- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Minor edit to the PGP 2.6 distribution
by Jeffrey I. Schiller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

About one half hour ago I replaced the PGP 2.6 distribution files with a newer version. The change represents a new mitlicen.txt file (minor wording correction, no big deal) and a corrected UNIX makefile. The source itself and the executables were not changed. -Jeff

1 0

PGP 2.6 uses RSAREF version 1
by Hal Abelson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

MIT's release of PGP 2.6 uses RSAREF version 1, under the RSAREF license of January 5, 1993. Some people have wondered whether including RSAREF 1, rather than RSAREF version 2, is an oversight in the PGP 2.6 distribution. It is not an oversight. Version 1 is what we intended. The change from RSAREF 2.0 (in PGP 2.5) to RSAREF version 1 (in PGP 2.6) was done on the advice of RSA Data Security, which has granted MIT permission to access non-published routines in all RSAREF versions 1.nn, and rights in accordance with the version 1 license. -- Hal Abelson Dept. of Elect. Eng. and Comp. Sci. MIT

1 0

(fwd) FBI infiltrates Connected.com
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: bga.com!news.sprintlink.net!connected.com!connected.com!not-for-mail From: turmoil(a)hebron.connected.com (Turmoil) Newsgroups: seattle.general,alt.activism,alt.2600,alt.drugs Subject: FBI infiltrates Connected.com Date: 21 May 1994 11:48:31 -0700 Organization: Connected INC -- Internet Services Lines: 22 Message-ID: <2rll1v$jmb(a)hebron.connected.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: hebron.connected.com X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2] Xref: bga.com seattle.general:3840 alt.activism:10793 alt.2600:9216 alt.drugs:20914 Recently the staff at connected. has admitted that they have "invited" two FBI agents to roan that system. According to connected.staff these FBI agents are looking for "hackers phreaks" and people having copywritten programs. I am pretty peaved about this, we don't know how long thev'e been here, what rights they have on the system, or much else. Just that they are here. Watching us. Of course, I never use my account for illegal activities. Shit, I don't even do much illegal (except smoke a bit of pot) But I do not like the idea of giving up my rights against undue searches. This seems a reflection on the state of America today. This used to be a free country, but now there is a pig or FBI agent watching EVERYTHING you do. This is NOT the America described in the constitution. It's not a society of free, independent people. It is a dictatorship that must spy on it's own people in order to survive. I am anxious to here what others that read these groups think about this. Have A Nice Day turmoil(a)hebron.connected.com The FBI have infiltrated this site, I am activly searching for a new site

1 0

Email firewall etc
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vincent.Cate(a)FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU: > Companies like the idea of firewall machines to protect the security of > their internal nets. I bet they would also like something called an > "email-firewall". Names are important. :-) I think of the > email-firewall as a slightly modified anonymous-remailer. I haven't delved into the wide world of remailers out there, but I'd like a remailer that encrypted, though did not necessarily anonymize, incoming mail. I'm not really bothered about the NSA reading my mail. In fact, I'm not usually concerned whether someone in New York, for instance read my mail. But I might not want people closer to home (local sysadmins, etc) to read it. I'm sure many others share this position. The problem is that I can't ensure that people encrypt their mail to me. They may not bother, or be unable. An alternative would be for them to send it to a remailer, which, knowing my public key, would encrypt and forward it to me. Comments? -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA The National Short-Sleeved Shirt Association says: Support your right to bare arms! --------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Extropians List Statistics 5/23 (fwd)
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gee Tim, the Ex. list sure has quieted down since your departure! -NetSurfer #include standard.disclaimer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.4: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " " |P. O. Box 15432 |finger for key / Viacrypt Reseller > " " /\ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 4 Jun 1994 23:01:12 -0400 From: Extropians Mailing List <extropians-request(a)extropy.org> To: Extropians(a)extropy.org Subject: Extropians List Statistics 5/23 Weekly List Statistics for 5/23 to 6/3 Total Number of Messages Posted: 24 Total Size of Messages Posted : 61156 bytes Average Total Size per Day : 8736 bytes Average # of Messages per Day : 3 Average Message Size : 2548 bytes Number of Posters Participating: 21 Top Ten Posters by Frequency 1. nancc(a)netcom.com (2 total, 0.3/day, 8.3% of total) 2. david(a)bitdance.mv.com (2 total, 0.3/day, 8.3% of total) 3. johnkc(a)well.sf.ca.us (2 total, 0.3/day, 8.3% of total) 4. russw(a)netcom.com (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) 5. vincent.cate(a)furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) 6. sasha(a)cs.umb.edu (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) 7. extropians-request(a)extropy.org (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) 8. jhdaugh(a)mail.msen.com (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) 9. pcm(a)world.std.com (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) 10. georgesmit(a)aol.com (1 total, 0.1/day, 4.2% of total) Top Ten Posters by Volume 1. more(a)usc.edu (10.9kbytes, 1601 bytes/day, 18.3% of total) 2. pcm(a)world.std.com (6.4kbytes, 934 bytes/day, 10.7% of total) 3. johnkc(a)well.sf.ca.us (4.7kbytes, 689 bytes/day, 7.9% of total) 4. vincent.cate(a)furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu (4.4kbytes, 648 bytes/day, 7.4% of total) 5. 70544.1227(a)compuserve.com (3.9kbytes, 563 bytes/day, 6.4% of total) 6. david(a)bitdance.mv.com (3.4kbytes, 496 bytes/day, 5.7% of total) 7. jhdaugh(a)mail.msen.com (3.3kbytes, 476 bytes/day, 5.5% of total) 8. pavel(a)park.bu.edu (2.7kbytes, 399 bytes/day, 4.6% of total) 9. nancc(a)netcom.com (2.7kbytes, 398 bytes/day, 4.6% of total) 10. xtr(a)liberty.demon.co.uk (2.6kbytes, 386 bytes/day, 4.4% of total) Histogram of the week by number of messages ++ Sun |0| ++ +----+ Mon |4 | +----+ +---+ Tue |3 | +---+ +-----+ Wed |5 | +-----+ +-------+ Thu |7 | +-------+ +-+ Fri |1| +-+ +----+ Sat |4 | +----+ Histogram of the week by daily volume ++ Sun ||0 ++ +-+ Mon | |7280 +-+ +--+ Tue | |8507 +--+ +---+ Wed | |14024 +---+ +----+ Thu | |19545 +----+ ++ Fri ||2389 ++ +--+ Sat | |9411 +--+

1 0

Bill Machrone's PC Magazine article
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Privacy in the Digital Age" Bill Machrone PC Magazine June 14, 1994 page 87 Copyright 1994 Ziff-Davis, I'm sure, but don't let that stop you from forwarding to interested lists and newsgroups. I'm a fairly conservative, law-and-order kind of guy. I support my local police. I sometimes have trouble identifying with some of my more liberal journalistic compatriots. But suddenly, you and I (along with the rest of the computer industry) are caught up in an issue of national importance that transcends politics and gets down to constitutional issues and basic freedoms. The issues, however,are in danger of being clouded as the usual suspects take sides and start shouting. The knee-jerk liberals have squared off against the knee-jerk conservatives over the privacy and security of digital communications. The Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility oppose the FBI and the Justice Department. And they're all quoting Al Gore. Let's get beyond the labels, politics, and allegiances and look at the facts. Here's the short form: The Feds realized that with the advent of widespread digital commmunications, their ability to monitor and tap communications would be radically diminished or would take far more time and money. So they proposed that all future digital devices be equipped with a high-security scrambling cip, called Clipper. Crazy? Like a fox. Every Clipper chip would have a serial number, which would give you access to a key that would decrypt whatever data the chip had encoded. The key would be kep in two pieces in two different places, and only a court order could bring them together. Trouble is, nobody trusts the law enforcement agencies to keep them apart. Don't even wonder if the National Security Agency will be monitoring digital conversations for its favorite trigger words. Furthermore, the pending legislation provides for fines up to $10,000 a day against telecommunications companies who don't give the Feds the access they want to decoded data streams. It doesn't end with telephones and data networks. The Feds intend to have Clipper technology on every fax machine, every cable TV box, every ATM, every device capable of receiving and sending a digital data stream. They want to monitor the entire information network for "patterns of abuse and criminal activity." Offering this capability in the form of a "security" chip that supposedly protects our data is insulting and offensive. The silly part of all this is that it represents the classic case of locks keeping out the honest people. The sad part is that we don't trust law enforcement agencies, however well-intentioned, not to abuse the power. Even worse, we the taxpayers are going to foot the bill (to the tune of half a billion dollars) just to build the monitoring network. We'll pay again in higher product costs. Nobody builds complex data-encryption chips for free. There is this little issue, however, of First Amendment rights. When the White House issued its briefing document on the Clipper announcement, it averred that no U.S. citizen, "as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product." FBI director Louis J. Freeh echoed this position in a _New York Times_ interview, in which he claimed that the American people must be willing to give up a degree of personal privacy in exchange for safety and security. I find both statements odious. Privacy is a nonissue for most of us. People who want their communications to be secure have always had the means to do so. People who don't need secure communications don't bother and don't care. Also, security is a pain in the neck. The inherent hassles make us very choosy about when we use it. All the Clipper chip will do is waste our tax money. There's no point in making everyone's transmissions and conversations secure if a third party holds the key. No criminal in his right mind would depend on Clipper encoding when fully secure means are available. If the government manages to overthrow all logic and make Clipper a legal requirement, those of us who want or need real security will be forced into acts of civil disobediance. For data, it's a piece of cake. You can find half a dozen shareware programs on ZiffNet that implement the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Data Encryption Standard (DES). If you're one of the superparanoids who suspect that the NSA put a trap door into DES--no one has ever found evidence of it--you can use PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), a shareware program popular on the Internet, or PC-IRIS, available on ZiffNet. Both use a technique known as RSA to encrypt your data, which is widely regarded as extremely difficult to break. RSA has the additional benefit of providing public-key encryption; you publish a key that people use to encode messages to you, and then you use a private key to decrypt the message. DES is probably only viable for another year or two before it becomes too easy to crack; RSA should be secure for some time longer. Voice security is harder, but not much. You either go to a spook shop and pay a lot of money for a telephone scramber device or build your own. The latter option is not all that difficult, given the advent of DSP (digital signal processing) chips. All you need is the DSP, a couple of megs of memory, and a few support chips. Some of the DSP vendors have evaluation kits that contain virtually everything you need, Basically, you digitize your voice, take samples of the data, and perform calculations and transformations on it. You then turn the resulting data stream back into sound and send it over the phone line. For fun, you might send several data streams at the same time but out of phase with one another, the way modems do. An identical piece of hardware on the other end performs the operations in reverse order. Suffice it to say, however, that if the NSA types hear a scrambled conversation that they can't understand, they're going to wonder what you've got to hide. We're not encouraging criminal behavior by pointing out cryptographic resources. The dummies won't read this and the smarties don't need to. The only people who will be adversely affected by Clipper are you and me. --end--

1 0

Ultra and Coventy
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry wrote that the British let Coventry be destroyed lest Ultra be revealed. Kahn doesn't believe that. From ``Kahn on Codes'', p. 110: Nor, to debunk another story, did Churchill let Coventry be destroyed because he believed that defensive measures would risk the secret of ULTRA. Critical analyses of documents show that this is pure myth. The footnote cites F.H. Hinsley with E.E. Thomas, C.F.G Ransom, and R.C. Knight, ``British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations'' (London, 1979- ), I:528-48; N.E. Evans, ``Air Intelligence and the Coventry Raid'', Royal United Services Institution Journal (September 1976), 66-73. I don't have access to either of those publications, so I can't assess that further.

3 3

Re: CEB 6 the Unpleasantness
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Cypherpunks' Electronic Book (CEB) 6 the Unpleasantness. [snip] > I don't know Tim May very well but I've noticed he gets into a lot of >flame wars. Could this be his M O?: Get into an argument with a victim >over a matter of fact, then slyly turn it into an attack on the person >without losing the applause of the gallery? Also, I don't like his >shrill strident manner. > I don't like a bully. When I run into one, I like to make sure he >takes a few lumps too! > Yours Truly, > Gary Jeffers [snip] I like a lot of what Tim May says. I don't think he starts out to flame on purpose. I forgot something important about netiquette when I got into that flame fight with Tim. If you ignore the first salvo, flame wars usually never happen. BTW, Gary, as a former Alaskan, the remark about rabbits and moose still makes me laugh out loud... Don't know why... Apologies ad<in>vance for the wasted bandwidth. And now we return you to your regularly scheduled cryptography... ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

1 0

Re: Help A Novice Understand
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)netcom.com> > >Someone said that Sternlight is a high-placed govt official. I don't > >believe this. (That someone was me, folks.) According to Tommy <nobody(a)soda.berkeley.edu> David Sternlight is a member of the council on foreign relations (pg. 176 of the 1993 Annual Report of the CFR) The following Executive Branch officials are also members of this organization: William J. Clinton, President etc etc... The CFR is a politicans equivalent of the rotary club and something you get into in exchange for little more than a few of the green folding ones. Everyone and his dog is in it - the membership must be in the tens if not hundreds of thousands. Basically it's like an English 'Gentleman's Club' - you're paying for the snob value of membership. What they get out of it is a big party cum picnic at somewhere posh once a year (like Camp David) and the chance to schmooze with the nobs. They disguise this on their tax claims as a policy conference. Membership marks Sternlight as a social climber, not as a mover and shaker. G

1 0

No Subject
by nobody＠kaiwan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There are a number of good text files out on anonymous mail forwarding servers, but nothing that really "ties it all together", so to speak. If you know of such a thing, please post it. Anyway, let me ask a few specific questions: I read that fingering ghio(a)andrew.cmu.edu will produce a current status of all "Cypherpunk" remailers. I did so and it was quite informative. However, "remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu" was omitted from the list. Is there a reason for that? Do any of the other CP remailers (other than soda.berkeley.edu) offer a post-to-Usenet gateway? If so, do they use the same syntax? Is there a way to disable the encrypted reply address at the Berkeley remailer? I know that a few of the CP remailers have a certain adddress, like "help@<address>" which will provide an info sheet by return mail. Do any of the others support that? If so, would "help" be used, or something else? Thanks... =====================

1 0