- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: POISON PILL
by pierre＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Panzer Boy <panzer(a)drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu> > [...] > Blowing things up is nice and all but also lacks style (unless you nuke). ROTFL ... I'd also second whoever mentioned not destroying evidence (and your own data remember? if there is actually a chance you get it back) > Basically a permently encrypted harddrive would be fine. Every boot up > you need to enter a password. If the screen saver kicks in, you have to > enter a password, or it reboots. Stuff like this. Yes, that's probably the best way as otherwise moving disks to an other machine would bypass the protection. Still booting if no or wrong password is good too. But let's add something else: It may be possible (easy?) to hide a partition on the disk: buy two hard drives from a family with different capacity and same packages. Move the labels of the small one to the big one. Discard the small one :-) Use partitions corresponding to the capacity of the small one to store boring un-encrypted material, software, etc... Fix the scsi controller on the drive (re-program) to self-identify with the smaller format, but to obey access commands to the hidden area. You now have a computer and disk drive that boots as a boring system, with a medium size drive, but if you know about it, you can access an other partition of encrypted stuff. The (even not so) casual inspection of the stolen or confiscated system reveals only stuff that is not worth spending time on. Only a very detailed inspection, or a leak, reveals the encrypted stuff, still encrypted... Very frustrating. Of course, if your backups were not encrypted or if you wrote down the keys... This solution is even compatible with using a BIOS ROM glued to the motherboard that prevents unauthorized use of the computer. The hard drive and the motherboard are protected by two different mechanisms. Pierre. pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Re: POISON PILL
by George A. Gleason 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Remote control via pagers is subject to false-positives, i.e. you'd need a passcode to activate it or otherwise the first wrong number which dialed your pager would wipe you out... and also, you're not in any position to dial your pager if some hypothetical robber was holding you hostage while trying to get at your data.

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Apple's PowerTalk: *breakthrough* in crypto export?
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the TidBITS Mac newsletter: (I'd be more specific but don't have it from my source -- perhaps someone can post the info on how to retrieve the whole article.) >PowerTalk Arrives >----------------- > by Wolfgang Naegeli -- wnn(a)ornl.gov Powertalk is Apple's new `Collaborative Environment' client software, supposedly to be released next week. Its a sort of groupware-email package with some significant security & cryptography mechanisms. Sounds like its very intuitive and a very highly refined user interface. I suspect this whole platform could have a *major* effect in bringing seamless, invisible, secure cryptography to the masses -- at least, reading all the promotional hype, the *potential* is there. > Apple claims that PowerTalk is more secure than most other off- > the-shelf software solutions since those use less secure > algorithms to avoid export restrictions. Apple is the first > company to receive an export license for a DES-based product. 1st? *WOW* Cypherpunks we need more intelligence on this ASAP! Does this represent a fundamental *breakthrough* in export policy? Why are they the first? Is it real live DES and not some strange crippled bit length version? What does this *mean*?! red warning flag: >RSA always is at the > root of the issuing process and signatures expire after two years. Not sure if this means what it seems to say -- that RSA is *generating* the private keys and passing them on? We just had that big discussion about this issue with some other software from Apple, didn't we? Here's some more from the article of interest to cypherpunks. ===cut=here=== Digital signatures, based on RSA Public Key Encryption, provide a secure way of ensuring data has not been altered and was signed by a particular person. The mechanism is similar to Kerberos [a security system developed at MIT -Adam], which was not mature enough at the critical point in PowerTalk development. Apple anticipates supporting Kerberos in a future PowerTalk release. To sign a document, simply drops it on a Signer icon. A prompt for the personal signer code then appears on the screen. If the content of the signed document later changes in any way, the signature becomes invalid. While being signed, a file automatically is locked to avoid inadvertent invalidation. The Get Info window of a signed file is used to uncheck the file lock, and it contains a Verify button with which the recipient can assert the integrity of the file and authenticity of its signature. Large companies can become trusted signature issuing agents for their employees by obtaining a titanium blackbox with key interlocks from RSA. The box contains a certain number oFrom owner-cypherpunks Sat Oct 2 03:18:43 1993 Received: by toad.com id AA25713; Sat, 2 Oct 93 03:14:17 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA25695; Sat, 2 Oct 93 03:13:54 PDT Return-Path: <sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu> Received: from soda.berkeley.edu ([128.32.149.19]) by toad.com id AA25690; Sat, 2 Oct 93 03:13:51 PDT Received: by soda.berkeley.edu (5.65/KAOS-1) id AA09739; Sat, 2 Oct 93 03:13:44 -0700 Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 03:13:44 -0700 Message-Id: <9310021013.AA09739(a)soda.berkeley.edu> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: nobody(a)soda.berkeley.edu Subject: Sternlight's Key Remailed-By: Sameer Parekh <sameer(a)netcom.com> As an official Key Escrow Agent of the United States Gubberment, I have decided that David Sternlight, being a controversial public figure, needs cryptographic protection for his private communications. Accordingly, a key has been created for him. He has been provided with his public and secret keys via e-mail. A copy of the secret key will be held in escrow. In the event that Mr. Sternlight is ever served with a subpoena, the key will be released to appropriate authorities. Since Mr. Sternlight has been a vocal advocate of key escrow, I'm sure he will have no problems with his key being created by an unknown person. In the absence of a subpoena, Mr. Sternlight, your key is safe. Trust me. I'm from the gubberment and I'm here to help you. pub 1024/5C4E59 1993/10/02 David Sternlight <strnlght(a)netcom.com> Available from a keyserver near you.

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secretive API
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't know if this is old hat, but I was amused to see a moment ago on another mailing list the following quote from the Windows NT API: ERROR_TOO_MANY_SECRETS -The maximum number of secrets has been exceeded. -Win32 (NT) API. Doug

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MPJ Encryption Algorithm
by Mike Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart writes: > Sounds interesting; do you have any comparisons between it and IDEA > about either encryption strength, speed, or design philosophy? The full design philosophy for MPJ is in my thesis. Since then, I learned about differential cryptanalysis and was relieved to see that MPJ is fairly resistant to that. Here is a short summary: Algorithm Key size Block size Rounds Strength* SW Speed HW Speed DES 56 bits 64 bits 16/2 22-55 slow fast 3DES 112 bits 64 bits (16*3)/2 24-58 slower fast IDEA 128 bits 128 bits 16 65-110 fast fast Skipjack 80 bits 128 bits 32 79 ? ? MPJ 128 bits 128 bits 10 70-120 medium very fast MPJ2 >=64 bits 128 bits >=10 50-128 <=medium <=very fast *Strength is a GUESS at log base 2 of the complexity of breaking it. Algorithm Legal status Back door? Origin DES Public Domain No IBM/NBS->NIST/NSA 3DES Public Domain No IBM IDEA Patented No Switzerland Skipjack Classified LEAF NSA MPJ Public Domain No USA - University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (UCCS) MPJ2 Not yet released No USA DES Design philosophy: (1) Fit in small chip (2) Use involution for reversibility (only half of block changes with each round) (3) Use polyalphabetic nonlinear s-boxes of limited size (requires great care to avoid differential cryptanalysis) (4) Some design criteria still classified. 3DES Design philosophy: (1) Cascade existing known algorithm (2) Avoid weak key situations (3) Try not to require too much more key than the strength of the algorithm justifies (i.e. just 2 instead of 3 keys are used). (4) Apply a bandaid. Making one compound block cipher would have been more secure, but not all the s-box design criteria are known. IDEA Design philosophy: (1) Use unrelated arithmetic operations on different fields. (2) Use only 32 bit arithmetic operations for speed on a computer. (3) Arrange the structure of the algorithm to do proper confusion/diffusion. (4) Very small code and memory space used in computer. Skipjack design philosophy (guessed): (1) Similar to DES, but with a block size of 128 bytes. (2) No attack known to the NSA will be more than a bit or two better than exhaustive key search. (3) Learn from the mistakes of DES (i.e. avoid weak keys and complementation symmetries DES suffers from). (4) Restrict knowledge of the algorithm as much as possible. MPJ Design philosopy: (1) Relax some of the size limits of DES & IDEA to gain security, but make sure it fits on a PC. (2) Avoid fragile fixed s-box & subkey design of DES, but copy its product cipher structure. (3) Change the whole block with each round instead of just half (i.e. 10 MPJ rounds is as effective as 20 DES-type rounds). (4) Make every output bit a strong function of every bit of the input and every bit of the key within 3 rounds. (5) Use such simple operations in a complex and nonlinear fashion that mathematical breakthroughs are not a threat (as with RSA). (6) Make the substitution steps reversible through a very clever construction of reversible substitution arrays directly from the key. (7) Make key scheduling slow (to discourage exhaustive search for keys), but make the algorithm very fast, especially in dedicated hardware. (8) Make creative use of nonlinearity, bit twiddling, and rounds to thwart an analytical attack using massive quantities of known or chosen plain text. MPJ2 Design philosophy: (1) Generalize the key scheduling to accommodate variable length keys. (2) Generalize to n rounds. (3) Attempt to do key scheduling on the fly in cases where the memory required for precomputed internal keys take up too much RAM. Common elements: All of these block cipher algorithms use repeating rounds of "confusion and diffusion" or "substitution and permutation" weaker ciphers to form a stronger product cipher. All of them are secure, even if the cipher becomes known. Skipjack is classified more to prevent knowledge of design criteria and cryptanalysis secrets, and to allow the forced insertion of a back door (LEAF) than for the security of the algorithm (just ask Dr. Denning). DES and 3DES can raise the price of unauthorized disclosure of secrets above the average individual's means. The others have the potential of raising the price of eavesdropping by breaking crypto algorithms to above the budgets of organized crime, hostile governments, and terrorists. None of them prevent other technological solutions to spying, such as placing bugs closer to the target individual, office, or computer system. General rules of the game in CRYPTOGRAPHY and CRYPTANALYSIS: 1. There is always a way to crack any practical cryptosystem. 2. Your opponent will not tell you if she has broken your cryptosystem and is reading your mail. 3. The longer any one cryptosystem is in use, and the more widely it is used, the more likely it is that someone has broken it, or at least discovered a weakness in it and not told anyone about it. 4. The more widely used a cryptosystem is, the more profitable it is to try to break it (for either noble or ignoble purposes). 5. Exclusive control of the ability to communicate securely is a powerful force that can easily be corrupted. 6. Putting all your eggs in one basket is unwise. Use more than one cryptosystem, and change keys regularly -- even if you don't suspect compromise. 7. Insecure cryptosystems often appear on the surface to be secure. They are often sold for good money. DISCLAIMERS: DISCUSSIONS ABOVE ARE FROM MEMORY AND MAY NOT BE ACCURATE. ALL DATA CLAIMING TO BE GUESSWORK IS. PROVING ANY CRYPTOSYSTEM SECURE IS USUALLY IMPOSSIBLE. INVENTERS OF CRYPTO ALGORITHMS ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO JUDGE THEM. Mike Johson mpj(a)csn.org This message contains writings protected under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America. Censorship is forbidden.

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[Question EFF yielding of crypto authority to NIST]
by Doug Humphrey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[stuff deleted] >Actually, they have issued such legal guarantees. They're in the form of the >administration's vow to uphold the US Constitution. That document's 9th and >10th amendments preclude US Government denial or disparagement of the people's >right to use cryptography (and a whole lot of others). The fact that these >legal guarantees are being ignored simply illustrates that their tyranny is >unbridled. When I first scanned this, I saw "... illustrates that their tyranny is unbundled" And I thought, what a concept! Doug

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FIDO, encryption
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here is the companion script to the other one I posted. It takes the output of the previous script (which takes PGP encrypted ascii to a list of geopraphic name), and turns it back into a PGP file. Not really stegonography since it's really just a substitution cipher. But, with a more sophisticated output grammar, you could embed your encrypted file in a bizarre vacation itinerary :-) pgphide < file.asc | mail -s "not encryped at all" user@host and then pgpuhide < mail_file_from_sneaky_person > pgpfile.asc will allow your friend decrypt pgpfile.asc. - ---------- #!/usr/local/bin/perl #pgpunhide - converts a geographic file back to pgp #Karl L. Barrus <klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu> %conversion = ( 'canada', '0', 'united states', '1', 'mexico', '2', 'pacific ocean', '3', 'atlantic ocean', '4', 'arctic ocean', '5', 'gulf of mexico', '6', 'north america', '7', 'allegheny mountains', '8', 'rocky mountains', '9', 'alabama', 'a', 'alaska', 'b', 'arizona', 'c', 'new mexico', 'd', 'arkansas', 'e', 'california', 'f', 'colorado', 'g', 'connecticut', 'h', 'rhode island','i', 'delaware', 'j', 'maryland', 'k', 'florida','l', 'georgia', 'm', 'hawaii', 'n', 'idaho','o', 'illinois', 'p', 'indiana', 'q', 'iowa','r', 'kansas', 's', 'kentucky', 't', 'louisiana','u', 'maine', 'v', 'massachusetts', 'w', 'michigan','x', 'minnesota', 'y', 'mississippi', 'z', 'missouri','A', 'montana', 'B', 'nebraska', 'C', 'nevada','D', 'utah', 'E', 'new hampshire', 'F', 'vermont','G', 'new jersey', 'H', 'new york', 'I', 'north carolina','J', 'north dakota', 'K', 'south dakota', 'L', 'ohio','M', 'oklahoma', 'N', 'oregon', 'O', 'pennsylvania', 'P', 'south carolina', 'Q', 'tennessee', 'R', 'texas','S', 'virginia', 'T', 'washington', 'U', 'west virginia','V', 'wisconsin', 'W', 'wyoming', 'X', 'washington d.c.','Y', 'bermuda', 'Z', 'guam', '+', 'puerto rico','/', 'virgin islands','=', ); print "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----\n"; print "Version: 2.3a\n\n"; while (<>) { $line = $_; chop $line; if ($line eq "") { print "\n"; } else { print $conversion{$line}; } } print "-----END PGP MESSAGE-----\n"; -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLKyz4YOA7OpLWtYzAQF3JAP9EjWnj7pix65fJLFf9mE+gLkw719nX0Xa jMgHFxmDIdeOxewi9ZnuzE99QqQHv4+TO3dO+CGg0zxGhCMO8/mu4vQtK6825kHl 9fESP/f2oSVLDPd2/Zv3c0/kMKe9UnMModNgl7tngzsMeBkFJVCnKjkQNGsJGCSz C5Z4uXaZccs= =M+N2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Medium destruction
by Peter Capek (TL-863-6721) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have no firsthand knowledge, but a friend who was into this a few years ago told me that the following is used for NSA's "best stuff" on paper... First, it is shredded. Then, it is burned. Then, the ashes are soaked in acid Then the acid is allowed to evaporate and the resulting mass is formed into bricks. The bricks are dumped at sea at a classified location which is changed weekly. Maybe he was putting me on, but... A few years ago, the American embassy in (I think) Teheran was invaded by mobs of locals. They apparently managed to get hold of a lot of classified documents which had been shredded in the minutes before they managed to break in. But a few months later, there appeared in the New York Times reconstructions of a few pages of the original material, based on a lot of tedious labor. So, maybe the procedures above aren't excessive...

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BlackNet Investigations--the Truth (fwd)
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherians, Here's a posting I sent to the "Extropians" list, which many of you are already on..sorry about getting this twice. Hit "delete" now if you are not interested in the "crypto-anarchy" side of what we are doing. I say this because when I post on these topics, which are apparently of interest to some, I often get notes or postings saying "Not all of us are anarchists, so keep this stuff off the list!" Now we are a diverse bunch. Some of us are fairly radical libertarians and see strong crypto as the technological tool to demolish governments (including the U.S. government). Others of us are anti-big business and see crypto as a means of reducing the power of large corporations over individuals. Others are socialists, acid freaks, even military cadets. Whatever. Some want to talk about using thermite bombs to melt hard disks (a current hot topic, as it were). Others are deeply into Perl scripts, MIME, and so on. For others, patent law and the ins and outs of the ECPA are the big excitement. The point is, there are a lot of loosely related items in the Cypherpunks agenda. What follows is related to _my_ main interest, the colonization of cyberspace and the institutions and methods which will arise. Don't read it if it doesn't interest you. And if you're scared that talking about using technology to bypass laws and ultimately overthrow national governments as we know them today will get you into trouble with the authorities or with your company, well, then this list is probably not for you. Me, I say what I think. Others can say what they think, too. -Tim May Forwarded message: To: Extropians(a)extropy.org Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 14:06:16 -0700 From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Subject: BlackNet Investigations--the Truth BlackNet Investigations Announces New Dossier Services FLASH: BlackNet Investigations is pleased to announce the immediate availability of dossiers from the former East Germany (DDR) and the former Soviet Union. We have obtained tens of millions of dossiers on activists, dissidents, extropians, and ordinary people and have meticulously scanned and digitized the essence of these files (many of these files were already in magnetic format, albeit primitive). Now you can learn what the KGB had on your business associates! Now you can discover if that little German pastry is as innocent as she seems. And you can even find out what the GRU had on you from your visit to Vienna in 1984. Contact us for details. Competitive rates, as always. And coming soon: the previously secret files of the KriminalStaatsPolizei. Plus, the now-privatized dossiers of the South American police states! Sources close to the FBI may soon make their files available as well! We are also negotiating with personnel at hospitals and insurance companies to obtain black market copies of insurance records, describing in gory detail all medical and psychiatric conditions for tens of millions of Americans. Onward and Upward! -BlackNet Investigations, a Cyberspace Entity ......... By now many of you know that BlackNet Investigations is not quite real...yet. More than just a Klaus!-style put-on, it's a basically plausible implication of current trends. Some of you requested your dossiers, others even wrote threatening notes. And a few of you even played along, saying how "shocked, simply shocked" you were to see the dossiers compiled on you. (Thanks! You know who you are.) As Dave Krieger noted in his piece on BlackNet Investigations, folks need to keep the inevitability of such dossier-based systems in mind. Others may not "advertise" the way BlackNet does, but they're just as surely keeping dossiers. I don't think it's overly paranoid to suggest that things you write on Usenet, or in mailing lists like Extropians and Cypherpunks, are being compiled by some into dossiers of sorts...call them "databases" if you like, but they're still dossiers. And in fact I do have a lot of Extropians and Cypherpunks postings tucked away in places that my Mac databases can access them easily, via keyword searches, tagged fields, etc. I'm quote sure a lot of people are doing this, quite likely some TLA agencies. All of the Extropians and Cypherpunks traffic for the past couple of years, and a lot more, fits on a single 128 MB magneto-optical cartridge...and I've got 10 or so of them. All Usenet postings are archived on CD-ROMs, available by subscription (Walnut Creek Software, or somesuch...and maybe multiple sources). Easy to obtain. Expect ftp sites to carry these back postings, if they aren't already available. In the next 10 years it'll be essentially a trivial exercise for any person--your child, your potential employer, credit agencies, etc.--to sift through the 20 or 30 gigabyes of Usenet traffic for a 10-year period and look for juicy items, for admissions of unusual sexual practices, for extreme political statements, etc. Data storage increases (CDs, DATs, MOs, new media) and processor speed increases will make searches easy and fast. Rather than having all this data on one's own machine, many people will compile it into files or dossiers, and then charge access fees. Customized searches, specialized grepping, and database "engines" optimized for search (like the Connection Machines, the Teradata hypercubes, neural net and fuzzy logic engines, etc.) will make this even easier. As jurisdictions attempt to pass laws restricting these accesses, as with the convoluted U.S. laws regarding credit, tenant (renter) credit, medical malpractice databases, etc. (the whole credit market, in other words), these databases will be moved offshore. Or the access may go offshore, and then back again! (You can set up the databases in your bedroom, then sell access through "cut-outs" that lie beyond the reach of U.S. laws.) Private investigation as we know it today will be radically changed. (Actually, much of current P.I. work is already accessing records and databases, so-called "skip-tracing" work, to see where vanished people have ended up...deadbeat dads, missing children, etc.) Entities like BlackNet will flourish in the crypto-anarchic world of cyberspace (or "cypherspace," as John Draper dubbed it). Positive reputations will be of utmost importance, as we've discussed so many times. Digital pseudonyms will of necessity become more widespread. Offshore data havens, credit agencies that aren't restricted to the "7 years" allowed by U.S. law, repositories of stolen software, all will be accessible by "BlackNet"-style "wormholes" (the public key access methods that allow entities to communicate anonymously and untraceably). Wake up and prepare for this future. Embrace it, or be left behind. Crypto-anarchy is inevitable, and changes everything. -Tim May -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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No Subject
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS > From: mdiehl(a)triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl) > I had heard a rumor that fidonet forbade encrypted e-mail, but I > had to find out for myself. Well, they do. No, they do not. This is a myth, and you have drawn a mistaken conclusion from your experiment. This thread has already run off into left field by the time I got to it, but to try to drag a little reality back in, I submit the following: FIDOnet has within it SECURENET, which is a netmail-handling network specifically for encrypted netmail. Mail points not wishing to handle PGPed or other encrypted netmail are provided with software to automatically remove PGP netmail and re-route it into the FIDO SECURENET network. FIDOnet has at least two conferences specifically for PGP and other public-key encryption system discussions and key exchange, PUBLIC_KEYS and KEY_DROP (if I remember correctly). Now, the point most internet people forget is that FIDOnet hosts are hobbyists with 100% privately-owned machines and generally pay for the entire participation of their userbase out of their own pockets, excepting a few who get some dollars here and there from their generous callers. As a completely justified consequence, they can decide if they allow encrypted traffic _on their individual BBSs_. In that there is considerable fear of the consequences of illegal activity being conducted on their BBSs via encrypted mail, many sysops (such as the one you mention, leaving aside, for now, that he apparently confused a PGP key with an encrypted message) do not wish to take the risk and forbid encrypted traffic. They also monitor e-mail, if only incidentally during the course of routine system maintenance, and notices to this effect are generally contained in log-on screens and new-user info files. In that these sysops are extremely, _personally_ vulnerable, they are generally more cautious than those internet folks who can hide behind institutions and businesses. In spite of this, there are a very large number of FIDOnet sysops who participate in SECURENET and encourage the spread of encryption technology to the general public.

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