- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Go away CIA
by Wayne H. Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:45 AM 9/23/96 -0400, Wearen Life wrote: >The CIA has many powers both great and small. If the can cover up findings >of UFO's Has this list sunk that low? Wayne H.Allen whallen(a)capitalnet.com Pgp key at www.capitalnet.com/~whallen

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National Security Committee amendments to SAFE
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Got a fax from Dellums' office this afternoon (finally!) with the amendments from the National Security committee to SAFE - this will be on the web at <http://www.parrhesia.com/safe-dellums.html>. --- AMENDMENTS TO H.R. 695 OFFERED BY MR. WELDON AND MR. DELLUMS Strike Section 3 and insert the following: SEC 3. EXPORTS OF ENCRYPTION. (a) EXPORT CONTROL OF ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS NOT CONTROLLED ON THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS LIST. - The Secretary of Commerce, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, shall have the authority to control the export of encryption products not controlled on the United States Munitions List. Decisions made by the Secretary of Commerce with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense with respect to exports of encryption products under this section shall not be subject to judicial review. (b) LICENSE EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS - Encryption products with encryption strength equal to or less than the level identified in subsection (d) shall be eligible for export under a license exception after a 1-time review, if the encryption product being exported does not include features that would otherwise require licensing under applicable regulations, is not destined for countries, end-users, or end-uses that the Secretary of Commerce has determined by regulation, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, are ineligible to receive such products, and is otherwise qualified for export. (c) ONE-TIME PRODUCT REVIEW - The Secretary of Commerce, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, shall specify the information that must be submitted for the 1-time review referred to in subsection (b). (d) ELIGIBLE ENCRYPTION LEVELS - (1) INITIAL ELIGIBILITY LEVEL. - Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall notify the Congress of the maximum level of encryption strength that could be exported from the United States under license exception pursuant to this section without harm to the national security of the United States. Such level shall not become effective until 60 days after such notification. (2) ANNUAL REVIEW OF ELIGIBILITY LEVEL - Not later than 1 year after notifying the Congress of the maximum level of encryption strength under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter, the President shall notify the Congress of the maximum level of encryption strength that could be exported from the United States under license exception pursuant to this section without harm to the national security of the United States. Such level shall not become effective until 60 days after such notification. (3) CALCULATION OF 60-DAY PERIOD. - The 60-day period referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be computed by excluding - (A) the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain or an adjournment of the Congress sine die; and (B) each Saturday and Sunday, not excluded under subparagraph (A), when either House is not in session. (e) EXERCISE OF EXISTING AUTHORITIES. - The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Defense may exercise the authorities they have under other provisions of law to carry out this section. Amend the title so as to read "A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to affirm the rights of United States persons to use and sell encryption." [Note - title 18 is the criminal section of the US Code. SAFE's original title was "To amend title 18, United States Code, to affirm the rights of United States persons to use and sell encryption and to relax export controls on encryption."] -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.

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Re: IP: Encryption Expert Says U.S. Laws Led to Renouncing of Citizenship
by jimg＠mentat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

M-K Shen wrote: > > Robert Hettinga wrote: > > > > Sameer Parekh, the president of the Web server company C2 Net, said: > > "I think it's essential if you want business that you're doing your > > development overseas. It's pretty clear to anyone internationally that > > anything exportable [from the United States] is a joke." > > Let's wait and see whether AES will be genuinely exportable. Why wait? None of the AES candidates is currently exportable without a license, and the much weaker DES algorithm that one of them will replace is not exportable without a license. In fact, according to the instructions posted at NIST the algorithm designers from outside the US and Canada were required to fill out export license applications in order to get a copy of their own algorithms back from NIST. Without a change in the regulations AES will be no more exportable than DES is now. Jim Gillogly

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KRAP is at it in the IETF
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii(a)invweb.net> > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hello, > > It has come to my attention that the KRAP (key recovery alliance program) > has submitted an I-D (internet draft) to the IETF for adding GAK > (government access to keys) to the IPSEC protocols: > > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rfced-exp-markham-00.txt > > I consider this a perversion of the standards process of the IETF to > advance a political agenda which must be stopped at all cost. > > Below are the e-mail addresses of some people that you should write > (politely) expressing your objections to any such additions to the > protocols: Dear Sirs, # o Government Requirements: Governments must be able to intercept the # CKRB at the time of key establishment or periodically while the # security association remains active. This requires that the key # recovery enabled entity transmit the CKRB during the key establishment # protocol and every N hours during the security association. Speaking as someone who monitors company Internet traffic (email) for compliance and security purposes, I would like to ask why the IETF is working on a key recovery standard. If a company chooses to deploy, say, PGP with key recovery internally, then any messages sent with it encrypted in the receiving party's public key are available to the sending company's Information Security personnel. If a company wishes to make the key recovery information available to the government, they can individually choose to do that. The IETF should not be helping to put such an infrastructure in place. Governments are our adversaries with respect to encryption and privacy. The US government, represented by the FBI/NSA, used to state that they weren't pushing for mandatory domestic encryption. (requiring people use curtains on their homes that the government can see through) Eventually we found out they lied, and were pushing for exactly that behind the scenes: * http://epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/impact_text.gif * * SECRET FBI report * * NEED FOR A NATIONAL POLICY * * A national policy embodied in legislation is needed which insures * that cryptography use in the United States should be forced to be * crackable by law enforcement, so such communications can be monitored * with real-time decryption. * * All cryptography that cannot meet this standard should be prohibited. Feel free to cite this manipulation when discarding key recovery proposals. If you put a key recovery proposal in place, it makes it that much easier for them to require its use. Plus my basic complaint: this proposal is of no use to business or Internet users. None. Its only purpose is to allow interception and decoding over the Internet. And if you think this would happen only with a court order, check out this "anytime, anywhere" wording by the US government... ---guy Don't be another cog in the ECHELON monitoring machine. The U.S. asked the OECD to agree to internationally required Key Recovery. * What Is The OECD * * The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, based in * Paris, France, is a unique forum permitting governments of the * industrialized democracies to study and formulate the best policies * possible in all economic and social spheres. : From owner-firewalls-outgoing(a)GreatCircle.COM Wed May 14 18:54:15 1997 : Received: from osiris (osiris.nso.org [207.30.58.40]) by ra.nso.org : (post.office MTA v1.9.3 ID# 0-13592) with SMTP id AAA322 : for <firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM>; Wed, 14 May 1997 12:56:13 -0400 : Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:58:46 -0400 : To: firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM : From: research(a)isr.net (Research Unit I) : Subject: Re: Encryption Outside US : : : I was part of that OECD Expert Group, and believe I may shine at least : some light on what exactly was said and happened at the meetings. : : The main conflict during all sessions was the demand of the US to be : able to decrypt anything, anywhere at any time versus the European : focus: we want to have the choice - with an open end - to maintain : own surveillance. The US demand would have caused an immediate : ability to tap into what the European intelligence community believes to : be its sole and exclusive territory. In fact the Europeans were not at all : pleased with the US view points of controlling ALL crypto. Germany and : France vigorously refused to work with the US on this issue. : : The Clipper initiative (at the time not readily developed) was completely : banned, except for the Australian and UK views that felt some obligation : from the 1947 UKUSA treaty (dealing with interchange of intelligence). : : With a vast majority the US was cornered completely, and had to accept : the international views. And actually adopted those as well. EFF, EPIC and : other US organizations were delighted to see the formal US views barred, : but expressed their concern on the development of alternate political : pressure that would cause the same effects. : : As time went by that was indeed what the US did, and up to now with minor : success. : : Bertil Fortrie : Internet Security Review : ==

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any relation?
by Steve Mynott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.kiva.net/~tmay/ -- pgp 1024/D9C69DF9 1997/10/14 steve mynott <steve(a)tightrope.demon.co.uk>

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Re: What we are Fighting
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Cryptography Manifesto excerpts used for replies] > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > > Tim asks: > > >Freeh and Company continue to mumble about "meeting > >the legitmate needs of law enforcement." What can they > >be speaking of? > ... > >Obviously his side is contemplating domestic crypto restrictions. > > Threat of terrorism will be the impetus for applying national security > restrictions domestically, for relaxing cold war limitations on spying > on Americans, for dissolving barriers between law enforcement > and military/intelligence agencies. Funny how the NSA's ECHELON monitoring machine keeps growing endlessly... : The Washington Post Magazine, June 23 1996 : "Government surveillance, terrorism and the U.S. Constitution" : from Main Justice, by Jim McGee and Brian Duffy, 1996, ISBN 0-684-81135-9 : : The FBI is growing in tandem with the NSA. With the help of the National : Security Agency, the U.S. eavesdropping bureaucracy that spans the globe, : the FBI operates a super-secret facility in New York code-named Megahut : that is linked to the other FBI listening posts. : : After the OKC bombing, Janet Reno and Louis Freeh asked Congress to raise : to 3,000 the number of FBI agents working counter-intelligence and counter- : terrorism. : : With the new legislation, the funding for just the FBI's counter-intelli- : gence/terror goals is now ONE BILLION DOLLARS a year, and their activities : will rise to a LEVEL HIGHER THAN AT ANY TIME DURING THE COLD WAR. 1984 means a constant State of War. Here's a new war: "cyberwar". # "Head of CIA Plans Center To Protect Federal Computers" # By Tim Weiner, The New York Times, 6/26/96 # # John Deutch, Director of the CIA, is building a "cyberwar" center in the NSA. # # Mr. Deutch said cyberwar could become a 21st-century national security threat # second only to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. # # "The electron," Mr. Deutch warned, "is the ultimate precision-guided weapon." Haven't I heard bad dialogue like this on Mystery Science Theater 3000? ---- > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > > Technical means for access to encrypted data will probably > come first in communications, then to stored material. There > will be an agreement for increased CALEA wiretap funding, which > is what the two cellular and wired suits against the FBI intend, > (paralleling what the hardware and software industries want from > federal buyers of security products). > > This will provide the infrastructural regime for the gov to monitor > and store domestic traffic as NSA does for the global, using the > same technology (NSA may provide service to domestic > LEA as it now does for other gov customers for intel). Question: How can the FBI use computers to monitor thousands and thousands and thousands and thousands of phone calls simultaneously, as they said they would do with CALEA, when we Americans speak so many different accents and languages? Answer: Thirty years of fine tuning by the NSA, y'all. ---- > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > > As noted here, the features will appear first as optional, in response > to demand from commerce, from parents, from responsible > institutions, to meet public calls for protection, for privacy, for > combating threats to the American people. * "Project L.U.C.I.D.", by Texe Marrs, 1996, ISBN 1-884302-02-5 * * These changes are necessary, we are reminded each day by our mind control * jailers in the media, to solve the immigration crises, to institute gun * control, to counter domestic terrorism, to fight pornography, to find * deadbeat dads who don't pay child support, to "Save Mother Earth", * to war against drug kingpins, to stop crime in the streets, to watch and * monitor the militias, to put an end to hate crimes and bigotry, * to extend universal healthcare benefits, to guarantee welfare reform, to * improve public education...the list of crises and problems to be fixed * seems to be never-ending. * * Implement National ID Cards, they promise, and a bright, secure future * can be ours. [snip] ---- > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > > Like wiretap law, use of the features for preventative snooping will > initially require a court order, as provided in several of the crypto > legislative proposals. > > Like the wiretap orders, gradually there will be no secret court refusals > for requests to use the technology in the national interest. > > Personal privacy will evaporate almost unnoticeably... * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** * * * * * * * * * * : The Puzzle Palace : Inside the National Security Agency, : America's most secret intelligence organization : Author James Bamford, 1983 revision, ISBN 0-14-00.6748-5 P468-469: Within the United States, FISA still leaves the NSA free to pull into its massive vacuum cleaner every telephone call and message entering, leaving, OR TRANSITING the country. By carefully inserting the words "by the National Security Agency" into the FISA legislation, the NSA has skillfully excluded from the coverage of the FISA statute as well as the surveillance court all interceptions received from the British GCHQ or any other non-NSA source. Thus it is possible for GCHQ to monitor the necessary domestic circuits and pass them on to the NSA through the UKUSA Agreement, giving them impunity to target and watch-list Americans. P475-477: Like an ever-widening sinkhole, the NSA's surveillance technology will continue to expand, quietly pulling in more and more communications and gradually eliminating more and more privacy. If there are defenses to such technotyranny, it would appear, at least from past experience, that they will not come from Congress. Rather, they will most likely come from academe and industry in the form of secure cryptographic applications to private and commercial telecommunications equipment. The same technology that is used against free speech can be used to protect it, for without protection the future may be grim. Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Intelligence committee, referring to the NSA's SIGINT technology, ciirca 1975: At the same time, that capability at any time could be turned around on the American people and no American would have any privacy left, such is the capability to monitor everything: telephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn't matter. There would be no place to hide. If the government ever became a tyranny, if a dictator ever took charge in this country, the technological capacity that the intelligence commun- ity has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there would be no way to fight back, because the most careful effort to combine together in resistance to the government, no matter how privately it was done, is within the reach of the government to know. Such is the capability of this technology... I don't want to see this country ever go across the bridge. I know the capacity that is there to make tyranny total in America, and we must see to it that this agency and all agencies that possess this technology operate within the law and under proper supervision, so that we never cross over that abyss. That is the abyss from which there is no return. * * * * * * * * * * *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * "Data Show Federal Agents Seldom Employ Surveillance Authority Against * Terrorists", By Stephen Labaton, The New York Times, 5/1/95 * * An item in President Clinton's five-year, $1.5 billion plan to combat * terrorist acts: * * o It would ease restrictions on the use in American courts of * information from surveillance conducted by foreign governments. # "Moynihan Says U.S. Killed His Anti-Spy Measure" # By Irvin Molotsky, The New York Times, September 11, 1985 # # Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan charged that the CIA and State Department # had killed a measure he had introduced aimed at protecting American # citizens from having their telephone conversations intercepted by foreign # agents in this country. # # The Senator's bill would have made telephone call interception by foreign # agents illegal and would have provided for their expulsion. # # The Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence opposed the measure # as unnecessary and could lead to disclosing "sensitive intelligence # sources." British wiretappers at the helm of the NSA's domestic spy-fest. ---guy http://www.newsguy.com/~mayday/crypto/crypto0.html

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RE: PEDIATRIC ADVISE - FREE WEBSITE
by Brown, R Ken 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Oh and the language they use! It's all > f*** this and f*** that -- if only their Mothers could hear them. Who's to say they can't? Mothers can read mailing lists too you know :-) Ken

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Re: any relation?
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Steve Mynott <stevem(a)tightrope.demon.co.uk> > X-Echelon: no-archive Heh. > > http://www.kiva.net/~tmay/ No, Cypherpunk Tim May's picture was shown in Wired... But now he's gonna hafta get a gun at least that big, or suffer major penis envy. ---guy ;-)

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Re: Cypherpunks HyperArchive
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> There is another archive at http://sof.mit.edu/cypherpunks, ironically > the machine that hosts it is not up at the moment The machine suffered either disk controller or HDD problems as I was logged into it. It is located in Boston, MA. I do not currently have a way of getting to the machine to repair it, and this will likely continue to be true, so until I can get one of the people I know at the site where the machine is located to fix it, the archives will be offline. If the machine cannot be fixed, I will put the archive up elsewhere. I believe hugh(a)toad.com copied the entire archive at some point, so that might be helpful. Sorry about this -- replicated servers are always a good idea. -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://sof.mit.edu/rdl/

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Re: Cypherpunks HyperArchive (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: Cypherpunks HyperArchive > From: Ryan Lackey <rdl(a)MIT.EDU> > Date: 07 Sep 1998 11:41:54 -0400 > The machine suffered either disk controller or HDD problems as I was > logged into it. It is located in Boston, MA. I do not currently have The L0pht folks are there and Wel Pond used to be a subscriber. Perhaps you could contact them and they could provide the support? ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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