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RE: Hiawatha Bray's column on key-recovery crypto
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 09:44 AM 9/11/97 -0400, Hiawatha Bray wrote: >What a cool idea! Why didn't I think of that? > >Hiawatha > >On Thursday, September 11, 1997 9:41 AM, Arnold G. Reinhold [SMTP:reinhold@worl > >> >> Hiawatha, I enjoyed your column (Boston Globe Business Section Sept. 11), >> but why don't you announce that you have a PGP key, print it's signature in >> a column and ask people to use it to send you news tips? This would enable >> a freedom of the press challange to GAK. Further, he could give pointers to Private Idaho, John Doe, etc., and encourage the use of anonymous tips to the newsmedia. Since I operate a cyberspace parking garage (the WinSock Remailer) and since the Lippo Administration is the most Nixonian since Tricky himself, I would think that the major media would be up-in-arms over threats to anonymous communication over the web. After all, which reporter-team doesn't want to be the next Woodward and Bernstein? I can understand (while not agreeing with...) my local rag's opposition to the second amendment, but the total apathy shown to dangers faced by the first is hard to fathom. I read the Herald pretty carefully, yet there has been NOTHING this week on the crypto-controversy. Nothing. While I often disagree with the Miami Herald's reporting decisions (both substance and emphasis) it is rare that I find it this scary. <sigh> JMR P.S. When *Seth* said, "(and wow, do they like to rant on every issue)" about Libertarians, my irony-meter broke its needle. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh. iQEPAwUBNBh3ITUhsGSn1j2pAQF4BQfPZqEWo714dVrd0tQH+fk3jN2nzwUEtlGh wB6ggUbEJ1GX+LaGdEnWlM1xfFYvIB+ej/3PHumw7P3yIYYNt4XI480LVEEFxfWO nohAmIOe19+zt73wTZ1Oa9cNDYdOAbrMS5YW3BeyCY1i6nGkaCqXQteaoEJ4MxE1 V+jRIW9sJAdll4+ATw+xzQafl4K8uFk0soCcaupb05FeJVkLseiBxmLl1kBQwOpr 3Y6O8gO8v+ZmlaWsehlgciM47jkOpaAKNX+4b2mHx0+NrfQcfXNQWQ6JoNbx5NaO L35zof4Ds0bt+t3sIiQG7i7kR5Bbsul4vSfb6R14TtZ6Og== =HOEQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Cypherpunks Bay Area Meeting, This Satuday September 13th
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 11 Sep 1997 06:08:29 -0700 (PDT) From: Hugh Daniel <hugh(a)ecotone.xanadu.com> To: cypherpunks-announce(a)toad.com Subject: Cypherpunks Bay Area Meeting, This Satuday September 13th Reply-to: hugh(a)xanadu.com What: Cypherpunks September 1997 Bay Area Meeting When: Saturday September 13, 12 noon till 5pm Where: PGP World Headquarters, 2nd floor meeting room Bayview Bank Building, just south of Hwy. 92 2121 S. El Camino Real, San Mateo California http://www.pgp.com/pgpcorp/contactpgp.cgi#head Agenda: Forbes Article background, everyone Cypherpunks at HIP'97, Lucky Green, David Del Torto Ecash announcement, Jeremey Barrett, BlueMoney Software Corp. Linux Onion Router, Jeremey Barrett Diffie-Helman Free of Patent, ??? New FBI Anti-Crypto Bill, how to react, everyone Domain name conference report, John Gilmore Attacks on US remailers etc., Bill Stewart ??? After: Eat dinner somewhere yet to be decided... PGP Building Access: This is an Open Meeting on US Soil and it is free for anyone to attend. There is a minor building security formality due to the facilities being in a bank building: anytime after 12 noon, approach the Bayview Building's Information window (in the plaza, see below for directions), and ask the Guard on Duty to let you up to the 2nd Floor for the Cypherpunks meeting (use the passphrase "cypherpunks release code"). If you have any difficulty (eg. if the guard is on a break), simply call DDT at +1 415 730 3583 he I'll let you in. You can arrive at any time during the scheduled meeting hours, though earlier is better if you want to hear the interesting stuff. --Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. DES is dead! Please join in breaking RC5-56. http://rc5.distributed.net/

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Different Ways to Serial Murder AOL Members' Children
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Different Ways to Serial Murder AOL Members' Children: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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Any talk of limiting _existing_ crypto?
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

OK, so the imminent legislation will ban sale or distribution unescrowed crypto products after 1999 or 2000 or whatever. Exact details unclear. But I see no language declaring existing products to be contraband. (Though such language could still come, of course...nothing would surprised me at this point.) So, what about Alice and Bob using PGP 5.0 or Explorer with S-MIME, or whatever. Plenty of crypto already out there. They can drop their encrypted text into whatever mail program or browser they're using. If existing crypto is fully legal to use, then it could be years and years before the Freeh-Reno-SAFE outlawing has any significant effect. Is there any reasonable interpretation of any of the SAFE or Pro-CODE bills that could make it illegal to use preexisting crypto programs (before the ban)? Any way they could make it illegal to use PGP or Lotus Notes or whatever in conjunction with a mailer or browser? If not, then our strategy should be to get the simpler, text-centric, crypto programs massively and widely deployed. Spend the year or so we have before D-Day getting crypto onto every CD-ROM being distributed, every public domain site, etc. (An old strategy, and one great progress has been made on. But now we have to really go into high gear, to _really_ get crypto widely deployed.) Integration with mailers and browsers may not even be such a good idea, as the evolution of such products will cause obsolescence. Better, perhaps, to leave the crypto at the "text edit" level, the ASCII level, where it can be dropped in cleanly to whatever program is current. (Also an old strategy, one with many advantages.) The war criminals in Washington will have a real hard time rounding up the crypto deployed between now and D-Day. Fucking criminals. Fight the _real_ criminals. Nuke em til they glow. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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MITSUBISHI MISTY algorithm
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anybody know MITSUBISHI MISTY algorithm ? If you know it,Please send e-mail to me. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: Jim Bell sentencing delayed
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Young wrote: > Greg, > What's your take on repeated delay in Jim's sentencing: > > 1. A squeeze on Jim to finger co-conspirators. Aleady confirmed, upon researching a theory that Jim's 'letter of pennance' was calculated to warn anyone with half-a-brain that it would be unwise to put a lot of trust in either himself or anyone working with information gleaned from the search/seizure and/or prosecution of James Dalton (Gang?) Bell. It is standard procedure to delay punishment in cases where: a) The narcs are *hoping* to 'turn' the individual, and need to string out their control over them (which diminishes rapidly once their fate is confirmed). b) The narcs *already have* turned the individual and are unsure if the person is yanking their chain, trying to get a done deal without giving up conspirators yet-to-be-born, as promised. (Known as "the unborn" by the spook-oriented.) c) The narcs have a 'done deal' with the individual, and need to postpone any signs of a 'sweetheart deal' so as not to spook (pardon the pun) the targets of an ongoing investigation. d) The warrants are in the mail and the individual's sentencing is dependent on future testimony/cooperation. e) The spooks are having trouble finding the right combination of chemicals to twist the individual's mind into a willing vessel of their mind-control plans for them as a suitcase salesman. > 2. Weak case, must use procedure to punish. Delay is usually used when they've gotten some backwoods legal aide dupe to sell their client down the river unwittingly, and they want the individual to spend as much time as possible in jail before finding out at his or her sentencing that they have gotten totally screwed and they go out and get themselves a good lawyer. Not the case, here. Jim's lawyer knew where his future career was buttered. Nobody unwittingly lets their client get stomped on that badly and refuses offers of outside assistance, without being a part of the plan. > 3. To let time served be the sentence. Nope. > 4. Jim was up to something worse now being discovered Nope. But they could very well be trying to manipulate him into turning on others, OR (listen closely...) 'pretending' to turn on others without really giving them up, and turning his own past non-crimes into real-crimes in the process. e.g. - "I don't know if John Young was *serious* about what he said in that email to me, but I could find out, once I am out of here." <But I will give you the Big FUCK YOU the minute my feet hit the outside pavement.> This is a true toilet-plunger maneuver, with the individual led to 'making' his past actions criminal with the statements he makes today. 'Wise guys' are susceptible to this, being too smart for their own good, and thinking they can walk with the Devil as far as the Bridge. <WRONG!> > 5. Jim is a secret gov agent, now feet up in Tacoma IRS > laughing at those who fell for suckerbait, screwball AP > written by IRS as a sting (a recent book package to Jim was > returned marked "Not in Jail"). a) A definite possibility, but extremely difficult to confirm. McVeigh, for instance, did everything but wave a red flag to get his ass picked up. Tough to tell a 'death wish' from personal involvement in 'the plan.' b) Jim and Tim were both 'led to believe' that they were 'part of the plan' and will continue to believe so until it becomes obvious that the burning coals being prepared in the pit are for them, at which time it is a little late to start saying, "Actually, the *real* story is..." > 6. The court was hoodwinked by IRS, too, and the AUSA > is preparing an indictment of the stingers and federal defenders > and who knows who else that was in on it. Not *that* court. That one, like the one in Denver, is a *home* court, with *home* referees and officials. It's tough to win in Vegas, unless you're *from* Vegas. (Nobody calls from Vegas just to say "Hello.") > 7. Secret Agent Jim is squealing on his double-crossing > secret agents, cutting a deal with whoever else is double- > crossing whomever. He's going down, they're going down, > we're going down, the whole country's going down; Up the > Revolution! We can only dream... 9. 'C'hoate, 'C'hudov and 'C'ottrel are actually running the CDR list from a cell adjoining 'B'ell's, and those whose names begin with a 'D' will be the next to join them. (The narcs are saving the 'A's for last, because they can't figure out who the hell 'Anonymous' is.)

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REPLY to Mitchells RESPONSE.
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Saturday 1/17/98 3:37 PM John Young Attached is our REPLY to Mitchells RESPONSE. Morales will have it filed on Tuesday. Monday is MLK day. Morales will send a FILED stamped copy to you. Later bill UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO William H. Payne ) Arthur R. Morales ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v ) CIV NO 97 0266 ) SC/DJS ) Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF ) Director, National Security Agency ) National Security Agency ) ) Defendant ) REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON EVIDENCE FROM ADMISSIONS 1 COMES NOW plaintiffs Payne [Payne] and Morales [Morales] [Plaintiffs], pro se litigants to exercise their rights guaranteed under the Constitution, Rules of Civil Procedure, and Local Civil Rules to respond to Defendant's MOTION filed on 98 JAN-5 within the 14 days allowed by local rule 7.3(b)(4). 2 US Attorney Mitchell [Mitchell] writes, Counsel for Defendant was not served with copies of any of said Requests for Admissions until sometime after the individuals had been served.2 Mitchell WAS SERVED PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF REQUEST FOR ADMISSION TO NSA DIRECTOR KENNETH MINIHAN I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing request for admissions was mailed to Jan Elizabeth Mitchell, Assistant US Attorney, 525 Silver SW, ABQ, NM 87102 this Monday November 3, 1997. Michell was not served with any other admissions since Mitchell is not representing others. Plaintiffs' served Defendant Minihan properly. And Minihan failed to respond to Minihan's admissions within the time allotted by law. 3 US Attorney Mitchell writes, As grounds for the Motion and Memorandum, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs had blatantly disregarded this Court's Order pertaining to the conduct of discovery and the deadline for discovery in this Freedom of Information Act action. Judges Svet and Campos willfully violated Plaintiffs' right to Discovery. And thereby earned criminal complaint affidavits filed with judge Scalia of the Supreme Court. 4 US Attorney Mitchell writes, In Defendant's Motion and Memorandum, Counsel for Defendant also objected to Plaintiffs' sua sponte decision to modify the Court's June 11 Order to reflect the delay of the Court's October 7 Order and the establishment, without leave of this Court, of new deadlines for discovery, motions practice, and the filing of the PreTrial Order. (Motion and Memorandum 9, at 4.) Judge Svet and Campos attempt to deny Plaintiffs' right to Discovery, again, earned Svet and Campos criminal complaint affidavits. Plaintiffs exercise their right under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Constitution to conduct Discovery WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT! 5 US Attorney Mitchell writes, By their own request, Plaintiffs sought to stay a ruling on the Defendant's Motion and Memorandum. Absent any ruling on either the Motion and Memorandum or Plaintiffs' Response, Defendant Minihan, employees of NSA, and employees of Sandia National Laboratory, were not obligated to respond to the Requests for Admissions as provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 36.3 For Plaintiffs to now assert in their "Motion for Summary Judgment On Based On Evidence From Admissions" that because the individuals have not responded to the Requests for Admissions they are deemed admitted, flies in the face of their own prayer to this Court to stay a ruling on the Defendant's Motion to strike the Requests for Admissions until the Supreme Court takes action. Plaintiffs' have REPEATEDLY asked judge Svet and Campos to disqualify themselves from any rulings on this case because Campos and Svet do NOT obey the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Replace judges Svet and Campos because these judges have demonstrated, IN WRITING, they do not follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs' pleas are directed a replacement judge[s]. Not Svet and Campos. Therefore, Svet and Campos' failure to remove themselves does not stop the legal process. Mitchell cites NO law to support her claim that time constraints imposed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 36.3 are inapplicable as a result of Svet's and Campos' failure to remove themselves. 6 US Attorney Mitchell writes, Defendant requests that this Court either rule upon Defendant's Motion and Memorandum granting the request to strike the Requests for Admissions, or grant Plaintiffs' request to stay this action pending the issuance of the order sought by Plaintiffs in another forum. Should this Court deny Defendant's Motion and Memorandum, Defendant respectfully requests that the individuals to whom Requests for Admissions are appropriate in this action be given the thirty days to respond to said admissions as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. REPLACEMENT JUDGES of the Court should realize the outcome of the lawsuit has attained international interest as a result of the 1 bungled NSA spy sting on Iran 2 US government agencies NSA, NIST, and the FBI's attempt to control cryptography. Mitchell's DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON EVIDENCE FROM ADMISSIONS was posted on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome nsasuit8.htm USA/NSA Responds to Payne/Morales Motion January 16, 1998 Importance of this posting is summed-up in the Toronto Sun, Jan. 11, 1998 US, Iran Need Each Other by Eric Margolis Iran launched a surprise charm offensive last week, throwing Washington into serious confusion. In a lengthy interview on CNN, Iran's new president, Mohammad Khatami, skillfully analyzed the bitter relations between the two nations and cautiously extended an olive branch to Washington, calling for an end to their 19-year cold war. Khatami's diplomatic ju-jitsu flummoxed the Clinton administration, which was busy trying to rally international support against Tehran - and to overthrow Iran's elected government. Both capitals are split over the question of relations. In Washington, the military establishment and conservative Republicans have inflated Iran into a bogeyman to justify military budgets and keep U.S. forces in the Mideast. ... America incited Iraq to invade Iran in 1980. They did this to crush the Islamic revolution, then provided massive war aid to Saddam Hussein. Half a million Iranians died. The US got caught involved in genocide. Using high tech. This is one subject of this lawsuit. Albuquerque Journal Tuesday 1/13/98 carried the editorial. Khatami Move Is Profile in Courage Richard Reeves Syndicated Columnist LOS ANGELES - If an American leader had done what Iranian President Mohammed Khatami did last Wednesday, it would have been hailed as a profile in courage. ... Miscalculation! We armed and pampered Saddam Hussein in the hope that Iraq would destroy Iran. Now that's policy and behavior to think about. Here is something to think about: If Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had pursued any kind of sensible policy toward Cuba and Fidel Castro - opposed to the policy of trying to assassinate him - there never would have been a Cuban missile crisis. I think Iranians have financed and encouraged terrorism against the interests of the United States and Israel. I would not be surprised at all if something like proof emerges soon, perhaps anonymously, from the CIA and other government agencies, where many officials have built their careers on sanctioning and isolating Iran, to try to straighten the backbones of the president and people of the United States. If they succeed, America fails. What would be more effective in closing down Iranian terrorism? More hostility, sanctions and charges? Or beginning the process toward more normal relations with a country positioned and born to be great? ... Clearly genocide fits into Now that's policy and behavior to think about. The wired world is watching what this Court, hopefully minus judges Svet and Campos, will do. What is there to be? A series of possibly unfortunate events? Or does this Court order release the lawfully requested documents to help settle this American tragedy? WHEREFORE. 7 Have replacement judges of this Court DENY Mitchell's Plaintiffs requested a stay. Absent a ruling from this Court denying their request, they cannot proceed to assert that the Requests for Admissions are deemed admitted. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' "Motion For Summary Judgment On Based On Evidence From Admissions" must be denied. for reason that Mitchell's request to subvert both the Discovery processes and its time limits have no basis in law. And appears to plead to judges who do not obey the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 IMMEDIATELY ORDER Defendant to release the requested documents in the interest of national safety so that this matter can be settled. Aggrieved victims of US genocide are reading these pleadings. Respectfully submitted, _________________________ William H. Payne 13015 Calle de Sandias NE Albuquerque, NM 87111 _________________________ Arthur R. Morales 1024 Los Arboles NW Albuquerque, NM 87107 Pro se litigants CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing memorandum was mailed to Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF, Director, National Security Agency, National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 and hand delivered to John J. Kelly, US Attorney, 525 Silver SW, ABQ, NM 87102 this Tuesday January 20, 1997. 5

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Re: how to release code if the programmer is a target for (fwd)
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<daemon(a)ATHENA.MIT.EDU> (Jim Choate) writes: > > That's all fine and dandy, however, we *are* talking about an eternity server > architecture that delivers documents to an end user in a secure manner on > demand with no mechanism, by design, to determine the original source. In > this case there would by definition be *no* history to verify against. > > It is in fact this lack of history from the users perspective that causes > the authenticity problem in the first place. Further, a point that seems > to have been forgotten, we are talking about signed and not encrypted > documents. Of course there are some similar problems if we do include the > encryption of the data itself into the protocol. Eternity delivers data. It's up to the user to verify that the data is what they want, be it PGP signed by the pope, a working cryptosystem, or whatever. In this sense, it's no different than random email or whatever as an untrusted transport medium. The original question was how to verify the eternity server source code. I assume the following: * a potentially corrupted author (give rdl $100 000 and he'll probably make a minor modification which has no apparent mal effects, give him $100 000 000 and he'll be a hired gun). The author is optionally anonymous. * A community of publically-known cypherpunks and code-verifiers, not all of which are corrupted, but some of which may be. * A random user who has the public keys of at least (thresh) number of the cypherpunks, optionally the key of the author of the document/product before the system becomes questionable, perhaps by looking in the NY Times for 1 Jan 1999 which has a full page ad taken out by Cypherpunks Anonymous with the PGP public keys for the 100 leading cypherpunks. * The piece of code to be verified is bloody long, that is, longer than any one cypherpunk can afford to verify alone (shooting practice, installing the minefields and poison gas sprinkler system, etc. take lots of time) * The user can tell by visual inspection that a small compilation system does what they want it to do, and can understand basic logic enough to tell what signatures imply. Then: 1) The author releases the code into the network in an optionally anonymous way. There is no reason to trust the code -- even if it is signed with rdl's eternity dds signing key, no one has any reason to believe that it isn't an NSA front, since rdl is assumed to be corrupt, signing anything put in front of him (as long as sufficient money is put there too) 2) The user wants to run the code, because it's Just That Cool. 3) No one can verify the entire code. So, Cypherpunks begin signing small sections of the code with their own previously-established key. Their keys are established as their reputation is established on the list, or perhaps by personally meeting these people, in the traditional PGP web of trust scheme. There is no central Cypherpunks Registry, just a decentralized mesh. 4) The user executes the compilation script. This script looks at the pgp signatures, sees which ones it can verify from keys it already has accepted as valid by (3), and, if there are verified good keys from at least the minimum number of people in every critical section of the code, it is added to the compile-me-source-tree. If there are enough people for every critical section (the user defines all aspects of this), the source tree is set up for compilation, and compilation can proceed. The user knows that every piece of the code in the system has been verified to their standards -- even if the author of the code is an evil NSA sleeper agent, it has gotten by independent review by at least a user-defined-number of people per section. I fail to see how the specifics of Eternity are relevant -- it's just basically a PGP web of trust issue. The transport is irrelevant -- it's untrusted code until it's been verified by people the user trusts. Implementing a keyserver in Eternity has the same issues -- you still need to deal with the PGP web of trust issues. Signing my secret alias key with my own key as the only signature and uploading it to eternity would fail to provide privacy, just as it would if I posted it anonymously to the mailing list. One working system is the buildup of "reputation capital" by an identity using the key. Again, this is entirely irrelevant to the Eternity server -- verifying document authenticity is better handled at the client side. Eternity should be set up so as long as your ecash is good, your document is stored -- if I want to store my document under the name "disney's greatest hits" when it really contains necrophilic kiddie-porn and microsoft warez, that's my business. The client software for interacting with Eternity, however, might do well to have a good document authentication interface. And perhaps third-party authentication services could pop up, willing to sign documents that just meet gross criteria for valid indexing. You could then download the key for that service somehow, then use the service happily. The abstract issue has been beaten to death on cypherpunks many times. I just assert that Eternity is no different from "the Net", "the Web", "remailer networks", "Blacknet", etc. in issues of document verification and anonymous reputation capital. -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/

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Re: how to release code if the programmer is a target for (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: how to release code if the programmer is a target for (fwd) > From: Ryan Lackey <rdl(a)mit.edu> > Date: 17 Jan 1998 19:07:10 -0500 > Eternity delivers data. It's up to the user to verify that the data is > what they want > The original question was how to verify the eternity server source code. How are these fundamently different? Assume for a moment that as a user of an eternity server the source is the data I want. > I assume the following: > * a potentially corrupted author (give rdl $100 000 and he'll probably > make a minor modification which has no apparent mal effects, give him > $100 000 000 and he'll be a hired gun). The author is optionally > anonymous. The point I am making is that whether the author is corrupt or not is irrelevant. > * A community of publically-known cypherpunks and code-verifiers, > not all of which are corrupted, but some of which may be. Ok. > * A random user who has the public keys of at least (thresh) number of the > cypherpunks, optionally the key of the author of the document/product before > the system becomes questionable, perhaps by looking in the NY Times > for 1 Jan 1999 which has a full page ad taken out by Cypherpunks Anonymous > with the PGP public keys for the 100 leading cypherpunks. Pretty expensive and rather unrealistic I suspect. Where does this random user come from? What is '(thresh)'? What good would an anonymous key signature provide? You can't verify it within the web of trust model, that would imply the author wasn't anonymous which takes us back to the 'friends' attack. How do we know that some number of these cypherpunks aren't turned? Are you proposing that the user test all 100 of the signatures? Which realisticaly is the only way to verify any given one of them. Not very many people will go to that extreme simply for grins and giggles. > * The piece of code to be verified is bloody long, that is, longer than > any one cypherpunk can afford to verify alone (shooting practice, > installing the minefields and poison gas sprinkler system, etc. take > lots of time) The standard is programs over ~10k lines is not comprehensible by a single individual on a line by line basis. > * The user can tell by visual inspection that a small compilation > system does what they want it to do, and can understand basic logic > enough to tell what signatures imply. 'small compilation system' of what? What who wants it to do? The author? Mallet? The end user? > Then: > 1) The author releases the code into the network in an optionally > anonymous way. There is no reason to trust the code -- even if it > is signed with rdl's eternity dds signing key, no one has any reason > to believe that it isn't an NSA front, since rdl is assumed to be > corrupt, signing anything put in front of him (as long as sufficient > money is put there too) It isn't the key of the author or the eternity server that is under attack by Mallet. It is the security of the individual user who is under assault. > 2) The user wants to run the code, because it's Just That Cool. We're talking here about users who want to get data that is illegal or otherwise incriminating or dangerous to one group or another. In particular let's consider the situation of a Lebanese freedom fighter in Isreal or perhaps a 'Free Burma' revolutionary in China. > 3) No one can verify the entire code. So, Cypherpunks begin signing > small sections of the code with their own previously-established key. > Their keys are established as their reputation is established on > the list, or perhaps by personally meeting these people, in the > traditional PGP web of trust scheme. There is no central Cypherpunks > Registry, just a decentralized mesh. Which doesn't effect the ability of Mallet to resign that code at the users end in order to break the users local security. > 4) The user executes the compilation script. [material describing script verification deleted] Mallet can re-write said script, especialy with the sorts of latency that the Eternity Server forces on the end user, such that it is consistent with the bogus keys the end-user gets. It is simply much easier to write scripts in a day than say 10 minutes. > I fail to see how the specifics of Eternity are relevant -- it's > just basically a PGP web of trust issue. The transport is irrelevant -- > it's untrusted code until it's been verified by people the user > trusts. The end user may not have people available to trust is the point. The reason the transport mechanism is relevant is that it is much easier to spoof a verification script if the user is not going to be surprised with 24 hour turn around on requests, whereas a responce time measured in minutes lessens the window of opportunity to Mallet significantly. It may come as a surprise to you and others but not everyone in the world can pick up a phone and call a 100 people all over the world and not raise some suspicion. > Implementing a keyserver in Eternity has the same issues While it is perfectly permissible to design Eternity or any data haven with inherent key servers, I believe it is a bad idea from a design perspective because it makes the code even larger, decreases the potential for monetary motives for indipendant key servers to appear, and if the server is compromised then the key server is also. It is more expensive if Mallet can be forced to deal with two indipendenat operators then a single monolithic operator. [rest deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Monty Cantsin README
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please post your public key somewhere. There's a variety of keyservers, or even to this list would be adequate. KeyMonger

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