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NYT on DNA Compute
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone wants to know the NYT has a longish article today on Leonard Adleman's experiment using DNA as a molecular computer. It amplifies the Science article mentioned here earlier and quotes several computer scientists who praise the work. To see it, send a blank message with subject: DNA_la

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A Chance Encounter with Brad Templeton, of ClariNet
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by Mike McNally: "Put yourself in his place. Mr. Templeton's attitude makes perfect sense. The entire fabric of his business is based upon state-supported protection of the "property" that's his stock in trade. I would think very little of him as a businessperson were he to simple roll over and give up." ........................................................ Businessmen must find a way to channel their goods & services so that they can reach their customers and receive the desired return on their efforts and their investments. It's a paradoxical quagmire, isn't it, to be both open, available, and accessible, while yet needing to be exclusive, particular, and restricted. Blanc

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re: Wired Whitehall
by m5＠vail.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Duhh. Reading a little further, I find that Kable can be reached at +44 171 410 9046. I called and there's a two-tier pricing policy for the report: about L40 (that's a fancy "pounds sterling" sign) for public sector & university purchases, and about L200 for private-sector purchases. They can't do credit cards, ironically enough. | GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5(a)tivoli.com> | | TAKE TWA TO CAIRO. ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX: | | (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |

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Brad Templeton, ClariNet, and remailers
by collins＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Brad and ClariNet have already caused one remailer to go down (the >operator of it has commented here before and of course can do so again >if he sees this), and his comments Saturday night cause me to think he >may be considering a test case of some sort. (He is fearful of losing >his Associate Press/etc. franchise if he fails to enforce his rights.) I might be the (ex-)remailer operator in question. I find Brad's lack of knowledge about remailers quite surprising in light of almost 4 hours of conversation devoted solely to this topic, by telephone, over the course of a month. My summary analysis of Brad is: he'll try to scare/bully you into getting what he wants by citing (or imagining) laws upon which he will base prosecution. Prosecution never follows. If you debate his law, he resorts to "You are Netcom's customer; Netcom is my customer; if you want to remain Netcom's customer then you had better toe my line." Persection of more or less potency always follows. I try not to flame, but the greater my contact with Brad---the greater my disdain for him. He is an extremely small-minded man. Brad can't yet even demonstrate a crime. He constantly reports remailer abuses in the form of AP Newswire articles distributed anonymously; and thus (_obviously_) stolen from ClariNet. The AP Newswire, however, is already distributed electronically has a vast army of legitimate direct-subscribers. Brad never offers evidence that the posts actually come from ClariNet, and in fact ***he immediately deletes the posts whenever he sees them*** (and saves no copies!). I have no idea how or why he is allowed to do this. Though it certainly cuts down on `competition'. ............................................................ collins(a)acm.org Scott Collins

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Re: Admiral Inman
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:50 AM 11/22/94, Jamie Lawrence wrote: >I knocked this off Cypherpunks. It has no relevance there, Er, I thought I did. Sorry all. It is the thought that counts, right? -j

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Snoop program for Linux
by Jim Pinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thought ya'll might want to know that the latest Slackware Linux distribution has a "ttysnoop" program that watches a users login tty. I haven't tried it, and probably wont', but thought I'd pass it along. Jim Pinson Galapagos.

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C.I.D.
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Multiple recipients of list <cypherpunks>: Some Happy Fool asked how we could defeat caller ID 'cause the *67 still sends along the calling number between switches (it just doesn't display it, but that is not the same as it not being available to the bad guys - *69 will still work, regardless). The discussion should probably be taken off the list, so please direct replies to me personally (or better: let us know of a more appropriate forum. I am disappointed in alt.hackers and 2600 really sucks, are there better places to go with this kind of stuff? Anybody?) To Happy Fool et al: I've got the specs for a program to use with your modem to generate what'll resemble a full CID. So with the computer set up to dial, even standard voice calls too and faxes, too, can be equipped with a fake field (or "header" if you will), displaying a homemade caller ID. Since it uses the exact same structure as the real caller ID, no telco along the entire system will ever doubt it. I can send the full specifications if you are seriously interested in doing the code in full or in part. Sorry, I can't implement it myself (lack of skills). If we get the thing running, it will dial any number and send the counterfeit header along with the call, making the telco switch believe it is dealing with a forwarded call. The beauty of it all is that this way, it will not insert its own header (it only does so when no previous CID header is detected). This is not just for use on the U-S Signaling System 7, because SS7 is now an international standard. Many countries are far more computerized than the U-S. In parts of Europe, some 95% of all areas now have digital switches. Caller ID is probably the most anticipated and feared part of these systems. This service, only available in digital areas, keeps track of the last 10 numbers that called and the time and date they did so. Example: Let's say you are in a digital area. You call a friend with a caller ID device (costing ~=$40). Between the first and second ring, they have your number. It's as easy as that. He doesn't even have to pick up the phone. Even busy calls or calls where no-one is home are registered! WARNING: When whole nations are digitalized, ANY system you call pegs you within 5 seconds of your call. What about diverters, call forwarders and stuff like that? They won't work. To cheat them, you need to produce fake headers. So if the software is not already written, let's write it. Volunteers? @@@@ This message has been brought to you by @ .. @ PETE "THE WIMP" WATKINS...BASICALLY SPINELESS(tm) | __ | \__/ <---Digitized representation of Pete Watkins My e-mail address is <mg5n+alias!wimp(a)andrew.cmu.edu>

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New remailer concept.
by Jim Pinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It occurs to me that most people have more to fear from their neighbors, than they do from the powerful TLA's. Knowing that you are hunting for a new job is not important to the world at large, but could be embarrassing if your current employer found out. Likewise, the people most interested in knowing about that sex list you subscribe to are your coworkers. The answer of course is encryption, but that is a problem when you are writing to your, well... , "crypto challenged" friends. Also, two way encrypted messages to most discussion lists is not possible (to my knowledge). To address these problems I suggest the creation of "crypto remailers". They would work like this: You subscribe to the remailer by sending a request including the account name you wish. This could be either a real name (jpinson) or a pseudonym (lizard). You would also include in the subscription request a copy of your public key. Assuming there are no name collisions with existing users, you would get back a message of acceptance, and a copy of the remailers public key. To use the remailer, you would create a message containing as the first line a "request remail to: USERNAME" , followed by your message. You then encrypt the message with the remailers public key and send it to the "remail" account at the remailer. The remailer then decodes the message you sent, and sends it to its destination as plain text. It sets the "from" field to your account name on the remailer. The recipient of your message can then reply to your remail account in plain text, with no need for any "remail to " commands or special processing. A .forward pipe on your remailer account would run a Perl script to encode the message to you with your public key, and send it to your real address. (for security it could set the "from" field to something other than your remail account name) The advantage is that you have total protection at your end. All mail to and from the remail account is encrypted. You could now subscribe to lists, and receive mail from lists, without your local administrator knowing anything about them. This last feature could be useful for students at universities that limit access. Is there anything like this out there already? Jim Pinson Charles Darwin Research Station, Galapagos

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Mandatory sigs
by Mark Rogaski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I would have to agree w/ not REQUIRING digsigs, but flagging posts w/out them. I guess that's my write in. doc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBLtv1T3sYwuXlZ+UZAQGXvgL/c21Yws0KUdzea12xExOszs1ZUuVUOKJX O7QtKbX96mZsh6lDUH+QS4uoNetqYdwwmbvW9PWcCkyksbzmjJpQOWzXwaDTw87S duLvkPNd+obUHUrawzUU+d0TNl/kXQIr =5DO0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Voice PGP, When?
by jamesh＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Punksters; Do we know when Voice PGP will be available? Can anyone point me to more info about it? I understand that "Call Security" does not include source, so I don't think I can consider using it. I'm wondering if I should continue writing my own. JJH -- Relationships are like modular furniture... Dardy Chang

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