- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

LESM - Link Encrypted Session Manager (3rd try)
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I tried to distribute LESM to the cypherpunks mailing list twice, and neither of them made it to the nntp.hks.com list archive (my laster posts HAVE). What is going on here? This is a second repost. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I finished hacking Matt's ESM to do link encryption yesterday, but for some reason the mail I sent to cypherpunks didn't get echoed back to me, so I'm sending this again. To install: get ESM and RSAREF, make sure you can compile ESM, then replace the esm.c with my hacked version and recompile. To use: same as ESM, but there's an extra option "-b bandwidth", the default is 100 cps. I've attached the modified esm.c here since it doesn't include any crypto code. To get ESM, write to cfs(a)research.att.com and state the following: - you are in the US or Canada, and - you are a US or Canadian citizen or legal permanent resident, and - You've read and understand the license and export conditions. RSAREF is in ftp://rsa.com/rsaref/ Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLzqTtTl0sXKgdnV5AQEmbgP8CRxE+RCGsDXwwShWhZKGytSywyWZ8RXB RPBHZmk6UgdpCR2VVo8wXjcPuEv4SHp9ZjhFTq53JZ/s3YcV5FxF33/ivSlh1Ra4 P8GSYnoEaIJoFrJyagukbBUaY6zWCx0PcnsLoVArCxujwRYwfrQvHdiNx13z7bJh OSEhhoE9djg= =PY8P -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- Enclosure number 1 ---------------- /* * LESM - Link Encrypted Session Manager * v0.6a.01 * Wei Dai * 2/8/1995 * * This program is a quick and dirty hack of: */ /* * ESM - Encrypted Session Manager * v0.6a * matt blaze * January 1995 */ /* * The author of this software is Matt Blaze. * Copyright (c) 1995 by AT&T. * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software and in all copies of the supporting * documentation for such software. * * This software is subject to United States export controls. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED * WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NEITHER THE AUTHORS NOR AT&T MAKE ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE MERCHANTABILITY * OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. */ /* * Some of this file was stolen from the BSD "script" program, which * is covered under the following notice: * * Copyright (c) 1980 Regents of the University of California. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * This product includes software developed by the University of * California, Berkeley and its contributors. * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef lint char copyright1[] = "@(#) Copyright (c) 1980 Regents of the University of California.\n\ All rights reserved.\n"; char copyright2[] = "@(#) Copyright (c) 1995 AT&T\nAll rights reserved.\n"; #endif /* not lint */ #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <termios.h> #ifndef SUN #include <sys/ioctl.h> #endif #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/file.h> #include <sys/signal.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include "global.h" #include "rsaref.h" #include "esm.h" char *shell; int master; int slave; int subchild; int escape=036; /* ^^ */ int ciphstate=0; int ciphbyte=0; int keyed=0; struct termios tt; struct winsize win; int lb; int l; char line[] = "/dev/ptyXX"; int aflg; #define REMOTE 0 #define LOCAL 1 #define CALC 2 int mode=LOCAL; int paranoid=0; #define SL_START 0 #define SL_GOT1 1 #define SL_GOT2 2 #define SL_GOT3 3 #define SL_GOT4 4 #define SL_KEYING 5 #define SL_CRYPT 6 int sloutstate=SL_START; char *cmd=NULL; #define TRANS 0 #define CMDWAIT 1 #define CIPHER 2 #define KEYWAIT 3 #define IV0 0 #define IV1 1 #define IV2 2 #define IV3 3 #define C0 4 #define C1 5 int state=TRANS; int cstate=IV0; FILE *fpmaster; struct timeval tvPause={0,10000}; struct timeval tvNoPause={0,0}; unsigned char filler = (unsigned char) 31; #define bwrite(fp,buf,len) (fwrite(buf,len,1,fp)) main(argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { extern char *optarg; extern int optind; int ch, result; void finish(); char *getenv(); fd_set fds; struct timeval tv; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "e:b:splrci")) != EOF) switch((char)ch) { case 'e': cmd=optarg; break; case 'b': tvPause.tv_usec=(long)1000000/atol(optarg); break; case 'i': case 's': case 'p': paranoid=1; case 'r': mode=REMOTE; break; case 'l': mode=LOCAL; break; case 'c': mode=CALC; break; case '?': default: fprintf(stderr, "usage: lesm [-rlc] [-b bandwidth] [-e program\n"); exit(1); } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if ((shell=getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = "/bin/sh"; getmaster(); (void) signal(SIGCHLD, finish); subchild = fork(); if (subchild < 0) { perror("fork"); fail(); } if (subchild==0) doshell(); else { /* main loop */ printf("LESM v0.6a.01, hacked by Wei Dai from ESM v0.6a - encrypted session manager\n"); printf(" by Matt Blaze, AT&T Bell Labs, January 1995\n"); randinit(); cipherinit(); switch (mode) { case REMOTE: if (paranoid) printf("remote server ready\n"); else printf("remote server ready; ctl-^ to escape\n"); break; case LOCAL: printf("local layer ready (run 'lesm -s' on remote)\n"); break; default: /* not yet */ printf("lesm ready\n"); } rawtty(); fpmaster=fdopen(master,"w"); if (fpmaster == NULL) done(); if (paranoid) startsession(); while(1) { FD_ZERO(&fds); FD_SET(0,&fds); tv=tvNoPause; result=select (FD_SETSIZE,&fds,NULL,NULL,&tv); if (result==1) doinput(); if (mode==LOCAL && sloutstate==SL_CRYPT && result==0) doslavein(filler); if (result<0) break; FD_ZERO(&fds); FD_SET(master,&fds); tv=tvNoPause; result=select (FD_SETSIZE,&fds,NULL,NULL,&tv); if (result==1) dooutput(); if (mode==REMOTE && state==CIPHER && result==0) domasterout(filler); if (result<0) break; } done(); } } doinput() { int cc; int i; static unsigned char ibuf[512]; if ((cc = read(0, ibuf, 512)) > 0) { switch (mode) { case REMOTE: for (i=0; i<cc; i++) domasterin(ibuf[i]); break; case LOCAL: for (i=0; i<cc; i++) doslavein(ibuf[i]); break; default: for (i=0; i<cc; i++) bwrite(fpmaster,&ibuf[i],1); break; } fflush(fpmaster); fflush(stdout); } else done(); } doslavein(ibuf) unsigned char ibuf; { int c; static int count=0; struct timeval tv; switch (sloutstate) { case SL_CRYPT: if (ibuf==escape) { bwrite(stdout,">>",2); fflush(stdout); if (slescape()) { printf("q\r\nEntering CLEARTEXT mode\r\n"); bwrite(fpmaster,"PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP",16); sloutstate=SL_START; } break; } c=cfb8_encrypt(ibuf); if (!(++count % 8)) bwrite(fpmaster,"!",1); sendhex(fpmaster,c); tv=tvPause; select (FD_SETSIZE,NULL,NULL,NULL,&tv); break; default: bwrite(fpmaster,&ibuf,1); break; } } slescape() { char buf; int c; int escaped=0; while (read(0,&buf,1)>0) { if (escaped) { escaped=0; bwrite(fpmaster,&buf,1); continue; } if (buf==escape) { c=cfb8_encrypt(buf); sendhex(fpmaster,c); return 0; } bwrite(stdout,&buf,1); fflush(stdout); if (buf=='\\') { mode=escaped; continue; } if (buf=='\r') return 0; if (buf=='C') { return 1; } printf("\r\nType one of the following:\r\n"); printf(" \\[char] to send char as cleartext\r\n"); printf(" ctrl-^ to send escape character\r\n"); printf(" 'C' to return to CLEARTEXT session\r\n"); printf(" <enter> to return to encrypted session\r\n"); } return 1; /* should never happen */ } domasterin(ibuf) unsigned char ibuf; { int c; char ch; static int bad=0; switch (state) { case TRANS: if (ibuf != escape) bwrite(fpmaster, &ibuf, 1); else { state=CMDWAIT; bwrite(stdout,">>",2); cstate=IV0; } break; case CMDWAIT: if (ibuf == escape) { bwrite(fpmaster, &ibuf, 1); state=TRANS; } else switch (ibuf) { case '\r': case '\n': bwrite(stdout,"\r\n",2); state=TRANS; break; case 's': case 'S': startsession(LONG); break; case 'Q': done(); break; default: printf("Type 's' to start encrypted session\r\n"); printf(" 'Q' to terminate remote session\r\n"); printf(" ctrl-^ to send escape character\r\n"); printf(" <enter> to return to session\r\n"); break; } break; case CIPHER: if (strchr("0123456789abcdef!",ibuf)!=NULL) { bad=0; if ((c = cipherout(ibuf)) >= 0) { ch=c; if (ch!=filler) bwrite(fpmaster,&ch,1); } } else if (bad++ > 16) { delkey(); bwrite(stdout,"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",16); if (paranoid) done(); state=TRANS; } else ciphstate=0; break; case KEYWAIT: if (strchr("0123456789abcdef:",ibuf)!=NULL) { masterkeyin(ibuf); } else { delkey(); bwrite(stdout,"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",16); if (paranoid) done(); state=TRANS; } break; } } int pubstat=0; int pubpos=0; unsigned char pubbyte=0; int pksize = -1; startsession() { static unsigned char buf[5] = {0177, '~', 0177, '~', 'L'}; static unsigned char colon=':'; int i; pklen=dhparams[LONG].primeLen; printf("Starting remote side of %d bit key exchange.\r\n",pklen*8); if (createdh(LONG) < 0) return -1; bwrite(stdout,buf,5); for (i=0; i<pklen; i++) sendhex(stdout,ourpub[i]); bwrite(stdout,&colon,1); pksize=LONG; pubstat=0; pubpos=0; pubbyte=0; state=KEYWAIT; return 0; } sltranspub(len) { static unsigned char colon=':'; int i; printf("\r\nStarting local key exchange.\r\n"); for (i=0; i<len; i++) sendhex(fpmaster,ourpub[i]); bwrite(fpmaster,&colon,1); printf("entering ENCRYPTED mode; type ctrl-^ to escape\r\n"); } masterkeyin(c) char c; { int bits; if (c==':') { if (pubpos!=(pklen+2)) /* +2 for trailing checkword */ goto abort; if (mcalckeys(pksize)<0) /* also verifies */ goto abort; ciphstate=0; state=CIPHER; return; } else if (pubpos<MAXPUBKEY) { bits=atoh(c); if (bits<0) goto abort; if (pubstat) { pubbyte |= bits; otherpub[pubpos]=pubbyte; pubpos++; } else { pubbyte = bits<<4; } pubstat = 1-pubstat; return; } abort: bwrite(stdout,"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",16); if (paranoid) done(); state=TRANS; } int mcalckeys(len) int len; { int i; if (dhagree(len)<0) /* sets up session keys */ return -1; for (i=0; i<8; i++) { ivin[i]=0; ivout[i]=0xff; } if (cfb8_decrypt(otherpub[pklen]) || cfb8_decrypt(otherpub[pklen+1])) return -1; return 0; } int slcalckeys(len) int len; { int i; if (dhagree(len)<0) /* sets up session keys */ return -1; for (i=0; i<8; i++) { ivout[i]=0; ivin[i]=0xff; } ourpub[pklen]=cfb8_encrypt(0); ourpub[pklen+1]=cfb8_encrypt(0); return 0; } initslkey(param) int param; { if ((param<0) || (param>2)) return -1; pklen=dhparams[param].primeLen; pksize=param; pubstat=0; pubpos=0; pubbyte=0; } slkeyin(c) char c; { int bits; if (c==':') { if (pubpos!=pklen) goto abort; if (createdh(pksize)<0) goto abort; if (slcalckeys(pksize)<0) goto abort; sltranspub(pklen+2); ciphstate=0; sloutstate=SL_CRYPT; return; } else if (pubpos<MAXPUBKEY){ bits=atoh(c); if (bits<0) goto abort; if (pubstat) { pubbyte |= bits; otherpub[pubpos]=pubbyte; pubpos++; } else { pubbyte = bits<<4; } pubstat = 1-pubstat; return; } abort: bwrite(stdout,"X",1); state=SL_START; } int cipherout(ch) char ch; { int bits; if (ch=='!') { ciphstate=0; return -1; } bits=atoh(ch); if (ciphstate) { ciphbyte |= bits; ciphstate=0; return(cfb8_decrypt(ciphbyte)); } else { ciphbyte = bits<<4; ciphstate=1; return -1; } } int ciphercalcin(ch) unsigned char ch; { static unsigned char iv[8]; static unsigned int cbuf; int c; int i; c = atoh(ch); switch (cstate) { case IV0: for(i=0; i<8; i++) iv[i]=0; cbuf = (c&0xf)<<4; cstate=IV1; return '.'; case IV1: cbuf = cbuf | (c&0xf); iv[7]=cbuf; cstate=IV2; return '.'; case IV2: cbuf = (c&0xf)<<4; cstate=IV3; return '.'; case IV3: cbuf = cbuf | (c&0xf); iv[6]=cbuf; cstate=C0; return '.'; case C0: cbuf = (c&0xf)<<4; cstate=C1; return '.'; case C1: cbuf = cbuf | c&0xf; c=cfb8_decrypt(cbuf); cstate=C0; if (isprint(c)) { bwrite(fpmaster,&c,1); return '_'; } else { return '?'; } default: return '?'; } } #include <sys/wait.h> void finish() { union wait status; register int pid; register int die = 0; while ((pid = wait3((int *)&status, WNOHANG, 0)) > 0) if (pid == subchild) die = 1; if (die) done(); } dooutput() { register int cc; int i; unsigned char obuf[512]; if ((cc = read(master, obuf, 512)) > 0) { switch (mode) { case REMOTE: for (i=0; i<cc; i++) domasterout(obuf[i]); break; case LOCAL: for (i=0; i<cc; i++) doslaveout(obuf[i]); break; default: for (i=0; i<cc; i++) bwrite(stdout, &obuf[i], 1); break; } fflush(fpmaster); fflush(stdout); } else done(); } domasterout(obuf) unsigned char obuf; { int c; static int count=0; struct timeval tv; switch (state) { case CIPHER: c=cfb8_encrypt(obuf); if (!(++count % 8)) bwrite(stdout,"!",1); sendhex(stdout,c); tv=tvPause; select (FD_SETSIZE,NULL,NULL,NULL,&tv); break; case TRANS: bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); break; default: /* throw away since i/o screws up keying */ break; } } doslaveout(obuf) unsigned char obuf; { static int bad=0; int c; char ch; switch (sloutstate) { case SL_START: bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); if (obuf==0177) sloutstate=SL_GOT1; break; case SL_GOT1: bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); if (obuf=='~') sloutstate=SL_GOT2; else sloutstate=SL_START; break; case SL_GOT2: if (obuf==0177) sloutstate=SL_GOT3; else { bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); sloutstate=SL_START; } break; case SL_GOT3: if (obuf=='~') sloutstate=SL_GOT4; else { bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); sloutstate=SL_START; } break; case SL_GOT4: /* key size indicator */ bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); if (obuf=='S') { initslkey(SHORT); sloutstate=SL_KEYING; } else if (obuf=='M') { initslkey(MEDIUM); sloutstate=SL_KEYING; } else if (obuf=='L') { initslkey(LONG); sloutstate=SL_KEYING; } else sloutstate=SL_START; break; case SL_KEYING: if (strchr("0123456789abcdef:",obuf) != NULL) { slkeyin(obuf); } else { bwrite(stdout,"U",1); sloutstate=SL_START; } break; case SL_CRYPT: if (strchr("0123456789abcdef!",obuf) != NULL) { bad=0; if ((c = cipherout(obuf))>=0) { ch=c; if (ch!=filler) bwrite(stdout,&ch,1); } } else if (bad++ > 8) { fprintf(stderr,"\r\nEncrypted session terminated -"); fprintf(stderr,"\r\npress enter for CLEARTEXT mode: "); waitenter(); delkey(); sloutstate=SL_START; } else ciphstate=0; break; default: bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); break; } } doshell() { int t; /*** t = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR); if (t >= 0) { (void) ioctl(t, TIOCNOTTY, (char *)0); (void) close(t); } ***/ getslave(); (void) close(master); (void) dup2(slave, 0); (void) dup2(slave, 1); (void) dup2(slave, 2); (void) close(slave); if (cmd==NULL) execl(shell, "sh", "-i", 0); else system(cmd); perror(shell); fail(); } rawtty() { struct termios sbuf; sbuf = tt; sbuf.c_iflag &= ~(INLCR|IGNCR|ICRNL|IXON); sbuf.c_oflag &= ~OPOST; sbuf.c_lflag &= ~(ICANON|ISIG|ECHO); sbuf.c_cc[VMIN] = 1; sbuf.c_cc[VTIME] = 0; (void) tcsetattr(0, TCSAFLUSH, &sbuf); } cookedtty() { (void) tcsetattr(0, TCSAFLUSH, &tt); } fail() { (void) kill(0, SIGTERM); done(); } done() { cookedtty(); switch (mode) { case REMOTE: if (state==CIPHER) printf("XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\n"); printf("lesm remote "); break; case LOCAL: printf("lesm local "); break; } printf("done\n"); exit(0); } getmaster() { char *pty, *bank, *cp; struct stat stb; pty = &line[strlen("/dev/ptyp")]; for (bank = "pqrstuvwxyz"; *bank; bank++) { line[strlen("/dev/pty")] = *bank; *pty = '0'; if (stat(line, &stb) < 0) break; for (cp = "0123456789abcdef"; *cp; cp++) { *pty = *cp; master = open(line, O_RDWR); if (master >= 0) { char *tp = &line[strlen("/dev/")]; int ok; /* verify slave side is usable */ *tp = 't'; ok = access(line, R_OK|W_OK) == 0; *tp = 'p'; if (ok) { (void) tcgetattr(0, &tt); (void) ioctl(0, TIOCGWINSZ, (char *)&win); return; } (void) close(master); } } } fprintf(stderr, "Out of pty's\n"); fail(); } getslave() { line[strlen("/dev/")] = 't'; slave = open(line, O_RDWR); if (slave < 0) { perror(line); fail(); } (void) tcsetattr(slave, TCSAFLUSH, &tt); (void) ioctl(slave, TIOCSWINSZ, (char *)&win); (void) setsid(); (void) ioctl(slave, TIOCSCTTY, 0); } waitenter() { unsigned char b; do { read(0,&b,1); } while (b!='\r'); printf("\r\n"); } sendhex(fp,c) FILE *fp; unsigned int c; { static char buf[16]; sprintf(buf,"%02x",c); bwrite(fp,buf,2); }

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RE: a new way to do anonymity
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric Hughes wrote: > Now here's an important detail that needs to get done right. Is the > forwarding for fixed length packets, variable length packets, or > streams? Is this decision global or local? What are the latency and > aggregatation effects? How important are these for different classes > of data? (telnet v. voice, e.g.) I'm not sure I understand the first question. My idea was originally based on link encrypted streams. How can forwarding variable length packets help untracibility? Wouldn't an attacker just have to match up the sizes of incoming and outgoing packets? Forwarding fixed length packets, on the other hands, just makes the system a remailer-net (so you'll have to do mixing, etc.). What am I misunderstanding here? > I'd suggest just getting something running first, to get some > prototyping experience. I just finished hacking ESM to do link encryption. (see my other post) Now if someone is willing to run a MUD type program and hook LESM up with it, then we'd have the first prototype of a pipe-net. Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLzrFzzl0sXKgdnV5AQFfOAP7BpGWmo7FLK02a10NVTfgLEeheBosazzz 0TbFs2dwhtL4IRtY6To25e7MN2cz4X+qKJOleWy6uGbUowygHKbd1uiHOS9DNRmx /fKeyIlGd/Ogv6hSpiL/JDd0vx7vVx9Ho1CIy+oAFq4v8Kwd0sqQenqqvhBdoEfA zmVUpc+82nU= =3mfe -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- E-mail: Wei Dai <weidai(a)eskimo.com> URL: "http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai" =================== Exponential Increase of Complexity =================== --> singularity --> atoms --> macromolecules --> biological evolution --> central nervous systems --> symbolic communication --> homo sapiens --> digital computers --> internetworking --> close-coupled automation --> broadband brain-to-net connections --> artificial intelligence --> distributed consciousness --> group minds --> ? ? ?

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RE: a new way to do anonymity
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Johnathan Corgan wrote: > Wei, your traffic analysis treatment of this sort of thing would go a long way > toward uncovering weaknesses and determining operational requirements and > limitations. It seems to me that if a user maintains a 24-hour a day pipe to an uncompromised server, then the method I described earlier against remailers should not work against that user. Otherwise, some kind of in-out statistical analysis may work. > Tim, what massive social effects would it have if this type of network service > were to become widely deployed? :) See Verner Vinge's _True Names_ for a fictional description of a future where real time anonymous interactions are possible. > At first glance, this Pipe-Net idea doesn't seem to take a lot of rocket science; > it seems that most of the components or algorithms are are already in use, just > in a very different way. This is certainly true. The system Vinge describes is almost a pipe-net. But he didn't say anything about link encryption, without which the system can be trivially broken. > I can think of a number of problems already, however. Spamming. Bandwidth > limitations. Complexity of client and switch software. Standards. Flow > control. > > In other works, all the stuff the ATM forum is already dealing with :) I haven't responded to the comments you made about the similarity between pipe-net and ATM, mostly because I'm not very familiar with ATM. But as I understand it, ATM is based on forwarding fixed length cells, whereas pipe-net is based on fixed-bandwidth link encrypted streams. Spamming, and flow control shouldn't be problems, since all users of a server will connect to it with pipes of the same bandwidth, so it can just accept a certain number and then stop. Bandwidth limitations will depend on how fast the server CPU can do the encryption and decryption. With LESM at 100 cps, each connection took 2% of the CPU capacity of a Sun 4-CPU(90Hz) 4/670MP. Of course, I made no consideration for efficiency when I hacked ESM, so this can probably be decreased quite a bit. Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLzrGOzl0sXKgdnV5AQE1TQP/UR0xfaS/Nxk7ta/AfdRhzV+v+BmpxT4O UqiMkCpXRZbMFTuw/hnhlJ9fuOF2QS/50MUHXu+kiFSASH5wBFpLNSgWuFIHADny 76RYSjpA+A4IpWomihGT1/BPZkyIcooDXCKGUbgWjZhi50S0oCfAILjV/1ti2f02 AOyBxRYRYvM= =IhUw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- E-mail: Wei Dai <weidai(a)eskimo.com> URL: "http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai" =================== Exponential Increase of Complexity =================== --> singularity --> atoms --> macromolecules --> biological evolution --> central nervous systems --> symbolic communication --> homo sapiens --> digital computers --> internetworking --> close-coupled automation --> broadband brain-to-net connections --> artificial intelligence --> distributed consciousness --> group minds --> ? ? ?

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(fwd) OREGON HOUSE BILL 2319 - Outlaw Anoniminty??
by skaplin＠mirage.skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Damn!! Has this been a crappy week!!! Sam Path: skypoint.com!scipio.cyberstore.ca!math.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!news.sprintlink.net!uunet!news.fc.net!ima!libertybbs!terry.liberty-parker From: Terry.Liberty-Parker(a)libertybbs.ima.infomail.com (Terry Liberty-Parker) Date: 09 Feb 95 08:26:51 Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk Subject: OREGON HOUSE BILL 2319 - Message-ID: <ff3_9502091822(a)ima.infomail.com> Organization: Austin InfoMail Association - Austin, TX Lines: 112 -=> Note: Forwarded (from: LIBALERT) by Terry Liberty-Parker using timEd. Originally from ERIC GRAY (76:48/200.0) to ALL. Original dated: Feb 05 '95, 03:42 This message was from LES LEMKE to ALL, and was forwarded to you by ERIC GRAY. ------------------------- ( HB 2319 Page 1 ) 68th OREGON LEGISIATIVE ASSEMBLY - 1995 Regular Session HOUSE BILL 2319 Ordered printed by the Speaker pursuant to House Rule 12.00A (5), Presession filed (at the request of Representative Kevin Mannix) SUMMARY The following summary is not prepared by the sponsors of the measure and is not a part of the body thereof subject to consideration by the Legislative Assembly, It is an editor's brief statement of the essential features of the measure as introduced. Directs operators of computer networks to keep records of identity of users of network and of personal information about individuals that is disclosed to users. Requires disclosure to individual when information about individual is accessed by user of network. Sets rules for disclosures. Allows injunction or maximum civil penalty of $100,000, or both, for violation. A BILL FOR AN ACT Relating to computer information systems. Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon: SECTION 1. As used in sections 1 to 3 of this Act: (1) To "access" means to instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from or otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system or computer network. (2) "Computed' means, but is not limited to, an electronic device that performs logical, arithmetic or memory functions by the manipulations of electronic, magnetic or optical signals or impulses, and includes all input, output, processing, storage, software or communication facilities that are connected or related to such a device in a system or network. (3) "Computer network" means, but is not limited to, the interconnection of communi cationlines, including microwave or other means of electronic communication, with a computer through remote terminals or a complex consisting of two or more interconnected computers. (4) "Computer program" means, but is not limited to, a series of instructions or statements, in a form acceptable to a computer, that permits the functioning of a computer system in a manner designed to provide appropriate products from or usage of such computer system. (5) "Computer software" means, but is not limited to, computer programs, procedures and associated documentation concerned with the operation of a computer system. (6) "Computer system" means, but is not limited to, a set of related, connected or un connected, computer equipment, devices and software. (7) "Data" means a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, computer software, computer programs or instructions. "Data" may be in any form, in storage media, or as stored in the memory of the computer, or in transit, or presented on a display device. "Data" includes, but is not limited to, computer or human readable forms of numbers, text, stored voice, graphics and images. SECTION 2. (1) An owner or operator of a computer network or computer system shall establish procedures requiring each person who accesses the network or system to disclose NOTE: Matter in boldfaced type in an amended section is new; matter [italic and bracketed] is existing law to be omitted. New sections are in boldfaced type. LC 984 [1] --- * Origin: Stargate Oregon - North Bend, Oregon USA (1:356/3) * OLX 2.2 TD * The oldest question known to man: "Where are my keys?!" ___ GOMail v2.0t Beta [94-0145] - Origin: The Desert Reef * LIB * Tuc.Az * V.34 * 602 624 6386 (76:48/200) --- timEd 1.00 * Origin: LibertyBBS Austin,Tx [512]462-1776 (1:382/804)

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Labour and capital in a post-industrial economy
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Earlier I'd written on the fall of corporations due to cryptoanarchy. This one is on the decline of (knowledge) capital and property rights, and the rise of labour. ------cut here------- Electric Dreams Weekly column for The Asian Age by Rishab Aiyer Ghosh #47, 6/February/1995: Labour and capital in a post-industrial economy The information economy will require not only knowledge capital, but also knowledge labour. Labour has historically been subservient to capital (or land, in agricultural societies) as a source of power and wealth, leading to various forms of political upheaval contrary to the naturally unequal relationship between these two essentials of an economy. But the knowledge revolution will change the nature of labour even more than it will that of capital, while also decreasing the distinction between them. One of the major differences between capital and labour in the past is that capital, owned and protected by property rights, can earn for its owners without their making any significant effort. Labour, though, is inherent in its 'owners' - you really don't need laws to protect your ownership of your capacity to work - and earns only with considerable effort from them. It follows that owners of capital are wealthier than providers of labour, at least until a digital deluge changes the rules altogether. A strict (but not universally accepted) definition of knowledge capital would consist primarily of those relatively static forms of intellectual output - specific ideas, software, works of art - that can be treated as property, thereby inviting legal protection in the form of patent and copyright. Like traditional capital, these don't necessarily require the intervention of their owner (after the work of painting or inventing is over) to generate cash. Intellectual property rights will do the earning. Unfortunately for fans of intellectual property rights, they are unworkable. As the sprawling information economy grows volatile and fast-changing, copyrights and patents are simply not going to be enforced. The ease of undetectable duplication, together with the suffocating effects of strong protection on growing markets, have been acknowledged by everyone familiar with both the technological as well as economic aspects. Expertise, then, not information, is the key. Expertise, which is dynamic and constantly adapting, is not 'intellectual property'. It hardly requires legal protection, and cannot be separated from its owners, the experts, in whom it inheres. Nor do experts earn without themselves making active use of their skills. Experts are, in fact, knowledge labourers. Not, of course, that these labourers own no capital. Quite the contrary -experts almost always rely on more static works, ideas, resources, that are their own. However, this 'property' being less important than their expertise, knowledge labourers (or knowledge workers, to use a more familiar but not always equivalent term) often don't bother about patents or copyrights. Knowledge capital is not, after all, as valuable as expertise and is also more inconvenient to rely on - so it will act as the auxiliary resource, rather as labour has done in industry. Once we realize this reversal of roles between labour and capital in a post-industrial economy, we face the prospect of a vast labour force of experts of all sorts. Knowledge labour will not always be high-end, though - for every millionaire quant plotting coffee futures against money- market derivatives, there will be the human agent, cybrarian in the jargon, hunting for curious clients rare species of data amid the information jungle. And there will always be some who cling on to their intellectual property rights and attempt to extract license fees from the on-line universe. But their share of the economy will shrink, and finally, in the era of expertise, what you have will matter less, than what you do. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh is a freelance technology consultant and writer. You can reach him through voice mail (+91 11 3760335) or e-mail (rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in) --====(C) Copyright 1994 Rishab Aiyer Ghosh. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED====-- This article may be redistributed in electronic form only, PROVIDED THAT THE ARTICLE AND THIS NOTICE REMAIN INTACT. This article MAY NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES be redistributed in any non-electronic form, or redistributed in any form for compensation of any kind, WITHOUT PRIOR WRITTEN PERMISSION from Rishab Aiyer Ghosh (rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in) --==================================================================-- ------cut here------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Electric Dreams subscriptions and back issues, send a mail to rishab(a)arbornet.org with 'get help' as the message Subject. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in rishab(a)arbornet.org Vox +91 11 6853410 Voxmail 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Re: MIME based remailing commands
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- <SNIP my comments> >Ah, I see how you are doing it. Having re-read your docs, I gather >that when un-armored the file is in an encrypted binary format, and >when decrypted at least the non-header portion of the file is still >binary? I think this is a good way to do it; it addresses the point >Eric made recently about size expansion when an armored file is >encrypted at each step. > That is about right. Inside the armor is a bunch of binary data. 20 header blocks, and the message block. The first message block is a PGP encrypted to the remailer, and contains the next destination. The other 19 headers, and the message block are IDEA encrypted with a key and IV in the first header. When decrypted, the second header is seen to be PGP encrypted to the next remailer, and the rest is encrypted with the key in that header. The remailer Shifts up all the headers, sticks junk in the 20th header, and rearmors the whole thing. This is rather more active manipulation than the current remailers. >The one thing I would mention is that "::" was not originally intended >as an indication that the message was to be remailed. Rather, this was >simply a "header pasting token" which could be used to move a few lines >from the body up into the header for those people who can't set header >fields on outgoing mail. Then the presence of "Anon-To:" or whatever >in the header is what actually causes the action. So you don't need to >use "::", you can just set your headers directly and get the same >effect. (This is not to say you need to do it like this, just that >that is how the original design that Eric created worked.) > I realize that. It was easy to implement, since I already had to check for :: to be compatible with type 1 messages. >If you did want to follow this model, you could think about using a >MIME header to indicate the type of the message contents rather than >the "::". Another alternative would be to use a different special >field in the mail header, like perhaps your "Remailer-Type: 2.0", but >I'm not sure that a new top-level header field is the right place for >this. It looks to me like most of the standard headers deal more with >moving the message around rather than with telling what would be done >with it on receipt. It's kind of a fine line but it looks to me like >more of a job for a MIME content type since that is really what it is >for. You could use something like: > >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: application/remail; version="2.0" > >or > >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: application/remail-mark-2 > >Then the rest of the message could look just as you have it. Or, to use >a little more of the existing standard, you could add: > >Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 > >and take out your BEGIN and END lines since it looks like you are using >base64, although the augmented kind that PGP uses with the CRC at the >end; you'd have to lose the CRC in that case. (I wonder if PGP will do >that in the MIME-PGP integration draft that is supposedly being worked >on.) > >One question is, how do you actually send your messages in the >mixmaster client and servers? Do you go directly to sendmail, or do >you use a user agent like /bin/mail? If the former then it doesn't >seem like it would be too hard to add these header fields. On the >receiving end then hopefully also it would not be much harder to match >the Content-Type: string than the one you are using. > >The advantage, again, is that to a considerable extent this kind of >application is exactly what MIME was planning for with the "application" >content-type. This lets you mark the contents of the message in a >standard way. And you are already using something very close to the >base64 encoding that MIME specifies. So this does seem like a good >opportunity to go with the internet mainstream by following this >standard. If this seems like something you want to do I'm sure our MIME >experts here can tell how to define a new content type. > >Hal > I agree that changing mixmaster to search for a MIME line, rather than the :: would be no effort at all. I use sendmail for the client and the remailer (actually they are the same code), so adding new headers is easy. Unfortunately I am having some problems with sendmail. Sendmail is marking the messages as "Apperently To:" rather than "To:". Any idea what might cause that? I am not sure I want to give up the CRC on the armor (esp. since I am using the PGP tools routines and not my own), but I would be interested in defining a new MIME content type. So, experts, what all is involved in that, and is there any problem with starting to use a MIME type before it is official? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLzsIElVkk3dax7hlAQFlmgP9FNxSrabWU7CyiRu1Kv28Lz2htuukq1Ul ANG4y/arJ9gseBvOxDKVDLVKWN1c2XyOKrEbUTVXxHDhk/WwhfpvJE/UrVWQuFEP eaFZB4G1xBvyjkx+DoQxsLVTEVcF1V54Mo5tfARBGCqf7aHqQGoLiRu8kR6i04fj nPgOrMeE5Bk= =vg7R -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Encrypted mail welcome. Home page http://nately.ucsd.edu/~loki/ Check out my essay on the next generation remailer Mixmaster on the WWW page. For anon remailer info, mail remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu Subject: remailer-help "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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Delphi and Encryption??
by Harry S. Hawk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RUPERT'S BIG PLANS Media mogul Rupert Murdoch has big plans for his Delphi Internet Services -- he wants to boost it from fifth to first place in online service providers. "Internet, Delphi and TV as it becomes interactive, all will become very much integrated," predicts HarperCollins' publishing VP. By choosing existing software modules, such as Mosaic, instead of developing its own graphical user interface, Murdoch hopes to leapfrog the competition and come out on top. Delphi's data encryption technology will also enhance its ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ position among privacy-conscious consumers. (Upside Feb.'95 p.39) Anyone know anything?? /hawk

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Indian Supreme Court ends state control of the airwaves
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Indian Supreme Court yesterday (9th February, 1995) directed the government to create an independent autonomous regulatory body for the airwaves (like the US FCC) and end the state monopoly on broadcasting and satellite uplinks. The judges took an interesting position that the "GREATER IMPACT" OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA and its "wider range of circulation of information" as opposed to the press, CANNOT BE USED TO RESTRICT or deny THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION. This may have important consequences, for all over the world, including in the US and India, the electronic media is denied freedoms allowed to the press with the excuse that it's somehow different. The three-judge bench, comprising of Justices PB Sawant, S Mohan and BP Jeevan Reddy, made the ruling after an government appeal against a previous ruling by the Calcutta High Court. The Calcutta High Court had earlier upheld the right to telecast as fundamental, which would theoretically prevent any regulation or censorship whatsoever. The consensual Supreme Court judgement, while denying the government's power of monopoly, upheld its right to subject the electronic media to regulation and censorship. However, Justice Reddy, in his separate ruling did not mention censorship. He pointed out that the century-old Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, which has been ingeniously extrapolated to support the government's monopoly over electronic media and right to 'licence' data networks, was "wholly inadequate and unsuited for" electronic media, and said that Parliament should enact new laws to govern such media. Unfortunately the Supreme Court has no powers to legislate, and new laws have a habit (as seen with the Digital Telephony Bill in the US) of increasing, rather than decreasing, government authority. The explicit statement that the electronic media should not be more restricted than the press will, hopefully, prevent that. The legal battle started with the Doordarshan, the state TV monopoly, objecting to the Cricket Association of Bengal's contract with Trans World International granting the latter worldwide broadcasting rights to a cricket tournament. Doordarshan used the 1885 Act to prevent TWI from uplinking to satellite, till the courts intervened. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Electric Dreams subscriptions and back issues, send a mail to rishab(a)arbornet.org with 'get help' as the message Subject. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in rishab(a)arbornet.org Vox +91 11 6853410 Voxmail 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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HR830 - Anyone tracking this?
by mgh5868＠ultb.isc.rit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The recent version of the EFFector Online had some information about the House of Representative's Bill HR830. They say that this bill is being rammed through Congress and would cripple FOIA. It would seemingly change any public information that is given value to non-public information. Does anyone have any further information? Mike

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Global Filesystem Guild
by lethin＠ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To reduce the vulnerability of a single user/BBS to having their files confiscated/stolen, could a distributed WAN filesystem be implemented with k-redundancy, e.g. the files wouldn't disappear until k servers (located in various unknown or inaccessible places) failed? The price of storage would vary with the level of redundancy desired. For security the servers would only store cyphertext, etc. Local cacheing to reduce network load. Andrew File System (from Transarc/IBM) implements the distributed filesystem and namespace and some security, but not the redundancy for RW files. (And it's not shareware). Issues: Quota management. Pricing (for space or time) Security: (only store cyphertext?) Ownership: (who gets to delete files?) ... Sort of the next level beyond SecureFS?

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