- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Trust through anonymity; time vaults
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The time vault suggestion resembles one from Tim May in 1993. Rivest Shamir and Wagner also addressed time vaults by requiring a computation (resistant to parallel calculation and of reasonably well-defined length) to decrypt the message. under http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/ -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ##############################################################

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Description of the RC2(r) Encryption Algorithm
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ron Rivest MIT Laboratory for Computer Science and RSA Data Security, Inc. November 1997 Request for Comments: Category: Informational A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption Algorithm Status of this Memo This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). 1. Introduction This draft is an RSA Laboratories Technical Note. It is meant for informational use by the Internet community. This memo describes a conventional (secret-key) block encryption algorithm, called RC2, which may be considered as a proposal for a DES replacement. The input and output block sizes are 64 bits each. The key size is variable, from one byte up to 128 bytes, although the current implementation uses eight bytes. The algorithm is designed to be easy to implement on 16-bit microprocessors. On an IBM AT, the encryption runs about twice as fast as DES (assuming that key expansion has been done). 1.1 Algorithm description We use the term "word" to denote a 16-bit quantity. The symbol + will denote twos-complement addition. The symbol & will denote the bitwise "and" operation. The term XOR will denote the bitwise "exclusive-or" operation. The symbol ~ will denote bitwise complement. The symbol ^ will denote the exponentiation operation. The term MOD will denote the modulo operation. There are three separate algorithms involved: Key expansion. This takes a (variable-length) input key and produces an expanded key consisting of 64 words K[0],...,K[63]. Encryption. This takes a 64-bit input quantity stored in words R[0], ..., R[3] and encrypts it "in place" (the result is left in R[0], ..., R[3]). Decryption. The inverse operation to encryption. 2. Key expansion Since we will be dealing with eight-bit byte operations as well as 16-bit word operations, we will use two alternative notations for referring to the key buffer: For word operations, we will refer to the positions of the buffer as K[0], ..., K[63]; each K[i] is a 16-bit word. For byte operations, we will refer to the key buffer as L[0], ..., L[127]; each L[i] is an eight-bit byte. These are alternative views of the same data buffer. At all times it will be true that K[i] = L[2*i] + 256*L[2*i+1]. (Note that the low-order byte of each K word is given before the high-order byte.) We will assume that exactly T bytes of key are supplied, for some T in the range 1 <= T <= 128. (Our current implementation uses T = 8.) However, regardless of T, the algorithm has a maximum effective key length in bits, denoted T1. That is, the search space is 2^(8*T), or 2^T1, whichever is smaller. The purpose of the key-expansion algorithm is to modify the key buffer so that each bit of the expanded key depends in a complicated way on every bit of the supplied input key. The key expansion algorithm begins by placing the supplied T-byte key into bytes L[0], ..., L[T-1] of the key buffer. The key expansion algorithm then computes the effective key length in bytes T8 and a mask TM based on the effective key length in bits T1. It uses the following operations: T8 = (T1+7)/8; TM = 255 MOD 2^(8 + T1 - 8*T8); Thus TM has its 8 - (8*T8 - T1) least significant bits set. For example, with an effective key length of 64 bits, T1 = 64, T8 = 8 and TM = 0xff. With an effective key length of 63 bits, T1 = 63, T8 = 8 and TM = 0x7f. Here PITABLE[0], ..., PITABLE[255] is an array of "random" bytes based on the digits of PI = 3.14159... . More precisely, the array PITABLE is a random permutation of the values 0, ..., 255. Here is the PITABLE in hexadecimal notation: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 00: d9 78 f9 c4 19 dd b5 ed 28 e9 fd 79 4a a0 d8 9d 10: c6 7e 37 83 2b 76 53 8e 62 4c 64 88 44 8b fb a2 20: 17 9a 59 f5 87 b3 4f 13 61 45 6d 8d 09 81 7d 32 30: bd 8f 40 eb 86 b7 7b 0b f0 95 21 22 5c 6b 4e 82 40: 54 d6 65 93 ce 60 b2 1c 73 56 c0 14 a7 8c f1 dc 50: 12 75 ca 1f 3b be e4 d1 42 3d d4 30 a3 3c b6 26 60: 6f bf 0e da 46 69 07 57 27 f2 1d 9b bc 94 43 03 70: f8 11 c7 f6 90 ef 3e e7 06 c3 d5 2f c8 66 1e d7 80: 08 e8 ea de 80 52 ee f7 84 aa 72 ac 35 4d 6a 2a 90: 96 1a d2 71 5a 15 49 74 4b 9f d0 5e 04 18 a4 ec a0: c2 e0 41 6e 0f 51 cb cc 24 91 af 50 a1 f4 70 39 b0: 99 7c 3a 85 23 b8 b4 7a fc 02 36 5b 25 55 97 31 c0: 2d 5d fa 98 e3 8a 92 ae 05 df 29 10 67 6c ba c9 d0: d3 00 e6 cf e1 9e a8 2c 63 16 01 3f 58 e2 89 a9 e0: 0d 38 34 1b ab 33 ff b0 bb 48 0c 5f b9 b1 cd 2e f0: c5 f3 db 47 e5 a5 9c 77 0a a6 20 68 fe 7f c1 ad The key expansion operation consists of the following two loops and intermediate step: for i = T, T+1, ..., 127 do L[i] = PITABLE[L[i-1] + L[i-T]]; L[128-T8] = PITABLE[L[128-T8] & TM]; for i = 127-T8, ..., 0 do L[i] = PITABLE[L[i+1] XOR L[i+T8]]; (In the first loop, the addition of L[i-1] and L[i-T] is performed modulo 256.) The "effective key" consists of the values L[128-T8],..., L[127]. The intermediate step's bitwise "and" operation reduces the search space for L[128-T8] so that the effective number of key bits is T1. The expanded key depends only on the effective key bits, regardless of the supplied key K. Since the expanded key is not itself modified during encryption or decryption, as a pragmatic matter one can expand the key just once when encrypting or decrypting a large block of data. 3. Encryption algorithm The encryption operation is defined in terms of primitive "mix" and "mash" operations. Here the expression "x rol k" denotes the 16-bit word x rotated left by k bits, with the bits shifted out the top end entering the bottom end. 3.1 Mix up R[i] The primitive "Mix up R[i]" operation is defined as follows, where s[0] is 1, s[1] is 2, s[2] is 3, and s[3] is 5, and where the indices of the array R are always to be considered "modulo 4," so that R[i-1] refers to R[3] if i is 0 (these values are "wrapped around" so that R always has a subscript in the range 0 to 3 inclusive): R[i] = R[i] + K[j] + (R[i-1] & R[i-2]) + ((~R[i-1]) & R[i-3]); j = j + 1; R[i] = R[i] rol s[i]; In words: The next key word K[j] is added to R[i], and j is advanced. Then R[i-1] is used to create a "composite" word which is added to R[i]. The composite word is identical with R[i-2] in those positions where R[i-1] is one, and identical to R[i-3] in those positions where R[i-1] is zero. Then R[i] is rotated left by s[i] bits (bits rotated out the left end of R[i] are brought back in at the right). Here j is a "global" variable so that K[j] is always the first key word in the expanded key which has not yet been used in a "mix" operation. 3.2 Mixing round A "mixing round" consists of the following operations: Mix up R[0] Mix up R[1] Mix up R[2] Mix up R[3] 3.3 Mash R[i] The primitive "Mash R[i]" operation is defined as follows (using the previous conventions regarding subscripts for R): R[i] = R[i] + K[R[i-1] & 63]; In words: R[i] is "mashed" by adding to it one of the words of the expanded key. The key word to be used is determined by looking at the low-order six bits of R[i-1], and using that as an index into the key array K. 3.4 Mashing round A "mashing round" consists of: Mash R[0] Mash R[1] Mash R[2] Mash R[3] 3.5 Encryption operation The entire encryption operation can now be described as follows. Here j is a global integer variable which is affected by the mixing operations. 1. Initialize words R[0], ..., R[3] to contain the 64-bit input value. 2. Expand the key, so that words K[0], ..., K[63] become defined. 3. Initialize j to zero. 4. Perform five mixing rounds. 5. Perform one mashing round. 6. Perform six mixing rounds. 7. Perform one mashing round. 8. Perform five mixing rounds. Note that each mixing round uses four key words, and that there are 16 mixing rounds altogether, so that each key word is used exactly once in a mixing round. The mashing rounds will refer to up to eight of the key words in a data-dependent manner. (There may be repetitions, and the actual set of words referred to will vary from encryption to encryption.) 4. Decryption algorithm The decryption operation is defined in terms of primitive operations that undo the "mix" and "mash" operations of the encryption algorithm. They are named "r-mix" and "r-mash" (r- denotes the reverse operation). Here the expression "x ror k" denotes the 16-bit word x rotated right by k bits, with the bits shifted out the bottom end entering the top end. 4.1 R-Mix up R[i] The primitive "R-Mix up R[i]" operation is defined as follows, where s[0] is 1, s[1] is 2, s[2] is 3, and s[3] is 5, and where the indices of the array R are always to be considered "modulo 4," so that R[i-1] refers to R[3] if i is 0 (these values are "wrapped around" so that R always has a subscript in the range 0 to 3 inclusive): R[i] = R[i] ror s[i]; R[i] = R[i] - K[j] - (R[i-1] & R[i-2]) - ((~R[i-1]) & R[i-3]); j = j - 1; In words: R[i] is rotated right by s[i] bits (bits rotated out the right end of R[i] are brought back in at the left). Here j is a "global" variable so that K[j] is always the key word with greatest index in the expanded key which has not yet been used in a "r-mix" operation. The key word K[j] is subtracted from R[i], and j is decremented. R[i-1] is used to create a "composite" word which is subtracted from R[i]. The composite word is identical with R[i-2] in those positions where R[i-1] is one, and identical to R[i-3] in those positions where R[i-1] is zero. 4.2 R-Mixing round An "r-mixing round" consists of the following operations: R-Mix up R[3] R-Mix up R[2] R-Mix up R[1] R-Mix up R[0] 4.3 R-Mash R[i] The primitive "R-Mash R[i]" operation is defined as follows (using the previous conventions regarding subscripts for R): R[i] = R[i] - K[R[i-1] & 63]; In words: R[i] is "r-mashed" by subtracting from it one of the words of the expanded key. The key word to be used is determined by looking at the low-order six bits of R[i-1], and using that as an index into the key array K. 4.4 R-Mashing round An "r-mashing round" consists of: R-Mash R[3] R-Mash R[2] R-Mash R[1] R-Mash R[0] 4.5 Decryption operation The entire decryption operation can now be described as follows. Here j is a global integer variable which is affected by the mixing operations. 1. Initialize words R[0], ..., R[3] to contain the 64-bit ciphertext value. 2. Expand the key, so that words K[0], ..., K[63] become defined. 3. Initialize j to 63. 4. Perform five r-mixing rounds. 5. Perform one r-mashing round. 6. Perform six r-mixing rounds. 7. Perform one r-mashing round. 8. Perform five r-mixing rounds. 5. Test vectors Test vectors for encryption with RC2 are provided below. All quantities are given in hexadecimal notation. Key length (bytes) = 8 Effective key length (bits) = 63 Key = 00000000 00000000 Plaintext = 00000000 00000000 Ciphertext = ebb773f9 93278eff Key length (bytes) = 8 Effective key length (bits) = 64 Key = ffffffff ffffffff Plaintext = ffffffff ffffffff Ciphertext = 278b27e4 2e2f0d49 Key length (bytes) = 8 Effective key length (bits) = 64 Key = 30000000 00000000 Plaintext = 10000000 00000001 Ciphertext = 30649edf 9be7d2c2 Key length (bytes) = 1 Effective key length (bits) = 64 Key = 88 Plaintext = 00000000 00000000 Ciphertext = 61a8a244 adacccf0 Key length (bytes) = 7 Effective key length (bits) = 64 Key = 88bca90e 90875a Plaintext = 00000000 00000000 Ciphertext = 6ccf4308 974c267f Key length (bytes) = 16 Effective key length (bits) = 64 Key = 88bca90e 90875a7f 0f79c384 627bafb2 Plaintext = 00000000 00000000 Ciphertext = 1a807d27 2bbe5db1 Key length (bytes) = 16 Effective key length (bits) = 128 Key = 88bca90e 90875a7f 0f79c384 627bafb2 Plaintext = 00000000 00000000 Ciphertext = 2269552a b0f85ca6 Key length (bytes) = 33 Effective key length (bits) = 129 Key = 88bca90e 90875a7f 0f79c384 627bafb2 16f80a6f 85920584 c42fceb0 be255daf 1e Plaintext = 00000000 00000000 Ciphertext = 5b78d3a4 3dfff1f1 6. RC2 Algorithm Object Identifier The Object Identifier for RC2 in cipher block chaining mode is rc2CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) encryptionAlgorithm(3) 2} RC2-CBC takes parameters RC2-CBCParameter ::= CHOICE { iv IV, params SEQUENCE { version RC2Version, iv IV } } where IV ::= OCTET STRING -- 8 octets RC2Version ::= INTEGER -- 1-1024 RC2 in CBC mode has two parameters: an 8-byte initialization vector (IV) and a version number in the range 1-1024 which specifies in a roundabout manner the number of effective key bits to be used for the RC2 encryption/decryption. The correspondence between effective key bits and version number is as follows: 1. If the number EKB of effective key bits is in the range 1-255, then the version number is given by Table[EKB], where the 256-byte translation table Table[] is specified below. Table[] specifies a permutation on the numbers 0-255; note that it is not the same table that appears in the key expansion phase of RC2. 2. If the number EKB of effective key bits is in the range 256-1024, then the version number is simply EKB. The default number of effective key bits for RC2 is 32. If RC2-CBC is being performed with 32 effective key bits, the parameters should be supplied as a simple IV, rather than as a SEQUENCE containing a version and an IV. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 00: bd 56 ea f2 a2 f1 ac 2a b0 93 d1 9c 1b 33 fd d0 10: 30 04 b6 dc 7d df 32 4b f7 cb 45 9b 31 bb 21 5a 20: 41 9f e1 d9 4a 4d 9e da a0 68 2c c3 27 5f 80 36 30: 3e ee fb 95 1a fe ce a8 34 a9 13 f0 a6 3f d8 0c 40: 78 24 af 23 52 c1 67 17 f5 66 90 e7 e8 07 b8 60 50: 48 e6 1e 53 f3 92 a4 72 8c 08 15 6e 86 00 84 fa 60: f4 7f 8a 42 19 f6 db cd 14 8d 50 12 ba 3c 06 4e 70: ec b3 35 11 a1 88 8e 2b 94 99 b7 71 74 d3 e4 bf 80: 3a de 96 0e bc 0a ed 77 fc 37 6b 03 79 89 62 c6 90: d7 c0 d2 7c 6a 8b 22 a3 5b 05 5d 02 75 d5 61 e3 a0: 18 8f 55 51 ad 1f 0b 5e 85 e5 c2 57 63 ca 3d 6c b0: b4 c5 cc 70 b2 91 59 0d 47 20 c8 4f 58 e0 01 e2 c0: 16 38 c4 6f 3b 0f 65 46 be 7e 2d 7b 82 f9 40 b5 d0: 1d 73 f8 eb 26 c7 87 97 25 54 b1 28 aa 98 9d a5 e0: 64 6d 7a d4 10 81 44 ef 49 d6 ae 2e dd 76 5c 2f f0: a7 1c c9 09 69 9a 83 cf 29 39 b9 e9 4c ff 43 ab A. Intellectual Property Notice RC2 is a registered trademark of RSA Data Security, Inc. RSA's copyrighted RC2 software is available under license from RSA Data Security, Inc. B. Author's Address Ron Rivest RSA Laboratories 100 Marine Parkway, #500 Redwood City, CA 94065 USA (650) 595-7703 rsa-labs(a)rsa.com

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Re: Freedom Forum report on the State of the First Amendment (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 1998 16:40:11 -0400 > From: The Sheriff <sheriff(a)speakeasy.org> > Subject: Re: Freedom Forum report on the State of the First Amendment > Sam Adams (as it may or may not have been mentioned on this list) > himself had a problem with our constitution -- he didn't think that > it was right for the people to ratify the bill of rights, thereby > protecting certain rights under the constitution. Why? Simple. > > He was of the mind that setting our rights, such as the right to > free speech, in concrete meant that anything NOT set in concrete > wasn't a right -- he felt that by ratifying the bill of rights, > rather than using logic as I did above, we were actually LIMITING > our rights as freely roaming human beings. Which is the reason they put the 9th and 10th in there. > America should be about not taking any shit from anybody -- not > because you can sue, but because you have enough attitude to realize > when the other guy's being an idiot, and because you have enough > balls to tell him so. Actualy it should be because people realize you don't owe that other person an explanation for your actions and you further don't need their permission. Of course this assumes you *aren't* using anything that belongs to them. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Future War on TDC this Sunday
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Just saw an add for Future War on The Discovery Channel this Sunday evening. It is supposed to discuss the impact of global television as the primary weapon in the warfare of tomorrow. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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College freshmen political interest at a nadir [CNN] (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From owner-austin-cpunks(a)ssz.com Mon Jan 12 13:31:10 1998 From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)ssz.com> Message-Id: <199801121930.NAA22376(a)einstein.ssz.com> Subject: College freshmen political interest at a nadir [CNN] To: cypherunks(a)ssz.com Date: Mon, 12 Jan 1998 13:30:47 -0600 (CST) Cc: austin-cpunks(a)ssz.com (Austin Cypherpunks) X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] Content-Type: text Content-Length: 2144 Sender: owner-austin-cpunks(a)ssz.com Precedence: bulk Reply-To: austin-cpunks(a)ssz.com Forwarded message: > POLITICAL INTEREST AMONG COLLEGE FRESHMEN AT NEW LOW > > Graphic January 12, 1998 > Web posted at: 1:37 p.m. EST (1837 GMT) > > WASHINGTON (AP) -- It is not easy peddling politics on a college > campus nowadays. Even talking about the issues is a turnoff, > according to a nationwide survey of freshmen. > > An annual study by the University of California, Los Angeles, for > the Washington-based American Council on Education found a record > low number of college freshmen showing much interest in politics. > > Just 27 percent of the nation's 1.6 million freshmen believed that > keeping up with political affairs is a very important life goal, > less than half the percentage recorded in 1966. Just 14 percent said > they frequently discussed politics, down from 30 percent in 1968. [text deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Economic spies increase US activity [CNN]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > ECONOMIC SPIES INCREASE ACTIVITY IN U.S. > > Economics Graphic January 12, 1998 > Web posted at: 11:38 a.m. EST (1638 GMT) > > LOS ANGELES (Reuters) -- Governments of at least 23 countries > including Germany, Russia, China, France and Israel have stepped up > their economic espionage against U.S.-based companies, the Los > Angeles Times, quoting the FBI, reported Monday. > > The newspaper said a new survey conducted by the American Society > for Industrial Security estimated that intellectual property losses > from foreign and domestic espionage may have exceeded $300 billion > in 1997 alone. > > More than 1,100 documented incidents of economic espionage and 550 > suspected incidents that could not be fully documented were reported > last year by major companies in a survey conducted by the society, > The Los Angeles Times said. It said it had obtained results of the > survey which was scheduled to be released Wednesday. > > A 1996 Economic Espionage Act makes theft of proprietary economic > information in the United States a felony punishable by a $10 > million fine and 15-year prison sentence. [text deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Trial jurisdiction options
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ARTICLE III. Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; -- to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; -- to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -- to Controversies between two or more States; -- between a State and Citizens of another State; -- between Citizens of different States; -- between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States; -- and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all Cases, affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Federal govt. & Science - Const. limits
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Congress has *no* authority to ban *any* scientific research. In fact they are specificaly enjoined to *promote* it. Section 8. The Congress shall have Power... [text deleted] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries; [remainder deleted] ARTICLE IX. The enumeration of the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. ARTICLE X. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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load balancing web proxy and server networks
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We might also think about adding hot spot avoidance to distributed web hosting mechanisms. A distributed web space which distributed itself to meet demand would be useful. (An example of hot spots being perhaps Dan Farmer's web site after he released Satan ... he switched the web server off to stop his T1 being saturated, until the deluge subsided). An automatic load balancing distributed web server would be a kind of next generation web proxy cacheing and mirroring scheme, dynamically replicating and cacheing data to meet demand. Robustness could be improved also by the redundancy introduced. Those browsing documents would pay for their web accesses at the service rate they desired. A market in web data would then give web proxies / mirroring agents an economic incentive to automatically replicate and migrate data. Web caches already have some protection from various laws. One other idea for an eternity service host we could leach off was suggested to me by Ian Brown <I.Brown(a)cs.ucl.ac.uk>. His suggestion was that it would be nice if we could con proxy caches into cacheing eternity web space for us. One way to do this for example would be to actually host our own web pages, but to configure our web server to only serve to a list of web proxies -- anybody else would get access denied. The .htaccess mechanism would be sufficient for this purpose. Adam

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Re: Talk of Banning Research into Human Cloning
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 1/12/98 3:32 PM, Tim May (tcmay(a)got.net) passed this wisdom: >Any implications for crypto? If Congress can successfully make >certain types of science illegal, felonizing the search for truth, >why not a ban on certain types of mathematics research? I think many of us are understandably nervous about the mistakes that could be made in the process of perfecting human cloning. But Tim's point is well taken, yet another potential 'slippery slope.' It also begs the question again of 'are we getting too paranoid?' I think the nanswer is still "no, not yet", as the Klinton administration proves to us almost every day it seems. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNLroFD7r4fUXwraZAQF9Cwf6AtGeZgKDN3nwY0FMsxoTgwXgalRmjGJT gqliyEIdYfqcQK/kGTFYvBbcGd0xl1dr+XpmJXvr7ItQ8lrsyyqEozGC2KJGYpJe 7C8nMl/nf49Pd4UcJRNZb86qAdwAB7wERW7nL8aGB5Bzm46tKEeaAS2jrzxVOgIt z7ysxDd+VNoU2czWrergrhvDjbtnXKjPVcIfwkN0M57SJgdWqIlX/fo5HLuiw8IZ i/Qg8JsLXJgnWr5ZDgrSRSNgVqmwAaV8980piBGyqY0X9ytOcYdjV197+rz55Hkh iqzIQm6aQa5BJuDy3p8B44LlICtxFB0XZP1UdgvRCbFWO3YD8P3mOA== =O6Dk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "It's what you learn after you know it all that counts" John Wooden

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