes, there are any number of ways you can transmit the same information. And so the courts are moving more toward an appreciation of the First Amendment status of broadcasting, to the point where the Supreme Court this summer in a case involving cable television essentially said that the government has no business dictating the content of broadcasting. Again, that was just language that the court used, but it tended the signal the direction they're heading. And I think ultimately again the technology will win. My concern though is at each stage where we're confronted with new technology we have to go through this process yet again. It happened with the printing press. It happened with film and then took four decades and longer for practical application, for that to get reversed. With broadcasting it first was regulated in 1927 as a scarce medium and then again that law was rewritten in 1934 and hasn't been rewritten since. We're on the verge of a rewrite, and that's what some of the telecommunications legislation is about, but it doesn't abandon these concepts of government control. In fact it strengthens them and would extend them to the newer technologies, whether it's fiber optics or something else, or direct broadcast satellites for that matter. So I think that it's time to recognize that all speech is the same under the First Amendment, and that the means of transmis- sion don't make any difference whatsoever. The fact that some communications may have social force or power to change things isn't a reason again for government to get involved. That's why the printing press was controlled. That's why we adopted a First Amendment in the first place. And so the method of transmission shouldn't make any difference whatsoever. The other thing that I think is fairly dangerous when it's handled in the way that it's currently being considered is that if things have moved slowly in the past wait until they become the subject of a regulatory agency. Having worked at the FCC I can tell you a lot about that. Things move much more slowly in the regulatory state. We are controlled by endless numbers of defini- tions, and once you fit into a regulatory pigeonhole, a defini- tional pigeonhole, you will stay there either until the courts turn it over, knock it down, or until some sixty years later or however many years later someone decides that that may have been a bad idea in the first place. So I'm very concerned about carving these things into the stone of legislation and then using that as the model for extending government control over communications. The whole idea of having this network, this notion of instantaneous communication, is to free up speech and not to create jurisdictional reasons to exert greater control. For that reason I am particularly concerned about the Digital Telephony Bill that was just passed. It was passed by both houses of Congress in early October, and it does require tele- phone companies to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in wiretapping and issues like that. In some ways it doesn't change the preexisting state of the law. In 1986 there was a rewrite of the Federal Wiretapping Law that essentially brought that into, recognized, digital communications. It did require that kind of cooperation. This really more clarifies that rather than imposes a new obligation. The other clarifying part of it thankfully is that it says that federal authorities have to get a warrant before they can do it. But it still maintains the essential premise of governmental control, and I think that what we need to working toward is an understanding that the First Amendment and the Fourth Amendment, because they work together, must be recognized for all technologies as we move on into the future. I'll just say one or two more things because I know I've taken a bit of your time, just to say that if nothing else, because again I've been talking legal structures because that's the world that I work in, but if nothing else it would helpful if people could get an understanding that when they're approaching a new type of communications they're not approaching something fundamentally different, and I'll give you two examples that I think tend to underscore that. One is a recent action by an export office in the Department of State that denied an export license for the disk version of a book on encryption, while the print version is freely available and as a matter of fact 20,000 copies have been sold worldwide. Now the justification is that when you put it on a computer disk it is somehow different and can be disseminated differently when of course anyone can take the print version and key it in and you have the same thing. But that's one example of where the understanding of what the communication is, what the information is, is treated differently under the law because it is in a different technological form. Another has to do with a recent case involving a regional office of the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights, an action that ended closing down a men's only and women's only computer bulletin system at Santa Rosa Junior College because of allegations of sexual harassment and people saying generally not nice things on this computer bulletin board. But as part of this ruling, and it's still being worked out, it isn't final yet, the Office of Civil Rights took the position that a computer bulletin board is not subject to the same free speech rights as if you were talking about a physical bulletin board or if you were talking about the campus newspaper. It is somehow different. I think these are very dangerous beginnings, very dangerous trends, and unless we address these questions both in terms of our understanding of what's going on and in terms of the law then what we've seen in history will be perpetuated and it will take a far longer time, decades, if we're lucky, for that to be sorted out. So that's why I think this is one of the most important topics that we could talk about today, because I think that communications has been historically a vital force in society and it's only going to get more important. Thank you. * * *

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Censorship In Cyberspace 3/6
by rarachel＠photon.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

MODERATOR: What about the children? Our new technolo- gies expose children to information and ideas from all over the world. Some of it is information. Some of it is misinformation. Should we take steps to restrict this access? Ellen Lafontaine will explore this area with examples of educational alternatives to censorship. LAFONTAINE: Thank you, Joan. I have a little cold, so I hope that you can hear me. I hope I won't cough halfway through. As we all know, cyberspace or the InterNet is a very popular subject today. When one adds the issue of censorship it becomes even more compelling and controversial. Today you will be presented with the legal, political and technical viewpoints of the censorship debate. However, I contend that while these perspec- tives are illuminating there is the danger of missing the far more important issue of the right to free speech for students in its application to this medium of technology. This issue of censorship is not solely one of a technical nature, for instance how to block access to pornographic material and banned books. A cursory glance at the variety of news groups and conferences on the InterNet may seem, depending upon your point of view, as either provocative or offensive. For example, it is possible to obtain an erotic article from the news group ALT.REC.SEX.WITH.OTHERS, or a few passages from Huck Finn, a banned book in some school districts. Indeed many educators and parents spend a lot of time worrying over whether Susan or Jimmy will accidentally read material that's not appropriate for their age. However, restricting access to news groups and conferences dealing with objectionable content matter is simply a subtractive strategy, subtractive in the sense of a withdrawal. The real issue instead involves the much great social challenge of placing in our schools this technological medium that has the potential to encourage student dialogue on any number of controver- sial issues. Increasingly our schools have greater access to the InterNet. We can expect that some educators and parents will perceive its introduction as dangerous as rolling a Trojan Horse into the classroom. Therefore a different and far more interesting approach to the issue of censorship is to focus upon the students themselves and their right to free expression in the classroom. To us this is an additive strategy, allowing our students to confront difficult realities both on a local level and a global scale and to successfully engage in the necessary conflicts that will inevitably result. The questions that we need to ask are: Can we tolerate and actively promote the desanitizing of the curriculum by allowing this new form of communication and inquiry into the classroom? Can we encourage our students to pursue the right to free expression and not turn their backs on controversy when it ensues? And lastly, can we create a critical literacy among students so that they are not only better prepared to confront the issues of tomorrow but also can be instrumental in changing or improving today's world for the better? To illustrate my point I would like to tell a story drawn from a paper that I coauthored with Professor Dennis Sayers of New York University. The research was originally compiled for his forthcoming book, Brave New Schools. The story concerns the use of a global learning network in an English class at a high school in Long Island. The network, supported by the Copland Family Fund, is called IERN, which stands for International Educational and Resource Network. The IERN network allows students to use telecom- munications to carry out projects with students from other parts of the world. The students at Cold Spring Harbor use the network to collect articles written by students from many different countries for a magazine called The Contemporary. Although produced at the high school, The Contemporary is so much a part of the IERN network that it is considered an official publication of that network. As its editors write, "The Contemporary is a student news magazine, international in scope, that aims to provide teenagers with a way to learn about issues of national and global importance as the first step toward understanding how youth can have an impact on the direction taken by our world." And one point I'd like to make. These are 14 to 17-year-olds that write, so I think you're all going to be very impressed by the level of their writing. Even though at times these issues of national and global importance were controversial in nature, this didn't stop the student editors from writing about them. However they were soon to find out that encouraging a debate on one of these controversial issues would lead to not one but two conflicts and near losses of their right to free expression, and surprisingly from two entirely different directions. It all began with the Middle East section of the January 1994 issue, which contained writings from Palestinian and Israeli teachers and students. Kristin Lucas, the 11th grade editor of the special sections, recounts her original motivations for collecting the writings. "At the start of my project my goal was to inform students around the world about recent developments in the long lived Middle East crisis. I set out with the belief that students from Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories needed to realize the similarities in their hopes and fears in order to pave the way for a more peaceful future." Using electronic mail and video send (ph), Kristin and the other students editors were able to collect several pieces of writing from both Palestinian and Israeli students and teachers. It was their intention to pair these writings next to one another in the Middle Eastern section for maximum impact. However, as they were going to press one of the Palestinian teachers, upon learning of Kristin's decision to intersperse the Israeli and Palestinian writings, and also objecting to some of the content in Kristin's introductory article, threatened to pull every one of the Palestinian writings. Kristin and her fellow editors were astounded. She spent seven periods of two school days trying to reach a compromise that wouldn't breach her right to free expres- sion. At the end they published all of the letters, but in separate sections of the magazine. This was a disappointing compromise for Kristin and her co-editors. In their opinion the initial attempt to foster a student dialogue on a controversial topic had failed. So they decided to exploit the technology to an even greater extent. Instead of relying upon letters and articles sent through elec- tronic mail, they opened a conference area on the network hoping this time for a more extensive, true back and forth student dialogue. Little were they to know that world events would sadly offer them one more Middle Eastern controversy. As we can all recall, on February 23, 1994 Baruch Goldstein murdered 50 Arabs and wounded many others at a mosque in Hebron (ph). This massacre triggered many Palestinian demonstrations on the streets of the occupied territories, which led to beatings and killings by Israeli authorities and reprisal murders by members of extremist groups on both sides. As a result extensive curfews were enforced and schooling for the Palestinians was suspended. Thus the resulting turmoil provoked a flurry of letters back and forth on many topics, one of which was the Western media coverage of the events. As one 12-year-old writes, Ranin Kiryan (ph), "The Western media is always at the scene when both Israelis and Arabs are killed, and the coverage is much more in favor of the Palestinian side in the opinion of Israel's. My opinion in general is that the Palestinians deserve a country." A Palestinian student disagreed with Ranin Kiryan. "I believe the Western media is not always at the scene when both Arabs and Jews are killed, and the coverage is in favor of the Israelis. But it's not important that the media covers this or that. What is important is that the killings stop. I respect your opinion that the Palestinians deserve a State." These two excerpts out of a handful of many demonstrate the enormous power of telecommunications to foster student partici- pation in an open and free dialogue. These students are learning tolerance by respecting each other's opinions on a very controver- sial topic. They are communicating in a real fashion about issues of social justice. One Israeli student who wished to remain anonymous, likely because his or her opinion would have sparked debate among his or her Israeli classmates, disputed the frequent press descrip- tions of Baruch Goldstein as an insane killer who acted alone. He or she says, "I believe that the massacre was not the action of a lone lunatic but one taken by a gunman acting under the influence of a radical minority group. This group deserves to be condemned, but the entire Israeli population should not be blamed. Similarly, the extremists among the Palestinians should be condemned but not all the Palestinian people." Truthfully, how many adults can master that concept, the few do not represent the many, as our anonymous contributor obviously has? Moreover, how many could acquire this understanding on such a controversial issue so close to home? Clearly these excerpts from the students' writings demonstrate the success of Kristin's original goals, to promote dialogue on a hotly contested issue in the Middle East with the hopes of illuminating common ground for peaceful coexistence. The Contemporary included these and many other letters in the May 1994 issue. There were also letters from students in other countries sharing their opinions and applying lessons from what they were reading to their own reality at home. Phoebe McDunna, a student from Australia, writes: "In my country we have many people from different backgrounds and we have grown to communicate and to accept everyone. This all sounds like Australia is a very loving and understanding country, but the sad truth is our native Australians, the Aborigines, are the last ones to become accepted and to be treated equally." Thus the debate that Kristin had sparked on the political turmoil in the Middle East led to students in faraway countries extrapolating lessons about the expansionist policies at the roots of their own countries' origins. So in going to press with this final issue of the school year, Kristin and her fellow students were pleased that they had achieved the goal of using telecommu- nications for opening and sustaining an extensive dialogue on a controversial issue. Kristin writes, "I've had the opportunity to accomplish what many other students may never have a chance to attempt. Even though I don't have the influence to reverse the sometimes harsh sentiments of these people, I would like to come away thinking that at least I did something to help the peace process along." Unfortunately Kristin had no idea of the new conflict for the May issue, this time much closer to home. Peter Copland (ph) is the head of the Copland Family Foundation that has supported the IERN network since its inception. His vision was to explore the potential of telecommunications to give youth a voice in shaping and improving their world. To this end he established IERN, providing funding from the Copland Family Foundation to underwrite the network during its formative years until it established a clear identity and had become self sufficient. This support took many forms, ranging from assisting in covering the cost of telecom- munications for some schools in North America and in other countries to assure cultural diversity in the networking projects and to contributing to special projects such as the Holocaust Genocide Project, with a range of funding demands including publications and study trips to Poland and Israel. So when Peter Copland asked to meet with the editorial staff and the faculty adviser at Cold Spring High to voice objec- tions to their coverage in the Middle East sections they were all very surprised. In his view, however, the coverage was biased toward the Palestinian point of view. He also felt that the writings from the adult contributors was a major departure from the original mission of the student magazine. Although he insisted that he didn't want to limit their editorial freedom he felt that The Contemporary's designation as an official annual IERN project should be reconsidered, and the controversial nature of the topics it covered might generate disagreements within IERN and jeopardize the willingness of some schools, for example in Israel and the U.S., to continue participating in the network. So the student editors met and drafted a response to Copland's concerns, and I'll quote a few passages. It was a very long letter, but I think this is very important: We sought to give all interested parties a chance to state their views and respond to each other. Did the contributors hear one another? Well, most seemed to listen but a few seemed to hear very well. Did we try to make the Middle East section a safe place to conduct such a discussion? Yes, but we realize that when feelings run as hot as they do in the Middle East there may be no such thing as a safe place to discuss any subject. Does this mean that we did not make a contribution to the resolu- tion of the problems discussed? No. We feel progress in this instance ought to be measured simply by the fact that the contending parties at least talked to each other and read what each other was feeling and thinking. Finally, dialogue, no matter how contentious it may seem, is the first step toward resolving any problem. These responses demonstrate the remarkably high level of critical thinking generated by engaging in such projects on a global learning network over the InterNet. The students developed a working knowledge of how to confront the possible loss of their right to free speech. Once again they negotiated a compromise by relinquishing the annual IERN project status for The Contemporary and incorporating a disclaimer for each issue. The final result was a conceptual awareness of the relationship of free expression and of the media of telecommunication that went far beyond the issue of keeping objectionable material out of young peoples' hands. In closing I will quote one student's real understanding of the individual right to free expression: "I think free and open communication is a wonderful thing. Perhaps with this experience some students will prize dialogue more dearly in the future. Hope- fully if we try to understand each other more we might be more willing to talk things out instead of going to war over them." Thank you. * * *

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