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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:46 PM 11/8/96 +0100, Matts Kallioniemi wrote: >At 17:12 1996-11-07 -0800, jim bell wrote: >>Simple analogy: Suppose you put two people into a room with a deck of >>playing cards and a table, instructing "Person A" to build a house-of-cards, >>and telling "Person B" to stop him from achieving his goal. Who do you >>think will win? Obviously, the latter will win: It's vastly easier to >>knock such a structure down than to build it in the first place, and all >>"Person B" has to do is occasionally take a whack at the structure. > >What if Person A is better armed? Could that change the outcome? Well, okay, I sorta assumed a non-violent scenario. But adding that as a possibility actually strengthens the argument: Generally, it's easier to stop somebody doing something out in the open, than to do it. It's easier to knock down a house of cards than to build it up. But it's also easier to shoot the person doing the knocking down, etc. On the other hand, it's easier to DO something...if it can be done in secret. And it's harder to keep somebody from doing something, if that something can be kept secret. That's why it's so important that good cryptography remain legal. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Exon Countdown Clock and farewell messages
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some of you might find this amusing. -rich ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 6 Nov 96 00:40 EST From: Michael Page - Fade to Black <mpage(a)fadetoblack.com> To: mpage(a)fadetoblack.com Subject: Fade to Black Update The Fade to Black Pages have been updated. This week we started the official Senator Exon Countdown Clock. (Days till retirement on Jan 3 1997). We also made it available for you to submit your own personal message to the Senator. All the messages will be delivered via certified Fed-X on his last days in office. Now you to can send a personal greeting to the Senator allowing him to know how much you appreciated all he has attempted to do for the Internet. We would attempt to send it via a Email, but the respected Senator does not have Email. (The Irony). http://www.fadetoblack.com/exon/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ If you encounter any problems with the pages feel free to drop us a line. f2b(a)fadetoblack.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ Thank you again for your support Michael Page Editor Fade to Black http://www.fadetoblack.com mpage(a)fadetoblack.com

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Re: RICO - (Was: Group order for Secret Power)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:13 AM 11/8/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Thu, 7 Nov 1996, jim bell wrote: >> But the odd thing is, the one entity we can't seem to attack using RICO is >> the Federal government, and probably most other governments levels. Looked >> at purely objectively, it should be easy to demonstrate that the Federal >> government (and its representatives) have engaged in plenty of crime as a >> pattern of activity, and certainly enough to rise to the level of the >> standards of RICO. (It takes only a few instances of such crime satisfy the >> standards of RICO.) > >Incorrect. Employees of the Federal Government can be, and have been, >prosecuted under RICO. Many political corruption cases involve some RICO >aspects. This should make Mr. Bell a big fan of the statute, unless he >just likes the flash of murdering officials instead. No, I meant the ENTIRE government Not just individual government officials. Remember, RICO is _supposed_ to apply to any organization with a pattern of criminal activity, and has been used (in fact, probably mostly used) against organizations where many of the members are "merely" employees, quite analogous to the Federal government. If RICO applies to anything, it should apply to the Feds, and that means conviction of the entire organization if it or its employees have a pattern of illegal activity. Since RICO only requires a relatively tiny number of criminal acts to meet its standards, it should not be difficult to show enough criminality. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: The final version of the NRC crypto report is now...
by CRYPTO 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Re: The final version of the NRC crypto report is now available! The Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB) of the National Research Council (NRC) is pleased to announce the availability of its cryptography policy study "Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society". This report was originally released in pre-publication form on May 30, 1996. The final printed version of this report can be obtained from the National Academy Press, 1-800-624-6242 or Web site http://www.nap.edu/bookstore. The pre-publication version and the final printed copy differ in that the printed copy contains an index and many source documents relevant to the crypto policy debate; of course, editorial corrections have been made as well. An unoffical ASCII version of the prepublication report can be found at http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/nrcindex.htm; the official NRC version should become available online in ASCII form in December. In addition, CSTB has been conducting briefings on this report at various sites around the country; if you would like to arrange a briefing in your area, please let us know (cstb(a)nas.edu, 202-334-2605).

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Re: [NOISE] If the shoe fits, wear it [VULIS]
by Thomas C. Allard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rich Graves <rcgraves(a)ix.netcom.com> said: > networks(a)vir.com wrote: > > The nature of the Internet means it is extremely difficult for John > > to prevent Dr. Vulis from either posting using a pseudonym or having > > messages forwarded to him. IF it were possible to prevent Vulis > > from either reading messages or posting do you think John would have > > done that too? Just curious. > > I think that gets into "how many angels can dance on the head of a > pin" territory, because it just isn't, and I certainly don't speak > for him. But... What if John didn't prevent him "suvscribing", but instead directed his software to simply send messages from Vulis back to him as though they were sent to the list, but in fact did not forward his messages to the rest of the list. Vulis would continue to (spit) and (fart) on the list, would assume everyone else saw it, but would not see any replies to his spew. His remailer (spits) would still get through, but think how much less noise there would be. Alternatively, he could just moderate the list and not forward his rantings at all. LOTS more work, but still feasible. All I'm saying is that it *is* possible for John to censor Vulis from this list if he was so inclined. rgds-- TA (tallard(a)frb.gov) I don't speak for the Federal Reserve Board, it doesn't speak for me. pgp fingerprint: 10 49 F5 24 F1 D9 A7 D6 DE 14 25 C8 C0 E2 57 9D

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:25 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >At 5:12 PM 11/7/1996, jim bell wrote: >> BTW, some of your confusion is probably based is the false assumptions in >> your last sentence above. "..wide use of strong cryptography results in >> widely unpopular activities such as sarin attacks and political >> assassinations." > >No, you're confused, but it's probably my fault. We don't really know >what cryptoanarchy will be like. We all have ideas about it. Some >we share and some we don't. But we won't really know until we see it >happen. Well, uh, with all due respect, but while it's obviously true that we won't know EXACTLY how it'll be, that doesn't mean that no portion of we imagine will come true. This is particularly true on the big issues. For example, you hypothesized that "wide use of strong cryptography resuts in widely unpopular activities such as sarin attacks and political activities. I pointed out, almost certainly correctly, that these are wrong: 1. To believe that use in cryptography will result in greater numbers of random attacks on innocent civilians. As I pointed out, the exact opposite should be true: A greater ability to target the guilty means less reason to kill the innocent. 2. To believe that political assassination will be unpopular even if the ordinary citizen has an effective say in who's going to die. In other words, based on my understanding these beliefs are diametrically opposed to the truth. Not simply a difference in extent, we're talking a 180-degree change. Your response is a sheepish, "but we won't really know until we see it happen." Harrumph! >My whole point is based on the proposition that the doomsayers are right. Which doomsayers? What version of "doom"? >I believe D. Denning has suggested that cryptoanarchy will result in >the breakdown of our society. I suppose that depends a lot on what a person means by the phrase, "our society." Used as you (and maybe she, as well) this sounds like a code-word. To a statist, "society" is basically the stratification system that has developed to let one group of people control another. By that standard, cryptoanarchy WILL "result in the breakdown of our society." But that's all for the good. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Judge Patel Background
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:12 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >Fred Korematsu was a Japanese-American shipyard worker in the >early 1940s. His fiancee was Caucasian. To stay with her, he evaded >the concentration camps for two months, but was caught and convicted >anyway. His conviction was not reversed until 1983 in the court of one >Judge Patel. > >Page 48, "After hearing lawyers on both sides, Judge Marilyn Patel >asked Fred Korematsu to address the court. `As long as my record >stands in federal court,' he quietly stated, `any American citizen >can be held in prison or concentration camps without a trial or >hearing.' Ruling from the bench, Judge Patel labeled the government's >position as `tantamount to a confession of error' and erased Fred's >conviction from the court's records." > >(Judge Patel is presiding over Dan Bernstein's challenge to the ITAR.) However, the fact that it took 40 years to reverse (and didn't, presumably, reverse the convictions of others, and didn't compensate people for lost property) is yet another reason to take a few pieces out of the hide of the SC, as well as a few pounds of flesh nearest the heart. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by Matthew Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, this is becoming a rather long thread, but I'll just make what I think are the key points: If, as is presumed in this discussion, society will become divided into two somewhat distinct groups of people, the crypto-anonymous group and the traceable-identifiable group, then the predictable outcome is that members of the traceable-identifiable group will become increasingly victimized by members of the crypto-anonymous group. People who are easily identifiable and tracked are easy prey. For example, if you can see when John Doe is logged in at home or logged in at his office, then you can burglarize his home while he is at the office and vice versa. If, as some government agencies would like, all motor vehicle records were online, a criminal could go 'shopping' on the internet, pick out the make and model he wants, look up the owner's address and go steal it. There are lots of other examples, such as seeing how much money is in various people's bank accounts, then target those who have money, etc... (Identifiable people are also likely to be targets of spam and other annoyances, and I suspect the proliferation of spam is encourgaing a great number of people to explore the possibilities for anonymous posting.) This situation is going to put an increasing amount of pressure on those in the traceable-identifiable group to change their ways. They will have two choices: either they start using crypto, remailers, etc to protect their privacy and protect themselves from criminals, or they can demand more identification and restrict their interactions with others such that they only associate with suitably identified persons. The net result of this is that it's easy (and economically desirable) for people in the 'traceable-identifiable' group to join the 'crypto-anonymous' group, but vary hard for anonymous personas to interact with the identified group. As such, the number of people demanding identification of their correspondents will decline. (Another way to look at it, is that crypto-anonymity is a high-entropy, and hence stable, situation, whereas tracable-identifiability is a low-entropy and metastable state, which spontaneously degrades into the former in the absense of a constraining force.) This is why cryptoanarchy is inevitable.

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WebTV Article...
by Lile Elam 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.sjmercury.com/business/today/biz/007555.htm Web browser classified as weapon New York Times SAN FRANCISCO -- American couch potatoes have become empowered -- too empowered, in the eyes of the government. A $300 television-set-top device for browsing the World Wide Web, which Sony and Philips Electronics began selling recently at chains like Sears, Roebuck and Circuit City Stores, uses computer-security technology so powerful that the government is classifying it as a weapon that will require a special export license before it can be sold overseas. Few industry experts expect such a license to be granted, meaning the companies are unlikely to begin selling current versions of the U.S.-made devices next year in Europe and Japan, as they had planned. The appliances, designed to let consumers surf the Web and transmit e-mail via a standard television set and phone line, have suddenly become the most significant challenge to the Clinton administration's attempt to restrict the export of powerful data-scrambling devices by categorizing them as ``munitions'' requiring a special export license. While the set-top boxes are intended to protect the privacy of users and permit secure on-line sales transactions, administration officials fear such technology could be used by foreign terrorists or criminals to conspire with electronic impunity. ``We're the guinea pig,'' said Steve Perlman, chairman and chief executive of Web TV Networks Inc., designer of the units, which are being manufactured in the United States by Sony Electronics and Philips. ``Can you imagine carrying one of our boxes under your arm and getting arrested at the border?'' NYT-11-07-96 2217EST Posted: Fri Nov 8 05:05:01 PST 1996

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Free software could not threaten purpose of ITAR ...
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It never ceases to amaze me how inconsistent the anti-crypto people are on this issue ... I just took a look at VADM McConnell's answers during a Senate hearing on May 3, 1994 ... http://csrc.nist.gov/keyrecovery/ees_q-a.txt Questions from Senator Murray: Q: In my office in the Hart building this February, I downloaded from the Internet an Austrian program that uses DES encryption. This was on a laptop computer, using a modem over a phone line. The Software Publishers' Association says there are at least 120 DES or comparable programs world wide. However, U.S. export control laws prohibit American exporters from selling comparable DES programs abroad. With at least 20 million people hooked up to the Internet, how do U.S. export controls actually prevent criminals, terrorists, or whoever from obtaining DES encryption software? A: Serious users of encryption do not entrust their security to software distributed via networks o bulletin boards. There is simply too much risk that viruses, Trojan Horses, programming errors, and other security flaws may exist in such software which could not be detected by the user. Serious users of encryption, those who depend on encryption to protect valuable data and cannot afford to take such chances, instead turn to other sources in which they can have greater confidence. Such serious users include not only entitles which may threaten U.S. national security interests, but also businesses and other major consumers of encryption products. Encryption software distribution via Internet, bulletin board, or modem does not undermine the effectiveness of encryption export controls. Why is it, then, that we don't just allow non-commercial software to be exported? 1. I don't believe, for a moment that "serious users" of cryptography cannot entrust their security to "software distributed via networks o bulletin boards". Those are precisely the mediums through which PGP became popular. 2. Phil Z was being harassed precisely because PGP is most definitely a serious threat in the trend toward undermining ITAR. 3. Phil K's export request was rejected, and MIT was harassed over the PGP source book, precisely because source code is source code. It does not matter if it came on a disk or through a network or through a bulletin board or on a book. The point is that the NSA DOES view this as a serious threat, so they are fighting this tooth and nail. Ern

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