- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: FUCK YOU: There's no general right to privacy -- get over it,
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Ray Arachelian wrote: >On Thu, 12 Jun 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >> http://pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,1050,00.html Pretty good article. >> I have a confession to make: Unlike many of my >> civil libertarian colleagues, I believe you have no >> general right to privacy online. Sure, you have the >> right to protect your personal data, but you shouldn't >> be able to stop someone else from passing along that >> information if you let it leave your computer. That's >> your responsibility. > >Booooooooo! Hisssssssssss! Putting your bread and butter before your >morals, eh? Maybe if someone would go through all your records and post >them all over the net, you'd feel differently! No need to go through them all. Just one record is guaranteed to set him and his friends off. >Declan, this truly sucks. :( I'm very disappointed in you. You are truly >scum if you believe this. Ray, he was talking about *rights*, not *morals*. I don't believe anyone has an absolute *right* to privacy, but that doesn't mean I think it would be anything short of morally abhorrent to knowingly post, say, Declan's social security number. He has no legal or moral *right* to privacy, but it would be morally *wrong*, and I would truly be scum, if I knowingly posted it. Rights are negative; morals are positive. The burden of proof is entirely different. Journalists have a First Amendment right to be free from government-imposed restrictions on speech, including non-criminal invasions of privacy (some invasions of privacy can be criminal if the target is not a public figure -- but such prosecutions are extremely rare), but some journalists are truly scum. Others, like Declan in this case, get bashed over misinterpretations and ideological flamers. - -rich http://www.stanford.edu/~llurch/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBM6Hjh5NcNyVVy0jxAQG+sAH/f0ZbXItOdKI/jOfcY9mDxU/0hBoHQVdM XUW9xIHgKIgVzYzUrXFdmRL81Ku9IR77aJ6MEYrN5HjMNCZXusGdLg== =u4We -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: PKCS-11 vs. CDSA APIs
by Dave Emery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green wrote : > > Furthermore, as William has mentioned in the past, encrypted instruction > sets make decompiling and thereby reverse engineering the application next > to impossible. Perhaps he has, but I believe I was the one to post about it first. As you know, my fear is magic stuff in OS inner rings that enforces social policies and perhaps also provides "sovereign right of lawful access" to you know who... Encrypted code may be very difficult to decrypt, and if the OS controls key management also nearly impossible to modify (presuming that the encryption is not just XOR'd with the instruction stream which would allow trivial modification once the instructions were decrypted). That combination is nice for copyright enforcement, but sure has some nasty other uses and is a fundemental enabling technology for such future statist possiblities as restrictions on running modified or unapproved software without a license to do so - a software developers license say, or the old Internet drivers license. I am sure that many businesses would be very happy if all their PCs would only allow software that management approved to run - there would be a huge market for such in fact... and probably a lot of the public would willingly buy machines that would only run approved software if they could pay less for the software or access first run movies or other candy unavailable on free machines. It is really hard to think of a way of controlling what the sheeple do with their computers that does not depend on hard encrypted code in both OS and application - code that is decrypted only inside the silicon of the CPU with precautions taken to make access to the decrypted streams very difficult and expensive for hardware probers. Years of trying other methods have failed to produce something practical from a cost and security standpoint; there are just too many smart and persistant people around who will find a means of attacking anything that is exposed. But it is also obvious that there are billions of dollars in revenue lost to software pirates and additional sales of copyright works that don't happen because the owners aren't happy if it is even remotely possible to obtain pirate copies. And money talks, and with those levels of dollars involved one can expect a lot of things to happen, especially in the current DC climate, and with the possiblity that such technology will both provide the protection of intellectual property that the big money interests want and the social control and surveillance that the fascists want. The good part is that making the whole thing adaquately secure is very hard and the attempt may fail, the bad thing is that there very well may be draconian laws that make any attempt to understand or modify the code running on one's computer a serious felony and people may be locked up for years for just trying to determine what a program is doing to them. There have already been attempts to create these laws. But I've said much of this before... Dave Emery die(a)die.com Weston, Mass.

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New key for shamrock@netcom.com
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- C'punks, I am preparing to retire my old 1024 bit RSA key. It was generated 1/14/1993 and good key hygiene suggests it is time to retire this key. What better time to generate a new key than now that PGP has moved away from shaky MD-5 and patent encumbered RSA to DSS and DH. I would ask anyone that signed my old key to please sign my new key with fingerprint 4A17 A6D7 8E80 3B44 C196 F509 8971 9FA7 B663 B0FD. The key is on the servers. Thanks, - --Lucky -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 5.0 beta Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBM5+iUwSQkem38rwFAQFQPAP/U8Ck6CYQUJI8W/TEf3BQDW1XF0YmYsF1 GcuIp9fYQnRXdB7fKdYvzSffaSs/N5TCjmyeqpTyuE9c7nFqIlu6L+iHoiwdaFdj UR3DBesS1BpmA71kRKzyt3bue1qttz+dhbhcQFd421sPzkqA7gSkOaQzP1ujspI7 mNS8FH9LyGs= =hwfW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Put a stake through the heart of DES! Join the quest at http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm

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It's only QA.
by bluelist＠hotmail.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thee BlueList is NOT harassment. It's NetWare Quality Assurance. No VM/CMS SMTP bugs here. This time it's a Linux Smail test. In the future, look for similar tests of HP SendMail, SGI/SVI, IBM OS/2, etc.

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just testing ...
by cypherpunks＠Algebra.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thee BlueList is NOT harassment. It's NetWare Quality Assurance. Check the headers on this, and you'll see that they are somewhat misleading. Maybe there's some Mail Transfer Agent bugs that need fixing. Or, could it be the specifications of how this is supposed to work? In the future, look for similar tests of HP SendMail, SGI/SVI, IBM OS/2, etc.

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Re: Photo ID is not needed for key signings...
by Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Joshua E. Hill (jehill(a)w6bhz.calpoly.edu) wrote: > Because _these_ people _are_ binding true names to keys. That's > what _this_ is about. No, they're binding supposedly government-issued ids to keys. There's a difference. There are three problems with signing keys based on government-issued ids. 1. There's no link between a driver's license and an email address, so anyone with a license for 'Mark Grant' could claim to be the owner of the 'mark(a)unicorn.com' key. 2. Governments will issue fake ids to their agents, so there's no proof that that 'Mark Grant' is 'really' 'Mark Grant' and not 'Joe Sasquatch, NSA, FBI, BATF'. 3. Thieves have got fed up with faking individual licenses and can now do so wholesale; see the following from a recent RISKS Digest (18:94) ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 16:39:50 -0500 (EST) >From: GaryG4430(a)aol.com Subject: Thieves steal license machines Excuse me Sir, but would you watch my Golden Goose while I go get a cup of coffee? Published in the *Portland Oregonian*, 25 Mar 1997, p.2, Around the Nation: Thieves steal license machines MIAMI - Last year, Florida bought computers to make driver's licenses that are virtually impossible to counterfeit. But brazen South Florida thieves have been stealing the computers, sometimes later returning to the scene to pick up accessories. In seven burglaries at five virtually unprotected driver's license offices from Key Largo to Okeechobee, crooks have gathered the $15,000 computers, software and supplies for five complete systems -everything they would need to crank out the state's new high-tech, counterfeit-resistant licenses. Yup, only our high-tech systems can make our high-security, tamperproof, extremely valuable documents. And you can't just buy one of these system just anywhere... Gary Grossoehme, Oregon Electronics [Also commented on by Bob_Frankston(a)frankston.com, who notes that if the new licenses are considered "foolproof", it only increases their value! PGN] ------------------------------

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Secrecy?
by Peter Nicol - VRL / BroomStick Productions 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hmmmm . . . After following this list for a while I offer the following observation: "Would it be better to DEMAND the full disclosure of the governments secrets rather than scramble around trying to keep ours." I am prepared to allow governments full access to my communications when they allow me full access to theirs. But then again, why be governed in the first place? Peter Nicol Global Media Magnet nicol(a)iap.net.au 019 111 943 "Nonlinear models differ form linear ones in a number of ways. Rather than trying to figure out all the chains of causality, the modeler looks for nodes where feedback loops join and tries to capture as many of the important loops as possible in the system's "picture." Rather than shaping the model to make a forecast about future events or to exercise some central control, the nonlinear modeller is content to perturb the model, trying out different variations in order to learn about the system's critical points and its homeostasis (resitance to change). The modeler is not seeking to control the complex system by quantifying it and mastering its causality; she wants to increase her "intuitions" about how the system works so she can interact with it more harmoniously."

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Press release: F-Secure SSH for ISPs !
by Elisabeth Grace Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

- Data Fellows announces F-Secure SSH for Internet Service Providers - Telecom Finland the first ISP to integrate strong encryption with commercial Internet services Here is the latest press release regarding F-Secure SSH for ISPs -- the file is available from the Data Fellows ftp server as \partner\f-secure\marketng\presskit\sshtelec.zip (Also available from N: as file:N:\DF\Press-Releases\f-secure\SSHtelec.rtf) Enjoy! Best regards, Elisabeth Baker ----------------------------------------------------------------- Elisabeth.Baker(a)DataFellows.com Tel +358 9 478 44551 International Publication Coordinator GSM +358 50 560 6350 Data Fellows Security Software Fax +358 9 478 44599 Päiväntaite 8 * 02210 Espoo * Suomi - Finland kotiosoite: 24º55'21" E and 60º11'09" N -smm http://www.DataFellows.com -----------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Flag burning vote TOMORROW and government-imposed ratings
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 12 Jun 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote: > > Jut woke up, but I would argue "no." This would be the first > constitutional weakening of the First Amendment ever. Hardly a move that > strengthens free speech protections. First constitutional weakening yes, but hardly the first weakening. :( What about virtual flag burning? Any Javafolks out there wanting to protest could write a nice "Click Here to Burn the Flag of these here United States... Just like Vince's Be a Crypto Runner page." Flaming Flag Monger Citizen Unit #401598424628

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Um, I'm probably already in trouble for the last one.
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded from 0xdeadbeef (inline tabs converted): ----- Michael Strelitz <mstrelitz(a)cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote: > >> But not every bra has a cryptographic function. Most are used for ASCII >> armor or for compression. Some are even designed to make the plaintext >> stand out and more enjoyable to read. > > Touche, but I believe what we have here is a clear case of steganography. Yikes. I think that we should hammer down some definitions before this whole thing gets out of hand. Cryptography: Building an difficult-to-unhook bra. Steganography: Building a flesh-colored bra, or one whose unhook mechanism is hidden somewhere unexpected (Man: "How the Hell...?" Woman: "It unhooks in front." Man: "Damn those steganographers.") Public-Key Cryptography: Building a bra that anyone can put on, but that only Alice can remove. Watermarking: Building a bra that stays on even after smoothing, compression, and rotation. Also, Bob should not be able to put his own bra on over Alice's and claim ownership of her body. Fingerprinting: Um, I'm probably already in trouble for the last one, so I'll just skip this. Signatures: Building a bra with a nametag ("Property of Alice, machine wash warm...") such that bras with Alice's name only fit Alice's body. Bob could in theory remove Alice's bra and replace it with his own, but there's no real reason for him to do so. All-or-Nothing Disclosure Of Secrets: Alice transforms her bra into a duffle bag, and either (a) shows Bob how to open it, or (b) shows Bob how she made it into a duffle bag. Alice repeats the procedure until Bob is satisfied (perverted freak). One-time Pad: Kleenex. NSA: An organization that wants women to go back to wearing corsets and chastity belts. Oh, and Bill Clinton gets to keep all the keys. [looks up at what's written so far and sighs] I'm so damned juvenile. I'm going to go do something more constructive and serious. Well, happy Monday. -Caj [**!!Oh, and these are not the views of my employer!!**] _________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________ Haha.. you fool! You fell victim to one of the classic blunders. The most famous is: Never get involved in a land war in Asia. Only slightly less well know is this: Never go in against a Sicilian when death is on the line!

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